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What happened in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of Allied 
forces in May 1942 and MacArthur’s return in October 1944?  Existing 
historiography is fragmentary and incomplete. Memoirs suffer from limited points 
of view and personal biases. No academic study has examined the Filipino resistance 
with a critical and interdisciplinary approach. No comprehensive narrative has yet 
captured the fighting by 260,000 guerrillas in 277 units across the archipelago. This 
dissertation begins with the political, economic, social and cultural history of 
Philippine guerrilla warfare. The diverse Islands connected only through kinship 
networks. The Americans reluctantly held the Islands against rising Japanese 
imperial interests and Filipino desires for independence and social justice. World 
War II revealed the inadequacy of MacArthur’s plans to defend the Islands. The 
General tepidly prepared for guerrilla operations while Filipinos spontaneously rose 
in armed resistance. After his departure, the chaotic mix of guerrilla groups were 
left on their own to battle the Japanese and each other. While guerrilla leaders vied 
for local power, several obtained radios to contact MacArthur and his headquarters 
sent submarine-delivered agents with supplies and radios that tie these groups into 
  
a united framework. MacArthur’s promise to return kept the resistance alive and 
dependent on the United States. The repercussions for social revolution would be 
fatal but the Filipinos’ shared sacrifice revitalized national consciousness and 
created a sense of deserved nationhood. The guerrillas played a key role in enabling 
MacArthur’s return. Their legacy shaped Philippine national identity and the 
political contest between exiled officials, collaborationists, and the members of 
resistance. The research presented in this dissertation crosses military, cultural, 
social, political, economic and diplomatic fields.  It gives voice to the Filipino, 
Japanese, and American actors and shows how their actions and stories are not only 
interrelated but interdependent. In this way it hopes to reach several audiences at 
once. For the military student, this case study reveals the multiple and particular 
roots of guerrilla warfare.  For others, it reveals the fundamental role of military 
action in important social and cultural developments.  Finally, and most essentially, 
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What happened in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of the Allied 
forces in May 1942 and MacArthur’s return in October 1944? During the two-and-a-half 
years between the worst defeat in the history of the United States Army and the greatest 
single loss of soldiers in the Japanese Army’s history, at least 260,000 guerrillas in 277 
units resisted the Japanese across the archipelago but the existing historiography about 
their struggle is fragmentary and incomplete. 1  Works by former political figures, 
noncombatants and guerrilla leaders offer points of view constrained by the limits of 
personal experiences and biases. No historian has yet provided a comprehensive 
examination of the Philippine resistance with the interdisciplinary approach the subject 
demands. The result has produced a glaring gap in history. 
The seventy-eight volume official history of the United States Army in World 
War II includes four books addressing the Philippines. The Fall of the Philippines (1953) 
concluded with Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright’s surrender on 6 May 1942 
which it labeled “The End of Resistance.”2 The author, Louis Morton, left a misleading 
impression when he wrote: “…by 9 June all forces in the Philippines, with the exception 
of certain small detachments in isolated areas, had surrendered… The six-month-long 
                                                        
1 See Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945 
(Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press: 1996), 225. Lapham argues that many of 
this Filipino numbers were “spurious” claims while 100,000 true guerrillas were rejected.  
2 Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: The Fall Of The Philippines (United States Army in World War 




struggle for control of the Philippine Archipelago was over.”3   Following a volume 
describing the Allied advance towards the Islands, the series resumed with MacArthur’s 
reappearance on 20 October 1944 in Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (1954). This 
book contained only a brief acknowledgement of guerrilla operations preceding the 
American invasion.4 What happened in the Philippines between those events apparently 
did not merit mention. 
These U.S. Army histories are a singular but by no means isolated example of the 
conspicuous absence of the Philippine resistance from the historiography of World War 
II. Tens of thousands of pages in the hundred books recently recommended by the West 
Point history department contain only two references to the guerrillas: Robert B. 
Aspery’s two-volume, 1,391-page, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History devotes 
fifteen pages to their story while Ronald H. Spector’s Eagle Against the Sun: The 
American War With Japan contributes two of 561 pages to these guerrillas.5 Even more 
recent seminal works such as Edward J. Drea’s Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 
1853-1945 and John Costello’s The Pacific War 1941-1945 make little or no mention the 
Philippine guerrillas. 
Academic studies on this subject are few and narrow. Notably, Bernard Norling, 
former professor emeritus at the University of Notre Dame, wrote of the American 
guerrillas in Northern Luzon up to 1943. Matthew Andres published a 144-page study of 
                                                        
3 Ibid., 582. 
4 Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, (Washington D.C.: The Center of Military 
History), 1. 
5 See David Asprey, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History. 2 Vols.  (New York: Doubleday and 
Co., 1975), 513-528, and Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan 
(New York: Free Press, 1985), 467-468 
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the Filipino guerrillas in Luzon.6  U.S. Army Major Peter T. Sinclair II wrote a Command 
and General Staff College masters thesis, “Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino 
Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines,” that became a short book 
of the same name. Unfortunately, these works are too limited in time, space, and subject 
to provide comprehensive understanding of the events in the Islands. 
Histories of irregular warfare prove no better on this subject. A prominent U.S. 
Army study on irregular warfare by Kalev Sepp identified forty-eight insurgencies in the 
twentieth century including three in the Philippines: the fight against the Americans in 
1899-1902; the Hukbalahap Rebellion in 1946-1954; and, the New People’s Army and 
Moro Liberations Front revolts that began in 1970.7  David Galula’s Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964), Francois Sully’s Age of the Guerrilla (1968), and 
Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea (1970) focused on Vietnam and the Cold War.8  
They led a new wave of interest in guerrilla warfare but one with limited perspective as 
reflected by U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine: “the modern era of insurgencies and 
internal wars began after World War II” as “national and transnational revolutionary 
movements.”9 These works thus both ignore the Philippine resistance in World War II 
and frame all guerrilla warfare within the constructs of Maoist revolutionary war 
theory.10 Accordingly, all guerrilla warfare is seen as part of phased revolutionary war 
                                                        
6 Matthew Andres, Pinoys at War (Chicago: Andres Historical Solutions, LLC., 20 January 2013). 
7 Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2005, 8-9. 
8 One author of current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, John Nagl, noted that of all its source 
material, “perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice.” United States Department of the Army,  U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-34, Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7 
9 United States Department of the Army,  U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-34, Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2007), xix. 
10 Galula opened his book with a quote from Mao Tse-Tung and throughout equated insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare with Mao’s concept of protracted revolutionary war. Galula, xi, 1-3.  
 
 v 
aimed at social change and culminating in the creation of conventional forces to conduct 
decisive military operations. The Philippine resistance did not fit this model.  
More recent works like Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and 
the Rise of American Power (2002) and Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla 
Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (2013) mention the World War II Philippine 
guerrillas only as a minor part of the larger conventional war. Ian Beckett’s Modern 
Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750 
(2001) includes only a one-sentence on the Philippine resistance against Japan.11 Robert 
W. Barnett’s Asymmetrical Warfare (2003), Anthony James Joes’ Resisting Rebellion 
(2004), Thomas X. Hammes’ The Sling and the Stone (2006), David Kilcullen’s 
Counterinsurgency (2010), and Emile Simpson’s War from the Ground Up (2013) do not 
mention them at all.  
Any search for evidence to fill this blank space in historiography faces daunting 
challenges. The memoirs of isolated guerrilla leaders and other actors tend to be myopic, 
cryptic and prone to exaggeration.12 Rumors and Japanese propaganda distorted their 
perceptions.13  The traces of their experiences captured in the documents and records 
collected by MacArthur’s headquarters lacked context and were further compromised by 
                                                        
11 See Ian. F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their 
Opponents Since 1750, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 56. 
12 For example, as the U.S. forces made their way across Luzon and Leyte, Fertig entered into his 
diary, “My own opinion is that the land fighting, at no time, has been as serious as communiqués 
would make you believe.” Wendell Fertig, Fertig Diary, October 27 1944, Wendell W. Fertig Papers, 
Diary, 1943-1945, Message Traffic intelligence Summaries Later Conference, Box 1 of 2, The United 
States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
13 See Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1954), 105-105. Sometimes the unfulfilled rumors of impending 
Allied invasion were worse on popular morale than any Japanese propaganda.  
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requirements for military secrecy. 14  Censorship regulations forbade soldiers from 
reporting locations of operations, escapes from enemy custody, Japanese propaganda, 
mistreatment of POWs, and even malarial control efforts. 15  Commanders barred the 
publication of any photographs that could reveal the effects of operations, disparage U.S. 
and Allied forces, or “be distorted by the enemy and used as propaganda.”16  
Language barriers present additional difficulties: I do not speak Japanese or many 
of the languages spoken in the Philippines. Fortunately, the pertinent Philippine sources 
are available in English. Unfortunately, the 102-volume Japanese War History known as 
the Senshi Sōsho is just now being translated.17 The Japan Center for Asian Historical 
Records (JACAR), with associated organizations such as the Corts Foundation and the 
Australia-Japan Research Project, has only recently translated the first volume of the vital 
work. Even so, enough postwar U.S. military intelligence translations of Japanese 
documents and interrogations – and Japanese academic works published in English – is 
available to gain the degree of knowledge of the Japanese perspective this effort requires. 
                                                        
14 AIB deputy Colonel Allison Ind got “an exclusive channel” for the AIB to be kept secret even from 
the guerrilla leaders. See “Radio Communications–Philippines,” Ind to Merle-Smith, 14 January 1943, 
in “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 
16. 
15 See Appendix 6, USAFFE Regulations No. 1-25, “Censorship Regulations Regulating Private 
Correspondence,” 8 December 1943. Charles A. Willoughby Papers, Intelligence Series: Operations of 
Military Civilian Censorship, Box 9 of 13, The United States Army Heritage and Education Center 
Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 
16 See Appendix 4, USAFFE Regulation N0. 1-25, “Processing and Censoring of Film,” 16 November 
1943, Charles A. Willoughby Papers, Intelligence Series: Operations of Military Civilian Censorship, 
Box 9 of 13, The United States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania 
17 The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) and associated organizations such as the Corts 
Foundation and the Australia-Japan Research Project have made available in English the first volume 
regarding the Dutch East Indies. 
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The particular influences operating upon archives present barriers of their own.18 
Two of the three major collections of Philippine guerrillas records are U.S. government 
controlled: the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, and the United States Army 
Heritage and Education Center Archives in Ridgway Hall in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The 
third is the MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia.  While the archivists I 
have worked at these locations with have been unfailingly professional and helpful, the 
government does not always make materials available. Alfred W. McCoy noted how for 
35 years the U.S. government withheld as classified vital records relating to Ferdinand 
Marcos’ war service.19  During the research for this work, the U.S. Army withdrew from 
public access all records of former Philippine guerrillas Russell Volckmann, Donald 
Blackburn and Wendell Fertig related to their drafting of U.S. Army Special Forces 
doctrine.20  Additionally, these archives draw almost exclusively from, or through, U.S. 
military sources. Filipino voices are largely absent.  
Postwar politics raised even more barriers. In 1945, Ferdinand Marcos petitioned 
the U.S. Army for recognition as the wartime leader of the Ang Mga Maharlika guerrilla 
group in Luzon.21  He claimed to have formed this unit on 1 December 1942, and later 
expanded it to 131 officers and over 8,000 men.22  Marcos asserted that he had led these 
men in constant battle against the Japanese and later even claimed the title of ‘most 
                                                        
18 Diana Taylor explained: “What makes an object archival is the process whereby it is selected, 
classified, and presented for analysis.” Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing 
Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003), 19. 
19 Uldarico S. Baclagon, Filipino Heroes of World War II published in WE Forum, 3-21 November 1982, 
and Jose F. Ariate, Jr, and Miguel Paolo P. Reyes, “File No. 60: Debunking the Marcos War Myth,” The 
Philippine Star, 5 July 2016. 
20 I discovered this at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the U.S Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. in the spring of 2015. 
21 See Marcos’ petition online at UP Third World Studies Center site at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3IczjzkKCDkV2FqMDlOemZyNVk/view 
22 Jeff Gerth and Joel Brinkley, “Marco’s Wartime Role Discredited in U.S. Files,” The New York Times, 
23 January 1986, A1.  
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decorated Filipino veteran’ with thirty-two medals for heroism, two from the United 
States Army. 23   Into the 1980s, Filipino writers were still “discovering” documents 
revealing his “super exploits” during the war.24  As Jeff Gerth of the New York Times 
reported, Marcos’ guerrilla history was “central to his political appeal.”25   
The intricate politics of the Marcos regime complicated the historiography of the 
resistance. Philippine President Manuel Quezon once noted: “Under our Constitution 
what is paramount is ‘not individuals’; it is the good of the State, not the good of the 
individual which must prevail.”26  The good of the state often became entangled with the 
interests of the person in power. As Ellen Schrecker noted, this turned “dissent into 
disloyalty.”27 History that contradicted Marcos’ legend could be seen as treasonous.  
The evidentiary record actually offers some support for Marcos’ claims. On 31 
March 1945, MacArthur’s General Headquarters identified Colonel Ferdinand E. Marcos, 
“ex-Manila lawyer” and an intelligence First Lieutenant on Bataan, as the commander of 
13 staff officers and 8,200 troops of the “ANG MANGA MAHARLIKA (The Noble 
Ones)” guerrillas.28 The report added however, “Many of the personnel belonging to the 
MAHARLIKA seem to belong to [American guerrilla leader Russell] VOLCKMANN’s 
organization.”29  As Marcos inflated his record in the decades after the war, anyone 
purporting to tell the history of the resistance was expected to support his story. In 1982, 
                                                        
23 Ibid..  
24 Baclagon, Filipino Heroes and  Ariate and Reyes, 
25 Gerth and Brinkley.  
26 Harold M. Vinacke, “Post-War Government and Politics of the Philippines,” The Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 9 No. 4, November 1947, 717. 
27 Ellen Schrecker, Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), xxiii. See also Colleen Woods, 53. 
28 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Guerrilla 
Resistance Movements in the Philippine,” 31 March 1945, 22, 45. Box 255, RG 407, Philippines Archive 
Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
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even the truly heroic Jesus Villamor included in his memoirs distinct recollections of 
Marcos as an unparalleled warrior on Bataan, a fearless guerrilla leader, and a source of 
vital intelligence from Luzon and Manila.30 
Despite this pressure to conform, some other Luzon guerrilla leaders challenged 
Marcos’ memories.  Robert Lapham wrote, “It seems to me that the critics have the 
stronger case, that much of Marcos’s wartime heroism was imaginary or at least 
exaggerated; nevertheless, the whole question has been grievously muddled by postwar 
American and Philippines politics.”31   Finally, in 1985, historian Alfred W. McCoy 
discovered documents confirming long-held suspicions that Marcos’ claims were 
“distorted, exaggerated, fraudulent, contradictory and absurd.”32  
By then the influence of the Cold War and Marcos’s politics had discolored the 
history of the resistance. One example was the obscuration of the wartime history of the 
Socialists, Communists and Sakdal party members. These movements coalesced first into 
an anti-Japanese United Front and then as the Hukbalahap guerrilla movement. When the 
prewar Filipino elites returned to power, the Hukbalahaps became a threat to the “good of 
the state” and Cold War order. As Colleen Woods explained, “by branding dissent as 
subversion, Filipino and American anti-communists contended that the state was not 
required to allow those deemed as communists the freedoms a liberal state promised its 
citizens.”33 The state’s subsequent victory in its ten-year conflict with the Huks threw a 
shadow over the substantial role the social revolutionaries had played in the resistance 
                                                        
30 Jesus Villamor, They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in World War II (Quezon City, 
Philippines: Vera-Reyes, Inc., 1982), 48, 183, and 261. 
31 Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945 
(Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 122. 
32 Gerth andBrinkley.  
33 Colleen Woods, “Colonial Elites in a Postcolonial State: Violence and the Problem of Political 
Legitimacy, 1944-48,” 53. 
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against Japan. Even many Huks sought to forget much about their wartime record. In a 
188-page autobiography written in prison, Huk leader Luis Taruc dedicated barely two 
pages to the war tersely noting “that errors were made and that innocent people died.”34 
Finally, racism – conscious or unconscious – raises concerns for researchers. 
Memoirs and records show flashes of conscious feelings of racial superiority or 
victimhood. These feelings filtered recollections. Worse, they colored popular memory of 
the guerrilla resistance in the Philippines during the war. 
If historical literature on the Philippine resistance is inadequate, the representation 
of the event in popular film has been almost wholly imaginary. Wartime American 
propagandists quickly seized upon the resistance to rally public morale. The September 
1942 movie Manila Calling featured Cornel Wilde and Lloyd Nolan as Americans who 
organized and led Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese.35 A parade of similar films 
followed in 1943: Wallace Beert’s Salute to the Marines, Otto Kruger’s Corregidor, 
Claudette Colbert’s So Proudly We Hailed!, and Bataan with Robert Taylor. John 
Wayne’s Back to Bataan (1945) rushed to include scenes of the return of U.S. forces that 
occurred during filming. These movies uniformly reinforced an image of Filipino 
insurgents as American-led adjuncts to MacArthur’s operations.  
The passage of time has done little to correct this perception. After a five year 
delay, in 1950 Twentieth Century Fox released a Fritz Lang movie starring Tyrone 
Power, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, based on the novel by Pulitzer Prize 
                                                        
34 Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, 1967), 23 
35 The New York Times called “hackneyed in writing and performance.” T.S., “Manila Calling With 
Lloyd Nolan and Carole Landis Opens at Globe—Counter-Espionage Featured at Rialto,’ New York 
Times, 28 September 1942, at  
http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9505EFDB1F3CE33BBC4051DFBF668389659EDE 
accessed 20 April 2015. 
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winning war correspondent Ira Wolfert. The small budget Back Door to Hell (1964) 
featured Jack Nicholson. Ambush Bay (1966) starred Hugh O’Brian and Mickey Rooney. 
Two small budget Philippine movies produced by Eddie Romero managed to make it to 
American screens in the 1960s: The Walls of Hell (1964) starring Jock Mahoney and The 
Ravagers (1965) with John Saxon.36  The ‘blaxploitation’ film Savage!, staring James 
Iglehart, had a limited run in 1973. Even the more recent The Great Raid (2005) featured 
Benjamin Bratt and other Americans as commanders in the raid on the Cabanatuan 
prison.  
In all these movies Americans lead the fight and Filipinos serve as brave 
supporting characters. Hollywood no doubt felt compelled to depict heroic Americans in 
lead roles to satisfy audiences and generate box office receipts. Some of the early movies 
were reportedly even banned in parts of the American South for depicting integrated Fil-
Am fighting units.37  Cold War viewers could find solace in depictions of successful 
American leaders and loyal allies. Against the backdrop of the gap in historiography, 
these movies compounded the problems of politics to help corrupt popular memory of the 
Philippine resistance during World War II. 
The chapters that follow set out to overcome these barriers and correct this record 
by investigating sources across a wide range of disciplines to present a comprehensive 
investigation of the actors and events of the Philippine resistance. Where practicable, it 
places this narrative in the context of guerrilla warfare theory to add to our understanding 
of the conduct of resistance. It also listens to the voices of Filipino, Japanese, and 
                                                        
36 See A.H. Weiler, “The Walls of Hell,” New York Times, 18 November 1965, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9804E5DA1730E33ABC4052DFB767838E679EDE 
accessed 22 April 2015. 
37 See “Bataan,” by The League of Dead Films at 
https://leagueofdeadfilms.com/2011/02/02/bataan/ accessed 20 February 12018.  
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American actors to gain their perspectives and grasp their motivations.38  Only through 
the synthesis of all their experiences can we capture the interconnected and 
interdependent nature of their struggle. In the end, this work provides the first 
comprehensive history of the Philippine resistance across the Islands throughout the 
period of MacArthur’s absence. 
This work is organized chronologically, in three parts, to demonstrate the 
synthesis of events. Part one is a historical review in two chapters to set the context of 
Philippine history highlighting the fragmented character of the country and its people, 
their tradition of armed revolt against foreign occupation, the evolution of popular social 
and economic divisions, and the Philippines’ changing relations with Japan and the 
United States. The second chapter explores the convergence of pending independence 
from the Unites States, an emerging social revolution within the Philippines, and the 
initiation of war by Japan.  
The body of this work is in the eleven chapters of the second section. These form 
the narrative of the Philippines resistance and include only the briefest mention of the 
conventional military operations involved in the fall of the Philippines or the wider war at 
large.  It includes analysis of previously unacknowledged factors that had major affect on 
the resistance: food, radios, submarines, disease, etc. It also explores integral issues such 
as the cultural consequences of Japanese occupation policies and the experience of 
women.  
                                                        
38 This work incorporates 49 primary and secondary sources on the Filipino experience, 38 on the 
Japanese, and 32 on the Americans. It draws from an additional 125 works on general military, economic, 





The final section of the dissertation consists of two chapters. The first describes 
MacArthur’s return and its relation to the resistance. The last is a conclusion that 
examines trends, provides observations, and briefly looks beyond the war to put the 
resistance into a historical perspective. 
The American Battle Monuments Commission built only two monuments to the 
Philippine guerrillas of World War II: one is a commemoration of Cabanatuan raid with a 
minor reference to the guerrillas, and the other a memorial at the 152-acre Manila 
American Cemetery at old Fort McKinley.39  There, the Southwest Room of the Chapel 
features an inscription that reads: “For over three years the Philippine Islands suffered 
under enemy occupation while the United States forces fought their way back. During 
these long years the courageous guerrillas fought unceasingly to keep alive the flame of 
hope in the oppressed but loyal civilian population.”40  This is that story. 
                                                        
39 The erection of monuments by the troops “was expressly forbidden by the military services.” 
Elizabeth Nishiura, American Battle Monuments” A Guide to Military cemeteries and Monuments 
Maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission (Detroit, Michigan: Omnigraphics, Inc., 
1989), 8. 
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1. Three Roads to War 
 
For hundreds of years the diverse people on the islands called the Philippines 
conducted isolated and sporadic resistance against the Spanish. The American 
determination to leave the Islands opened the door for rising Japanese imperial interests. 
 
On the eve of World War II, the Philippines were still very much “a socially and 
geographically fragmented nation.”41 Grouped and named in 1542 for the Spanish king 
by adventurer Ruy López de Villalobos, the Philippines existed as a little more than a 
geographical expression. It consisted of more than 7,100 islands stretching 1,150 miles, 
the distance from Washington, D. C., to Denver, with a total land area only the size of 
Arizona (Maps 1). These islands contained twelve major ethno-linguistic groups 
separated by waterways, jungles and mountains into more than a hundred identifiable 
tribes speaking seventy dialects (Map 2). Even before the arrival of the Spanish, itinerate 
Arab, Chinese and Malayan migrant populations added to the Islands’ diverse coastal 
communities.42  
Journalist and U.S. Army intelligence agent Yay Panlilio catalogued the diverse 
mixture of natives and migrants by describing a range of facial types: “Chinese blood 
gives a fair, fine-textured skin. Spanish heightens the bone structure and, like Portuguese 
and Italian, makes for beautiful eyes; only the Hindu, called ‘Bombay,’ bequeaths a 
larger, deeper, more lustrous eye. German and Swiss blood is weak and usually loses to  
                                                        
41 Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1989),  
42 Matt K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures (Cambridge, United 














the Malay, but English and American half-breeds are strikingly Occidentalized, so much 
so that they sometimes lack the piquant, petite charm of the oriental.”43 By 1941, these 
Filipinos identified themselves not by nationality but by family ties. 
Political scientists like Jean Grossholtz have identified the Philippine family as 
“the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual and 
coloring all social activity with its own set of demands” and noted that “the communal 
values of the family are often in conflict with the impersonal values of the institutions of 
the larger society.” 44  As Alfred W. McCoy explained, family meant more than the 
political term household or the ethnographers’ idea of kinship: “Seeking a term that 
describes the political role of family, we might use kinship network, that is, a working 
coalition drawn from a larger group related by blood, marriage and ritual.”45 Assuming 
six children per family, each Filipino could count 825 family members in a kinship 
network that included both paternal and maternal lines.46 Marriage doubled that number. 
The networks then increased through personal and ritual relationships and often 
surpassed “linguistic boundaries.” 47  For colonial powers, the primacy of family ties 
limited the value of national institutions as a means of population control. 
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The Spaniards learned to leverage native kinship networks. Borrowing a 
Malaysian title, they officially recognized local clan leaders as datus – chieftains under 
the Spanish suzerain.48 They chose not to teach Spanish as a common language in the 
Philippines so as to keep natives from uniting in opposition to their rule. They did 
however support the Catholic Church in efforts to convert the Hindus, Buddhists, 
Muslims and practitioners of native faiths. Tribal chiefs, rajas, and datus uneasily 
received new priests, captains and governors and reached accommodation with the 
Spanish bureaucracy and church, turning “barangays” into “pueblos and barrios.”49  
Except for the southern Muslim areas, Catholicism provided the basis for a first common 
Philippine identity. Filipinos embraced the Gospel concepts of redemption yet,  as Communist guerrilla 
leader Luis Taruc observed, “it would be misleading for North Americans and Europeans to equate the 
highly organized Catholic life they know, which revolves around the Church and clergy, with Catholic life 
in the Philippines.”50 During the 400 years of Spanish rule, most Filipinos lived too far from churches to 
attend mass regularly; priests came to them on days of fiestas. None but the urban wealthy and well-
connected citizens could enjoy association through elaborate rituals in big churches.  
The involvement of the Church justified the Spanish empire and helped pacify its subjects. The 
crown granted the armies of Augustinian, Dominican, and Recollect missionaries large tracts of land to 
administer.51 The Church managed encomiendas, estates with vassal labor or haciendas renting to tenant 
farmers. The Church also provided a rare institutional space for Filipinos through native education and 
ordinations that helped bond the people with the Spanish crown. Baptisms, confirmations and weddings 
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expanded kinship networks. In this way the Church aided government efforts to connect local clan leaders 
into a web of elites spanning the Islands.52  
Seven hundred years of Islamic dominance in Spanish history shaped the 
character of the colonial bureaucracy in the Philippines. As Patricia Seed noted, Islamic 
concepts of tribute-collecting (jizya), census-taking, and ethnically segregated townships 
(ahl al-dhimma) reemerged in the sixteenth century Spanish colonial practices.53 The 
Umayyad Caliphate had placed Spain under requerimiento, an edict required subjugated 
people to convert voluntarily or face harsh punishment.54 The Spanish imposed religious 
uniformity in a similar manner across their empire. Yet Spain’s colonialism “was first of 
all a military conquest.”55 The administration enforced its policies with little tolerance of 
native dissent leading to outbreaks of violence, especially around the large populations in 
Manila and the Pampango language areas.56  
Periodic and localized revolt characterized Philippine colonial history. In 1574 the 
pirate Limahong led a Chinese settlement on Luzon against the Spanish.57 The imperial 
administration responded by incorporating Chinese community, clan, and business 
societies into the Gremios de Chinos captain system, similar to the datu sytem, as a 
means of enforcing order. Japan’s new ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi sought to exploit the 
revolts and demanded the surrender of the Philippines. Diplomacy placated the Japanese 
but the Chinese community in Manila again rebelled in 1603. Three thousand Japanese 
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residents in the city rose up against the Spanish three years later. Violent rebellions in the 
Islands would occur about every twenty years thereafter. 
  Spain found Muslim populations in the southern islands impossible to control. In  
1639 Augustinian friars established fortified bases around Lake Lananao in their effort to 
convert the “stronghold of heathenism” in Mindanao. 58  Typhoons, volcanoes, Dutch 
interventions, and thousands of Moro troops under Sultan Kudarat drove the Spaniards 
out of the area. They would not return until the nineteenth century. Islam proved an 
impermeable barrier to colonization in other unexpected ways. Because Muslims would 
not accept baptism, there could be no intermarriage with Spaniards and no ties to Spain 
through kinship networks.  
As later explained to American administrators, intermarriage provided a key 
means for Spanish development of native cooperation: “The Spanish masters bred sons 
and daughters who frequently were only part Spanish, the other half being Tagalog or 
some other indigenous tribe, and the class of mestizos multiplied. The social structure of 
Spanish society was modified to find a place for the mestizos halfway between the 
Spanish and the Tagalogs, who occupied the lower stratum.”59 The mestizo children of 
the elites became a critical link between the colonialists and the colonized peoples. 
The elite family-run plantations connected with Spain through the galleon trade 
known as the situado. Manila collected goods from across the Islands for shipment 
through Mexico to the rest of the Empire. In return the bureaucrats in Manila distributed 
“wages for military personnel, compensation for clerks and officials, donations to 
hospitals, widow’s pensions, and other administrative coasts. Tributes and taxes were 
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levied and regularly increased in the islands but were never nearly enough.” 60 
Government efforts to make up for revenue shortfalls with mandatory labor routinely met 
resistance. In 1649 peasants in Samar revolted against efforts to force them to build 
shipyards in Cavite on Luzon. In 1745, Cavite workers rose up against the imposition of 
corvée labor and the government seizure of land for Dominican estates. In 1762 Cagayan 
peasants rebelled against landowner imposed beatings and slave labor.  
The inchoate economic development of the Philippines caught the attention of 
other powers. During the Seven Years War, Great Britain seized and held Manila for two 
years. Spain’s grip on the Islands slipped further in 1785 when the Royal Philippines 
Company replaced the galleon merchant monopoly. 61  Foreign competition, rigid 
bureaucracy and other factors led to its eventual ruin. “Again,” William Lytle Schurz 
observed, “the voluntary labor of the native Filipinos was not adequate to the gigantic 
task of developing the resources of the islands, which was an important phase of the 
company’s program.”62  British and American companies began to dominate Philippine 
trade of cash crops produced mostly by wealthy Chinese mestizo families employing 
tenant labor.  
A revolt in 1841 added a new dimension to the tradition of discontent in the 
Philippines. In 1829 Manila church officials rejected Apoliniario Cruz’s application for 
the priesthood because he was not Spanish. After joining an order of monks serving a 
local hospital, Cruz formed the Brotherhood of Saint Joseph (Cofradía de San José) in 
Tayabas. He banned Spanish and mestizos from the order and began teaching a mix of 
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gospel mixed with local beliefs and talismans (anting-anting). By 1840 Cruz had over 
4,000 followers and decided to seek official recognition from the Church and colonial 
government. Rejection led to protests, arrests, violence and suppression. During the last 
week of October 1841, the Brotherhood fought a major battle with government forces in 
Isabang, Tayabas. The Spanish captured, tried, executed and dismembered Cruz (also 
known as Hermano Pule). Yet Cruz had introduced a new and volatile combination of 
Christian faith and armed social revolt in pursuit of salvation. As Kessler noted, growing 
ideals of Filipino nationalism and independence “found expression in religious forms that 
peasants easily understood and accepted.”63 
By the mid-nineteenth century, unrest in the Luzon threatened colonial control. 
As Paul Rodgers noted: “young mestizos, educated in Europe, came home with the ideas 
of the French Revolution and began to organize the Filipino people, for whom they acted 
as leaders and organizers, in a struggle against the few thousand Spaniards who held the 
power of society.” 64 In A Report on the Status of the Philippines 1842, ambassador 
Sinalbaldo de Mas warned Spain to liberalize policies regarding the “rights of Filipinos” 
or lose the Philippines.65 
The Catholic Church was caught between the interests of the Filipinos and Spain. 
It “trained an increasingly well-educated population of native disciples and teachers” and 
protected Filipinos from imperial abuses but at the same time it kept native priests in 
subordinate positions and excluded them from religious orders and influential 
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assignments. 66 In 1872, the Church withdrew support from the indigenous organization 
known as Mary’s Honor Guard (Guardia de Honor Maria) and supported the execution 
of three native priests “for raising grievances that the government condemned as anti-
Spanish.” 67  Rejecting traditional protest and revolt, thousands of the organization’s 
members went into the hills to fight as guerrillas. They formed a commune in Cabaruan, 
Pangasinan, which lasted until dispersed by the Americans in 1901.  
The merger of political and religious revolt also found expression in the example 
of Dionisio Sigobela.  During the 1890s, he lost his farm to hacienderos on Negros, 
declared himself ‘Pope Isio,’ and led an armed movement in the hills against the rich 
while preaching independence as a step towards building a “communistic paradise.” 68 
The Americans forced him to surrender in 1907 before granting him clemency.  
 Against this episodic social unrest, the Spanish authorities found allies in the 
emerging class of native elites who benefited from colonial trade. Over the last century 
they had thrived in enterprises related to the increased productivity resulting from the 
replacement of traditional small plot tenure agriculture by large plantation haciendas.69 
As the decreasing availability of land fueled peasant discontent, this rising native middle 
class gave its support to Spanish rule out of “fear that political revolution would lead to 
social revolution.”70  In 1868 they manned the Guardia Civil from local levies to enforce 
Spanish control. Philippine society stratified into a power hierarchy of “the hacenderos 
(landowners), non-cultivating tenants, and sharecroppers.”71 
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Despite dependence on the Spanish for their economic and social status, many 
elite Filipinos had begin embracing thoughts of political independence. Nationalist 
writers such as Marcelo H. del Pilar and Lopez Jaena popularized calls for political 
reform in the Propaganda Movement. Jose Rizal published his novels Touch Me Not 
(Noli Me Tángere) in 1887 and The Subversive (El Filibusterismo) in 1891, protesting 
abuses by Church friars, tax collectors, and colonial administrators. His protagonist, Juan 
Crisostomo Magsalin Ibarra, fought colonial authorities. Despite official censorship, 
Filipinos read and shared the stories and their arguments for rights, democratization, 
education reform, and liberation from Spain. To Spanish ears, the calls for reform 
sounded like rebellion. The “inability to distinguish between the two” led to Rizal’s 
arrest.72 The Spanish executed him by firing squad in 1896.73 
The decades following 1890 were “disastrous for the peasantry because of 
epidemics of man and beast, locusts, wars, changes of regime, banditry, collapse of 
foreign sugar markets, and general economic depression. The landowners reacted to all 
these threats to their economic interests by squeezing tenants harder.”74 The hardships led 
clerk Andres Bonifacio to organize in 1892 three hundred independence supporters into a 
secret society, the Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People 
(Kataastaasang Katipunan nang manga Anak Bayan), better known as the Katipunan. 
Within a year the organization claimed 10,000 members. The Spanish authorities moved 
against it, provoking general revolt. “The Katipunan movement, however, was a historic 
watershed in the linking of nationalism with peasant unrest,” Kessler observed, “bringing 
together peasant aspirations for religious salvation and bourgeois yearning for national 
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independence.”75 In May 1896, Katipunan leaders José A. Ramos and Doroteo Cortes 
employed the captain of a Japanese vessel, the Kongo, to carry a message to Oi Kentaro 
asking for aid, “as France had once aided the American revolutionaries.”76 Bonifacio then 
sent a delegation to Tokyo seeking the Emperor’s acceptance of the Philippines as a 
Japanese protectorate. Additionally, Katipunan secretary Emilio Jacinto negotiated with 
Admiral Kanimura Hikonojō for help against the Spaniards.77  
The contacts reflected Japan’s rising stature in international affairs. Twenty-five 
years after United States ships ‘opened’ Tokyo in 1853, Japan forced previously closed 
Korea to accept unequal trade relations. In 1893 the Meiji government’s new Overseas 
Development Society (Shokumin Kyōkai) characterized Japan’s interest in Asia’s 
resources: “Men in the north, materials in the south.”78 In the north, Japan went to war 
with China in 1894. In the south, the Society noted three trends in the Philippines. First, 
the Spanish were losing their hold over the Islands. Second, the Philippines possessed 
undeveloped resources and profits. Third, the Spanish were not likely to develop those 
resources. Japan immediately offered to buy the Philippines from Spain for $200 
million.79 Within the year Japan wrested from China its claim on Korea and possessions 
including Taiwan, reducing the distance between the Japanese Empire and the Philippines 
from 1,500 to roughly 200 miles.  
Bonifacio began a revolt in Manila in August 1896. Mariano Alvarez, Emilio 
Aguinaldo and others spread the fight into the provinces. Despite failure in battle, the 
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Katipunans declared a national government and elected Aguinaldo president of the new 
Republic of the Philippines in November 1897. Their war however became increasingly 
brutal, with Filipinos attacking Filipinos. Aguinaldo arrested Bonifacio for burning a 
village and had him executed by Katipunan firing squad in 1897. Then, in December, 
Aguinaldo surrendered to the Spanish “for 800,000 pesos and exile in Hong Kong.”80 
 Fortunes in the Philippine changed dramatically with the United States war 
against Spain in 1898. U.S. Navy Commodore George Dewey sailed from Hong Kong to 
Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet on 1 May. Dewey had won the Philippines, 
but lacked any troops with which to claim his prize. He sent dispatches of his victory to 
Hong Kong aboard the USS McCulloch with instructions to bring back Aguinaldo and 
about forty of his subordinates to take command of rebel Filipino forces.81 Upon his 
return Aguinaldo proclaimed: “The great North American nation, a lover of true liberty, 
and therefore desirous of liberating our country from the tyranny and despotism to which 
it has been subjected by its rulers, has decided to give us disinterested protection, 
considering us sufficiently able and civilized to govern ourselves.”82   
Meanwhile seven German warships under Vice-Admiral Von Diederichs arrived 
in Manila Bay “for the purpose benefiting the trade relations between Manila and his own 
country.”83 The combination of Spanish troops still in Manila and German warships now 
in the bay worried Dewey. By the time General Wesley Merritt arrived with the first 
American troops at the end of June, Aguinaldo had already declared the Philippines an 
independent nation under his administration. President William McKinley feared that 
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withdrawing from the Philippines would invite foreign powers to take it but at the same 
time an American occupation would “engender jealousy and hatred on the part of the 
natives which could not be overcome for many years.”84  As the President wondered what 
to do, Merritt’s undermanned force operated under vague and shifting orders.  
The Spanish commander in Manila secured Dewey’s promise to keep the rebels 
out of the capitol until ships arrived to take his forces back to Spain. Aguinaldo felt 
betrayed. “Trusting in the honesty of the Americans and recognizing that our easy 
triumph was partly due to their destruction of the Spanish fleet,” he complained, “I have 
obtained the friendship of those representatives by assuring them that the Filipinos 
preferred an alliance with America to any other nation. Unfortunately my efforts 
encountered their pretension, which was as inconceivable as it as firm, that I should be 
subservient to their orders.”85  
By the Treaty of Paris, America paid Spain $20 million dollars for possession of 
the Philippines. The next month Aguinaldo declared the First Philippine Republic under 
the Malolos Constitution, although his authority hardly reached beyond Luzon’s Bulacan 
Province. General Merritt assumed duties as the first United States Military Governor of 
the Islands and incrementally replaced Spanish rule with American authority. In 
February, war broke out between Aguinaldo’s forces and the U.S. Army.  
The victory over Spain had left President McKinley with an empire but he was 
still not sure what to do with it. He sent a five-man First Philippine Commission under 
Cornell University President Jacob Schurman to recommend a policy for the Islands. The 
commission toured the Philippiones and delivered its report on 3 January 1900. They 
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concluded that the Islands were not ready for self-government and were a likely target for 
occupation by some other power should the United States depart.  
Indeed, disciples of Alfred Thayer Mahan in many countries coveted sea bases in 
the Philippines. 86   Japan’s Foreign Minister, Okuma Shigenbou, instructed his 
representative in Washington that if the U.S. hesitated to claim the Philippines, Japan was 
willing to do so jointly or alone “to form, subject to proper conditions, suitable 
government for the territory.”87 This was one part of a robust foreign policy manifested 
by Japan’s contribution of the largest contingent of troops to the nine-nation intervention 
against the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900.88 McKinley hesitated but finally decided 
that America had no choice but to keep the Philippines as a U.S. protectorate until such 
time as when the Islands were prepared for independence. However, as Walter LeFeber 
noted, to maintain this new frontier the U.S. would need Japanese cooperation.89  
McKinley’s decision, of course, depended on securing the Philippines. Until his 
capture in March 1901, Aguinaldo moved from desultory conventional combat to full 
blown guerrilla warfare against the Americans and their Filipino allies. U.S. generals 
including Arthur MacArthur responded with violent campaigns against the insurgents, 
while Governor Generals such as William Howard Taft oversaw programs to benefit 
friendly Filipinos. The vicious fighting was marked by “shootings of surrendering 
combatants, torching of villages, and bayonetting of villagers.”90 Yet it was the failure of 
American anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan’s presidential bid in 1900 followed by 
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Aguinaldo’s capture the next year that doomed rebel hopes in the Islands. By 1902 at 
which time President Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to Philippine Insurrection, 
126,468 American troops had fought there and lost 4,234 dead and 2,818 wounded; by 
some accounts 200,000 Filipinos had died, the vast majority from diseases and 
starvation.91 
A significant number of Filipinos allied with the Americans during the war and 
fell victim to the Katipunan attacks. U.S. Army Lieutenant Matthew Batson converted a 
remnant Filipino scout unit employed by the Spanish in Macabebe, Pampanga, into the 
Macabebe Scouts and by 1901 the unit had grown to 15,000 native men in over 50 
companies in support of the U.S. Army. 92  In retaliation, insurgents under General 
Antonio Luna massacred Macabebe’s population and burned its buildings. The Macabebe 
Scouts would become the Philippine Scouts, a critical part of the Islands’ defense force. 
One of the surrendering guerrillas was a young, malaria-ridden lieutenant named 
Manuel Quezon. He had been moved when Americans returned the body of the brother of 
his mentor, General Mascardo, along with his belongings and a letter of condolence. 
Quezon wrote: “What a different picture it gave us of the kind of men the Americans 
were from that depicted by the Spaniards in the early days after the declaration of war by 
the United States against Spain.”93 Quezon’s had also been impressed by two Japanese 
observers attached to his command, Captain Hara and Lieutenant Nakamori. Most 
memorable to him, however, was a visit he paid to the captured Aguinaldo: “I felt that the 
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whole world had crumbled; that all my hopes and all my dreams for my country were 
gone forever!” 94 Starved, penniless and sick, Quezon suffered a nervous breakdown. 
 The Americans compelled the surrendered guerrillas to take an oath of allegiance 
to the United States. General Artemio Ricarte refused to comply and instead accepted 
exile to Hong Kong. He returned to Manila at the end of 1903 in hopes of renewing the 
revolution but was arrested and sentenced to eleven years in Bilibid Prison. In 1910, 
Governor William Cameron Forbes released Ricarte but, still refusing the oath of 
allegiance, he was again exiled to Hong Kong. In 1915, fearing arrest for revolts in 
Manila, Ricarte fled to Yokohama, Japan, where he ran a coffee shop.95 
Theodore Roosevelt issued Field Orders No. 3 on 28 March 1903 instructing 
soldiers to “pay careful attention to local customs and sensibilities and expressly 
prohibited indiscriminate arrests, property destruction, or looting.” 96  Meanwhile the 
colonial administration pursued and ‘attraction policy’ through improvements in 
administration, schools, hospitals, sanitation and other quality of life areas.97 Leonard 
Davis described these reforms as “sophisticated methods of subduing the spirit and 
seducing the mind of the Filipino. The recreation of Philippine society in the image of its 
conqueror, the conversion of the elite in adjuncts of colonial rule, and the cultural 
Americanization of the population became integral parts of the process of colonization.”98 
Certainly, like the Spaniards, the Americans sought to develop a cooperative alliance 
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with the Filipino elites. As a measure of their success in this effort, from July 1899 to 
July 1900 the Filipino-run Manila Native Police made 7,442 arrests for the new 
administration.99  
While many elite provincianos demonstrated support for the Americans, many 
peasant taos aligned with “those independence fighters and religious Robin Hoods 
seeking an ‘ill-defined utopia,’ such as the Babilanes in Negros, the Pulajanes in Samar, 
and the Santa Iglesia of Central Luzon.”100 Still, the end of Spanish rule saw a growth of 
elite mestizo and Filipino haciendero wealth and power by “first creating multiple 
tenancies and then converting leasehold tenants into sharecroppers by imposing higher 
rents.”101  American laws designed to break up the large Spanish and Church estates 
unintentionally transferred the land to native hacienderos who divided plots, sacrificing 
productivity in order to increase tenant dependency on landlord grants of credit. What 
hacienderos lost in profits they gained in influence and power. Through kinship networks 
they also controlled the new 6,000-man Philippine Constabulary (PC) created in July 
1901 “to supervise local police forces and suppress guerrilla activity.”102  
Freedoms granted by the Americans brought new opportunities various 
populations in the Islands to compete for political power.103  The largest of the immigrant 
communities, the Chinese, comprised less than one-half of one percent of the overall 
population.104 More than eighty percent were men who came to make their fortunes and 
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go home again and those who stayed were legally barred from Filipino citizenship.105  As 
Yung Li Yuk-Wai observed, however, “it was highly doubtful if most of them would 
have applied had this been available to them. Culturally, real assimilation did not take 
place.”106  Most of the small permanent Chinese community worked as merchants and 
controlled an astounding eighty to ninety percent of all retail trade in the Philippines.107 
Under the Americans they tentatively moved to convert their economic power into 
political influence. In 1904, at Taft’s invitation, they formed the Manila Chinese 
Commercial Council that protected the Chinese monopoly on retail commerce, supported 
Chinese mainland interests, and increasingly challenged Japan on both counts.  
The American policies, no doubt reinforced by general exhaustion from war, 
reduced rebellious impulses among Filipinos. Nationalists found it hard to rally people to 
fight for independence. As Quezon later explained, “Damn the Americans! Why don’t 
they tyrannize us more?”108  The apparent complacency was easily misinterpreted. In 
1904, a U.S. War Department commission in the Philippines reported: “The common 
people are not a warlike people, but are submissive and easily – indeed much too easily – 
controlled by the educated among them, and the power of an educated Filipino politically 
ambitious, willing to plot and use all the arts of a demagogue in rousing the people, is 
quite dangerous.”109  Yet the soldiers respected the Filipinos’ fighting skills. Captain 
William E. Birkhimer recounted, “I owe it to our rebel enemy to say that, from their 
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standpoint, I regard their scheme of warfare nearly perfect.”110 Filipinos had proven adept 
at waging guerrilla raids and ambushes. They had endured jungle hardships and seemed 
impervious to the tropical illnesses that ravaged the Westerners. They even developed 
effective intelligence networks that tracked American military movements. They seemed 
to vanish when confronted with overwhelming forces and blended into the general 
population as friendly natives when caught by their pursuers – a tactic the frustrated 
Americans called the “insurrecto-amigo game.” 
The Americans’ expressed desire to eventually grant independence further sapped 
Filipino resistance. As Theodore Roosevelt said, “If we act so that the natives understand 
us to have made a definite promise, then we should live up to that promise.”111  Seeing 
prominent Filipinos of the Federal Party (Benito Legarda, Trinidad Pardo de Tavera and 
Jose R. Luzurriga) included in the Philippine Commission under Governor-General 
William Howard Taft, Quezon wrote: “I wondered, in my own mind, if the freedom 
which we lost by fighting America could not be won by co-operating with her. The idea 
flashed through my head that I might renew the same fight by peaceful means, by taking 
active part in the political field.” 112 In 1907 the Philippines would become the first Asian 
colony to establish a national assembly.113 
Meanwhile, many worried about Japan’s territorial ambitions. In 1905, Tokutomi 
Sohō wrote a widely read essay “The Yellow Man’s Burden” that stated, “It is not 
something we sought, but all the yellow races – one of the two great racial groups in the 
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world – look up to Japan as their hope.” 114 At Yale University, legal historian Asakawa 
Kan’ichi reported that in the United States, “Many people believe that Japan in the future 
is sure to annex Korea, swallow up southern Manchuria, control the destiny of the China 
dynasty, extend her armed reach to sway in India, and threaten the Philippines and 
Australia, thus conquering the whole of Asia.” 115  That September, the Overseas 
Development Society began publishing Greater Asianism (Dai Ajia shugi). This term, 
which grew in popularity in the 1920s and 1930s, differed from pan-Asianism (Han Ajia 
shugi) or even Asianism (Ajia shugi) in that it advocated not just leadership in Asia but “a 
tendency towards expansionism and imperialism.”116 
Racial attitudes also colored relations in the Philippines. The Americans adopted 
Spanish policies segregating occupiers and subalterns. Military and government 
personnel enjoyed separate quarters, stores, clubs, theaters and golf courses. American 
Major John C. H. Lee argued that commanders should not publicly order white soldiers to 
perform menial tasks lest they lower their status in native eyes.117 Despite a lack of anti-
miscegenation laws, American women marked “the bodily and cultural separation of the 
colonized and colonizers, most consciously in domestic spaces.”118 Wives enforced this 
divide. A reporter noted: “The American who marries a Filipina is promptly ostracized. 
She may be a graduate of Bryn Mawr or Vasser or Wellesley, she may be beautiful and 
cultured and charming, but no matter – she is not white.”119  
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Many of the Americans administrators agreed with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s 
views that “superior races could improve the characteristics of the inferior.” 120 
Correspondent E. Alexander Powell reflected their thinking in 1922: “The dominance of 
the mestizos in insular affairs is undoubtedly due in part to the advantages of education 
and travel which they owe to the wealth and influence of their fathers, but I am convinced 
that an even greater factor in gaining their present ascendancy is in the alien blood – 
particularly the European blood – which courses through their veins.”121 Such attitudes 
reinforced local superstitions and inferiorities: one American recalled that pregnant 
peasant Filipinas would shyly request to touch him and other Americans in the hopes they 
would then give birth to a ‘whiter’ baby.122 Powell contended that the ablest Filipinos had 
at least half Spanish or one-third Chinese blood.  
Even one as admiring of Filipinos as William Howard Taft paternally referred to 
them as “our little brown brothers.”123 Many soldiers, on the other hand, remained frankly 
hostile towards the natives. A song famous among them included the line: “He may be a 
brother of William H. Taft, but he ain’t no brother of mine.”124 On Samar, U.S. Marine 
Pete Ellis described the local children in a letter to his father: “I wish that you could be 
with me so that you might meet your little brown brothers and sisters… they remind me 
of a lot of little brown rats and they are just as plentiful too.”125  Quezon would later 
wonder about Taft’s critics: “Many of them doubtless remembered how Southerners were 
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dealt with after the Civil War and, therefore, felt no better treatment should be given to 
the ‘brown brothers.’ Still others were told by English and Dutch subjects how foolish it 
was – and how dangerous – to attempt the experiment of ‘shooting’ democracy into the 
fabric of ‘Oriental’ minds.”126  
Prejudices aside, the American still hoped to grant independence to the Islands. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for such a policy was the Islands’ inherent vulnerability 
to foreign invasion. In 1904 officers at the U.S. Army War College began drafting Plan 
Orange for a potential war against Japan.  Completed two years later, Orange posited the 
practicability of a successful defense of Hawaii and Guam, but not the Philippines.127 
Theodore Roosevelt publicly mused, “The Philippines from a military standpoint are a 
source of weakness to us. …These being the circumstances, the Islands should be given 
at an early moment their independence without any guaranty whatever by us and without 
our retaining any foothold in them.”128  
The most likely threat to the Philippines remained Japan. Progressively ambitious 
military leaders there contested government officials over international policy. Vice 
President Takahashi Korekiyo led opposition to increased military expenditure in favor of 
civilian investment.129  In 1904-1905, Japan fought a war with Imperial Russia and won a 
decisive naval victory at Tsushima, leading to greater political influence in Tokyo for the 
military. When the American President negotiated an end to that war, Russian diplomats 
warned him that after the Japanese secured Korea, they would go after the Philippines.130 
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U.S. Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, J.A.T. Hull, told the 
Washington Post the Japanese coveted the Philippines. Japanese Japan’s Foreign Minister 
Kogoro Takahira replied: “Just now [Japan] is engaged in a life-and-death struggle for 
existence in Manchuria. She will sacrifice life and treasure to carry out that end but she is 
not intent upon gaining the possession of the U.S. in the Philippines.”131  
For all intents and purposes, the Japanese seemed happy with America’s efforts to 
colonize the Philippines. In an effort to build the Islands’ economy, the U.S. 
administration had opened the door to Japanese immigration. In 1903, the administration 
hired 250 Japanese workers for a two-year construction project to build the twenty-two 
mile long Kennon Road in Benguet.132  When finished, some workers went home, some 
became farmers in Benguet, and 180 went to Davao, Mindanao. Others joined them 
hoping to make their fortunes. Twenty-six-year-old Ota Kyosaburo came to Manila in 
1901 and established a shop selling Japanese goods for the workers on the Kennon 
Road.133 Afterward, he served as an agent for laborers moving to Davao to work in hemp 
cultivation. The Japanese immigrant population in the Philippines grew at 0.5 percent in 
1886, and expanded to a rate of 2.87 percent by 1903, an increase of 574 percent.134  
Minister Takahira reported to Tokyo, “The possession of the Islands by [the 
United States] is beneficial to Japan and its people. The United States has given an object 
lesson to the Orient of a more efficient way of life. We are trying to do our best to teach 
the Koreans, as well as the Chinese, and we are aided by what has been done by the 
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United States in proving the benefits of the principle of progress.” 135  The Japanese 
colonial government in Taiwan even made “intensive studies” of the American 
occupation of the Philippines to monitor the situation there and to look for lessons on 
how to more effectively manage their colony. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce sent Genji Hatano in 1901, Kazue Kato in 1902, and Iekichi Ihara in 1906 to 
the Philippines “to observe industrial and commercial practices in the country and 
encourage the Japanese to participate in the country's business and commerce.”136 
In 1905, U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Japan’s Prime Minister 
Katsura Taro exchanged notes promising to respect claims on the Philippines and Korea. 
Three years later Secretary of State Elihu Root and Foreign Minister Takahira agreed to 
honor the territorial integrity and free trade of China, and Japan renewed assurances that 
it had no ambitions towards Hawaii or the Philippines.137 In 1906, however, when the San 
Francisco school board segregated ‘Asiatic’ children, Giichi Tanaka drew up the first 
draft of the Imperial National Defense Policy that included plans for war against the 
United States in the Philippines.138 
That same year Japan’s Agriculture Ministry argued that the country needed to 
better understand Filipinos in order to break the West’s monopoly of trade with the 
Islands.139 When in 1910, Jokichi Iwatani ended his second term as Japan’s Vice Consul 
in Manila, he issued a report describing Filipino natives (dojin) as lovers of gambling, 
with no sense of right and wrong, who told lies and committed robberies. “He saw 
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Philippine history as one of battles, civil wars, and secret revolutionary organizations,” 
noted Lydia N. Yu-Jose.140  Iwatani also believed non-Christian Filipinos would welcome 
the Japanese into the Islands. 
The Japanese were by then increasing their population in the Philippines. By 1901 
there were nearly 1,000 Japanese, mostly in Manila, and almost all from lower social 
classes -- twenty-eight percent worked as prostitutes.141 To improve this community, the 
Japanese Consul organized the Japanese Mutual Aid Association with support from 
Tokyo for the stated purpose of increasing trade. By 1912 the Japanese population in the 
Philippines had risen to 3,654, with 1,318 living in Manila. Seven years later the overall 
population reached 9,874, with 2,068 in Manila and 5,621 in Davao. Increased 
immigration corresponded with a growth in trade: in 1903 nine ships carried goods to 
Japan, by 1918 that number rose to three hundred and seventy-five ships.  
Coincident with Japan’s growing interest in the Islands, the U.S. Congress took 
steps to defend Filipinos from exploitation by monopolistic enterprises. 142  In 1910, 
Colorado Congressman John Andrew Martin led lawmakers in limiting to 1,024 acres the 
amount of public land that the government could sell to corporations or individuals.143 
American sugar corporations got around this law with help of government officials who 
saw the industry as a key to expanding the Philippine economy. The sugar industry that 
had collapsed during the Katipunan revolution from over 250,000 tons of export in 1892 
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to about 50,000 tons in 1900, would increase six-fold before World War I.144 Yet as a 
resident commissioner to the U.S. House of Representatives from 1909 to 1916, Quezon 
expressed fears that such “large investments of American capital in the Philippines will 
inevitably result in the permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States.”145 
The expanding Philippine economy hastened social changes. As Manila and other 
cities prospered and modernized, elite landowners shifted residence from rural areas to 
urban centers. Supervision of lands was delegated to overseers who replaced the old 
paternal patron-client relationship between landlord and peasant with exploitive profit 
taking. Increasingly dependent tenants lacked protection from landlords who expropriated 
greater amounts “of the fruit of others’ labor.”146 Peasants, especially tenants on sugar 
plantations, lived as impoverished slaves. Kessler observed, “Workers were regularly 
whipped, and the police patrolled the highways at night to prevent workers from 
escaping.” 147 
With Americans guaranteeing freedom of association, exploited peasants created 
tenant unions such as the Brotherhood of Farmers (Kapatiran Magsasaka). The 
Brotherhood preached “syncretic folk-Marxist ideas, adapted through the earlier idiom of 
folk-catholic ideas.”148 Manila printers formed the Islands’ first workers’ union in 1902 
and four years later voted Crisanto Evangelista as its secretary.149  Seven years later 
Evagelista founded the Philippine Labor Congress (Congress Obrero de Filipinas, or 
COF).  Like the nationalists, social revolutionaries turned to politics to effect change. 
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 As the Philippines moved towards social upheaval, Japanese merchant Tomio 
Matsuoka returned to Japan and published ten years’ worth of observations of economic 
conditions in the Islands. With an introduction by Kyoto University professor Inazo 
Nitobe, Matsuoka cited Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce figures to show that 
Philippine natural resources were underexploited due to the Islands’ small population.150 
He said Filipinos were naturally lazy and that they had not embraced modern agricultural 
technology. Matsuoka added that the Chinese “were more interested in trade and 
commerce than agriculture” and the Americans “were not keen on investing in the 
country” because “they believed that their government would sooner or later 
withdraw.”151 Under these conditions, development would depend on the Japanese.  
In Tokyo by 1914, military ambitions and government restraint had reached 
equilibrium. The government refused to raise two army divisions for operations in Asia 
but agreed to nationalize the Japan’s railroads.152 The outbreak of World War I tilted the 
balance. Japan secured Britain’s approval to grab German possessions in the Pacific, 
declared war on Germany, and captured the German settlement in Tsingtao in China. The 
Imperial Navy, acting on its own authority, quickly seized German territories in the 
Marianas, Caroline and Marshall islands and conducted unprecedented aerial attacks on 
German and Hungarian ships. The “fleet faction” in government resisted international 
pressure to withdraw and pushed for expansion to the south.153  
Japan completed diplomatic negotiations with Russia, sent naval vessels to aid the 
British in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and joined the United States in sending troops 
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into Siberia. Tokyo presented Twenty-One Demands to China, insisting on greater 
control over Manchuria and the Chinese economy. At war’s end Japan held a prominent 
position in the Paris Peace Conference and a permanent seat in the Council of the League 
of Nations, yet the Western powers at Versailles rejected the Japanese-Chinese proposed 
racial equality clause to the final peace treaty. From America’s view, as A. Whitney 
Griswold observed, “With Japan ensconced in the Marshalls and Carolines, the 
Philippines were now more than ever hostage to fortune.”154 
In 1915 several prominent Tokyo businessmen formed the South Seas Association 
(Nan’yo Kyokai) to investigate, advertise and develop opportunities for Japan in the vast 
South Seas area. 155  The association published a journal, Reports of the South Seas 
Association (Nan’yo Kyokai kai ho), later renamed the Bulletin of the South Seas 
Association (Nan’yo Kyokai zassho). An article by Miyama Kichisaburo, renewed claims 
that Filipinos were lazy people but welcoming to the Japanese. He added that the Chinese 
grip on Philippine commerce blocked opportunities for the Japanese, but noted that 
Japanese communities made hemp, coconut, and pearl industries ripe for exploitation.  
The next year Inazo Nitobe joined a South Seas observation tour in the 
Philippines. In later essays and lectures he argued that Philippine population was too 
small to develop the Islands, suffered poor nutrition and disease, and needed the 
immigration of Japanese laborers. This past champion of indigenous self-representation 
wrote that Japanese “patriotism is confined too narrowly within the home land and feeds 
itself upon the insular spirit, which does not see that there are regions untouched by man 
where, if they but work, our people will be welcome. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, 
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social economy abhors a dearth of labor when land and capital can be had in 
abundance.”156 
Yusuke Tsurumi, a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Railroads, toured Manila and 
praised American colonial improvements in public works, national literacy, and health. 
He reported “that the Philippines was neither under-developed, nor were the Filipinos 
suffering under an oppressive colonial regime.” 157  He added that the Christian, 
westernized Filipinos were arrogant for thinking they were on par with the Japanese. 
Tsurumi suggested a new direction for Japan in the Philippines by using a law that 
permitted corporations to own land denied to foreigner individuals. “Japanese investors,” 
he advised, “should establish corporations and this in a way, would contribute to the 
realization of Japan’s southward expansion.”158 
The Japanese businessmen note rising American economic enterprise in the 
Islands. In 1900, U.S. goods amounted to nine percent of Philippine imports and eleven 
percent of the value of all Philippine imports.159 Nine years later the U.S. passed the 
Payne-Alrich Act allowing unlimited duty free American imports into the Philippines. 
The next year, U.S. goods made up forty-one percent of the value of Philippine imports. 
By 1933 U.S. goods would comprise eighty-three percent of Philippine imports and about 
seventy-five percent of the value of all Philippine imports. 
More worrisome to the Japanese, in the midst of World War I the United States 
passed the Jones Act that created both a new Filipino constitution and a path towards 
independence. The Act promised, “it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people 
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of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to 
recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established 
therein.”160 The implications for Japan’s colonies were ominous. “By this time,” wrote 
Quezon, “even the most intransigent Filipinos, with the exception of General Ricarte, 
who had exiled himself form the country, had become sincere friends and loyal 
supporters of the United States.” 161  Still, many Filipinos saw no reason to delay 
independence and viewed American power as an obstacle to needed reforms.  
As Richard Kessler noted, many Filipino elites “sought to free themselves of 
American bondage partially because they thought independence would make it possible 
to define what it meant to be Filipino – in much the same way that millenarian 
movements promised a new definition or self in a spiritual rebirth.” 162  Whether identity 
preceded or followed independence was a matter of debate. Filipino writer Maximo M. 
Kalaw, who earned law degrees at Georgetown and the University of Michigan, argued, 
“The Filipinos are a people, like the Cubans or the Irish or the French – a distinct political 
entity with a consciousness of kind and with national feelings and aspirations.”163 Others 
like American war correspondent E. Alexander Powell contended, “Although, as the 
result of four centuries of white man’s rule, they have gradually come to resemble one 
another more and more and to have more and more in common, they are still as distant in 
their genealogies as the Chinooks, the Zunis, the Iroquois, and the Sioux.”164  
In fact, Quezon argued that Filipinos shared unique commonalities: “The Filipino 
is, psychologically speaking, a Westerner. His concept of honor is, by heredity, Spanish: 
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gallant, although generally humble and not presumptuous, he reacts violently against the 
least act of contempt.”165 This uniqueness produced the only Christian country in the Far 
East, one he thought ready for independence from West and East. Others suspected that 
elites like Quezon only sought independence “as a means of enlarging their power base. 
For them, independence promised a paradise of riches. Even under American rule, 
members of the elite were able to amass more wealth and power as the Spanish were 
displaced.” 166  Whatever the motivation, the desire for independence was real and 
growing. 
The Jones Act spurred Japanese efforts to increase migration to the Philippines 
before a future independent government could close the door.167 The 1920s saw Japan’s 
population rise from about 56 million people to over 64 million, a fourteen percent 
increase. The Philippines, roughly the same size as Japan, had less than 14 million 
people. Officials in Tokyo worried their population would outgrow the resource capacity 
of their national territory. One solution was to stimulate migration and by 1930, 
government programs had encouraged 510,000 Japanese to live in foreign countries.168 
An article by Kamiya Tadao noted favorable conditions for migration to Davao, 
Mindanao, where Japanese companies owned more than 147 square miles of land.169 He 
suggested sending 7,000 to 8,000 immigrants to Davao each year, a number thought low 
enough to avoid complaint from the American government.  Indeed, from 1918 to the 
mid-1930s the Japanese population in the Philippines grew from 8,000 to 20,000, mostly 
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in Davao.170 In 1918, forty-five percent of all overseas Japanese in Southeast Asia were 
in Philippines; that increased to sixty percent by 1929.171 
The Japanese arrivals to the Philippines did not seek to assimilate. The Davao 
community was particularly exclusive due to the insular nature of the hemp estates. 
During the 1920s Japanese immigrants arrived on Japanese ships, stayed in Japanese 
hotels, registered at the Japanese consulate, joined Japanese clubs, and got hired at one of 
the Japanese corporations.172 When they needed wives, they went back to Japan. 
The rising numbers of Japanese immigrants encountered resistance. In 1919 and 
1920, editions of Nan’yo Kyokai Zasshi, Kakuro Itakura noted increasing Moro attacks 
on Japanese, new laws restricting ownership of public lands to Filipinos, a proposed 
survey of land in Davao, and a restriction on Japanese doctors.173 This evidence of rising 
anti-Japanese sentiment appeared to be as part of an ongoing American policy. Theodore 
Roosevelt had negotiated a “Gentleman’s Agreement” in 1908 by which Japan limited 
emigration to America. The United States then passed the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 
and the Immigration Act of 1924 to close the door to Japanese (and Chinese) immigrants. 
President Coolidge passed an Immigration Exclusion Act that not only barred Japanese 
immigration to the United States and Canada, but also prohibited Japanese from 
naturalizing as U.S. citizens.  
The Japanese who migrated to the Philippines reported finding opportunity. Six-
foot tall Matsuzo (Santiago) Kitaguchi arrived in Naga, Luzon, in the 1920s and married 
a Japanese mestizo, Presentacion (Tancing) Yamaguchi. He partnered with another 
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Japanese named Mori in the popular corn with ice (maíz con hielo) and mango con hielo 
refreshment parlor they called Ki Mori in downtown Naga.174  He died young and his 
widow married Hisato Kubato, a regular on the Naga tennis courts, who partnered with 
Mori in the Naga Bazaar and engaged in commodity trading of husked rice. His close 
associate, the well-liked Takeru Suga, owned the popular Lion Bazaar in Naga. Their 
community was a far cry from the Japanese in the Philippines twenty-years earlier. They 
were members of associations connected to Japan through the Consul General in Manila. 
And, they would later play a role in the Japanese invasion of Bicol. 
Gradually, the Japanese found themselves competing with Chinese interests in the 
Philippines. As Yung Li Yuk-Wai observed, “The Philippine Chinese enjoyed the 
freedom and security under the American rule that they had never experienced in the 
Spanish period.” 175  A Chinese consulate opened in Manila in 1899, but there the 
community was mostly from Fukien and resisted its influence. That same year thirty 
Cantonese came from the United States and established the Hong Shun Tang, once a 
secret organization to overthrow Qing. It became a Chinese Benevolent Society, 
multiplied into numerous lodges, and in 1935 formed the anti-Japanese Philippine 
Chinese Hungmen Federation (Feilubin zhonggua hangmen lianhe zhonghui).176 By this 
time the community had its own newspapers (The Chinese Commercial News and 
Fookien Times), an arbitration committee to settle community disputes, and fifty-eight 
schools “to maintain Chinese tradition” and “orient the Chinese population only toward 
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Chinese politics.” 177 The Chinese community formed a shadow nation run by strongly 
anti-Communist business interests. 
In the late 1920s, Philippine Labor Congress leader Crisanto Evangelista bucked 
opposition to bring leftist Chinese into Philippine labor groups. Philippine and Chinese 
antipathy had led most Chinese communists to go underground and blend into a larger 
leftist population. The Overseas Chinese Labor Party (Huaqioa gongdang) ended 
publication of the Common People’s Daily newspaper in 1922.178 The leftist Chinese then 
formed the Worker’s Association (Gongren xiehui) to foster trade unions. It became the 
Philippine Chinese Laborer’s Union (Feilubin huaqiao zhonggonghui) in 1928.  Filipino 
laborers however increasingly resented Chinese workers who accepted lower pay and 
harsher work conditions. Resentment broke out in anti-Chinese riots in Manila in October 
1924 and in San Pablo in 1931.179 The issue eventually contributed to a split over the 
direction of the COF, with the Chinese joining the COF-Proletariat (Congress Proletario 
di Filipinas) led by Evangelista and Jacinto Manahan and supported by the Secretariat. 
Under free trade in the 1920s  “the Philippines became prosperous, but at the 
same time largely dependent upon the profitable market of the United States.”180 The 
social revolutionaries continued to organize workers.  In 1922 the Central Luzon peasants 
led by Manahan joined in the Philippine Confederation of Tenants and Agricultural 
Workers (Confederatión de Aparaceros y Obreros Agrícolas de Filipinas).  
In 1924, a leader in the Communist Party of the United States of America, 
William Janequette (alias Harrison George), arrived in Manila “to observe labor 
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conditions in the Philippines.”181 Introduced to the labor leaders including Evangelista, 
Janequette invited the Manila unions to send representatives to the First Congress of the 
Oriental Transportation Workers in Canton, China. Five delegates led by Domingo Ponce 
attended the Communist-organized congress. Ponce returned to Manila to organize a 
secretariat “under the direction of the Third International of Moscow.” 182  Jacinto 
Manahan returned to transform the National Federation of Tenants and Agricultural 
Workers of the Philippines (Confederacion Nacional de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas 
de Filipinas) into the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines (Kalipunang 
Pambansâ ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas), better known by its initials KPMP.183 
According to Alvin H. Scaff, “It was this union which became the basis for the 
Communist activity among the peasants, especially in the central provinces of Bulacan 
and Nueva Ecija.” 184  Alongside the Philippine Labor Congress, they championed 
agricultural and labor reforms.  
Coincidentally, millenarian movements arose in the Islands. Called colorums 
(after the liturgical expression ‘per omnia secula seculorum’ or ‘world without end’), 
they followed the path of groups like the Brotherhood of Saint Joseph and Mary’s Honor 
Guard in uniting spiritual determinism with social revolt. In 1923, Pedro Kabola 
established the Association of the Worthy Kabola (Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag) that 
two years conducted a religious uprising in which Kabola was killed.  
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In the midst of this social upwell, rumors from the Philippines rippled through 
Japan that the United States was planning war. On 30 June 1921, Nagasaki governor 
Akaboshi Tentai relayed to Minister of Home Affairs Tokonami Takejiro and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ichida Kosai a report from Kadowaki Shin of Mitsui Bussan’s Manila 
branch on rumors of an impending war between the United States and Japan.185 He wrote 
that Philippine newspapers were reporting that the Japanese military was recruiting men 
between 18 and 35 years old residing in the Philippines. Shin added that he believed 
lower-class Filipinos would embrace the Japanese against the Americans, but the elites 
favored staying with the Americans to further prepare for eventual independence.  
These fears of war contributed to, and were exacerbated by, the Washington 
Naval Conference in 1922. The world powers agreed to restrict naval construction and 
Japan felt compelled to sign the treaty which limited it to three-fifths of the tonnage of 
capital ships allowed to the British and Americans who maintained fleets in two or three 
oceans. The treaty also required Japan to turn over its base in Tsingtao, China, to the 
Americans, to build no defenses on its newly gained Pacific islands, and to respect the 
territorial integrity of China.186  In return the U.S. promised it would not build a modern 
naval base in the Philippines nor fortify the Islands. 187 
Before the Naval conference, new Philippine Governor General Leonard Wood 
visited Japan.  War Minister – later Prime Minister – General Giichi Tanaka indicated his 
desire to visit the Philippines. After touring areas in north and central Luzon, “Tanaka 
accurately judged the military defense of the Philippines as small-scale, weak, and unable 
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to hold off a prolonged enemy attack.” 188 He saw that Filipino soldiers trained only once 
a year but thought they could be good in small-scale warfare on familiar terrain. He 
believed the greatest threat to any invading army would be the harsh environment and the 
lack of infrastructure. Tanaka argued that Japan should expand into the Philippines and 
utilize its resources. However, added to the naval restrictions, Japan suffered internal 
budgetary concerns. Throughout the 1920’s Japan’s economy was about one-seventh the 
size of the American economy but, even after the Naval Conference, it spent four times 
more per capita than the Americans to maintain a navy.189 The Kato government then cut 
military budgets in 1925. 
Filipinos remained focused on independence and social reform. In 1924, after 
failing to win Nacionalista party support for a congressional run, Evangelista founded the 
Labor Party of the Philippines (Partido Obrero de Filipinas). The next year, his COF 
received an invitation to attend the Red International Labor Union (RILU) meetings in 
Canton.190 In 1927, the COF voted to affiliate with the RILU and organize a political 
party, the Workers’ Party (Partido Obrero), formed under Evangelista the following year. 
 The COF affiliated with the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat in 1927. Late in 
1928, Evangelista and Crisanto Bognot attended meetings in Shanghai where they 
conferred with American Communist leader Earl Browder and Mao’s deputy Chou En-
Lai.191 Evagelista and Bognot then went to Moscow for training, and were joined there by 
Manahan. In 1929 the COF split over Marxist doctrine. Evangelista walked out to form 
the Association of Toilers (Katipunan ng maga Anak Pawis ng Pilipinas,) or KAP, which 
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he dedicated to implementing a “Soviet system in the Philippines.” 192  Ruperto S. 
Cristobal and Antonio Paguia stayed with the COF. In 1930 Manahan founded the 
Communist Party (Partido Comunista) dedicated to the end of American sovereignty and 
the overthrow of the Philippine government.  
Meanwhile in 1927, Patricio Dionisio founded a ninety-seven-member secret 
National Association (Katipunan ng Bayan) that in 1930 became the Association for an 
Offensive for Our Future Freedom (Kapatiran Tangulang Malayang Mamamayan) 
calling for immediate independence. Rampant rumors that Japan was providing military 
supplies to the association brought a government crackdown. The administration acted in 
piecemeal fashion, “identifying and destroying their leaders, the government broke them 
down and isolated them from their mass base. Leaders were played off against one 
another; bribery, deceit, and treachery were commonly used tactics. After a period of 
tumult, the government suppressed the rebellion, and the rebels merged back into the 
fabric of rural society.”193 
In 1930 wealthy landlord and Pampanga lawyer Pedro Abad Santos, once 
imprisoned by the Americans, founded the Socialist Party but it remained very small for 
several years. Born into an elite family in 1876, Abad Santos had represented Pampanga 
in the Philippine National Assembly for two terms and was a member of the Philippine 
Independence mission to the United States in 1922 under Sergio Osmeña. In the late 
1920s he accepted an invitation to study at the Lenin Institute in Moscow, and returned to 
spread Marxist ideology. Close associate Luis Taruc wrote, “He was a Marxist, but not a 
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Bolshevik. He was truly a socialist.”194 Taruc explained that Abad Santos sought change 
from within the existing political structure. Abad Santos established the General 
Workers’ Union (Aguman ding Malding Talapagobra), better known as the AMT, with 
Taruc as both Socialist Party general secretary and AMT political director.195  
An American guerrilla later wrote, “Luis Taruc was a relatively unsophisticated 
man and a believing Christian. Whether he ever became a ‘real’ Communist in the sense 
of wholeheartedly believing Marxist metaphysics is uncertain.”196 Years after the war, 
Taruc answered the question: “Yes, I have been a Communist – and yet originally not a 
Communist but a Socialist. …I, for one, was never completely won over to toeing the 
Stalinist line. I was never ‘Bolshevized,’ and I never accepted completely the atheism 
that is fundamental to Communist belief.”197 Taruc believed Communists and Socialists 
wished to overturn the existing social order but disagreed on the necessity of revolt.  
Into this age of social unrest, the Great Depression strained relations on both sides 
of the Pacific. After ten years of increasing Filipino emigration to the United States, in 
January 1930 in Watsonville, California, rioters attacked Filipino migrant workers when 
a local dancehall allowed them to dance with white dime-a-dance girls. One Filipino was 
killed. Two months later in Manila, high school teacher Mabel Brummitt’s efforts to 
discipline Filipino students sparked large anti-American rallies.198  Some 10,000 high 
school students in the city went on strike and threatened to lynch education department 
officials Alejandro Albert and Luther B. Bewley.  Benigno Ramos, a Senate staffer, used 
                                                        
194 Taruc, 13. 
195 Kerkvliet, 37. 
196 Lapham and Norling, 128. 
197 Taruc ,5-6. 
198 Associated Press, “Police Called Upon to Quell Riot of Manila High School Students,” The Stanford 
Daily, Vol .77, Issue 2 (5 March 1930), 1.  
 
41 
the event to launch a weekly newspaper Sakdal (Tagalog for ‘accuse’ or ‘absolute’) to 
protest against both the U.S. and the Philippine governments. Sakdal circulation grew 
from nearly 20,000 after one year to nearly 300,000 as the paper gave voice to advocacy 
groups calling for reforms in land ownership and political power.  
In 1932 the elites struck back. The Philippine Supreme Court outlawed the 
Communist Party. Many party leaders went to jail, the rest went underground. Abad 
Santos’ Socialist Party absorbed idealist elites and peasant masses in Central Luzon. In 
October 1933 after spending ten months in the United States, Benigno Ramos turned 
hundreds of thousands of Sakdal subscribers into the Sakdal political party. Millenarian 
peasants flocked to the Sakadal movement and its promise of political participation in the 
democratic structures.199 They called for immediate, complete and total independence 
from the U.S. (“kagyat, ganap at lubos na kasarinlan”). American Governor-General 
Frank Murphy welcomed the new party saying, “Finally, an opposition party in the real 
sense of the word has been born in Philippine politics.”200 
In China by this time, a three-year campaign by Kuomintang nationalists against 
warlords encroached upon Japanese claims in Manchuria and led militarists to pressure 
Tokyo for action.  In 1928, Japan had sent troops to Shantung Province to isolate 
Manchuria where support for the Kuomintang was growing and endangered Japanese 
control. Native Manchurian efforts to develop railroads already threatened the Japanese 
South Manchurian Railway monopoly. When Japanese troops assassinated a Manchurian 
warlord, the Imperial Army General Staff protected the culprits and caused the 
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resignation of the Tanaka government in July 1929. Yet, with the financial constraints 
caused by the onset of the Great Depression, Japan joined other governments at the 
London Naval Conference the following year to extend limits on naval construction for 
another six years.  
The Japanese aggression in far away Manchuria worried several audiences in the 
Philippines. The Chinese community, already concerned about growing Japanese 
challenges to their economic interests in the Islands, began to rally in opposition. 
American authorities, facing growing Filipino demands for political independence, 
continued to seek a way to leave the Islands without losing the colonial economic 
advantages or exposing the Philippines to foreign aggression. Filipinos seeking 
independence feared the Japanese demonstrated imperialism. Filipino revolutionaries 
organizing to force social change in the Islands began to feel the tug of internationalist 
concerns pushing for united fronts against fascist powers. Each audience followed the 




2. Failure to Plan 
 
Events leading to war outpaced the expectations of military planners in the 
United States and Japan. As a result, all sides went to war guided by faulty assumptions 
that left them unprepared for the conflict that arose in the Philippines. 
 
 In 1930, Japanese militarists assassinated Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi. 
Imperialists ascended. Headlines in Osaka the next year asked: “Why is the American 
annexation of the Philippines justified, while the Japanese seizure of Formosa is not? 
Why is it just for Great Britain to control India, but not for Japan to control Korea?”201 In 
September, the army in Manchuria provoked an incident to justify invading Mukden, 
Manchuria. The Kwantung Army then seized all of Manchuria to “thunderous public 
applause at home.”202 In May 1932 naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai 
Tsuyoshi and other officials who had tried to reign in the military. Four months later the 
Kwantung Army established the Manchurian puppet state of Manchukuo. International 
condemnation led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. Japan invaded northern 
China and forced a truce by which it gained Jehol province for Manchukuo. 
These events galvanized the Chinese community in the Philippines. In November 
1931, the Federation of Philippine Chinese National Salvation Association (Feilubin 
huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui) formed of 303 local associations, all of them in support of 
China against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang Party attempted to gain 
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control of the Philippine Chinese, but their business leaders resisted calls for economic 
boycotts against the Japanese. The Kuomintang did however gain considerable influence 
over the Chinese schools in the Philippines.203  
Mao also sought influence in the Philippines, with help from international 
communist organizations supported by the Soviet Union.204  Encountering resistance, his 
agents turned to the anti-Japanese Philippine Chinese Hungmen Federation as a gateway 
into the “lower strata of the Chinese community.”205  At the same time the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce reorganized into the Philippine Manila Chinese General Chamber 
of Commerce (Feilubin Manila zhonghua shanghui), indicating “the adjustment of the 
body to secure recognition and influence in both the Chinese and Philippine 
governments, and to widen its scope from Manila to the whole of the Philippines.” 206 
In 1931 former Philippine Senate President Sergio Osmeña and Speaker of the 
House Manuel Roxas, both of the ruling Nacionalista Party, led a delegation to 
Washington seeking independence. In January 1933, the U.S. Congress passed the Hare-
Hawes-Cutting Act over President Hoover’s veto. The act promised independence to the 
Philippines after a ten-year period, but allowed the United States to retain military bases 
and tariffs on trade. As Alfred W. McCoy wrote, “Realizing that the glory of having 
negotiated independence in Washington would prove a major advantage in the 
subsequent campaign for the Commonwealth presidency, the country’s leading 
politicians – Senate president Quezon, Senator Osmeña, Congressman Manuel Roxas, 
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and Senate minority leader Ruperto Montinola – split over specifics.” 207  Osmeña and 
Roxas embraced the bill but Quezon surprisingly opposed it saying, “I did not object to 
the provision regarding the retention of naval stations so long as this was made dependent 
upon the consent of the Philippine Republic; but I did strenuously and definitely oppose 
the retention of military establishments otherwise, for it destroyed the very essence of 
independence for the Philippines.” 208  Quezon won the debate and the Philippine 
legislature vetoed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. 
Japan moved quickly to gain influence in the potentially independent Islands. 
Tokyo established the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Manila to challenge the 
Chinese retail monopoly but the 775 Japanese small retail stores in the Philippines could 
not compete with their 13,818 Chinese competitors.209  Six Japanese department stores 
operated in Manila in the 1920s with an average of ten employees each. After ten years 
the new Chamber of Commerce only increased that number to twelve stores with twenty 
employees each.210 Only when Chinese stores finally agreed to boycott Japanese goods 
did consumers turn to the Japanese stores and increase their retail market share.211  
When Japan left the League of Nations in February 1933, influential journalist 
Shiminaka Yasaburō organized the Greater Asian Society with politician Knoe 
Fuminmaro, General Matsui Iwane, Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, and journalist 
Tokutomi Sohō.212   The Society pushed for an aggressive foreign policy, especially 
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towards Southeast Asia.  That June, Tokyo sent a ‘South Seas Fact-Finding Tour’ of 
twelve influential citizens, including members of the House of Peers, to the Philippines.  
Japan was uneasy over the American offer of self-government to the Filipinos. “It 
was not only, nor even primarily, that by offering the Filipinos self-government, if not 
independence, the Americans might be setting a course which would stimulate their own 
subjects to seek the same,” historian Nicholas Tarling explained, “It might also indicate 
that the United States, having become a colonial power amid controversy, might cease to 
be one.”213 During the 1930s, Japan established forty-three agricultural corporations in 
Davao with a total investment of twenty million pesos, managed 2,000 independent 
tenants with a total capital of ten million pesos, ran 200 commercial and industrial 
enterprises worth five million pesos, and increased investments in lumber and fishing.214 
A U.S. withdrawal endangered returns on these investments. 
 Quezon led a commission to the Washington to discuss with President Franklin 
Roosevelt possible improvements to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and Philippine security. 
Roosevelt pessimistically responded, “After all, the American military force in the 
Islands is too small to protect the Philippines against foreign invasion, and after we have 
been in the Islands all these many years, it will be impossible to induce Congress to 
appropriate the necessary funds for the military defense of the Islands and the 
maintenance of an army of sufficient size to keep any enemy at bay.” 215  Quezon told the 
newspaper magnate Roy J. Howard that the Americans should either fortify the 
Philippines and build a navy, or ‘leave bag and baggage,’ or make an ‘alliance, or 
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…partnership in commerce and defense.”216 He went to the War Department and asked 
Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur if he thought the Islands could be 
defended. “I don’t think so,” the general replied, “I know of course that the Islands can be 
protected, provided, of course, that you have the money which will be required.” 217  
MacArthur estimated the Philippine Constabulary budget as P6,000,000 
($3,000,000) per year and thought it would take an additional P10,000,000 ($5,000,000) 
per year to build an adequate military. 218  A large, professional army would be too 
expensive. “You would have to create a citizen army on the basis of universal 
compulsory service,” he advised Quezon, “If you have a small regular force as a nucleus 
to be expanded by employing the citizen army in time of peril, no nation will care to 
attack you, for the cost of conquest will be more than the expected profits.”219 
The Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 1934 promised Philippine independence. 
The Act opened negotiations on bases and tariffs and authorized the Philippine 
government to write a new constitution. Once ratified, the constitution would make the 
Islands an American Commonwealth for a ten-year period leading up to independence 
that would provide time for the Philippines to practice self-government and build an 
adequate national defense force. The new constitution also included a clause binding it to 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, renouncing the use of war as a means of international politics. 
220 
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The new Commonwealth worried Japan. The United States became the first 
modern imperial power to willingly withdraw from a colony.221 This shifted an existing 
paradigm by proving that Asian colonies could gain independence and that imperial 
powers could give up their colonies. The contrast with Japanese policy was stark.  
In 1935, Consul General Kiyoshi Uchiyama sent Foreign Minister Koki Hirota 
suggestions for dealing with the ‘Philippine Problem.’ A possible course of action was to 
take “decisive” action as in China. He added an alternative: “We can… publish a pro-
Japanese newspaper, manipulate the members of Congress, join hands with the 
opposition, stir up anti-American sentiment, arouse public opinion in Japan, and… adopt 
other behind the scene measures. We should educate the people of this country… that we 
have no territorial ambitions and we only desire to expand our economic interests.”222 
Quietly, the Japanese consulate lobbied against perceived anti-Japanese legislation on 
immigration and land ownership and recruited allies in the National Assembly, including 
Manuel Roxas, Benigno Aquino, Camilo Osias, Quintin Paredes, and Pedro Sabido.223 
The consulate contracted promising Jose P. Laurel as a legal adviser and hired Claro 
Recto for Ishihara Industries Company seeking Philippine mining concessions. 
Tokyo saw in the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in December 
1935 the creation of a power vacuum that spelled opportunity. 224   The Education 
Ministry and the Foreign Ministry together formed The Philippine Society of Japan 
(Hiripin Kyokai) to “promote the friendly Philippine-Japan relations through such means 
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as cultural exchange.”225  Founding members included Society for International Relations 
(Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) co-founder Prince Tokugawa Yorisada, Minister of Education 
and Culture Viscount Okabe Nagakage, League of Nations delegate Ishimaru Yuzo, Vice 
Foreign Minister Horiuchi Kensuke, prominent educator Oshima Masanori, Propaganda 
Division Chief Major General Kojo Tanehide,.226 Business, trade, and banking officials 
interested in the economic exploitation of the Philippines filled many of its offices. The 
Society also received funds from the Army and Navy and in return frequently provided 
the military briefings.227  Beginning in December 1936, for eight years the Society issued 
a roughly 80-page monthly journal called Philippine Information Bulletin (Hiripin Joho) 
“to produce friendly relations between the two countries, to advance cultures and to 
strengthen economic links.”228  A secret supplement to issue Number 21 carried a speech 
by the former Consul General in Manila, Kiyoshi Uchiyama, “On the U.S.-Philippine 
Relationship After Independence.”229  
American politicians recognized the Commonwealth as a potential diplomatic 
hostage. A. Whitney Griswold explained, “President Roosevelt’s willingness to waive the 
right to maintain military bases on the islands, his evasiveness with respect to a naval 
base, indeed his very approval of the Tydings-McDufie Act were generally interpreted as 
a decision to fulfill the wish Theodore Roosevelt had expressed to Taft and Sternburg, 
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and rid the United States of its costly hostage. It was both praised and condemned as a 
withdrawal from active participation in Far Eastern politics and as a renunciation of 
potential American economic predominance in China.” 230  An Army War College 
planning group, chaired by Colonel Jonathan Wainwright, reviewed Plan Orange and 
concluded that the Philippines would be lost early in any war against Japan.231 
Chinese community opposition to Japan increased. In 1935 in Iloilo, Panay, -- 
home to more than 3,500 Chinese -- teachers Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimei of the 
Chinese Commercial Secondary School (Huashang Secondary School) organized the 
National Defense Drama Club to spread anti-Japanese sentiment and support a boycott of 
Japanese goods.232 The next year they founded the Chinese Salvation Association (Yilang 
huaqiao Jiuwang xiehui) which would later turn Chinese youth towards guerrilla warfare. 
Coincidentally, the leftist Philippine Chinese Laborers’ Association furniture workers led 
a strike that brought a backlash from the Philippine government with of a series of bills to 
curtail the economic power of the Philippine Chinese.233  
On 15 November 1935, Manuel Quezon became first president under the new 
constitution. He already faced guerrilla resistance. “Banditry in the mountains at the other 
end of Laguna de Bay was still active,” he recalled, “and the Sakdalistas in the nearby 
provinces were still restless. I seized both of these problems quickly and with great vigor 
and soon settled them to the general satisfaction and without further bloodshed.” 234 In the 
1934 elections, the Sakdal party had won several seats in the new House of 
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Representatives as “village true believers” challenged the Nacionalista Party with 
“rampant patriotism of the millennial variety.”235  Quezon’s election brought rumors that 
Sakdal leader Benigno Ramos would join General Ricarte with Japanese supplied arms 
and air support to lead an overthrow of the new Philippine government. In fact, inspired 
by the new multilingual Free Filipinos newspaper, some 7,000 Sakdalistas revolted in 
May 1935 across several northern Luzon cities. Quezon suppressed the movement, 
leaving sixty dead and driving the Sakdals underground and Ramos into self-exile in 
Japan. “Yet the movement was a landmark event in the secularization of the spiritual 
themes of personal and national salvation,” Kessler wrote, “just as the Katipunan had 
been central to the popularization of nationalism.”236  
 Based in Manila, dominated by the Nacionalistas, and adopting Tagalog as its 
official language, the new government was hardly a national one. Historic geographic, 
cultural and social divisions remained. Quezon sought to win over the peasants and wipe 
out “tribal particularism,” saying: “In frequent visits to the provinces, especially those far 
distant from Manila, I addressed large audiences and rallied them to the knowledge that 
we were all, first and foremost, Filipinos, and that at last they had their own 
government.” 237  He saw himself as the “first Filipino politician with the power to 
integrate all levels of politics into a single system” and he used it to balance powerful 
provincial kinship networks against peasant organizations seeking a share of power. 
Under Quezon, the ‘Ins’ were never entirely secure and the ‘Outs’ were never completely 
excluded.238 
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Quezon secured soon-to-retire MacArthur to serve as the Commonwealth’s Field 
Marshal and Military Advisor to the Government of the Philippines. The general had to 
do what the American military said was impossible. “My plan for building a defense for 
the Philippines was a simple one,” he wrote, “patterned after the citizen-soldier system of 
conscription effectively established in Switzerland.”239 He would use the Constabulary to 
build a small, professional standing army. MacArthur divided the islands into ten military 
districts and planned 128 training camps.  Cadres of four officers and twelve enlisted men 
assigned to each camp would train the men from their nearby areas.  Each district was to 
train 4,000 men annually. By Quezon’s direction, MacArthur confessed: “In addition to 
the purely military side of the camps, there was a broad effort to build up the health and 
economic well-being of the trainees, the great majority of whom were from backward 
rural homes and surroundings.”240 More ambitious plans included the establishment of a 
military academy modeled on West Point, a navy of fifty torpedo boats, and a two 
hundred and fifty plane air force. MacArthur expected to have forty divisions by 1946 
with 400,000 men equipped with American surplus equipment and weapons. Congress 
promised him a budget of eight million dollars a year, then promptly cut to six million a 
year and reduced his quota of trainees by half.241    
Militarists in Tokyo had by now assassinated three of the past five Prime 
Ministers. On 26 February 1936 army officers assassinated two advisors to the Emperor 
and missed the Prime Minister when they killed his brother-in-law by mistake. Mutineers 
surrounded the Japanese Foreign Office and held much of Tokyo for three days in a 
failed coup. Militarists also killed finance ministers when they opposed higher military 
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budgets. That opposition ended with the murder of Finance Minister Takahashi. His 
successor doubled the military budget in his first year. 242 The military set foreign policy: 
resist Russia, capture all of China, and move south to take British, Dutch and French 
colonies for resources. Japan announced its withdrawal from the international naval 
pacts.  In August, the Five Ministers’ Conference agreed to a southward advance to 
coincide with the existing Standard National Policy of northward advance. 243  Three 
months later, Japan entered the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. 
In February 1937, Quezon travelled to Tokyo with his military chief, MacArthur. 
On this and a subsequent visit the next year, he held informal talks with Foreign 
Ministers Arita Hachiro and Ugaki Kazushige and other officials. 244  Arita warned 
Quezon, “many Americans believe that Japan will take the Philippines once you are free, 
these Americans, plus many others who are imperialists at heart, object, even now, to the 
independence of the Philippines.” 245   “Mr. President,” the Japanese foreign minister 
continued, “you may tell your people – you may even assure President Roosevelt when 
you see him – that Japan will gladly be a signatory to a treaty that will recognize the 
Philippines as a neutral territory once it shall have become independent. …Japan has no 
aggressive intentions towards the Philippines. All we want is your trade – to buy your 
products and to sell you our goods.” 246 Quezon promised to check growing anti-Japanese 
sentiments at home.  
The visit was part of a world tour. Quezon arrived in the United States to a 
nineteen, not twenty-one-gun salute, reminding him that Americans did not yet consider 
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him as a head of state. He told reporters he now wanted independence in 1938.247  
Meanwhile MacArthur sought promised military support but reported, “My request for 
supplies and equipment went unheeded by the War Department.”248  
Consul General Kiyoshi Uchiyama alerted Tokyo to a growing “Philippine 
problem,” the anti-Japanese attitude of the Commonwealth government “as especially 
reflected in the proposed laws of the Congress of the Philippines.” 249  Increasingly 
concerned about Japanese intentions, Filipinos worried about a colony in their midst they 
referred to as “Davaokuo.”250  New legislation restricted foreign land purchases in Davao. 
During the May 1936 question hour, Foreign Minister Arita told the lower house of the 
Diet in Tokyo that this law resulted from growing Filipino nationalism, not United States’ 
policies. 251  Unsatisfied, a leader of the Japanese community in Davao, Matsumoto 
Katsushi, pressed for action warning that “the next set of problems would be about 
lumbering rights, immigration, taxation, and so forth.” 252 More ominously, Matsumoto 
warned developments in the Philippines put at risk the “continental policy of the army” 
and the “southward advance policy of the navy” if the Japanese government did not take 
immediate action to support the Japanese population in Davao who were fighting 
“economic war in peacetime.” 253 
 Philippine economic nationalism interfered with Japan’s plans to develop and 
exploit the Islands’ resources. Fourteen years earlier the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce 
had sent Namikawa Eijiro to the Philippines to explore its mining potential. In 1935 the 
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Vice Minister of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nagai Ryutaro, sent 
Namikawa back to the islands to start the Pacific Mining Company, Ltd. (Taiheiyo Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha) and develop mines in Pilar and Panay. Consul General Uchiyama 
made certain that “Filipinos with political influence” were on the board of directors, 
“believing that Filipino government officials used their position to obtain economic 
favors for themselves and their friends.”254 In 1937 Japan opened four manufacturing 
businesses in the Philippines: the Balintawak Beer Brewery Company, the Seafood 
Corporation in Zamboanga, the Oriental Industrial Company, and the Mori Bicycle 
Company. Kanegae Seitaro also established the Filipinas Mining Company that sold 
chrome to the Toho Metal Company at roughly five percent the price they offered other 
companies.255 From 1934 to 1939 Japanese mines in the Philippines increased shipments 
of iron ore to Japan from 7,240 tons to over 1,000,000 tons.256  
In July 1937, Japan used an exchange of gunfire near Beijing as an excuse for 
declaring war on China. From August to November, outnumbered but more advanced 
Japanese forces conquered Shanghai and inadvertently brought the influential Chinese 
community in the Philippines into the war. Their first response was financial. From 1937 
through 1939, the Chinese in the Philippines contributed some P7,000,000 to 
P12,000,000 for the mainland defense.257 Militant members of the community organized 
the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (Feilubin huaqiao yiyongjun), the CVP, under 
one of three members of the Kuomintang Standing Committee in the Philippines, Central 
Military and Political Academy graduate Colonel Shi Yisheng (Shih I-sheng). The CVP 
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became “a para-military extension of the Kuomintang Army in China.”258 Li Qingquan 
(Dee C. Chuen), President of the Chinese Chamber of Congress, organized CVP financial 
support from twenty-five of the wealthiest Chinese families in the Philippines.  
Chinese leftists in the Islands also joined the war effort. Under conditions of the 
Second United Front, the Communists worked more openly in the Chinese community in 
the Philippines. The Philippine Chinese United Workers’ Union (Feilubin huaqiao ge 
laogong tuanti lianhehui or Lao lian hui) grew in numbers and broke with the Philippine 
Chinese Labor Association’s fight over workers’ concerns in order to concentrate on war 
propaganda and support. The Union raised money and manpower for the Communists in 
China, and in November 1937 sent twenty-eight members of the first Voluntary Team of 
Returned Philippine Chinese to join Mao’s army.259 
On 24 November the popular Dutch East Indies newspaper Batavian Newspaper 
(Bataviaasch nieuwsblad) printed an editorial titled “Pacific Penetration” that warned: “It 
has recently been emphatically shown that no illusions may be cherished that Japan’s 
expansion on the mainland of Asia and the incidents which that involves are reducing 
interest in the development of the southward ‘life line.’”260 The essay drew attention to 
“Trojan horse” Japanese shops and communities and specifically mentioned Davao in the 
Philippines as a Japanese colony. Indeed, many buildings including schoolhouses in 
Davao flew the Japanese flag.261  
A few weeks later the Japanese captured the Chinese Nationalist capital of 
Nanking and began a historic spree of massacre, rape and looting. Prodded by the 
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Kuomintang, the Chinese in the Philippines again considered a boycott of Japanese goods 
but businessmen were reluctant to lose profits. In February 1938, the newly formed 
Philippine Resist-the-Enemy Committee (Kangdi hui) drafted a boycott resolution, 
“Regulations Governing the Execution of Enemy Goods Boycott.”262  The Philippine 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce endorsed the measure but it remained unenforced until 
October. It failed to harm Japan economically but alerted it to hostility in the Philippines.  
 Meanwhile, alarmed by how Hitler exploited the divide between Socialist and 
Communist parties in Germany, in 1935 Stalin used the Seventh Comintern in Moscow to 
direct all Communist parties to form United Fronts against Fascism with leftist and 
centrist parties. Within two years American Communist leader James Allen intervened 
with President Quezon to secure pardons for all members of the Philippine Communist 
Party (PKP).  The PKP then moderated its propaganda to work more closely with Abad 
Santos’ Socialist Party. Chinese tactical advisers arrived to encourage an alliance 
between the Communists and Socialists and the two organizations merged their 15,000 
members into the Popular Front in May 1937, formed the Collective Labor Movement, 
and elected PKP leader Guillermo Capadocia as Executive Secretary.  
Wealthy brothers Vincente, Jose and Jesus Lava assumed key PKP leadership 
positions, but they chose Socialist Luis Taruc as their front man. Vincente Lava was an 
“urbane, sophisticated, a highly educated chemist from the Bureau of Science in 
Manila… from an aristocratic land-owning family in Bulacan Province and had 
completed a Ph.D. in chemistry some years before at an outstanding university in New 
York City.”263  Taruc, on the other hand, was from a poor family in Pampanga and had 
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dropped out of law school in Manila after two years for lack of money.  Between them, as 
Kessler noted, “The question of who controlled who is still open to debate.”264 
In August, the Popular Front’s Central Committee issued a manifesto, 
“Mobilization of Filipinos Against Japanese Aggression.” They now proclaimed Japanese 
aggression as “the greatest threat to our national integrity and the achievement of our 
independence” and called for “unity with the democratic and progressive forces in the 
United States, not policies which will play into the hands of Fascists and lead Filipinos 
under the yoke of the Mikado.”265 Having absorbed the Socialist Party, PKP leaders 
sought to expand the United Front: “We are ready to cooperate with all parties, political 
groups, labor, peasant and fraternal organizations, no matter what our differences may be 
with regards to ultimate aims and programs, for the purpose of establishing a democratic 
front of the Filipino people which will be dedicated to the improvement of our living 
conditions, to the defense and extension of our democratic rights, to safeguarding our 
national autonomy, and furthering our cause of peace and security.”266 
The Filipino elites were not eager to join this popular front. Instead, Quezon went 
to Japan in 1938. He made a point of visiting Benigno Ramos to encourage him to return 
home. “The president was looking, as [G.K.] Goodman puts it, for ‘an almost mystical 
‘national unity’ under his own aegis,’ and expected Ramos to lead his followers into the 
fold.”267  Ramos ended his three-year exile in August, and reformed his Sakdal Party as 
the Ganap Party though some of the old group refused to join him. The Philippine 
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Supreme Court declared the Sakdal party subversive and ordered it disbanded. Moreover, 
inspired and supported by Franco’s Spanish Falange party, many in government urged 
action against the peasant opposition movements. Quezon tired of Ramos’ anti-American 
and pro-Japanese preaching and had him arrested. Instead of achieving national unity, 
Quezon’s outreach had furthered class division. 
United Front cooperation between Chinese Nationalists and Communists led to 
the Philippine Chinese United Workers’ Union sending students to Mao’s base in Yenan 
to study at the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University or the Lu Xun Academy of 
Art.268 Graduates Wang Xixiong, Huang Jie, Cai Jianhua, and a few others returned to the 
Philippines before the Japanese invasion.  The Kuomintang also recruited in the Islands: 
“In 1938, a group of eighty-three Philippine Chinese youths went to Nanping, Fujian, to 
receive military training in the Reserve Officers Training Camp No. 13 held by the War 
Department of the Chinese Nationalist government.”269 
Quezon’s visits to Japan left him “convinced by the crushing strength of the 
Imperial war machine that it was futile for the Philippines to resist.”270  He saw his 
country’s best hope in diplomacy, not MacArthur’s plans for defense. Quezon “cut the 
arms budget, halved reserve training, and postponed mobilization,” wrote Meirion and 
Susie Harries, “As a result, many Filipino troops would go into action without ever 
previously having fired their rifles – obsolete Enfields and Springfields – and with such 
basic equipment as helmets and shoes missing.”271 
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The Japanese continued with economic and migration policies in the Philippines. 
Tokyo established the Greater Japan Islam Association (Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai) to 
support Japanese foreign policy. There were 678,000 Muslim Moros in the Philippines, 
over four percent of the country’s population. 272  The government also created the 
Overseas Mining Association to assist in China and Southeast Asia.273  
Western corporations discovered promising mineral deposits in the Philippines. 
Unfortunately for Japan, Commonwealth laws declared: “all natural resources, including 
minerals, belong to the state.” 274   As Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines George Malcolm interpreted the new Constitution, “Private agricultural land 
cannot be assigned to unqualified persons – that is, to aliens, that is, to the Japanese.”275 
Sakamoto Tatsuoki, the head of the Taiwan foreign affairs division, proposed the 
recruitment of second generation Japanese-Americans who he believed could use their 
rights in the Philippines. “They could also opt for Philippine citizenship but they should 
not become like the lazy Filipinos,” he argued, “They should keep the Japanese spirit and 
be the vanguard of Japanese expansion.”276 The manager of the Taiwan branch of Mitsui 
Bussan, Ikeda Takuichi, suggested Japanese born in the Islands might apply for 
Philippine citizenship and act as agents for Japan. To ensure they did not lose their 
character, however, Japan would have to support Japanese schools in the Philippines so 
the children could be raised with proper values.  
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 In the February 1938 issue of Nan’yo Kyokai zasshi, the director of the Manila 
branch of the Nan’yo Kyokai, Hara Shigeharu, urged immediate Japanese migration 
before Philippine laws limiting immigration took effect. He wrote, “If through 
immigration we occupy territory in the Philippines now, we need not cry even if Japanese 
goods are taxed prohibitively, because the advance post of our southward advance will 
not be taken from us.”277 Twice in the next three years the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs supported migration by publishing volumes on Philippine history, politics, 
economic, people, and relations with Japan.  A chapter on Philippine-Japan relations 
stated: “Japan sympathized with the Philippines’ desire for independence and that Japan 
had no intention of invading her. Japan simply did not want to be isolated and out of this 
consideration, it was Japan’s wish to see an independent Philippines that would be free to 
receive aid from her.”278 The volumes also denounced as “anti-Japanese” the Philippine 
immigration quotas, legal barriers to Japanese seeking Philippine citizenship, and laws 
barring foreign exploitation of Philippine resources.279 
In April 1939, Japan’s Navy National Policy Research Committee considered the 
impact of the China Incident on the Administration of the Southern Area and drafted a set 
of objectives for the Philippines. Among them: the promotion of exports and friendship; 
the development of economic relations and “necessary and appropriate” industries 
including agriculture, forestry and fisheries; and the replacement of Chinese, British and 
U.S. influence in “regional commercial rights.”280 These were goals for diplomacy. The 
Navy report called for the “promotion and guidance for advancement and self-awareness 
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of native peoples” and “a gesture towards giving sufficient support out of good will for 
Philippine independence (corrected to: taking an appropriate attitude out of good will for 
Philippine Independence).”281 This cultural approach included plans for using Catholics 
and placating Muslims in the Southern Area. 
 Despite Japanese protests, the Commonwealth government continued to pass 
legislation protecting national interests.  In 1939 the Philippine government passed the 
Fisheries Act, the Public Land Act, the Mining Act, and the Forestry Act that limited 
foreign investments in these industries to forty percent. An Anti-Dummy Act prevented 
Filipinos from acting as shells for foreigners. An immigration law passed in 1940 also 
limited immigration from any country to 500 per year. These acts served to both create an 
independent national identity and to ensure the economic interests of the Filipino elite.  
On top of these legislative acts, the Chinese community stepped up efforts to 
maintain is its economic interests. From 1932 to 1937, Japanese imports increased 
twenty-five percent and Chinese share of rice retail and marketing fell to about sixty-five 
percent. 282 In 1939 Japanese immigrants to the Islands exceeded Chinese arrivals for the 
first time.283  Prominent Japanese were quoted saying that if “China disobeyed Japan” she 
must be severely punished “by having her arms and legs cut off!” 284  In May 1939, the 
Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce (PCCC) began enforcing “Regulations 
Governing the Purge and Registration of Enemy Goods” and expanded their boycott. 
Ironically, the boycott increased Japanese retail in the Philippines by leaving them as the 
only stores providing popular Japanese products.  The PCCC Chairman announced: “The 
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Chinese must regain their primary mission [of being businessmen], and must not be 
excessively indulged in military and political affairs.”285 The PCCC remained strong. In 
July, Quezon’s government established the Emergency Control Committee to set prices 
but before the year was out, the PCCC twice negotiated higher prices. 
Americans continued to worry about Japanese aggressiveness. 286  U.S. High 
Commissioner Paul V. McNutt called for reconsideration of Philippine independence out 
of a fear that Japan would seize the Islands once the United States departed. 287 Quezon 
roundly denounced McNutt’s position. Independence remained on schedule. 
The 1938 and 1940 the U.S. Army War College reviewed and updated plans for 
defending the Philippines. Influenced by MacArthur’s optimistic forecasts, both plans 
assumed a successful defense of the Islands.288 Faculty member Major J. Lawton Collins 
wrote: “When we consider the actual situation in the Philippines today, it seems to me 
nothing short of a crime that the Army and Navy let themselves get into the hole we are 
in… we have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the organization of the defense 
of Corregidor, and we all agree that we cannot hold it.”289 Officers in the Philippines 
questioned America’s commitment. General William E. Brougher said: “Who had the 
right to say that 20,000 Americans should be sentenced without their consent and for no 
fault of their own to an enterprise that would involve them in endless suffering, cruel 
handicaps, death or a hopeless future?”290  
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The Army Air Corps sold the idea that B-17 bombers in Manila could deter Japan 
from aggression because Japanese cities were especially vulnerable to incendiary 
bombs.291 By some unseen logic, the United States military agreed and disregarded Plan 
Orange that “had called for the abandonment of the islands as indefensible in a war with 
Japan.”292  
In September, Hitler invaded Poland. Colonial powers Britain and France were 
now at war, but America remained neutral. Japan remained focused on economic 
diplomacy in the Philippines. In May 1940, as Germany overran France and threatened 
Brtiain, Japan’s Overseas Mining Association set up a liaison office in Manila and the 
Ishihara Sangyo Company added an office for developing mines in the Philippines. To 
comply with Commonwealth laws that required at least sixty percent of stock in any 
mining companies and seventy-five percent in shipping companies owned by Philippine 
or U.S. citizens, Sangyo set up joint ventures with Insular Mine operations and Luzon 
Lighterage.293 They began developing iron ore mines in Paracale, Camarines Norte, and 
surveyed Hintatuan and Nonoc islands north of Mindanao. 
Germany’s rapid defeat of France and the Netherlands encouraged militarists in 
Japan to seize those countries’ Southeast Asian colonies. U.S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt renewed commitments to allies in the region. Japan had played a long game, 
confident that since the establishment of the Commonwealth, the United States would 
leave the Southwest Pacific. Now they reconsidered this assumption.294 
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On 4 July 1940, Japan’s Imperial Army General Staff and its Military Affairs 
Section of the War Ministry submitted “The Principles to Cope with the Changing 
World’s Situation.” It expressed fear of a U.S. Navy build-up. The Japanese economy 
would suffer unless Japan “decided immediately to take the initiative in laying the 
groundwork in the south.”295 The navy agreed. Their planners wrote: “The use of armed 
forces in the southern area will be decided upon depending upon the domestic and foreign 
situation, but the target will be limited to Great Britain, insofar as possible.”296 Political 
pressure by army leaders compelled the cautious Yonai Cabinet to resign.297 A second 
Konoye Cabinet embraced the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy, looked to 
expand southwards, and was hostile towards Britain and America. The Japanese general 
staff began to envision a rapid establishment of a “self-supply area” from Manchuria to 
Australia, from India into the Pacific Islands.298 The Philippines sat at its heart. 
 In the Islands, there was no appetite for war. The Americans, recognizing the 
weakness of their position, did not include MacArthur in their planning and 
communications. 299  Filipino elites hoped to maintain “good and friendly terms with 
Japan.”300 The once burgeoning leftist opposition to Fascism ceased with Stalin’s pact 
with Hitler.301 In provinces like Pampaga the Socialists even used their old party identity 
in the 1940 elections.302 Class antagonism, however, continued to simmer. Luis Tarlac 
noted, “The menace of the invasion… caused much tension in the towns and barrios of 
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Central Luzon. It was not relieved by the reactionaries and landlords, who took the 
opportunity to accuse the AMT, the socialists, and the Communists of being a 5th column. 
Nacionalistas circulated false propaganda that our movement was connected with the 
Sakdals.”303 
 The Japanese military lacked plans for striking the Philippines. In fact, through 
March 1941, the Navy General Staff would have “only an extremely rough study of war 
strategy against the United States and Great Britain on a total war scale.”304 The Army 
General Staff First Section Research Group issued broad Proposals for the Governance 
of Occupied Territories in the Southern Area of Operations that described a limited 
mission in the Philippines for “destroying American strongholds” and noted the 
“extraction of Philippine natural resources should not be looked upon as urgent.”305 The 
document stressed, “In any and all cases, our military forces are not to become involved 
in the direct governance of the country, except for the purpose of attaining our military 
mission or providing assistance to the Philippine government for the establishment of a 
new domestic economy.” 306  Planners assumed cooperation from the Philippine 
government on measures to keep the Filipinos from siding with the Americans. Should 
the Philippine government stand with the Americans, the Army General Staff advised, 
“we should take measures for gradual disintegration of the government through intrigue 
and other such means.” 307  They considered returning General Ricarte from exile in 
Yokahama to replace President Quezon. Finally, the Proposals presciently warned: “The 
Philippines, if obtained, has very little to offer us, while at the same time increases our 
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encumbrances.”308 Japan had higher priorities.  On 17 April, the Imperial High Command 
issued a new Outline of Policy Toward the South that announced offensive operations 
would not begin unless absolutely necessary, and Navy mobilization would not be 
complete until November.309 
 In May, in Manila’s Chang Kai-Shek High School for Chinese students, teacher 
Jiang Jieshi organized students from 14 to 25 years old into the Philippines Chinese 
Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (Feilubin huaqiao qingnian zhanshi tebie 
gongzhuo zongdui) (PCYWSSC) as part of the Youth Corps (Sanmin zhuyi). 310  The 
PCYWSSC started with about eighty members. The organization remained selective in 
recruiting and retention, taking only Chinese Nationalists of good character and physical 
ability. It grew to about 500 members. Its youth and inexperience bred exuberance that 
would lead to the destruction of its headquarters on two occasions. Though it was to 
report losing only thirty-six members during the war, thirty-three were organization 
leaders. 311 
 In early 1941 the Japanese High Command established a new General Staff 
department, the War Guidance Office.312 The government began implementing financial 
maneuvers to both preemptively neutralize American sanctions and to influence the 
Philippine government. On 14 June, Japan began withdrawing tens of millions of dollars 
of deposits from the Yokohama Specie Bank in New York.313  The money went to pay 
debts to Western nations, with about ten million dollars sent to balance a trade debt with 
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the Philippines.314 A week after the withdrawal, Hitler upset all geopolitical calculations 
with his invasion of Russia. 
 Forty-eight hours after the Germans crossed the Russian border, Prime Minister 
Fuminaro Konoe’s cabinet met to reconsider their southern advance policy. With the 
Pacific colonial powers Britain, France and the Netherlands reeling, and the Soviet Union 
neutralized for the time being, the moment seemed opportune. The Japanese leaders 
decided to force an unequal military alliance on Vichy French Indochina to further isolate 
China. From 28 June to 2 July, a Liaison Conference between representatives of the 
government and the Imperial General Headquarters met and produced the Outline of the 
Empire’s National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation which called for 
southward and eastward expansion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, an 
evolving concept of economically a self-sufficient Asian bloc free from Western 
influence.315  The “Main Principles,” however, included two faulty assumptions: first, 
Britain would fall and, second, Japan was not going to attack the Philippines.316 
On 24 July, President Roosevelt sought to block Japan by offering to recognize 
French Indochina as a neutral country.317  Japanese troops disembarked at Cam Rahn Bay 
that same day.  U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull publicly stated that everything was 
now going “hellward” and the path to war seemed clear.318  Twenty-four hours later, 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8832, freezing Japanese assets in the United States 
(including the Philippines). Additionally, the administration increased lend-lease 
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shipments to China, with more planes to the Flying Tiger volunteer airmen, and recalled 
Douglas MacArthur to active duty to command United States Army forces in the 
Philippines. Manila was already home to an American infantry division under Major 
General Jonathan Wainwright. Roosevelt authorized the immediate incorporation of the 
Philippine Army’s nine reserve divisions into a new command, the United States Forces, 
Far East (USAFFE). Unfortunately for MacArthur, the annual six-million-dollar military 
budget meant the new divisions existed only on paper. In comparison, that same month 
the United States sent $240 million in military aid to China.319 MacArthur expected a 
similar large investment in his force soon and began to plan accordingly.  
Faced with an increasingly hostile United States, Japan adjusted its policies. After 
another Liaison Conference, the Konoe administration announced a French-Japanese 
Joint Defense Pact on 29 July. With this flank secured, Japan then looked to seize the 
Pacific colonies of the European countries. Teiichi Suzuki, President of the Prime 
Minister’s Planning Board, submitted to the Government and the Imperial General 
Headquarters a report outlining resources needed for expanding hostilities. Suzuki 
believed Japan possessed reserves of two months of nickel, four months of manganese, 
and one month of Manila hemp – all products available in the Philippines. 320  He urged 
that any war must aim for “the acquisition of resources in line with these demands.”321 
Southern Area resources had not yet been part of any plans.  
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While the army and navy argued over whether to attack the Philippines first or 
last, German advisors suggested that the United States might stay out of the war 
altogether if Japan simply bypassed the Islands.322  Yet every day the United States 
seemed to get stronger in the Pacific. The government approved as national policy the 
Imperial Staff’s General Principles to Cope with the World’s Changing Situation that 
recognized “the inevitable and natural deterioration of relations with the United States” 
and vaguely stated that Japan would “solve the southern area problem by taking 
advantage of opportunities.”323 Suzuki proposed four options for seizing the Philippines, 
all of which necessitated the destruction of American forces.324 The government and 
military officials agreed on a “swift advance of our forces along the two lines of 
operations to the oil fields in simultaneous operations in the Philippines and Malaya. 
Insofar as strength permitted.”325  
The Navy Central Authorities objected to the ambitious strategy: “The southward 
expansion policy was originally advocated by the Navy but it emphasized that the goal 
must be achieved by peaceful means, if at all possible, and the use of military force must 
be determined with great prudence.”326 An American embargo of oil would justify the use 
of military force in the south, but the navy felt unprepared for a long war with the United 
States. Even so, the navy began “thorough preparations for the commencement of 
hostilities against the United States” after deciding, “it may prove impossible to avoid 
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war with that country.”327 War strategy would depend on a quick victory in decisive 
battle so as to deter America from mobilizing its vast latent strengths. 
 Planning became more urgent on 1 August when President Roosevelt declared an 
embargo of all oil to Japan. Without another source of oil, Japan either had to placate 
Roosevelt by sacrificing its imperial ambitions or risk war to secure further resources. 
Internal estimates indicated that Japan held “reserves of 9.4 million kilotons and 
consumed 450,000 kilotons per month, giving it about a one-and-a-half year supply at 
stable consumption rates.”328 War, of course, would increase consumption rates.  Faced 
with these projections, the war ministry accelerated planning for war. 
On 6 August, Roosevelt offered to suspend military measures (and get the British 
and Dutch to follow), if Japan withdrew from Indochina, promised not to deploy 
additional troops in the Southwest Pacific, and recognized Philippine neutrality.329 Japan 
did not respond. 
On 10 August the Japanese Army Headquarters summoned the Catholic 
Archbishop of Tokyo, Tatsu Doi, and the Bishop of Osaka, Yoshigoro Taguchi. Bishop 
Taguchi arrived the next day accompanied by Tatsu’s representative, Father Tatsuya 
Shimura. The Army representatives informed the clerics that the war would start soon 
and that Japan would occupy the Philippines. They would need fifty Catholic clergy and 
one hundred and fifty laity to serve as religious propaganda workers in the Islands.330 
There were only about 150 Japanese among the 596 priests who served the 119,224 
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Catholics in Japan and the 192,209 Catholics in its colonies – a ratio of one Japanese 
priest for every 2,000 Catholics. There were over 12,000,000 Catholics in the Philippines. 
The military plans seemed to expect one Japanese priest to serve 240,000 Filipinos. 
Bishop Taguchi arranged a meeting with the leading Catholic clerics in Tokyo 
and the apostolic representative to Japan, Paolo Marella. They agreed to cooperate with 
the army but were determined not to get involved in a war. Father Shimura gave Major 
Yokoyama of the General Staff the names of three priests, five seminarians and eight 
laity who would report in November as civilian employees of the 14th Army’s Religious 
Pacification Operations Section. Lieutenant Tomoji Narusawa assumed command of the 
Religious Section aided by his Second Lieutenants, Hiroshi Iijima and Sakae Mihara.  
Narusawa was not a Catholic but his wife was and so were his lieutenants.  
 In Manila on 19 August, President Quezon announced: “We owe our loyalty to 
America, and we are bound to her by bonds of everlasting gratitude. Should the United 
States enter the war, the Philippines will follow her and fight by her side, placing at her 
disposal all our manpower and material resources to help her achieve victory, and for this 
reason America’s fight is our own fight.” 331  MacArthur, however, lacked the 
infrastructure and logistics to mobilize the nine Philippine reserve divisions. Even his one 
standing division, the scattered American-manned Philippine Division, had only three of 
its four authorized brigades and was without much of its equipment.332 Still, he decided to 
use this division to organize, equip and train the reserve divisions during their 
mobilization. In August they would build camps, send American officers and non-
commissioned officers to form a training cadre, and loan the division’s equipment to the 
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Filipino reservists and recruits. MacArthur scheduled a gradual call up of his 120,000 
Philippine Army reservists to begin on 1 September and end on 15 December. 
 In Tokyo, another Liaison Conference met from 3 to 5 September to refine the 
Outline of the Empire’s National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation.  The 
Diet ratified the revision on 6 September stating: “The Empire, determined to face a war 
against the United Sates, Britain, and the Netherlands for the sake of self-existence and 
self-defense, will complete preparations for war with early October as the approximate 
deadline.”333  Until then, Japan would pursue negotiation. One official later recalled, 
“This decision, however, did not mean that the Government was determined to wage war. 
It would be closer to the truth to state that greater expectations were placed on diplomatic 
negotiations.”334  Negotiators demanded that U.S. “military facilities in the Far East will 
not be strengthened further than the status quo.”335 Ambassador Nomura delivered to 
U.S. Secretary of State Hull a demand for the U.S. to stand down in the Philippines.336 
An air of fatalism hovered over Japan’s decision makers. “The government has 
decided,” said Chief of the Naval Staff Osami Nagano, “that if there is no war, the fate of 
the nation is sealed. Even if there is war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a 
nation which does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is already a doomed 
country.”337  From 10 to 13 September, the Imperial Navy’s Combined Fleet assembled 
“all commanding officers and staff officers of the Fleet” at the Naval Staff College in 
Tokyo to wargame maneuvers for seizing the Southern Area and attacking Hawaii.338  
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Commander in Chief Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto served as chief referee. To clear up 
ambiguities found in the exercise, on 24 September the Supreme Command, supported by 
the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff, requested that the government 
“changeover from political to military strategy” by 15 October, “at the latest.”339  
While MacArthur and the Japanese military remained focused on potential 
conventional operations, other began to think differently. With German columns closing 
on Moscow, Communist-led Popular Fronts mobilized around the world. In October, the 
leaders of the AMT party in Manila issued orders for “all cell groups to prepare for 
guerrilla warfare” against possible Japanese invasion. 340  They issued a circular 
suggesting the formation of twelve-man squads as the basis for combat. 
 Quezon had been a guerrilla from 1899 to 1901. He well understood the 
Philippines’ historic tradition of irregular warfare. Yet he never seriously considered 
preparing his country for guerrilla resistance against a potential Japanese invasion. 
Douglas MacArthur had fought Philippine guerrillas as a young officer in 1903. He knew 
his citizen soldiers lacked the equipment, training, and cohesion to fight conventional 
battles. He also never seemed to consider preparing his reservists to fight a guerrilla war. 
MacArthur drafted conventional plans for defending the Philippines with units he 
did not have. He expected to muster the 120,000 Filipino soldiers, augmented by the 
30,000 Americans and Philippine Scouts, to face probably 50,000 invaders sometime in 
1942. Accordingly, he organized his paper command into three infantry divisions in 
northern Luzon, four in southern Luzon, three in Visayan-Mindanao areas, and two more 
in reserve. Meanwhile, the men of the first of three regiments in each Philippine reserve  
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division reported for training on 1 September, followed by the second three regiments 
towards the end of October, and the third towards the end of December.341 Equipment 
shortages, obsolete weapons, untried leaders, and a pervasive lack of discipline marked 
their training.  There was not enough time or material to make these divisions ready. 
 In September, the U.S. Army advertised for officer volunteers for the Philippines. 
Signal Corps Lieutenant Donald Blackburn volunteered out of his basic officer’s course.  
After the twenty-three-day voyage from San Francisco, he arrived in Manila in October. 
He became one of many ‘casuals,’ someone to strip from his regular unit and assign to a 
new Filipino unit.342  Blackburn reported to the Headquarters of the new 12th Infantry 
Regiment filled with Igorot reservists who did not speak English. Second Lieutenant 
Charlie Youngblood asked Blackburn, “How do we train these people?” Blackburn 
answered, “We’re just going to have to draw pictures, I guess.”343 
Captain Russell Volckmann, a young infantry officer who had arrived in Manila 
in 1940, became a senior instructor and executive officer for the new 11th Philippine 
Infantry Regiment near Baguio. He found his soldiers, despite having a five and a half-
month call up in 1937, only trained in close order drill and saluting. Volckmann recalled, 
“Officers, non-coms, and privates all had practically no knowledge of basic military 
tactics and techniques. What little they did know was in most cases either wrong or  
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obsolete.”344  On paper the regiment had 1,850 soldiers; in reality, it contained a smaller 
number of civilians in uniform. Moreover, Quezon still hoped to avoid war and wanted to 
use the call up to build new and better citizens. White House advisor Fred Howe toured 
MacArthur’s command and happily observed new soldiers training “in hygiene, in 
agriculture, in handicraft, and in making them ready to take up homesteads and establish 
themselves as self-respecting citizens.”345  They were not training for modern war. 
The Japanese also failed to anticipate guerrilla war. Their plans focused on 
controlling cities: “Manila (the military, political, economic and cultural center of the  
 entire Philippines with a good harbor and a population of 620,000); Cebu (with a good 
harbor and a population of 140,000), Davao (population 95,000; Japanese residents 
18,000); Ioilo (on Panay Island. Population 90,000; Japanese residents 400); Batangas 
(population 50,000); Legaspi (the only port at the southern extremity of Luzon Island 
with a population of 40,000) and Cavite (U.S. Asian Fleet base with a population of 
40,000).”346 Planners identified food as essential to controlling these populations: “Rice 
is the staple food of the Filipinos but its domestic production is insufficient to feed its 
population. However, substitute foodstuffs such as corn, sweet potatoes, coconuts and 
Chinese yams as well as cattle, fish and spices are abundant throughout the islands.”347 
There were no plans on how to obtain the amount of food needed to feed the people. 
The Imperial Army did consider environmental challenges. The Philippines had a 
dry season from November to early June and wet season July to October, with noticeable 
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differences in precipitation across the islands.348 Early plans also recognized the threats 
of dysentery and poor sanitation, malaria, dengue fever, cholera, typhoid, sunstroke and 
heat-stroke in the islands.349 The plans did not include remedies for these challenges. 
Into October, hesitancy to go to war hampered Japanese military planning. On 7 
October, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano warned Chief of the Army General Staff 
Sugiyama: “The undue extension of the time limit for the purpose of continuing 
negotiations will deprive us of the opportunity of taking the initiative in war and, in 
consequence, will make the carrying out of future operations more difficult.”350 Mid-
month found the Premier and the Foreign Minister at odds with the War Minister while 
the Navy Minister remained indecisive. “Accordingly,” an official later recalled, 
“Imperial General Headquarters pressed the Government to clarify its attitude on the 
issue of peace or war, but the Government was unable to give a definite answer. As a 
result, the Third Konoye Cabinet resigned en bloc on 16 October and the Tojo Cabinet 
was formed on the 18th.”351  From 23 to 30 October, Tojo convened another Liaison 
Conference under the presumption that war would begin in March 1942. The attendees 
prioritized logistical preparations for war and options for breaking the stalemated 
negotiations with the United States by diplomatic means.  
On 29 October, navy planners submitted a draft plan to the Combined Fleet 
Headquarters. As the Liaison Conference wound down, the President of the Planning 
Board explained that war in early December would require Japan to occupy the oil fields 
                                                        
348 Ibid., 6. 
349 Ibid., 5. 
350 Monograph 150,” Japanese Monographs, 19. 
351 Monograph 147, Japanese Monographs, 51. 
 
80 
in the southern areas within four or five months if it was to continue fighting.352 Even 
then, he forecast a period of low oil supply and cautioned: “As time passes, the ratio of 
military strength between Japan and the United States will be more and more to Japan’s 
disadvantage. This will be especially true in regard to air strength.”353  He feared that the 
United States would strengthen Philippine defenses and draw closer to Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and China. The Americans had already scheduled construction of five new 
airfields for the Philippines for early 1942. 
A Liaison Conference between the military and government convened on 5 
November, this one in the Imperial Court Room in the presence of the Emperor.354 The 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Planning Board President, Finance Minister, and 
military Chiefs of Staff briefed the plan for war they had agreed to four days earlier. The 
attendees reviewed two plans (A and B) for continued negotiations, neither of which 
would contain enough concessions to satisfy the U.S.  They therefore now planned to go 
to war in early December. Believing American strength in the Philippines increased by 
4,000 men a month, the Japanese army planners concluded: “Despite foreseeing 
considerable difficulty in operations against the southern area in the initial phase, the 
Japanese Army is fully confident of success. Thereafter, with the maintenance of surface 
traffic by the Navy, the Army will be able to secure the areas required.”355  The Chief of 
the Army General Staff estimated the 14th Army could conquer the Philippines within 
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fifty days.356 Agreeing that war was inevitable, the Emperor formally endorsed the war 
operations plan.357 
At the conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff reported American 
strength in the Philippines as about 42,000 troops and 170 aircraft – up from 10,400 men 
and 115 planes 14 months earlier.358 To seize of the Islands, he tasked the Southern 
Army’s 14th Army with the 16th Division, 48th Division, and two tank regiments. 359  The 
11th Air Fleet would fly support. The rushed plan included preparatory air raids, 
amphibious assaults, carefully allocated air support, and vague “mopping-up 
operations.”360 There was still no consideration of guerrilla resistance. On 10 November, 
the 14th Army Commander reported to the Imperial General Headquarters for informal 
instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, the War Minister and the Commander in 
Chief of the Southern Army. They were less than four weeks away from war. 
Yet another Liaison Conference on 13 November approved a “Plan to Speedily 
Conclude Hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands and the 
Chiang Regime.” This plan stated: “The Japanese Empire will carry out swift armed 
warfare in order to destroy the bases of the United States, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands in the Far East as well as the southwest Pacific Area; establish strategically 
important positions; and, at the same time, secure areas containing necessary resources 
and principal communication lines in order to make Japan self-sufficient. Every possible 
measure will be taken to draw the main strength of the United States toward Japan Proper 
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and to destroy it at an opportune moment.”361 The plans centered on decisive battles in 
which victory was assumed sufficient to secure resource areas. 
 After defeating its enemies, the Imperial Army planned military administration of 
the occupied areas to establish “public peace, assist in the rapid acquisition of national 
defense resources and to help maintain the forces engaged the operations.”362 Occupation 
forces would secure key roads, railroads, harbors, airfields, post services and 
communication centers to support military operations. This left uncrontolled areas that 
could be used to organize guerrilla bases.  
The Imperial Army decreed: “In establishing a military administration, existing 
administrative structures were to be utilized as much as possible and racial customs were 
to be respected.”363 Military administrators were to maintain existing foreign trade, local 
currency, and civil order. At the same time, they were told, “The people of the occupied 
countries were to be warned that they would have to face some deprivation as it would be 
necessary for the occupation forces to acquire certain defense materials.”364 American, 
Dutch and British citizens in the occupied lands were subject to “such measures deemed 
as necessary.”365 Future Liaison Conferences would address any unforeseen issues caused 
by occupation. In summary, the Central Authorities and the Planning Board in Tokyo 
would oversee the exploitation of new territories, while local military officials maintained 
order through the existing governmental structures.366 
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 The Japanese based their plans on number of key assumptions. First, MacArthur’s 
defense would not last beyond fifty days. Second, the existing Philippine government 
would remain effective under the Japanese. Third, there would be no guerrilla resistance 
of significance. Fourth, the productivity of the existing economy could be maintained and 
thus prevent unbearable hardship on Filipinos. The Japanese did not prepare for the 
possibility that these assumptions proved invalid. 
 On 15 November, the Japanese army reassessed the defense forces in the 
Philippines. It believed that approximately 22,000 troops filled one U.S. division while 
the Philippine National Defense Army had 110,000 more men available in ten 
divisions.367  It expected another 15,000 men would enter army service by the end of 
1941. The ‘patrol unit’ (the Constabulary) was thought to be under MacArthur’s 
command.  The planners reported: “Although, the Americans are generally of excellent 
character, they tend to be physically and mentally lax and devoid of seriousness due to 
the tropical climate. The natives are well-educated and are especially satisfied with 
simple foods, but on the other hand they lack perseverance, and sense of responsibility. 
The military efficiency of native officers and men is greatly inferior to that of 
Americans.”368   
  The commanders of 3rd Fleet, 11th Air Fleet, and 5th Air Group met with the 
Southern Army on 14 and 15 November to prepare operations for the Philippines. They 
determined: “The operation objectives of the army are to defeat the enemy in the 
Philippines and to destroy its main bases… the army will seize the strategic points within 
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the Philippines.”369  Advance detachments were to capture Batan Island, Vigan, Laoag, 
and Aparri quickly and construct airfields to support main operations. The 48th Division 
would land in the Lingayen Gulf, sweep central Luzon, and occupy half of Manila. The 
16th Division would land in Lamon Bay, sweep southern Luzon, and occupy the rest of 
Manila. Finally, several detachments would take Legaspi, Davao, Jolo and secure naval 
bases in Subic Bay and Olongapo. Southern Army planners identified Manila as the place 
of the decisive battle and noted, “After seizing Manila City, the army will then occupy 
the fortress at Manila Bay and promptly open the Bay.”370  After fifty days the Army 
would reassemble a force around the 38th Division “for transfer to the Dutch East Indies 
area” and the main part of the 5th Air Group would transfer to “the Malay area.”371  
 To command the 14th Army, the Imperial Headquarters selected General 
Masaharu Homma, a thirty-four-year army veteran considered to be one of the smartest 
army officers in Japan. He was an anomaly, known for his “taste for good paintings and 
furniture, a modest talent for verse, a flair for Western languages.” 372 He had survived 
scandal while stationed in Britain in 1919 when his wife Toshiko, the daughter of a Meiji 
general, became an actress of stage and film. Her many romantic affairs led Homma to 
attempt to jump out a window of the Langham Hotel in London.373  He divorced and later 
married Westernized wealthy Fujiko. 
The Imperial General Staff issued two planning directives. A Liaison Conference on 
20 November approved the first, “Guidelines Governing the Administration of the 
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Southern Occupied Areas.”374 The Conference added an addendum, “Listing of Standards 
for Development/Acquisition of Important Resources According to Each Area of the 
South Seas,” that set targets of 50,000 tons manganese, 50,000 tons chrome, 100,000 tons 
copper, 300,000 tons of iron to be acquired in the Philippines in the first year.375  The 
Imperial General Headquarters Army Section adopted the second planning directive, 
“Plan for Governing Areas in the Territories Occupied During Southern Area 
Operations,” on 25 November and sent it to the commander of Southern Army. It 
prioritized the “restoration of law and order, immediate extraction of defense-related 
resources, and Occupation Force self-sufficiency, as the three cardinal rules of 
occupation.” 376   The policy called for using “existing governmental institutions, 
protecting and respecting existing religious institutions, and the inevitability of burdening 
the livelihood of citizens in order to obtain defense resources and achieve self-sufficiency 
for the Occupation force.”377 
Less than two weeks before the invasion, the Imperial General Staff finally provided 
the Army with guidance for the occupation of the Philippines. In “The Proposed Plan for 
an Early Termination of the War Against the United States, Great Britain, and 
Netherlands,” the military leaders announced, “the present regime in the Philippines shall 
be allowed to continue for the time being and be guided towards contributing to 
accelerating the termination of the war.” 378  There was no thought that the ‘present 
regime’ may not want to continue under occupation. The 14th Army was to establish 
military administration to “restore law and order, quickly acquire resources vital for 
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national defense, and realize self-sufficiency of the Occupation troops.”379  The army 
would coordinate private enterprise with central administration to exploit the needed 
resources. The head of the Department of Industries, Michizo Yamagoshi, produced a 
top-secret report for the 14th Army Military Administration entitled “Transformation of 
the Philippine Economy under Military Administration” with priority assignments for 
Japanese industries: three copper mines at Mankayan, Hixbar (Rapurapa) and Antique; 
the chrome mine at Zambalese (Masinloc); two manganese mines at Bohol (Gundorman) 
and Busuanga; and, the iron mine at Kalambayangan.380 
 The Southern Army Group and 14th Army completed their plans under the 
assumption that they would attack after the New Year. They estimated a thirty-four-day 
campaign to clear and seize Luzon, followed by one brigade “mopping up the enemy 
remnants.”381  The planners again emphasized, “With the expiration of the period slated 
for the Luzon operation, about a half of the army (one division, specialist units under 
direct army command, and almost the entire strength of the army and navy air units) will 
embark on vessels after making preparations near Manila….”382 Based on these plans, the 
high command would quickly strip quality troops from the Philippines. 
On 26 November, American Secretary of State Hull met with the Japanese 
representatives and again demanded that Japan withdraw from China and Manchuria. The 
next day Tojo convened another Liaison Conference. On 29 November, the senior 
Japanese leaders met again with the Emperor to confirm their belief that war was now 
inevitable. Tojo later testified: “No one attended from the Imperial General 
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Headquarters.”383  He announced: “Japan desired an early decisive battle, but in war there 
was always the other side so there would always be times when the situation would not 
develop as expected or desired. Therefore, we must be prepared for a prolonged war.”384 
Tojo was thinking in terms of the larger war, not prolonged resistance in the Philippines. 
He addressed concerns about “unrest of the people at large,” but only in reference to 
Japanese citizens, not occupied populations.385  He also admitted “there was no definite 
plan as to the means by which the war would be terminated.”386 The next day at 1500 
hours, Tojo reported to the Emperor who noted that the navy was against going to war. 
The Prime Minister argued they had no choice. The Emperor authorized an Imperial 
Conference. On 1 December, the leaders reconvened with the all the government 
ministers to announce negotiations had failed and the nation was going to war.  
In Manila, Quezon recalled: “For several months, I had been almost certain that 
war with Japan was inevitable in view of the positive stand taken by the United States 
vis-à-vis the so-called ‘China Incident’ and the announced Greater East Asia policy of 
Japan.” 387 Despite his feeling, his country remained unprepared for war. 
In early December the Japanese 9th Submarine Division (with two submarines, the 
I-123 and I-124) of the 6th Submarine Squadron assigned as the Philippine Submarine 
Group, left Samah on Hainan Island for the Philippines. The I-123 proceeded to Balabac 
Strait and the I-124 to Manila Bay and per prearranged schedule, on 8 December the two 
submarines secretly laid about 40 mines at the western entrance of the Balabac Strait and 
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at the mouth of the Manila Bay.”388 Later in the month the 13 Submarine Division (I-121 
and I-122) joined the two subs.  
 The Japanese government prepared a statement to issue in conjunction with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, “An Outline of Information and Propaganda Policies for the War 
between Japan and the Anglo-American Powers.” While emphatically denying that their 
war was one against white people (so as not to offend their Axis allies), the document 
made it clear that Japan’s cause was a moral one for a “new world order” which “enabled 
all nations and races to assume their proper place in the world, and all peoples to be at 
peace in their own sphere.”389  This aim derived from the worldview of the legendary 
Emperor Jimmu who 2,600 years earlier projected Japan as an enlightened center of a 
world at peace. As John Dower explained, “What makes this bureaucratic guide to 
propaganda policy so useful, however, is that it embraces in a brief format many of the 
other emotional elements that were intimately wrapped up with the concept of proper 
place and integral to the Japanese designation of themselves as the ‘leading race.’ We 
have here moral righteousness, mythical legitimization, global vision, and the evocation 
of a ‘shining history’ – an image of brightness that will be found recurring in many 
forms.”390 Dower concluded: “It was the intention of the Japanese to establish permanent 
domination over all other races and peoples in Asia – in accordance with their needs, and 
as befitted their destiny as a superior race.”391   
The Japanese adapted their mythology to support a racist vilification of their 
enemy. “There were certainly no great impediments to hating or denigrating the 
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Westerners,” noted Dower, “but the idioms had to fit: strong and threatening, beneficent 
and evil. They settled on demons, albeit demons with a human face.” 392  By this 
philosophy, Filipinos, like other Asians, were not evil but they had natural positions to 
fill subordinate to the Japanese. The Japanese plans framed their appreciation of the 
political, economic and military weaknesses of the Philippines in this worldview. To 
control and develop the Islands, they would drive out the Americans and seize and 
subordinate the larger cities that linked the Philippines through administration and 
commerce. They assumed that the inhabitants of the vast spaces outside those nodes 
would then accept subaltern status. The plan of attack was part and parcel of the overall 
decision to go to war that Eri Hotta aptly termed “a huge national gamble.”393 Events, 
however, invalidated the planners’ assumptions. 
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3.  A Time to Die 
8 December 1941 – 10 March 1942 
 
The Japanese invaded the Philippines to drive the Americans out of that 
strategically vital region. By the time MacArthur realized that he lacked the forces and 
support needed to carry out his conventional defensive plans, he was too late to organize 
a viable guerrilla resistance. The Filipinos however, caught between the Japanese and 
Americans, had already begun armed resistance against their new occupiers. 
 
Manila, D1/R-1,048 
(Day 1 of Japanese occupation/ 1,048 Days until MacArthur’s return) 
It was 8 December in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. 
Nine-year old Isabel ‘Lita’ Yumol, the daughter of a Manila attorney, learned the news 
from a neighbor who heard it on his short-wave radio. Lita’s father sent her to tell 
neighbors to stock up on supplies. News of attacks on Malaya, Thailand, Singapore, 
Guam, Hong Kong, and Wake Island, followed. That night Lita asked her father if the 
Japanese would attack them. He explained, “The Philippines is a Commonwealth of the 
United States and we’re friends, and so the Japanese will think of us as enemies.”394 
The Japanese now controlled the 4,000 miles of sea between the Philippines and 
the nearest American base at Midway Island. Their troops seized the little island of 
Batan, a hundred and fifty miles north of Luzon, and began building an airfield. Ten 
hours after the attack on Hawaii, Japanese aircraft struck Clark Field north of Manila and 
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crippled MacArthur’s Far East Air Force.395  That evening, the bulk of the U.S. Navy in 
the Philippines, Asiatic Fleet Task Force 5, left the Islands for Australia.  
Four days earlier, MacArthur reorganized his army and placed the four divisions 
and one cavalry regiment in Luzon under Major General Jonathan Wainwright with 
orders to defend the Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales coast, and the Bataan Peninsula. He 
told Wainwright there would be “no withdrawal from the beach positions” and to hold 
them “at all costs.”396 On the beaches, however, local commanders found that inadequate 
training, lack of equipment, and sparse communications undermined such plans.  
MacArthur had sent his officers on B-17 bombers over Luzon to see how two 
volcanoes in Bataan and the Zambales Mountains would constrict enemy movements. 
Impassable mountain ranges in the north would funnel invaders into the lowlands of 
Manila. “The logic of an invasion was obvious,” wrote one officer, “as MacArthur 
understood: land at Lingayen, drive down the plain to Manila, and seize the bay from 
within.”397  MacArthur planned conventional defenses to block these routes. 
Early on 9 December, Japanese aircraft struck Nichols Field south of Manila. In 
the evening planes appeared over Manila. Adalia Marquez, wife of Philippine Civil 
Liberties Union leader Antonio Bautista, recalled, “At first we didn’t think much about 
them. We hoped they were American planes flying up there to assure the Filipinos that 
Uncle Sam was on the job – that he would soon chase the enemy out over the ocean and 
they would never come back. But then the sirens lifted up their mournful voices.”398 Fear 
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swept the capital as the Japanese bombs fell. “Utter confusion seized our whole 
neighborhood,” Marquez remembered.399 
Helen Lawson Cutting, in the advertising staff at the Herald, asked editor Carlos 
Romulo, “Why aren’t we fighting them? Where are our planes?” 400 He had no answer. 
Romulo would soon to return to active duty as an aide to General MacArthur. Reporter 
Yay Panlilio, single mother of three, covered the bombing and then joined others from 
the paper that volunteered to serve USAFFE. The Assistant Chief of Intelligence at Fort 
Santiago, Captain Ralph Keeler, swore her in as a U.S. intelligence agent with badge 
number 67 with instructions to report anything of value.  
Japanese air attacks early on 10 December destroyed the U.S. Navy facilities at 
Cavite. The Naval Yard normally employed 1,500 to 2,000 civilian workers but recently 
had given work to about 5,000 Filipinos. 401  Attacks like these destroyed jobs and 
infrastructure and created a resentful and idle pool of manpower. 
That morning the Japanese Tanaka Detachment landed on Luzon’s north coast at 
Aparri while the Kano Detachment came ashore on the northwest coast at Vigan. These 
were part of six small advanced landings to gain footholds on the island for airfields.402 
MacArthur saw the landings as diversions and refused to engage them in force.403 
Filipinos grew worried. “They were poor people who had nothing to do with this 
new war and little knowledge of the events that brought it upon them,” American 
Lieutenant Ed Ramsey remembered, “They had no weapons and only the frail shelter of  
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bamboo built on stilts, and we urged them to evacuate while there was still time. Few did, 
even the women and children choosing to remain in the home to tend to their copra 
groves and rice paddies.”404 Filipinas began cutting their prized long hair and dressing 
like men in hopes of avoiding Japanese attention. As Adalia Marquez recalled, “We had 
heard about the sex atrocities the Japanese had committed in China.”405 
Against the Japanese landings, initial USAFFE defenses melted away. An 
American commander recalled, “…when the Japs fired on the Filipinos, the noise would 
scare these guys more than anything else, and that they would often break and run. They 
perceived the Japanese as ‘being ten feet tall,’ but they didn’t know what their guns could 
do. They just didn’t have any confidence.”406  MacArthur shifted forces and equipment 
across Manila Bay to the Bataan Peninsula and the island citadel of Corregidor. Recently 
recalled U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Chick Parsons supervised the fueling and 
supply of ships in the Manila port.  
Short and dark complexioned, the thirty-nine-year-old Parsons had learned 
Spanish and stenography in his Tennessee high school. Upon graduation, he hopped a 
freighter to the Philippines where two uncles had remained after the Spanish American 
War.407 In 1921 he found work as a secretary with a commission under retired General 
Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes as they investigated the readiness of the 
Philippines for independence. For three years Parsons traveled the Islands on the yacht 
Apo, learning firsthand local topography, cultures, and dialects. After postgraduate study 
in commerce at the University of the Philippines, he worked for the Telephone and 
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Telegraph Company, became a senior purchaser of lumber on Mindanao for the Meyer 
Muzzall Company and a manager of the North American Trading and Importing 
Company. Parsons found time to accept a commission in the United States Naval Reserve 
with the Pacific Fleet in Manila. When he turned thirty, he married fifteen-year-old 
Katraushka Jurika, daughter of a Czechoslovakian veteran of Spanish-American War, and 
settled into a comfortable life managing the Spanish owned La Insular Cigar and 
Cigarette Factory in Zamboanga. The couple moved to Manila where Parsons managed 
the Luzon Stevedoring Company’s tugboats along with local chrome and magnesium 
mines. He prospered enough to retire young and enjoy life with his wife and three young 
boys. When Katsy’s father died, her mother Blanche moved in to help care for the boys. 
Parsons even organized the Los Tamaraos Polo Club.  With roots established in the 
Philippines, Parsons decided to remain with his family in Manila. 
Fate now asked more of Chick Parsons. To escape confiscation by the Japanese, 
several Danish ships stranded in Manila harbor applied for Panamanian registration.  
Caught without a diplomat in Manila, the Panama sought a local ‘honorary consul’ to 
carry out the transfer. Authorities reached out to Parsons who accepted and received 
Panamanian passports for his family, official papers and seals, and a Panamanian flag.408 
These accouterments would play large in Parsons’ future. 
On 12 December, MacArthur confided to reporters that he could not defend all 
likely invasion points. “The basic principle of handling my troops is to hold them intact 
until the enemy commits himself in force,” he explained, “These small landings are being 
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made to tempt me to spread out and weaken our defenses.”409 Had he organized guerrilla 
forces, this would have been the time to deploy them. 
MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Sidney Huff, went to Quezon’s house in 
Mariquina to discuss movement to Corregidor.410 At 2000 hours that night, Quezon met 
with MacArthur in the Manila Hotel. “The military defense of the Philippines is primarily 
America’s responsibility and not mine,” the President said, “I have already placed every 
Filipino soldier under your command. My own first duty is to take care of the civilian 
population and to maintain public order while you are fighting the enemy.”411 MacArthur 
told Quezon it was his duty to keep him from falling into enemy hands. “He was also of 
the opinion that as long as I was free,” said Quezon, “the occupation of Manila, or even 
of the Philippines, by the Japanese Army would not have the same significance under 
international law as if the Government had been captured or surrendered.”412  
 
Southern Luzon, D5/R-1044 
The Philippine 11th Division faced the Japanese in north Luzon when the Kimura 
Detachment’s 2,500 men landed two hundred miles southeast at Lagaspi.  Major General 
George M. Parker, Jr.’s South Luzon Force covered two hundred and fifty miles of front 
with Brigadier General Vincent Lim’s 41st Division and Brigadier General Albert Jones’ 
51st Division.413  They were spread too thin to stop the landing. The Philippine soldiers 
had too few machine guns and the guns jammed in the sand. “Well, with this,” 
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Blackburn, “the Filipinos started taking off. There was no stopping them.”414 Blackburn 
added, “there was no unity. There was no feeling of pride…. when the Japs hit the beach 
and started shooting, the Filipinos just ran.”415 
Blackburn recognized that the Filipino soldiers were simply unprepared to fight as 
conventional units. English and Tagalog speaking officers could not rally the division’s 
enlisted men who spoke only in the Bicolanian dialect.416 Unable to return fire, they left 
their weapons and fell back. The soldiers had never developed unit teamwork, especially 
in combined arms. Parker instructed his forces to fall back north and destroy all roads, 
bridges and rails along the way. 
 
Manila, D6/R-1043 
Manila received reports of looting in Camarines Sur near the Kimura 
Detachment’s advance, “first, of the Japanese-owned stores, then of those owned by the 
Chinese.” 417  Officials ordered Provincial Inspector of the Sorgoson Philippine 
Constabulary, Major Licerio P. Lapus, to evacuate Legaspi’s 40,000 citizens into the 
nearby hills. Lapus spread word to “go to the mountains and wait for aid.”418 To buy 
time, he led his Constabulary in small hit-and-run attacks against the invaders. Skilled 
men like Medical Inspector First Lieutenant Burgow T. Sayoc arrived and transformed 
Lapus’ band into a guerrilla unit. The Japanese continued north towards Manila.   
At 1100 hours on 13 December, Quezon convened his Council of State. Vice 
President Sergio Osmeña, Speaker of the National Assembly Jose Yulo, Chief Justice 
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Jose Abad Santos, and Majority Floor Leader Quintin Paredes attended along with staff 
secretaries Serafin Marabut (Finance), Jose P. Laurel (Justice), Rafael Alunan 
(Agriculture and Natural Resources), Sotero Baluyot (Commerce and Communication), 
Jorge Bocobo (Public Instruction), Leon Guinto (Labor) and Jose Fabella (Health). 
Quezon’s protégé Secretary to the President Jorge B. Vargas served as acting Secretary of 
Defense. Teofilo Sison served as the Head of the Civilian Emergency Administration. 
Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army General Basilio Valdes and Chief of the Philippine 
Constabulary General Guillermo Francisco represented the military and the police forces. 
Finally, Senator Manuel Roxas, wore his U.S. Army major’s uniform as liaison to 
MacArthur. Quezon later wrote that Roxas was “one of our most able.”419  
The Council of State reviewed defense plans. Valdes reviewed the call up of 
80,000 men in seven divisions for Luzon, two for the Visayas, one for Mindanao, along 
with the 10,000 Americans soldiers and 10,000 Philippines scouts.  Francisco reported 
his 6,000 Philippine Constabulary had “orders to round up all the Japanese and to take 
them to internment camps.”420 Quezon, “well trained by actual experience to stand the 
hardships of war,” still did not consider guerrilla resistance.421 
 
Southern Luzon, D7/R-1042 
 In southern Camarines Sur, Assemblyman Mariano E. Villafuerte appealed to 
Governor Ramon Imperial to return from hiding to restore order in the provincial capital 
Naga.422  Villafuerte, whose prominent family ran the lumber mill in Sipocot and who 
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had introduced the Boys Scouts to the Philippines, fretted about Naga’s citizens. The 
governor declined to return and instead authorized Villafuerte to act in his place. 
Villafuerte rallied the Naga police and got the government operating to reassure both the 
people of the province and the Commonwealth Government. 
 At 0800 hours on 14 December, the Japanese entered Naga. Locals had to decide 
to fight, flee, or cooperate. Villafuerte left for Sipocot leaving the governor’s brother 
Senator Domingo Imperial to meet the invaders. Using local Japanese resident Kubota as 
interpreter, Commander Denzo Kuriyama asked for the governor, the former governor, 
assemblyman Ramon Felipe, and Villafuerte. “That early,” Jose V. Barrameda, Jr., wrote, 
“their policy apparently was to get the political big guns to serve in the government a-
forming under the control of the Japanese military.”423 
Kuriyama spent two days meeting with Villafuerte, both Imperial brothers, 
Bishop Pedro P. Santos, and Naga resident American judge Robert E Manley who lost his 
mansion to the Japanese military police as their headquarters. It fell to Villafuerte to 
organize the thirty-two provincial municipalities for occupation. Several times he would 
try to give up his post. The province had P600,000 frozen in the Philippine National 
Bank. Villafuerte sought a loan of P500,000 using the bank account as collateral. The 
government was so absent of funds that on 16 December, Kuriyama released P3,000 to its 
coffers. 424 Kuriyama also tasked Kubato to organize a Japanese Association in Naga.   
Elsewhere in Bicol, recently elected congressman and Philippine Army reserve 
lieutenant Wenceslao Q. Vinzons of Camarines Norte opted to fight. By 18 December, 
assisted by Francisco “Turko” Boayes, he had several hundred men organized as 
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Vinzons’ Traveling Guerrillas (VTG). They quickly impounded Chinese merchant Dy 
Hian Sian’s mill and stockpiles of rice, storing it in mines and villages.425  Vinzons then 
removed his provincial government from Legaspi to the remote town of Tuláy na Lupà. 
Short, dark Negritos from Labo came to complain of Japanese pillaging and raping. 
Vinzons advised them to fight with their bows and poison arrows. Days later he received 
hard-to-believe reports that sixty Negritoes destroyed a column of two thousand Japanese 
on the Manila South Road.426 
Prejudice colored opinions of the Negritos but American Henry Clay Conner 
lived among them and knew them well. “Not only were they enthusiastic fighters who 
hated the Japanese, but it was impossible to put spies among them because no other 
people looked like them,” Lapham knew Connor and said, “He thought they had much 
more intelligence than others gave them credit for, and said they were remarkably loyal 
to him once he learned their language and treated them as equals.”427  Connor even 
married the sister of Negrito tribal chief Kodario Laxaman and had a child by her. Once 
the Philippines were liberated, however, he left his new wife and son to return to the 
States, fifteen years later arranging to provide them financial support.428 
Another Luzon tribe subject to prejudice were the “pygmy-sized, bushy-haired, 
extremely dark skinned” Igorots dressed in loincloths and armed only with bolo knives 
and bows and arrows.429  Bob Stahl witnessed their lethality against a target one-hundred-
feet distant: “Immediately the Igorot whipped out an arrow and zinged it into the tree. 
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And again, and again. Three arrows in not more than ten seconds, all without the 
attention-gathering noise of rifle fire, and if there had been a six-inch-diameter bull’s eye 
on that tree, all three arrows would have been in it! I could do no better with a carbine.” 
430 The Igorots were naturals for guerrilla hit-and-run tactics. 
According to Barrameda, “During the first days, the invaders treated the civilians 
generally with almost exemplary courtesy, partly because most of the Japanese troops 
were being thrown northwards in a savage drive to bring MacArthur and his stubbornly 
heroic Filipino-American soldiers to their knees according to a timetable. The Japanese 
did not want an actively resistant population against their initially skeleton-force 
garrisons behind the war front.”431 Even so, at 0430 hours on 18 December, Vinzons and 
Turko led an attack on Japanese troops at Laniton Bridge in Basud, Camarines Norte, 
killing five soldiers.432 About six hours later one hundred and twenty Japanese soldiers 
arrived at Daet.  Vinzons fled to hide in Barrio Tulaynalupa.  
Before the end of December, Philippine Constabulary Sergeant Faustino Flor and 
municipal counselor Teofilo Padua organized the Camp Isarog Guerrillas near 
Irigacalled. 433 Because Flor brought more weapons, the group named him captain and 
commander while Padua became First Lieutenant and executive officer. 
The emergent resistance groups had more volunteers than weapons. Almost all 
Filipinos carried knives with blades that varied by tribe: wavy kris, thick elliptical 
barong, curved campilan, angled kukri, etc. Guns were harder to find. Some gathered old 
Springfield and Enfield rifles from abandoned USAFFE training areas or old battlefields. 
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Others created their own weapons. Many crafted a crude shotgun known as the baltik 
from a three-quarter inch pipe using 2-guage shotgun shells. Don Willis recalled: “The 
pipe was fitted into a larger pipe so it would slide back and forth. A wooden stock was 
put on the opposite end of the large pipe with a short length of nail sticking up in the 
center of the larger pipe. A hole was cut in the side of the larger pipe. The small pipe was 
slid forward, a shell loaded into it, the gun was pointed at the target, and then the small 
barrel is jerked sharply back. The nail hits the primer of the 12-guage shell, and the shot 
is on the way.” 434  It was definitely not a long-range weapon. “Nor was the baltik 
accurate,” Bob Stalh reported, “for without a rifle’s bore to send it point first on a direct 
course, the slug, if it hit its target, often hit broadside, with very effective results. Crude 
as it was, the baltik had killing power, and that was what mattered.”435 
 
Central Luzon, D11/R-1038 
The Philippine government called up the untrained militia to support the 
conventional defense. One U.S. officer noted, “Most had never seen a rifle and few 
possessed even uniforms.”436  All senior and junior ROTC cadets also received orders to 
report to army camps and join USAFFE units. Instructors sent freshman and sophomore 
cadets home, but many chose not to stay there. 
 USAFFE hastily shuffled units to the front. Lieutenant Ed Ramsey had joined the 
26th U.S. Cavalry at Fort Stotsenberg in June only to spend “every spare minute” 
preparing for a match against the Manila Polo Club. Meanwhile, he remembered, “reports 
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of Japanese over-flights became so frequent that we scarcely took notice of them.”437 
Suddenly he received orders to take a staff car with a radio, two machine guns, twenty-
seven Filipino cavalrymen on horseback, and local constabulary troops to central Luzon 
and defend the east coast from Dingalen to Baler. Traveling that area by car from one end 
to the other took more than three hours. “It was a forlorn hope,” Ramsey recalled, “I 
knew it as I set out.”438  MacArthur counted on many such forlorn deployments to slow 
the Japanese until he could counterattack.439 Yet the thinly spread units could only report 
and fall back, assuming they could communicate at all.  
 
Davao, Mindanao, D13/R-1036 
Attacks on Japanese residents in Luzon caused the Japanese high command to worry about the 
security of the large Japanese population in Davao, Mindanao. Homma sent a small battle group from Palau 
to secure Davao late on 20 December. Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Miura’s force consisted of the 56th 
Brigade of the newly raised 56th   Division augmented by the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Infantry Regiment.440  
The next morning, USAFFE Chief of Staff Sutherland dictated a message to Washington: “Enemy 
attacking Davao with land forces from four transports. Engaged by advance elements of the 101st Division. 
If more than predatory effort I plan to launch guerrilla warfare throughout Mindanao with Mohammedan 
population.”441 He prepared no such plans. 
After securing Davao, the Miura Detachment lost the 56th Brigade to Jolo Island and the 
Netherlands Indies. Miura augmented his remaining battalion with local constabulary forces before 
attempting to extend his control on Mindanao into Digos, Augusan, and Zamboango. A few skirmishes 
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later, he decided to remain around Davao.442 American commander, General William F. Sharp, thought it 
best not to attack Miura’s position.443  
 
Central Luzon, D15/R-1034 
Late on 22 December eighty Japanese ships dodged sporadic 155mm artillery fire 
and entered the Lingayen Gulf north of Manila. The next morning, they landed six 
regiments of the 48th Division and threatened to cut off the 11th Philippine Regiment at 
the southern tip of the bay. Major Russell Volckmann had just recently assumed 
command of the regiment.  
The thirty-year old Iowan and West Pointer Volckmann had arrived in country 
with his wife and son only eighteen months earlier. He became the executive officer of 
the Filipino regiment when it stood up in July. The next month he waved goodbye to his 
family as they joined the exodus back to the States. His family was now his unit’s 
mountain Igorots and lowland Ilocanos and Cagayanos who spoke eleven dialects.444 He 
noted, “The officers, being mainly political appointees, had less training than the men 
they were to lead.” 445  At Daguban they scavenged shovels and other equipment to 
prepare defensive positions. They retreated without ever having seen the enemy. 
Units rushed from the Lingayen Gulf to Baguio where the commander of Camp 
John Hay, Lieutenant Colonel John P. Horan, tried to get them organized. Regimental 
commanders Colonel Donald Bonnett, Major Max Ganahl, Lieutenant Colonel Martin 
Moses, and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble met with Horan and discussed the 
possibility of dispersing to wage guerrillas operations. “It was known at the time that 
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there were food stocks and weapons in the many mines around the area,” Blackburn 
recalled, “Most of the mines, as the story went, had about six months to a year’s supply 
of food, and quantities of weapons, and a lot of the miners were [in the] Reserves.”446  
Horan decided to use his radio to coordinate with MacArthur’s headquarters one hundred 
and thirty miles to the south. Many of the units around Camp John Hay, however, had no 
means of communication. The 11th Infantry Regiment arrived with “neither wire nor 
radio communications between the battalions and the regimental command post.”447 The 
12th Infantry Regiment came with “no vehicles, no radios, no mortars, and only one rifle 
company.”448 USAFFE ordered all the units to fall back to Bataan.  
With the Japanese cutting between Baguio and Manila, MacArthur authorized 
Horan to take whatever steps he thought necessary to save the units.449 Horan gathered 
his forces and retreated to Caranglan before turning back to Kiangan.  The Japanese 
reached Balete Pass and cut off his position. On Christmas Eve, Horan radioed: “My right 
hand is in a vise, my nose in an inverted funnel, constipated my bowels. Open my south 
paw…”450 USAFFE headquarters replied, “Save your command.”451  Horan destroyed 
vehicles and equipment, dissolved his force, and authorized his men to head for Bataan, 
surrender, or fight on as guerillas. He gave Filipino soldiers permission to go home.  
Horan’s destruction of his radios would prove costly, but the SCR-177’s radio, 
receiver and generator were a bulky forty-five pounds and his soldiers needed to move 
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quickly.452 As for himself, Horan opted to fight on as a guerrilla. Volckmann wrote: “As 
a result of this order, sparks of resistance spread to every corner of North Luzon, and 
from these sparks a flame sprang that burned throughout the dark days of the Japanese 
occupation.”453 He was unaware that Lapus, Vinzons, and others were already fighting. 
 
Southern Luzon, D16, R-1033 
MacArthur’s withdrawal had left Bicol undefended, creating a power vacuum filled by 
Filipinos. Citizens and remnant USAFFE troops gravitated to Vinzons, Lapus, Lieutenant 
Colonel Montano Zabat of Albay, Sorsogon Province Governor Salvador C. Escudero, 
and Gregorio Espinas in Sorsogon City. Zabat – “a self-styled colonel who had been a 
traffic officer in Albay and Sorsogon with the pre-war rank of first lieutenant” – led the 
strongest group with three to four hundred armed men in Camarines Norte.454 Lapus 
established his base in the Inang Maharang mountain forests near Manito in Albay, with 
training facilities on the remote Bulusan volcano slopes. Escudero’s family connections 
and political alliances gave him power in Sorsogon province but inspired challenges from 
other guerillas, especially Lapus. These leaders had to compete for scarce support. A later 
U.S. Army report said: “Fighting between units over matters of area command almost 
exceeds any fighting against the Japanese. The leaders have frequently asked for an 
appointed outside commander, knowing their own shortcomings and desiring to 
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contribute something more concrete to their country, but no action has been taken to 
coordinate these units.”455  Bicol remained a Filipino field of battle. 
 
 
                                                        
455 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Guerrilla 
Resistance Movements in the Philippine,” 31 March 1945, Box 255, RG 407, Philippines Archive 






Map 6: Major Guerrilla Groups in Bicol (southern Luzon), December 1941 
 A 1937 Philippine Constabulary Academy graduate, Lieutenant Ernesto S. Mata, 
led an independent group of seventy-five to one hundred armed men along the coast of 
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Zabat’s area in Camarines Norte. Padua, with Flor, had three hundred and fifty armed 
men (but claimed 2,000 members) in the reorganized Camp Isarog Guerrilla Unit (CIGU) 
in the San Miguel Bay area of Camarines Sur. He would join Zabat’s force. Philippine 
Army finance sergeant Juan Q. Miranda promoted himself to captain and organized the 
Tangkong Vaga Guerrillas (TVGU) near Libmanan, Camarines Sur. 456  Damaso O. 
Dianela, who claimed to be a captain in the U.S. Army, raised a band in Camaroan that 
became known as the Camp Tingawagan Guerrillas. Major Francisco Sandico, the 
Provincial Inspector of Albay and Senior Constabulary in Bicol, and Lieutenant Julio 
Llanrezas led active, independent groups in Albay Province, and twenty-one-year-old 
Lieutenant Salvador Rudolfo commanded guerrillas on the island of Cantanduanes.   
Later, Captain Eustacio D. Orobia, a Philippine Division air officer taken prisoner on 
Bataan and paroled, assumed the title of “General” and organized 200 men of the Bagong 
Katipunan guerrillas around Jovellar on the west coast opposite Legaspi.457 Meanwhile a 
Major Aguilar reportedly formed another band around Tiwi on east coast. Zabat, Lapus 
and Padua competed to recruit a small group under a Captain Tacerua on Burias Island 
off the west coast of Bicol.  
North and Central Luzon, D17, R-1032 
In Pangasinan Province, Jose de Guzman led guerrilla attacks in Umingan, San 
Nicolas, Asingan, San Quentin and Tying. 458 Closer to Manilla, in Bulacan Province, 
Pacifico Cabreras led forty men in operations near Baliuag.  On the northeast corner of 
Luzon, Cayagan Province Governor Marcelo Adduru withdrew his government from 
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Tuguegarao to the inland town of Tuao on the Chico River. A reserve major in the 
Philippine Army, Adduru had since August prepared contingencies and trained his 
constabulary in guerrilla tactics. 459  He reorganized two Constabulary companies, 
augmented by USAFFE stragglers and local volunteers, into the Cayagan Guerrilla force. 
With Adduru was American Captain Ralph Praeger. After the Japanese landed at 
Aparri, Praeger’s Troop C of the 26th Cavalry attempted to delay the invaders in the 
Cagayan Valley. The landing in the Lingayen Gulf cut them off from the main USAFFE 
forces. Praeger withdrew through Tuguegaroa towards Vigan in Ilocos Sur and received 
orders to disperse his isolated force. He turned what remained of C Troop back northwest 
into the Cagayan Valley. 460  There he picked up a number of Filipino soldiers from 
disbanded units. Praeger arrived at Adduru’s headquarters with Lieutenant Francis Camp 
and three other American officers from Horan’s dissolved command.  
The USAFFE forces were without sufficient food, communications, sleep or 
guidance, and became increasingly frustrated. Supplied only with commercial maps, 
Captain John Wheeler of the 26th Cavalry complained, “Jesus Christ, these maps aren’t 
worth a damn. I now know where to buy Goodyear tires and Camel cigarettes everywhere  
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Map 7: Major Guerrilla Units in North and Central Luzon, December 1941 
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between here and Subic Bay, but I’m damned if I can tell where a trail ends or a river or a 
bridge is anywhere.”461 The men stumbled past the limits of endurance. Seeing his friend 
Cliff Hardwick shot through the head, Ramsey recalled, “I brooded over it all day until I 
felt I might be going mad.”462 Only faith in reinforcement from America kept the men in 
the field going. Leaders in Washington, however, knew the otherwise. In late December, 
Roosevelt told Churchill the Philippines were a lost cause while Secretary of War Henry 
L. Stimson added: “There are times when men have to die.”463 
Early on Christmas Eve the Japanese 16th Division landed at Lamon Bay at the 
waist of Luzon. At 0900 hours, MacArthur’s aide Colonel Sidney Huff went to 
Malacañang Palace to inform President Quezon that it was time to move the seat of 
government to Corregidor. At 1500 that afternoon, after a delay caused by Japanese 
bombing, Quezon and his family, his senior aide Colonel Manuel Nieto, Vice President 
Osmeña, Chief Justice Abad Santos, Major General Valdes, and the President’s staff 
headed out in two launches for the S.S. Mayon anchored about a mile out in the bay.464 
United States High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis Bowes Sayre and his family 
and staff joined them.465  Four hours later MacArthur and his staff followed them to the 
island fortress on Corregidor known as “the Rock.” Chief of the Philippine Constabulary 
Major General Francisco stayed behind to maintain law and order. MacArthur also left 
his Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall, behind to run the rear 
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guard. Quezon left Secretary of Justice Laurel and Presidential Executive Secretary 
Vargas with instructions, “You two will… deal with the Japanese.”466 
On Christmas day as part of the force from Davao seized Jolo, Homma neared his 
main objective, Manila. USAFFE’s series of defensive lines had pushed Homma behind 
schedule. Then on 26 December, MacArthur declared Manila an open city. There would 
be no final stand in the capital. MacArthur urged the 684,000 citizens of Manila to 
evacuate, and 400,000 would indeed leave. 467  The Yumol family joined the harried 
exodus in an over-loaded Packard and headed for their matriarchal grandmother’s home 
in Mabatang, Bataan. Some relatives remained in Manila saying, “This is our home – we 
were born and grew up here; we built up this town. We would never abandon it; we need 
to keep it going. And if we would die here, so be it.”468   
MacArthur completed his withdrawal across Manila Bay to the Bataan Peninsula. 
Homma followed. Retreating soldiers advised the Filipinos along their route to leave 
before the Japanese arrived. On 27 December, near Bayambang, Volckmann received 
orders to move the remnants of his 11th Regiment another fifty miles south and join the 
forces in north Bataan. They commandeered all the vehicles they could find and headed 
south. Bado Dangwa, who ran a transportation company in the Mountain Province, 
turned over one hundred and thirty buses and other vehicles to USAFFE. When the 
Japanese arrived at Baguio, he headed into the hills to organize a resistance group.  
One of those left behind was twenty-five-year-old Japanese mestizo Cecile Okubo 
Afable, an editor and writer for the Baguio Midland Courier. Japanese soldiers entered 
her home, executed her pacifist Japanese father, and seized their house – apparently 
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because it had a grand piano – for use as a brothel. 469  Cecile recalled about a hundred 
women brought to the house as sex slaves for the Japanese soldiers. A number were later 
killed for trying to escape or to prevent them from testifying after the war. 
 On 28 December, President Roosevelt delivered a radio address: “I give to the 
people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their 
independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and material, of the 
United States stand behind that pledge. It is not for me or for the people of this country to 
tell you where your duty lies. We are engaged in a great and common cause. I count on 
every Philippine man, woman, and child to do his duty. We will do ours.”470 Quezon later 
said, “On reading the message I was instantly electrified and thrilled.”471  Hernanado J. 
Abaya recalled thinking, “Our freedom would be redeemed! This meant the battle of the 
Philippines was already lost.”472 Captain Jesus Villamor, a hero pilot now serving as an 
aid to Quezon realized, “Clearly no American warships were on the way. There would be 
no victory dinner at the Manila Hotel on New Year’s Day.”473 
Quezon had won reelection as president on 11 November. To demonstrate the 
functioning of his government, he insisted on carrying out an inauguration ceremony on 
Corregidor on 30 December. First his staff had to find a radio to “communicate with the 
outside world …with the occupied areas.” 474  The headquarters contacted Brigadier 
General Marshall in Manila who sent Major Teague and Lieutenant Ince scrambling to 
find a radio strong enough to broadcast from the Rock. For the ceremony, U.S. High 
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Commissioner Sayre and MacArthur flanked Quezon. Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos 
gave the oath. Quezon then spoke: “At the present time we have but one task – to fight 
with America for America and the Philippines… Ours is a great cause. We are fighting 
for human liberty and justice, for those principles of individual freedom which we all 
cherish and without which life would not be worth living.” 475  In the weeks ahead, 
however, Quezon began to doubt Roosevelt and said, “It seems that Washington does not 
fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and 
welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here.”476  He began to consider 
possible ways to pursue immediate independence and neutral status in the war. 
In Manila the leftist members of the Philippine Civil Liberties Union, who had 
long fought for democratic reforms, feared the Japanese arrival.477  Antonio Bautista 
hosted a secret Union meeting to organize an underground resistance he called ‘the 
group.’478  Founding members included Ramon de Santos, Lorenzo Tanada, Francisco 
Lava, Anselmo Claudio, R. Mamino Corpus, Cirpriano Cid of the Manila Bulletin, 
columnist Amando L. Dayrit, Jesus Roces, Rafael R. Roces, Jose B.L. Reyes, Jesus 
Barrera, and Bautista. 479  Eventually ‘the group’ became better known as The Free 
Philippines and managed to place agents inside the collaborationist government and the 
Japanese hierarchy. They sent communist leader Vincente Lava “out to the province to 
help set up an underground movement.”480 The Japanese were on the lookout for these 
men. They eventually captured and executed de Santos, Rafael Roces, and Apacible. 
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Bautista was captured, reportedly escaped, but was never seen again. Dayrit died in the 
hospital in 1944.  
 
South Central Luzon, D21/R-1028 
“At this time,” a later U.S. Army assessment noted, “popular sentiment in the 
Philippines was agitated due to enemy propaganda and the strategies of some vicious 
inhabitants including Chinese residents and members of the Communist Party.” 481 
Chinese Workers’ Union, the Dramatic Clubs, the Chinese Cultural Association and the 
Salvation Association combined to form the Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force 
(Feilubin huaqiao kangri zhidui also known as the Hau Zhi, Wha Chi or Wah Chi) in 
Bataan with cells in Laguna, Tayabas, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Bulacan, Rizal, 
and Batangas. The group established communications and assisted people in escaping the 
Japanese while spreading anti-Japanese propaganda and encouraging loyalty to the 
United States, the Philippines and the Chinese Nationalists. Yung Li Yuk-Wai noted, 
“Unlike the Chinese leftists, the Chinese resistance forces on the rightist side were 
characterized by diversity and disunity.” 482 
The eighty members of the Philippines Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services 
Corps provided aid to bombing victims in Manila but dissolved when the Japanese were 
about to enter the city. One of the three members of the Kuomintang’s Standing 
Committee in the Philippines, Shi Yisheng, received authority from the Chinese Military 
Council to convert the Chinese Volunteers of the Philippines (CVP) into a guerrilla force. 
They became the genesis of two groups, the US-CVP in the Baguio-La Union area under 
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Li Bocai (Lee Pak-chay aka Vincente Lopez) linked to USAFFE, and the CVP under Shi 
Yisheng in the Calabugao Mountains in La Union.483 Unsubstantiated sources reported 
that on 18 December, USAFFE supplied the US-CVP with 600 Springfield rifles.484  
The Philippine Chinese United Workers Union joined other Chinese leftists to 
form the Anti-Japanese and Chinese-protection Committee (AJCPC) and a militia of 
Wartime Service Corps (WSC) and petitioned Quezon and MacArthur to join 
USAFFE.485  On 25 December, Wang Xixiong of the AJCPC led 400 Chinese women, 
children, and elderly out of Manila to Paete, Laguna. Xu Jingcheng and Chen Cunsheng 
led others to Bulacan. Huang Jie and Cai Jianhua took the WSC to San Fernando, 
Pampanga, to train. After leaving Manila, the AJCPC reformed as the Emergency Action 
Committee (Feichang shiqi xingdong weiyuanhui).  
A group under Xu Zhimeng included leftist and nationalists, the Philippine 
Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (Feilubin huqiao kangri chujian yiyongdui) or 
Kang Chu or PCAJVC. 486 With up to 300 members the PCAJVC conducted nonmilitary 
operations such as gathering food and publishing the Chinese Commercial Bulletin 
(Qiaoshang gong bao). 
The appearance of such guerrilla units annoyed Homma. Unwilling to divert his 
hard-pressed combat units, he ordered his Luzon Line of Communication Department to 
apprehend these “insidious elements” of USAFFE in the north central areas around 
Bontoc, Bayombong, and Zambales with support from the Army Air Unit.487  To the 
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Japanese military, ambush and sabotage were the work of lawless ‘bandits,’ not 
organized enemy resistance. As such, they were the responsibility of the local 
government, not the Imperial Army. Homma instructed Filipino political leaders 
including Manila mayor of Jorge Vargas to establish “a central administrative organ” to 
execute governmental affairs and a “provisional consultative committee” to ensure strict 
accord with the Japanese military.488  While he still hoped Quezon and his government 
would return and cooperate, Homma needed a national authority to keep law and order. 
Stories of the Japanese committing random rapes, beatings and killings spread 
like wildfire. When Japanese soldiers shot and killed a teacher in Vigan, Buenaventura J. 
Bello, for refusing to lower his school’s American flag, his name became famous 
throughout the Islands.489  Yet in many personal encounters, Filipinos found Japanese 
troops less than terrifying. Isabel Yumol remembered her father’s first encounter. In 
heavily accented English the older of two soldiers identified himself as a colonel who 
taught at the University of Tokyo. His compatriot was a lieutenant who was once one of 
his students. They were lost and needed directions. The younger soldier used a translation 
dictionary to call Isabel “little sister” and shared a picture of a girl he called, “my sister, 
same you, miss her.”490  The soldiers moved on, leaving behind a relieved Yumol family.  
Marcos V. Augustín had a much different experience. The son of a lawyer and 
mayor, Augustin had run away from home at a young age and earned his living as a boxer 
and cab driver.491 He entered the army as a truck driver. As a part of demolition platoon 
under Lieutenant Colonel Narcisco L. Manzano, he became trapped behind enemy lines 
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when the USAFFE engineers blew the Kalumpít Bridges early on New Year’s Day.492 
They destroyed their equipment, dropped 130 rifles and cases of ammo into the Pasig 
River, and headed south. Augustin traveled with Lieutenant Vidan through Pampanga 
and witnessed a Japanese patrol kill an old man who tried to stop them from beating his 
wife and raping his granddaughter.493  They shot Vidan through the head and captured 
Augustin. Discovering he had a tattoo of an American eagle with the Stars and Stripes 
and the words “Love unto Death,” the Japanese beat Augustin harshly.494  Though bound 
and tied, he managed to knock down a guard and jump from a truck into a river. Augustin 
escaped into the hills near Antipolo and gathered around him a band of resistance 
fighters. He assumed a nom de guerre, Marking.  
Many Filipinas suffered worst. On a street in Angels City, Pampanga, two 
Japanese soldiers grabbed fourteen-year-old Maria Rosa Luna Henson while she was 
gathering firewood. She screamed and an officer arrived to berate the two men. The 
officer then grabbed Maria from behind and raped her on the street before passing her to 
the others to share. In all, twenty-four soldiers raped her that day.495 The Japanese took 
Maria with six other women to a rice mill near a local army headquarters. Ten to twenty 
Japanese soldiers raped the women and young girls every day for several months.496  In 
August the soldiers moved their captives to a larger facility.497  
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The Filipinas suffered from a combination of Japanese cultural attitudes towards 
both subjected people and women. A British observer noted in 1912: “It has been 
conclusively shown that at present the social structure of Japan rests upon loose 
foundations; that woman, though not subjected to physical ill-treatment, is precluded 
from exercising a will of her own; and that the prince no less than the peasant is not slow 
to take advantage of a system that gives rein to the passions.”498 The writer, Lancelot 
Lawrence, added: “It is not realized that in the midst of a country which perhaps more 
than any other part of the world has been endowed with the glorious beauties of nature, 
thousands of women, and even little girls, are enslaved in a condition of moral 
degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings of Christianity are 
accepted.”499 
Jesus Villamor recalled hearing: “The Japanese raped all Filipino women they got 
hold of, some of the men believed, and I was inclined to think this true, so many were the 
stories of horrors carried by the [bamboo] telegraph.”500 Thirty-two Japanese soldiers in 
Cebu reportedly took turns raping the fourteen and sixteen-year-old daughters of a man 
found with suspicious slips of paper.501 A guerrilla said, “The degree to which they raped 
and otherwise brutalized legions of women led to the frequent remark that the Spaniards 
had built churches in the Philippines, the Americans had built schools, and the Japanese 
had built brothels.”502  
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South Luzon, D25/R-1024 
In Bicol, the Japanese hunted Vinzons for fear that he served as a potential center 
of resistance. Indeed, by New Year’s Day, Philippine soldiers from units disbanded near 
Gumaca, Tayabas, were streaming into Vinzon’s new headquarters in Camarines Sur. 
The Japanese stepped up propaganda efforts to compel Vinzons’ surrender, including 
torturing members of his Young Philippines political party and burning down barrios.503 
 
Central Luzon, D25/R-1024 
On 1 January 1942, Homma’s reconnaissance reported large fires in Manila. He 
acted quickly to save targeted areas from destruction and to rescue the city’s Japanese 
citizens.504  At 2000 hours he ordered his 48th Division to occupy and hold the capital.  
At the same moment MacArthur met with Quezon on Corregidor. “General 
MacArthur read aloud to those present a telegram which he had received from 
Washington to the effect that if my evacuation could possibly be accomplished,” Quezon 
wrote, “I should be taken to Washington and function there as the head of the 
Commonwealth Government in exile and as the symbol of the redemption of the 
Philippines.”505  The asthmatic Quezon suffered terrible coughing fits in Corregidor’s 
damp tunnels, but preferred to stay on the Rock. He passed the decision to his Cabinet 
and they determined he “should refuse to make the trip” under the assumption that 
“before Bataan and Corregidor were forced to surrender, sufficient help would come 
from the American and Filipino forces to take the offensive and drive the enemy out of 
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the land.”506 Quezon later confessed that at the time he knew his “evacuation to America 
could be made in comparative safety” and he “was doubtful if help could come in 
time.”507 He remained. 
On Luzon, Horan lost all hope. He disbanded his remaining units near 
Cararanglan, Neuva Ecija. Major Calvert Parker of the 43rd Infantry left with Captain 
Arthur Murphy and Private Grafton “Budd” Spencer to find the units in Bataan. They 
made it as far as Montalban in Rizal before Japanese forces forced them back north.508  
Meanwhile Major Everett Warner and Captain Manuel P. Enriquez organized guerrillas 
around Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, into the ‘1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment.’ Captain 
Guillermo Nakar joined them with remnants of the 71st Infantry Regiment. With 
scavenged equipment, Nakar established radio contact with Corregidor in mid-January.  
On 2 January, the society page of the Manila Tribune reported the wedding of 
Jose Laurel III, son of the prominent Secretary of Justice. Jose III had studied at a 
Japanese military academy before becoming a captain in the USAFFE. He had 
commanded troops at Mauban until his capture. 509  His timely release signified the 
Japanese interest in placating Filipino politicians like the Secretary of Justice. 
At 1745 hours that evening, the Japanese 48th division entered Manila with three 
infantry battalions. Fifteen minutes later another infantry battalion and reconnaissance 
units from the 16th Division joined them. Japanese residents welcomed them 
enthusiastically.510 Homma garrisoned the city with two infantry battalions of the 48th 
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Division later joined by four infantry battalions of the 16 Division.511 All schools closed, 
leaving 2,000,000 students across the Philippines on the streets.512 Still, the lack of a 
decisive battle upset Japanese campaign plan. Homma turned to the Bataan Peninsula, an 
area he knew only from a few 1:200,000 scale maps.513 
Quezon later wrote that not until 2 January did he notice Roosevelt had said 
Philippine independence would be redeemed. He asked MacArthur if that word indicated 
Roosevelt thought the Islands to be irredeemably lost. “The General,” wrote Quezon, 
“while not expressing a positive opinion, suggested the possibility that the transmission 
of the presidential message might have been garbled.”514 Quezon had the word changed 
to “preserved” before relaying Roosevelt’s message to the men on Bataan. 515  
The next morning Chick Parsons awoke to discover Japanese sentries in front of 
his house in Manila. A sign on the front gate declared the home as “Property of the 
Imperial Japanese Government.”516 Parsons and his family faced internment. Thinking 
quickly, he ran a Panamanian flag up his flagpole and informed the guards he had 
diplomatic immunity. After verifying his status with the Philippine government, Japanese 
officials arrived to inspect Parson’s credentials. They suspiciously approved his neutral 
status. Parsons then spent days exploring the city to witness Japanese actions and Filipino 
reactions. He turned his curiosity into intelligence collection and, with Katsy’s help, filed 
reports he thought might be useful one day.  Catholic priests supplied names of people 
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held by the Japanese. Disguised as a peasant, Parsons went into the jungles to find 
guerrillas. Only once did police detain him in Santo Tomás for a couple hours.517  
On 3 January, the Japanese announced martial law in all occupied districts. In 
Naga they painted the outline of two feet in the front of the capitol building. “All 
Filipinos passing by the building had to stand with their feet inside the outlines and bow 
to the Japanese sentries,” a witness recalled, “A wrong bow brought a blow on the 
Filipino, so people practiced bowing.”518 These measures supported population control. 
Leon Parong of Tibgao executed a perfect bow, but still suffered instant arrest followed 
by a month of forced labor on a gang at the Pili airport.519  
In the afternoon three hundred men, women and children reported as ordered to 
the University of Santo Tomas in Manila. 520   Only that morning Japanese officials 
selected the fifty-acre campus as an internment camp for foreign nationals. Four hundred 
more arrived the next day, another five hundred on Tuesday, and hundreds more through 
the rest of the week. Luis de Alcuaz, Secretary to the Father Rector, opened more space 
to the new arrivals, but the conditions were harsh. “Within 10 days, there were over 3,000 
people in the camp, some 2,000 of whom were lodged in the main building, 700 in the 
gymnasium, and 400 in the annex,” intern A.V.H. Hartendorf reported, “From 30 to 50 
people were jammed into each of the rooms in the main building and annex, and the 
average floor space per person was only about 22 square feet; in some rooms it was at 
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one time as low as 16 square feet.”521 Seventy percent of the interns were Americans, 
twenty-five percent were British, the rest from many countries.  
 From that first day, Filipino fiends and neighbors arrived outside the camp 
bringing food and other necessities. Soon the routine crowds established exchange points 
with the internees through “The Gate,” “The Fence,” and “The Package Line.” “The 
Japanese were astounded and irked at the loyalty and affection shown by the Filipinos for 
their ‘oppressors,’” Hartendorf wrote, “and at first attempted to drive the crowds off with 
blows, but they kept coming back.” After three weeks, the commandant banned internees 
from the front grounds and ordered all Filipinos not to approach the fence. Packages still 
went in and out, many with notes of communication. Always lacking adequate sanitation 
facilities, food, or water, internees organized committees, hospital wards, and even a 
school for the children. The occupiers adopted harsher measures to reform the population. 
 On 4 January, Horan reorganized his remaining forces into the 43rd Infantry, 
Philippine Scouts, and withdrew to Kiangan, Ilfugao. A week later, he secured an Army 
radio in Bontoc and sent it to Aritao where Warner, Enriquez and Nakar had formed the 
1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment.522  Horan had Technical Sergeant William Bowen and 
Private Earl Brazelton of Camp John Hay’s 228th Signal Company build another radio out 
of old radios and spare parts.523  He contacted USAFFE and was told to carry on as 
guerrillas under the designation of the 121st Regiment.  
                                                        
521 Hartendorp, Vol. I, 11. 
522 Horan’s accounts are from “Dairy [sic] of Col Horan,” National Archives, Philippine Archives 
Collection, RG 407 Box 258. The radio was probably the Bureau of Post radio at Suyoc. See also 
Geography of Luzon, June 1942, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, 
Box No. 68, Records Group 16. 
523 Norling, 50. 
 
126 
Twenty miles east of Warner, Major Calvert commanded the remnants of the 43rd 
Infantry Regiment, the bulk of it being the A and B companies of Ifugoa tribesmen from 
Bontoc in the Mountain Province and Philippine Scouts from nearby Bontoc. These men 
transformed themselves into the Calvert Guerrillas, determined to protect their homes. 
They moved west to link up with Warner, but they would never made the rendezvous. 
 Horan reached out to claim command of guerrillas from Abra Province to La 
Union Province. At the war’s outbreak, American engineer Walter Cushing demolished 
his mine in Kalinga and ventured into Abra where a number of disorganized soldiers 
guarded armories for deployed Philippine Constabulary units.524 Cushing took charge of a 
training unit in Bangued and commandeered their weapons. He moved his small band 
sixty miles inland to a mine in Batong that had a radio he knew could contact USAFFE 
headquarters. Taking the radio, he returned to Abra with 200 men including thirty 
American soldiers from an air warning unit in Cape Bojeador under 1st Lieutenant Robert 
H. Arnold. These men had been cut off and set out to join Cushing and his guerrillas. 
Cushing and his men were motivated but untrained and unorganized; Arnold and his men 
provided needed military expertise and leadership.  
After some training and intelligence collection, Cushing planned a New Year’s 
Day ambush against a Japanese truck convoy on Highway 2 near Naravacan, Ilocos Sur.  
Arnold led the successful operation, but across northern Luzon Cushing got the credit. 
Horan designated Cushing’s force as the 121st Infantry Regiment (after the largest 
USAFFE remnant in Cushing’s command). Arnold became irritated “over the way 
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Cushing was monopolizing the honor of founding and leading the guerrilla organization 
that was then attracting the attention of the people of Ilocos.” 525  
  Other guerrillas remained beyond Horan’s grasp. Somewhere on the northwest 
corner of Luzon in Ilocos Norte, Governor Roques Alban led his hundred armed men in 
the border area of the Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur and Abra provinces. In Nueva Vicaya, 
Philippine Army sergeant Benidicto Erasmus reportedly promoted himself to Lieutenant 
and led a guerrilla band. Rumors spread of an independent guerrilla group under a major 
Gaular or Ganlan in Ilocos, but no record of this unit exists. 
On 5 January on Corregidor, Carlos Romulo began “Voice of Freedom” radio 
broadcasts announcing, “People of the Philippines! You are listening to the Voice of 
Freedom – from the battle front of Bataan!” 526   The Japanese countered with daily 
propaganda over radio KZRH questioning why Filipinos should fight, suffer and die for 
America. Romulo responded for Quezon with a message ‘from a typical Filipino soldier 
in Bataan,’ walking a line between encouraging resistance and protecting the people:  
“Be courageous and prudent. Do not offer futile resistance. Yield as 
far as you honor will allow, but no farther. Remember that if you 
cooperate with the Japanese you are fighting against me – against all 
of us. The rice that is harvested from your fields, the scrap iron 
collected in your streets and yards, is used to feed the inhuman war 
machine that has separated us and desolated our country. The 
ammunition that is being made in Manila is being used against us; 
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those very same bullets may kill your son, your husband. You can see 
why it is important you refrain from helping the enemy.”527 
 
Northern Luzon, D37/R-1012 
On 13 January, Praeger led an attack ordered by Cagayan Governor Adduru that 
surprised and damaged the Japanese airfield at Tuguegarao.528  He followed up forty-
eight hours later with an attack on the Aparri airfield and the bridges and culverts 
between the two fields. A Japanese counterattack drove his guerillas from Tuao deeper 
into the mountains of Rizal near Apayao.  
 
Manila, D39/R-1010 
In Ermita, Manila, the Civil Liberties Union members of the underground Free 
Philippines began gathering intelligence from capitol and disseminating it to the 
guerrillas in the mountains. 529  They recruited intellectuals like Hernando J. Abaya, 
Teodoro M. Locsín, Rafael Ledesma, José Apacible and Arsenio Lacson.  Manzano, who 
avoided capture with Augustin, joined and used his experience as an intelligence officer 
to evaluate the information collected by agents.530 He also mimeographed a newsletter for 
the people to counter Japanese propaganda and expose collaborators.  
In the San Juan Catholic Church just outside Manila on 15 January, two 
underclass Philippine Military Academy cadets, Miguel Ver and Eleuterio “Terry” 
Adevoso, began gathering the dispersed sophomore and freshmen ROTC cadets in and 
                                                        
527 Romulo, 111. 
528 Ibid., 652. 
529 Agoncillo, Vol. II, 685. 
530 Marquez, 192. 
 
129 
around Manila into a motivated but inexperienced and ill-equipped unit.531 These ‘ROTC 
Guerrillas’ pledged to collect intelligence for MacArthur, to bolster morale and protect 
civilians, and to fight behind enemy lines for USAFFE. 532  When a San Juan priest 
reported the youngsters to the Japanese, the group moved into the hills around Talbak. 
From a base in Banabá they tracked enemy movements, harassed the occupiers, and 
began eliminating collaborators.  
Life on Luzon became difficult. American and Japanese troops confiscated all 
transportation. Strafing Japanese aircraft endangered anyone traveling on main roads 
while bands of armed men roamed the jungles. With bridges destroyed and 
communications cut, people became isolated and subject to rumor. An editor at the 
Herald recalled, “Nervous provincial correspondents were reporting Japanese landings in 
the most impossible places. The radio stations began broadcasting hectic warnings that 
paratroops were landing. There were rumors that the water supply had been poisoned; of 
uprisings among the large Japanese population at Davao.” 533  An important role for 
would-be guerrillas was to learn what was really happening across Luzon and pass word 
to the people. Energetic young men like Terry’s ROTC filled that role. 
In other unforeseen ways the Japanese invasion disrupted life. Although 
Camarines Sur harvested a million sacks above annual consumption, Commander Denzo 
Kuriyama, Lieutenant Colonel Tokiaki Nyhro, and Captain Hiroshi Ohtami prohibited its 
export out of the province.534  The Japanese army seized the husked rice, abaca and 
copra, barely paying for 100,00 sacks of rice, and sent it to warehouses in Iriga, Tigaon 
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and Libmanan under police guard.535  Meanwhile, shoppers in the markets across the 
islands began to go hungry. 
Without pay, farmers could not afford items needed for the next planting season. 
Food, gas and other confiscated commodities skyrocketed in price. In Naga, acting 
governor Villafuerte tried to cap prices at or below a fifty percent markup from prewar 
levels. With the Chinese stores sequestered by the Japanese, he tried to get the occupation 
military authorities to get the Japanese stores to lead the way in price controls but the 
Japanese Association saw profits to be made. “That early,” Barrameda wrote, “the 
civilian population had begun to taste the bitter fruit of the Japanese invasion.”536 
At Homma’s side when he entered Manila was Hideico Kihara who had served 
many years as Vice-Consul in Manila and Consul General in Davao. 537 Kihara was to 
advise Homma on the formation of a new Philippine Government. Prominent Filipinos 
left in Manila by Quezon formed a commission to maintain order and deal with the 
Japanese: Mayor Jorge Vargas, Benigno Aquino, Jorge Bocobom, Antonio de las Alas, 
Jose P. Laurel, Rafael Alunan, Claro Recto, Quintin Paredes, and Jose Yulo.538 Quezon 
advised them that “if they should be given an opportunity to co-operate in the 
administration of a civil government, they should accept it in order that the interests of 
the people and public order and respect for property should be safeguarded.”539 If they 
refused to join the Japanese, Quezon said Homma would find “Filipinos who were more 
sensible and cooperative, that is to say, pro-Japanese or more pliable Filipinos.”540  
                                                        
535 Ibid., 14. 
536 Ibid., 14. 
537 Quezon, 290.  
538 Jonathan Black, “Jose P. Laurel and Jorge B. Vargas: Issues of Collaboration and Loyalty during the 
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines,” (senior thesis, Claremont McKenna College, 2010), 4. 
539 Quezon, 291.  
540 Ibid., 291.  
 
131 
Homma’s Chief of Staff Masami Maeda reached out to the commission to 
establish a cooperative administration. They met at Yulo’s house as the Japanese entered 
Manila. Through Vargas, Maeda would convene another meeting on 23 January with 
leaders including Aquino, Paredes, Laurel, Yulo, Osia and Recto, but not Ricarte or 
Ramos.541 They decided to ask Japan for a republic, not a commonwealth. For head of 
government they proposed Vargas “who only held an appointive position” rather than an 
elected official “in order that none of their acts might be interpreted as bearing popular 
sanction or the endorsement of the public.”542   
Most commission members were determined to prevent radicals like Benigno 
Ramos and General Ricarte from heading the government. They believed that the 
Japanese “as in Burma, preferred more generally accepted figures.” 543  As historian 
Nicholas Tarling observed, “One reason for installing Vargas was that he was more 
politically ‘neutral’ than Aquino or Laurel, and ‘would also be, at least temporarily, a 
stand-in for Manuel Quezon. For there is no question that from the outset the Japanese 
believed that Quezon himself would be the ideal figure to lead a regime under their 
aegis.”544 Vargas was also a guardian of the pre-war elites. Ramos, Ricarte or another 
radical might have opened the door to social revolution. At a press conference on 17 
January, Vargas said, “Let independence come in any form! We will co-operate!”545 
Cooperation would be the policy of the new government and the duty of loyal Filipinos. 
Those who would not cooperate stood outside the law.  
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On 24 January, the Japanese Military Administration issued Order No. 1 
establishing the Philippine Executive Committee (PEC) with Vargas as Chairman. 
Thirty-four prominent Filipinos formed the advisory Council of State (later 35 members, 
then 24); any twelve could form a quorum. “Six governmental departments and a number 
of bureaus were also established, but for all the names of appointees published in the 
newspapers, these existed chiefly on paper,” wrote Hartendorf.546  In the next week, more 
than fifty Commonwealth offices closed with their officials and employees ‘retired.’ 
Vargas and the PEC focused on issues they knew would please the Japanese and 
prepare for independence, those steps that would “eliminate the blind dependence upon 
Anglo-American culture and civilization” and promote among the Filipinos the 
“consciousness that they are Orientals.” 547  Among their first steps was a Japanese 
program to revise Philippine schoolbooks, eliminate western influence and promote 
Japanese ideas of proper place and spirit.548 The PEC pushed a proposal to eliminate 
English and replace it with Tagalog, already deemed the national language.  
 
Northern Luzon, D42/R-1007 
Meanwhile Walter Cushing struck again, ambushing a column of sixty Japanese 
soldiers and ten trucks passing through Candon, Ilocos Sur on 18 January. He then 
destroyed three cars carrying a Japanese General and his party and recovered captured 
maps of the American fire control plans for Bataan and Corregidor. Accepting a 
commission from Horan as a captain, and later major, Cushing continued his guerrilla 
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campaign throughout northern Luzon under the 121st Regiment. Lieutenant Colonels 
Moses and Noble also appeared at Horan’s growing headquarters.  
These American soldiers turned guerrilla leaders had to learn on the job. 549  As 
Robert Lapham wrote, “As for the other schemes to wage guerrilla warfare, whether they 
were already under way or merely gleams in somebody’s imagination, all I can say is that 
in January 1942 I had never heard of any of them.” 550  MacArthur rather quickly 
embraced the idea of guerrilla resistance. He modified the mission of Sharp’s Visayan-
Mindanao Force: “When organized resistance was no longer practicable, he was to split 
his force into small groups and conduct guerilla warfare from hidden bases in the interior 
of each island. Food, ammunition, fuel, and equipment, were to be moved inland, out of 
reach of the enemy, in preparation for such a contingency. Those supplies that could not 
be moved were to be destroyed.”551 
 
Central Luzon, D43/R-1006 
With Wainwright in Bataan was Major Claude A. Thorp, a veteran of the Mexico 
Expedition and World War I, who until recently served as the Fort Stotsenburg Provost 
Marshal. After the first week of January, Thorp drafted a plan for organizing guerrillas 
behind Japanese lines.552 He took his plan to Wainwright who rejected it.553  
It was not that SWPA refused to consider irregular warfare. MacArthur had 
already began quietly constructing “an extensive network of prominent businessmen, 
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plantation owners, miners, and newspaper people” to collect intelligence on the Japanese 
and their operations as his forces withdrew to Bataan.554  In July 1941, G-4 Colonel 
Charles Willoughby G-4 and deputy G-2 Colonel Joseph K. Evans had begun organizing 
the Postal and Telegraph Service, the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company, 
the Postmasters, the Philippines Civil Service and more into a network for air-raid 
warning and other intelligence gather. MacArthur’s G-2 later reported: “Many American 
businessmen, miners, and plantation owners were enrolled secretly, with a view to 
forming a nucleus of information and a potential ‘underground,’ in case the Japanese 
were successful in over-running the Islands, a pessimistic possibility no publicly 
admitted.” 555   Willoughby worked with Captain Joseph McMickling “on a plan for 
certain communication workers to go underground and form nets should the Japanese 
attack.” 556  Senator Manuel Roxas, journalist Yay Panlilio and many other Filipinos 
joined this network.  
Thorp went to Colonel Hugh Casey, MacArthur’s adjutant, who arranged for him 
to see the boss. Unfortunately, Thorp was shot in the left thigh while probing the front 
lines on 17 January. Even so, two days later MacArthur approved his plan. Shortly 
thereafter Thorp departed Bataan with nineteen men and two women. With him was 
Lieutenant Robert Lapham, Lieutenant Charles Cushing, Captain Ralph McGuire, 
Sergeant Alfred Bruce, Sergeant Fred Sladky, Sergeant Everett Brooks, Sergeant 
Malacoli, Corporal Daniel Cahill, Corporal George McCarthy, and Corporal Young (a 
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Moro).  The married Thorp also brought along his secretary and mistress, Herminia 
“Minang” Dizon. Lapham recalled, “This would have been a purely personal matter had 
not some of the men made jokes about it, thereby visibly reducing the respect some of 
them had for Thorp.”557  The group slipped through the Japanese lines and began an 
arduous forty-day journey towards an arms cache at Camp Sanchez deep in the Zambales 
Mountains. Reflecting their inexperience, Thorp’s party brought with them only a radio 
receiver: they could monitor broadcasts from USAFFE but could not talk back.558  Thorp 
chose the mountains around Timbu as his base and the area became something of a 
collection point for stragglers.  
Meanwhile USAFFE G-2 Brigadier General Simeon de Jesus organized sixty 
agents, mostly from the Philippine Constabulary, into the Military Intelligence Service 
(MIS) for clandestine intelligence operations on Luzon. As G-2 reported, “Mission of the 
MIS was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate military information obtained in Bataan, 
Zambales and Pampangas and other occupied areas, operating principally behind enemy 
lines.” 559Plagued by poor communications and the time it took to get agents into targeted 
areas, the MIS had produced limited results but stayed in operation until after the fall of 
Bataan. 
  MacArthur also authorized retired officer and Spanish-American War veteran 
Colonel Hugh Straughn to organize a guerrilla force. Straughn was already behind the 
Japanese lines in Bataan in the mountains around Antipolo in Rizal. Yay Panlilio recalled 
Hugh Straughn as a “U.S. Army colonel whom some of Marking’s men coaxed out of a 
cave with three old women, a middle aged one and a boy, thereafter organized the Fil-
                                                        
557 Lapham and Norling, 14. 
558 Ibid., 18-19. 
559 Intelligence Activities. 2. 
 
136 
American Irregular Troops (FAIT)” in Central and Southern Luzon provinces.” 560 
Straughn asked Sorsogon Governor Salvador Escudero to join the FAIT as a colonel, and 
in March, drew Major Francisco Sandico out of hiding to join his force.  
 
Tokyo, D44/R-1005 
On 20 January, Premier Tojo addressed the Japanese House of Peers in the 79th 
Diet, echoing the Hakko Ichi-U ideal of divinely ordained imperial rule over the eight 
directions that united the entire world.  He said Japan wanted each country and its people 
“to have its proper place and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing an order of 
co-existence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its 
nucleus.”561 The Board of Information further explained: “The people of Greater Asia are 
now confronted with the greatest opportunity in their history to build their common name 
according to the proud social conception of the world as a single family, each member 
thereof performing his functions according to his talent and ability for the good of the 
whole. We in Japan, speak of this conception as based upon the ideas of Hakko Ichi-U, 
the tradition of the nation as a family which has held our country and people intact and 
united for twenty-six centuries.”562  The prospect of permanent hardship, brutality and 
rapes made Filipinos increasingly desire the return of the United States and its promise of 
independence.  
Tojo described Hong Kong and Malaya as ‘absolutely essential’ for Japan’s 
defense. “As regards the Philippines,” he said, “if the peoples of those islands will 
hereafter understand the real intentions of Japan and offer to cooperate with us as one of 
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the partners for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan 
will gladly enable them to enjoy the honor of independence.”563  On 21 January, The 
Japan Times and Advertiser printed Tojo’s speech.  If the promise of independence did 
not win over the guerrillas, it might convince the ruling elites to police the countryside.  
The Japanese understood that the Philippines posed an awkward problem. Studies 
in Tokyo identified Filipinos as “Asians but not Asians, Westerners but not 
Westerners.”564 After more than a month among the Filipinos the Southern Army added 
its own assessment: “They are self-indulgent, idle, fickle and frivolous. They adore the 
United States and make light of us. There is not much public peace. We must maintain 
strict military authority and try to have them heartily cooperate with our policies by 
abandoning their attachment to the United States.” 565  The army appeared not to 
appreciate the link between their harsh policies and growing Philippine resistance. 
 Tojo warned of a long war. “The United States and the British Empire are, 
however, the countries which boast of their wealth and power as the greatest in the world, 
having for many years consolidated the foundation for their domination of the world,” he 
said, “Even though they have suffered overwhelmingly from defeat in the opening stage 
of the war, it is not difficult to imagine that they will stubbornly resist us and try to turn 
the tide of the war. We must, therefore be prepared for difficulties of various sorts which 
may become a protracted one.” 566  He was not talking about popular resistance in 
occupied lands. 
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Applying lessons from Manchuria and China, the Japanese high command began 
utilizing propaganda units in the Philippines to influence the natives and reassure Japan’s 
citizens and military. Most of this propaganda corps remained in Manila coordinating the 
mass media. Smaller detachments went into the field to support the combat troops and 
constabulary forces. One unit was the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon (Hitomi Senden Tai), 
named after its commander, twenty-five-year-old Lieutenant Junsuke Hitomi. 
Commissioned in 1938, he had spent three years with the 12th Battalion of the 
Manchurian Independent Defense Force against the Chinese communist guerrillas of the 
Unified Anti-Japanese Resistance Army of the Northeast.”567  He now went with his 
platoon on “goodwill missions” to convince Filipinos hiding in the hinterlands to return 
to their homes and farms and go back to work.  
The focus of Japanese propaganda was to remind Filipinos of their racial 
brotherhood. “They were heavy-handed conquerors, appealing at once to visions of 
wealth as well as to racism and fear,” noted Ramsey, “In return for cooperation the 
Japanese promised fabulous prosperity within the pan-Pacific commonwealth of Asian 
peoples. This theme formed the centerpiece of their propaganda, and in the face of 
shortages and rationing the racial aspect was stressed.”568 As Kempeitai Colonel Akiro 
Nagahama said to Adalia Marquez: “You are Filipino. You are brown-skinned and you 
will always be brown, no matter how much American make-up you apply. We Japanese 
and you Filipinos are of the same color and it is only right and natural that our two people 
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should be brothers. The American is of another color. He will never be your friend.”569 
Racial brotherhood, however, failed to motivate Filipinos. Willard H. Elshrec noted: 
“Even if there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the white man’s reform, scarcely a 
hand was lifted in support of the Japanese. They clearly had failed to identify the interests 
of South-East Asians with their own.”570  
 
Central Luzon, D48/R-1001 
On 24 January, Hitomi began thirteen days of platoon propaganda operations in 
Batangas preaching cooperation to peasant communities. Just the day before, as the 
Japanese prepared to invade the Solomon Islands, MacArthur cabled Washington that he 
was nearly out of maneuver room and announced, “I intend to fight it out to complete 
destruction.” 571   Despite USAFFE’s dire situation Hitomi found, “the people were 
completely opposed to us… the objectives of propaganda activities based on respect and 
courtesy have not been achieved here.”572  Then he had an epiphany.   
One day a ranking officer of propaganda corps, Shingeobu Mochizuki, arrived to 
give a speech on Kunmi Watanabe’s imperialist ideology and racial brotherhood.  A local 
citizen who had studied in Japan, Julio Luz, translated. The quiet crowd slowly warmed 
to the speech and applauded loudly at the end. Isamu Wad, a local Japanese in attendance 
who spoke fluent Tagalog, explained to Hitomi what had happened. Mochizuki’s speech 
confused the peasants so halfway through his interpreter simply began telling a story of 
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how he once witnessed a Japanese man in a Nagoya shopping center go through great 
lengths to return a lost item to its proper owner. The Japanese, Luz said, were basically 
honest so everyone should give them a chance. The crowd loved that story.573 
The lesson for Hitomi was clear. Forget preaching the Greater Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere and other things that didn’t matter to these people. Instead, use a 
simple, comprehensible and relatable argument: you Filipinos are caught in the middle of 
a war between Japan and the United States; the Japanese want to fight the Americans, not 
you Filipinos; if you ‘sit-it-out’ and don’t support the guerrillas, the Japanese will leave 
you alone.  Hitomi augmented his platoon with “local Japanese residents, news reporters, 
photographers, and novelists in addition to Filipino entertainers, motion picture 
projectionists, public speakers and physicians” to bring out the crowds.574  
 From the end of February through the first week of March, the Hitomi 
Propaganda Platoon took its show to Bicol in southern Luzon and saw that drawing 
crowds and delivering a message tailored to their concerns produced results.575 Hitomi 
also deployed “special tactical forces” which he had used in Manchuria: “sneak attacks 
on guerrilla hideouts, using the prisoners rounded up for counterespionage, or taking the 
family members of the guerrillas hostage.”576 The combination proved very effective. 
 
Northern Luzon, D51/R-998 
 Having moved his government out of Laoag and into the mountains of Apayao 
ahead of the Japanese, Governor Ablan spent weeks with Lieutenant Feliciano Madamba 
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organizing guerrillas.577 On 27 January, Alban and Madamba led a detachment to Solsona 
and recovered three hundred rifles, eighteen machine guns and several crates of 
ammunition. The next day they ambushed and slaughtered a column of fifty Japanese 
soldiers entering Ilocos Norte. Excited local citizens rallied to Alban. A week later the 
Japanese sent in a larger column under Major Kumatsu only to see them succumb to a 
similar ambush. “This time,” a guerrilla reported, “the Japs retaliated by bombing several 
of the inland villages and executing some twenty civilians at Banna, Ilocos Norte.”578 
After continued attacks by Alban, the Japanese executed further reprisals in Neuva Era. 
 
Central Luzon, D52/R-997 
On 28 January, Tokyo announced the new government in Manila. High 
Commissioner Sayre pressed Quezon to publicly denounce the collaborators. Quezon 
refused saying, “any evidence of my faith in their loyalty would in itself serve to fortify 
their determination not to betray me; whereas, any indication that I considered them lost 
to the cause and practically traitors, would perhaps force them to go over to the 
Japanese.”579 By this time, Quezon needed morphine shots to calm his asthma attacks.  
The Japanese bombed Port Moresby in New Guinea on 3 February, worrying the 
fragile American-British-Dutch-Australian joint command in the Pacific. The next day 
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C Marshall sent a request to MacArthur for 
plans on how he intended to evacuate his wife, his almost four-year old son, and other 
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officials, adding that if he withdrew from Bataan perhaps MacArthur should go to 
Mindanao or Australia.580 MacArthur did not reply. 
That day the submarine SS-202 Trout arrived at Corregidor. Before departing 
with the Philippine Treasury’s gold, intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Warren J. 
Clear revealed to MacArthur that the recent Arcadia Conference in Washington between 
British and American chiefs of staff ended with an agreement to prioritize operations 
against Germany. War Department planners had concluded that reinforcing the 
Philippines was impractical. It would take five to seven aircraft carriers, seven to nine 
battleships, fifty destroyers, sixty submarines and auxiliaries, and 1,500 aircraft to 
breakthrough to the Philippines – “an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the 
principal theater - the Atlantic.”581  USAFFE stood alone.  
Meanwhile the Kempetai continued to hunt down Philippine leftists.  A raid on a 
house in Manila on 24 January resulted in the capture of Communist Party Chairman 
Crisanto Evangelista, Party Vice-Chairman Pedro Abad Santos, and Communist mayor of 
Angeles, Agapito del Rosario. The Japanese executed Evagelista and Rosario. Abad 
Santos became gravely ill during his two years in prison and died shortly afterward. 
Perhaps influenced by their alliance with Hitler, the Japanese forfeited any chance to use 
the social revolutionaries against the pro-American elites. Instead, they drove leftists to 
further resistance. 
Early February, remaining Communist leaders Luis Taruc, Mateo del Castillo, 
Juan Feleo, Casto Alejandrino, Fernancio Sampang, Jose de Leon, Eusebio Aquino, 
Mariano Franco, and Lino Dizon gathered in Bakwit in Kabyaw in Nueva Ecija. They 
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declared an end to the AMT and Socialist parties, leaving only the Communists to 
represent the people. With Quezon out and the PEC under the Japanese thumb, the 
Communists considered declaring a new republic. Tarluc recalled: “Our Politiburo 
leaders emphasized in conversations with me that it was opportunism to put nationalism 
before Communism at that moment. They said we must merge the two in our minds.”582  
It was a key moment for Filipino social revolutionaries. The fight against the 
Japanese presented an opportunity to erase the old order. Yet the best chance to defeat the 
Japanese was to join with the Americans who stood with Quezon. Taruc considered the 
situation. “Ours was not a fight for America,” he believed, “except in the sense that we 
were allies, but a fight for Filipinos. I saw our resistance movement as being 
revolutionary, from which we would emerge free men in every sense of the word.”583  
The group opted to continue the policy of a ‘united front’ so as not to alienate 
potential allies among “moderate landlords” and “middle-class groups.” Trotsky had 
argued in 1922 that when the party was in the minority, and the majority failed to 
understand its mission, the “party must assume the initiative in securing unity in these 
struggles,” as long as it remained independent and led the movement as the “vanguard of 
the proletariat.”584 Hard liners accepted Taruc’s ‘petty-bourgeois nationalism’ to fight 
and discredit the Japanese and obstruct their economic exploitation the Philippines. From 
a prison cell years after his association with the Huks, Taruc would write, “I know now 
from experience that the nationalism of the Communists is indeed opportunism, and that 
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they use it for their own ends. Any nationalist who makes an ally of the Communists is 
going on a ride on a tiger.”585 
 
Philippines, D59/R-990 
Cornered on Luzon, with no hope for reinforcement, MacArthur looked at defending Mindanao, 
Cebu, Panay, Negros, Leyte, and Samar. At 36,000 square miles, Mindanao was second largest – and 
closest to Australia – of all the islands. Cebu’s capital Cebu City was the second largest urban center in the 
Philippines. In early January, MacArthur organized the Visayan-Mindanao Force of five Philippine Army 
units under Brigadier General William F. Sharp headquartered in Cebu City. 586  On 4 February, he 
reorganized USAFFE into four independent groups. 587  The Luzon force under Wainwright defended 
Bataan. A separate Harbor Defense Command held Corregidor. Sharp lost the 71st and 91st Divisions to 
Luzon, leaving the Philippine Army’s 61st, 81st, and 101st Divisions augmented by two recently mobilized 
regiments from the 71st and 91st divisions with some provisional and Constabulary units.  
Master Sergeant Paul Rogers was the chief stenographer at USAFFE headquarters 
for both MacArthur and his chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Richard K. Sutherland. He 
captured his commander’s thoughts: “MacArthur was hedging against the day when, in 
spite of Roosevelt’s orders to him, and his orders to Wainwright, the command must 
collapse and surrender. With the four forces operating independently under his command, 
surrender of one would not tumble down the others.”588   If Bataan fell, MacArthur 
planned to direct the separate commands from Australia in continue resistance until he 
counterattack. As explained by Rodgers: “When Corregidor surrendered, as it must in 
spite of the orders from the White House, two forces would still be free in the Southern 
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Islands to fight on as guerrillas.” 589  “Marshall, however,” William Manchester noted, 
“had decided to give Wainwright a third star and command of all the Philippine forces. 
That meant that Wainwright had the power to surrender all fighting in the islands and that 
the Japanese, aware of it, could threaten to execute everyone on Bataan and Corregidor 
unless he exercised it – which is exactly what happened.”590  
  Each night the residents on Corregidor listened to KZRH from Manila play a tune 
called “Waiting For Ships That Never Come.”591 On 6 February, the radio broadcast a 
call from the venerable Aguinaldo asking MacArthur to surrender for the best interests of 
the people, just as he had done in 1901. The message moved the physically exhausted 
Quezon who also feared the effect of Tojo’s promise of independence on “the less 
educated classes.”592 One night the exasperated President complained to Romulo, “The 
fight between the United States and Japan is not our fight. I want to go back… and try to 
protect our people, Romulo, not America.” 593  Quezon informed MacArthur he was 
considering “placing myself in the hands of the Japanese.”594 MacArthur talked him out 
of such a drastic action, arguing that the Japanese would isolate him and issue bogus 
statements in his name. Quezon considered asking Roosevelt and the Japanese to accept 
Philippine neutrality as a way to save his nation from further sacrifice.595 Over Osmeña’s 
and Roxas’ objections, the Cabinet agreed to let him send the request to Roosevelt. 
Not everyone at the KZRH radio station was under Japanese control. When their 
agents carted off broadcaster Johnny Harris to Fort Santiago prison for being found with 
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a U.S. Army G-2 calling card, Jorge Vargas happening to be visiting the station. He 
cautioned broadcaster Yay Panlilio, “Watch your health, Yay. The weather is 
undependable. There is much influenza, and it is catching.” 596  
 
Central Luzon, D67/R-982 
Horan had spent weeks trying to establish radio contact with MacArthur’s 
headquarters. On 12 February, he finally got through and received authorization to 
reorganize his forces into the 14th Infantry Regiment.597 The designation indicated an 
intention to turn the guerrillas into a conventional army unit. Horan also received official 
appointment as commander of all USAFFE and Constabulary forces in North Luzon. 
Unfortunately, he again lost communication with USAFFE until 19 March.    
Since the end of January, Huang Jie and Cai Jianhua oversaw Emergency Action 
Committee agents in training cadres from the Wartime Service Corps in San Fernando, 
Pampanga.598 The first three parts of the Cadre Training Course occurred in Mandili 
under veterans from Mao’s army. Luo Lishi and Guo Jian began with instruction on team 
organization. Xu Jingcheng followed with lessons on United Front policy. Guo Jian then 
taught classes on the political work of the army. Then Huang Jie taught guerrilla tactics in 
the field on Mount Arayat.  
On the day Japanese capture Singapore, 15 February, Xu Jingcheng convened the 
leftist Chinese leaders for a conference on strategy. They agreed on three objectives: 
assist Filipino peasants and workers in organizing an anti-Japanese force; organize 
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underground activities in Manila and central and southern Luzon, Iloilo, Cebu, Samar and 
Cotabato; and, return the bulk of the 400 evacuated Chinese back to Manila.599  To 
accomplish these objectives they divided the Cadre Training Course graduates into three 
groups. The first remained in central Luzon. The second became the Philippine Chinese 
Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League and organized an underground in Manila 
southern Luzon. The third organized Chinese leftist communities in Cebu, Iloilo and 
Cotabatao over the next several months. “Meanwhile, the leaders brushed up on guerrilla 
tactics,” Agoncillo wrote, “In particular, they read American reporter Edgar Snow’s Red 
Star Over China which described the guerrilla tactics of the Chinese communists under 
Chu Teh.”600  
With Mao’s army, P’eng Teh-huai explained to Snow the Chinese Communist 
revolutionary theory of guerrilla war. “Imperialism, landlordism, and militaristic wars 
have combined to destroy the basis of rural economy, and it cannot be restored without 
eliminating its chief enemies,” he said, “Enormous taxes, together with Japanese 
invasion, both military and economic, have accelerated the rate of this peasant 
bankruptcy, aided by the landlords. The gentry’s exploitation of power in the villages is 
widespread unemployment in the villages. There is a readiness among poor classes to 
fight for a change.”601 These were similar to the conditions the Philippine Communists 
saw in their country. 
 P’eng outlined steps for revolutionaries under such conditions:602 
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1. Use economic hardship tied to exploitative landlords and war to 
create the conditions for peasant willingness to support revolution. 
2. Exploit rural lack of communications and transportation networks 
to “make it possible for the people to arm and organize.” 
3. Occupy the gaps between the areas of imperialist control where 
“partisan warfare can develop quickly.” 
4. Arouse peasant resentment of “intolerable social and economic 
conditions” while  providing “leadership, form and objectives.” 
5. More than warriors, be “political propagandists and organizers” to 
convince peasants that only by revolution can they meet their needs.  
6. Ensure that only the Communist Party leads a revolution because 
only it understands the “political and organizational work” needed.  
7. Ensure “field leadership” is “determined, fearless and courageous.” 
8. As the first step in meeting the peasants most urgent needs, 
promptly disarm the “exploiting class.” 
9. Never remain stationary; continually expand.  
10.  Include in every phase of operations “political training” and local 
leader development. 
11.  Do not fight any “losing battles.” 
12.  Use surprise as the fundamental tactic of partisan operations.  




14. Defeat the landlords and gentry militarily and win them over if 
possible. 
15. When outnumbered, use speed, surprise and concentration to attack 
single enemy locations.  
16.  Always be prepared to give ground and retreat. 
17.  Master the tactics of “distraction, decoy, diversion, ambush, feint 
and irritation.” 
18.  Avoid attacking enemy strengths and concentrate on enemy 
weakness. 
19. Take every precaution “to prevent the enemy from locating the 
partisan main forces.” 
20.  Use connection with the people to develop and use advantages in 
intelligence collection.  
Tactically, the guerrillas had to display “fearlessness, swiftness, intelligent 
planning, mobility, secrecy, and suddenness and determination in action.” 603  Most 
importantly, they had to remain philosophically focused on class politics to motivate and 
unify the masses. This required an emphasis on educating the people and eliminating 
competing ideas and the people who held them. “If there is no movement of the armed 
peasantry, there is in fact no partisan base, and the army cannot exist,” P’eng told Snow, 
“Only by implanting itself deeply in the hearts of the people, only by fulfilling the 
demands of the masses, only by consolidating a base in the peasant soviets, and only by 
sheltering in the shadow of the masses, can partisan warfare bring revolutionary 
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victory.” 604  P’eng concluded: “Tactics are important, but we could not exist if the 
majority of the people did not support us. We are nothing but the fist of the people 
beating their oppressors!”605  
 
Tokyo, D71/R-978 
Meanwhile in Tokyo, officials became frustrated with the duration of the 
Philippine campaign.  They had already exceeded the Southern Army Group’s estimate 
of a thirty-four day campaign to conquer Luzon.606 The 14th Army had anticipated that 
Mindanao and the Visayas would fall quickly after Manila. 607   Homma, however, 
appeared stalemated in Bataan with no end in sight. The Imperial General Headquarters 
urged him to finish off USAFFE.  When he pushed back, in early March the headquarters 
promised to send reinforcements for advance into the southern Philippines.608 
 In another speech before the Diet in Tokyo on 16 February, Tojo repeated his 
promise of independence in return for cooperation with Japan. 609  The next day the 
Imperial Japanese Army issued Order No. 2 dictating six principles to guide the 
education of children when the Philippine schools reopened. Teachers were to construct 
lessons that would: 1) promote relations between the Philippines and Japan in the New 
Order of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; 2) erase Western influences; 3) elevate morals over 
materialism; 4) promote Japanese language and eliminate English; 5) promote vocational 
education; and 6) inspire in the people a love of labor.610  
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Central Luzon, D79/R-970 
 At the same time, the army continued with the war. Unmolested Japanese aircraft 
dropped leaflets on Bataan: “Dear Filipino Soldiers! There are [sic] still one way left for 
you. That is to give up all your weapons at once and surrender to the Japanese force 
before it is too late, then we shall fully protect you. We repeat for the last! Surrender at 
once and build your new Philippines for and by Filipinos.”611 
 In late February, Filipinos listened on the radio to Roosevelt as he promised to 
soon send thousands of planes -- to Europe. Quezon exploded at MacArthur’s Chief of 
Intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, who was fluent in Spanish: “For thirty years I have 
worked and hoped for my people. Now they burn and die for a flag that could not protect 
them. Por Dios y todos los santos! I cannot stand this constant reference to England, to 
Europe. I am here and my people are here under the heels of a conqueror. Where are the 
planes this sinverguenza is boasting of? How American to writhe in anguish at the fate of 
a distant cousin while a daughter is being raped in the back room!”612 
MacArthur decided it was time to get Quezon off Corregidor. The position was 
tenuous and the president’s health was failing. Residing in the damp, unventilated 
Malinta tunnel, Quezon had developed a chronic cough and his temperature spiked at 
times to 105 degrees.613 With great secrecy MacArthur’s staff put Quezon and his party 
aboard the submarine SS-193 Swordfish at 2300 hours on 18 February. As proof of his 
intentions, the submarine also carried a box containing MacArthur’s papers, medals and 
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last will and testament.614  At the War Plans Division in Washington, Brigadier General 
Dwight Eisenhower wrote in his diary: “Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I’m 
hoping his yelps are just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain 
factor.”615 Before departing, Quezon handed a letter to Roxas “to act in my name in all 
matters not related to changes in policy” 616  After three days, Swordfish commander 
Lieutenant Chester C. Smith disembarked his passengers on San Jose de Buenavista, 
Antique Province, in Panay. From there the party traveled to Iloilo by car and then aboard 
a steamer to Bacolod, Negros, before U.S. Navy PT boats, under the ubiquitous 
Commander John D. Bulkeley, moved them to Del Monte in Mindanao. 617 When the 
Japanese moved into the Visayas, the presidential party went by B-17 bomber to 
Australia to set up a government in exile. 
The day after Quezon left Corregidor, Japanese aircraft bombed Darwin, 
Australia. The next day Japanese troops invaded Bali and Timor.  A worried Australian 
Prime Minister John Curtin pressed Churchill to return his country’s three divisions from 
North Africa. Churchill demurred. On Saturday, 21 February, Curtin convened his 
cabinet and gained their agreement to trade their divisions for a United States’ general to 
command the Australian theater of war with reinforcements as soon as possible. New 
Zealand concurred. Churchill quickly relayed the Australian request to the American 
President. At 1123 hours on 23 February, MacArthur received orders from President 
Roosevelt to leave Corregidor, go to Mindanao and then on to Australia to take command 
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of the newly designated Southwest Pacific Area command.618  MacArthur did not reply, 
feeling his duty was to remain with his men.  
On 25 February, Benigno Aquino volunteered to campaign across the Islands for 
co-operation with the Japanese. 619  Sakdalista and Ganap leader Benigno Ramos had 
already employed his followers in aiding the Japanese “by cutting communications in 
Luzon behind Allied lines.”620 On the last day of the month PEC leaders in Manilla 
issued a telegram for Quezon signed by Vargas, Laurel, Aquino, Yulo, Sison, Recto, de 
las Alas, Parades and Alunan. The message read: 
“In view of the enormous toll in lives and property now exacted of 
our people and because of the imminence of further untold 
suffering among the entire population and as it is evident that 
further resistance in the Philippines will be futile because of the 
present supremacy of Japan in the Far East, we believe that the 
time has come for you to consider the advisability of taking the 
necessary steps to bring about the immediate cessation of 
hostilities in the Philippines. In view thereof we are sending the 
following telegram to President Roosevelt: 
‘We the undersigned leading officials of the newly established 
civil administration of the Philippines beg leave to express our 
desire for the re-establishment of peace in the country and 
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earnestly request you to consider the advisability of ordering the 
immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines. We believe 
that in view of the trend of events further resistance in the 
Philippines will mean more destruction of lives not only of soldiers 
but also of civilian non-combatants living in and around the fields 
of battle. We are co-operating with the Japanese forces in the re-
establishment of civil government on the promise of the Japanese 
government to grant the Filipino people their independence with 
honor. We have taken this step with the aim in view of insuring 
and realizing our aspiration for our early independence.”621 
 The signatories saw only hardship for the people of the Philippines in further 
resistance. Others saw only hardship in accepting Japanese suzerainty. On 28 February, 
Quezon broadcast his response: “I urge every Filipino to be of good cheer, to have faith 
in the patriotism and valor of our soldiers in the field. But above all, to trust America and 
our great and beloved leader – President Roosevelt! The United Nations will win this 
war. America is too great and too powerful to be vanquished in this conflict. I know she 
will not fail us!”622 
For most Filipinos, the decision as to whether to collaborate or resist came down 
to kinship network concerns. Guadencia Vera was just a private in the Philippine Scouts 
but an influential citizen of Tayabas.623 He returned to his home in early 1942 to lead 
about one hundred men, women and children of his extended kin into the mountainous 
forests to escape the Japanese. Badly prepared and poorly organized, this group turned to 
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ruthless banditry to survive. Nearby, Vicente Umali, former Mayor of Tiang, Tayabas, 
organized a local group that would become known as President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas 
in central Laguna, Batangas and western central Tayabas that would later claim 10,000 
members in 11 regiments. 
Hopes in the Philippines dwindled. While the United States began the internment 
of Japanese citizens on its west coast, Aquino began his campaign for collaboration. In 
the week beginning 27 February, the Japanese navy defeated a combined Allied fleet in 
the Battle of the Java Sea, invaded Java, bombed Broome, Australia, and captured 
Batavia, capital of Dutch East Indies. On Bataan, Ed Ramsey, recalled, “We had been 
promised relief but none was coming, and all of us in Bataan shared a sense of 
betrayal.”624  
Exhaustion and lack of medicine left thousands ill. Ramsey went to General 
Hospital #2: “I could hear and smell the place long before I saw it. There were rows of 
men on metal bedsteads hung with mosquito nets, suffering from every kind of sickness 
and wound. Their screams were terrible, and the stench hung thick upon the air, almost 
visible in the morning light.”625 
 
Central Luzon, D92/R957 
In the first week of March collaborationist police in Candaba, Pampanga, forty 
miles north of Manilla, surprised a Communist guerrilla band gathering rice and captured 
eight men. The guerrillas were under the command of a woman, Felipa Culala, alias 
Dayang-Dayang (“Moselm Princess”), who had been a pre-war peasant activist in nearby 
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Mandili. She had enlisted thirty-five men at the start of the war into a guerrilla unit.626 
Described as “a huge woman, manly, rough, and with a commanding personality that 
made her men tremble with fear,” she did not take her men’s loss lightly.627  
On 8 March, Dayang-Dayang led a raid on the makeshift prison in the municipal 
building in Candaba and freed her men before retreating home to Madili. Word of her 
success brought volunteers that swelled her unit’s ranks to 130 members. Japanese 
patrols retaliated by brutalizing local civilians. Dayang-Dayang ambushed one enemy 
patrol, reportedly killing nearly forty Japanese soldiers, eight police officers, and sixty 
collaborationist constabularies while capturing thirty-eight of their weapons and some 
equipment.628 These engagements marked a turning point for the communists, “proving 
that the guerrilla movement could defeat a powerful enemy and pose a serious threat to 
the Japanese.”629  In Luis Taruc’s opinion, Dayang-Dayang inspired the formation of 
guerrilla bands across Luzon. 
 
Visayas, D92/R-957 
MacArthur again reorganized, this time with his eye apparently on potential guerrilla resistance. 
He reduced Sharp's command to just the Mindanao Force and placed the five central island garrisons in a 
Visayan Force under Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth headquartered on Panay. The Visayan 
Force consisted of: Colonel Albert F. Christie's 7,000-man Panay Force with the 61st Division (PA); 
Colonel Irvine C. Scudder’s 6,500 troops on Cebu; Colonel Roger B. Hilsman’s assorted 3,000 troops on 
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Negros; Colonel Theodore M. Cornell’s “hastily improvised force” of 2,500 men defending Leyte and 
Samar; and, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Grimes lightly armed 1,000 men on Bohol.630  USAFFE oversaw 
the Panay and Mindoro garrisons.631  
 Chynoweth expanded and refined the planned transition to guerrilla operations in what he called 
Operation Baus Au (Visayan for "Get it Back"). He oversaw “the large-scale movement of goods, supplies, 
and weapons into the interior for use later in guerrilla warfare” with hidden caches in the jungles and 
mountains.632  Great strides in Panay’s preparations resulted from the cargador work of the 63d Infantry 
Regiment, which adopted its insignia of a carabao sled carrying a sack of rice with words Baus Au.633 On 
the other hand, the preparations shook civilian confidence. “They took great pride in their Army,” noted 
Colonel Tarkington, “and having been indoctrinated for years with the idea of American invincibility, were 
all for falling on the enemy tooth and nail and hurling him back into the sea.”634 
 On 8 March, Japan invaded New Guinea. The next day their army marched into 
Rangoon, Burma. Two days later they landed in Mindanao. 
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4. MacArthur’s Departure 
11 March - 6 May 1942 
 
MacArthur’s departure to Australia coincided with General Marshall making 
changes that undermined his plans for sustained guerrilla war outside Luzon. 
Meanwhile, the Fil-Am troops heroic resistance delayed the Japanese in subjugating 
the islands and created time for Filipinos and expatriate Americans to form ad hoc 
guerrilla groups. Filipino elites meanwhile chose between resistance, collaboration, 
and revolt. 
 
Corregidor, D94, R-955 
At 2000 hours on 11 March, two hours after sunset, U.S. Navy Lieutenant 
John Bulkeley steered his seventy-seven-foot boat PT-41 from the North Dock of 
Corregidor Island.635  Off shore in Manila Bay the three other PT boats from Torpedo 
Boat Squadron Three fell into formation as they headed into the open sea.  Overhead 
the last three P-40 fighter planes in the Philippines flew air cover.  A network of 
coast watchers reported increased Japanese naval activity and an enemy destroyer 
squadron heading towards Manila. Indeed, after becoming separated from the 
escorts in squall-whipped seas that night, PT-41 narrowly dodged several Japanese 
warships. With his boat’s worn-out 4,050-horsepower engines only mustering half 
their normal fifty miles per hour speed, Bulkeley needed thirty-five hours to cut 
through 560 miles of 15-foot waves to reach the Del Monte pineapple plantation on 
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the big island of Mindanao. His was a heroic but sensitive mission: the escape of 
Douglas MacArthur.   
After MacArthur ignored two messages from Washington in February calling 
for him to relocate to Australia, two urgent cables on 6 and 9 March finally 
compelled him to relent and make his retreat. Some thoughtful historians have 
concluded that by that time, MacArthur deserved to be relieved of his command. 
Ronald Spector wrote, “His ill-conceived and grandiose plan to defend the entire 
archipelago had resulted in confusion and near disaster; it helped to produce the 
acute supply shortage which was sapping the strength of the Bataan forces. His 
grandiloquent pronouncements, together with his strange refusal to visit the front, 
hurt morale and shook the confidence of his men.”636 
 To the American people, however, MacArthur had become an early hero of 
the new war. He was leading America’s boys in a intrepid fight against a dastardly 
enemy, desperately trying to hang on until promised reinforcements arrived. 
MacArthur did his best to stoke this popularity: “Of 142 communiqués released by 
his headquarters between December and March, 109 mentioned only one 
individual: MacArthur. ‘When an action was described, it was ‘MacArthur’s right 
flanks on Bataan’ or ‘MacArthur’s men.’ The communiqués… omitted the names of 
combat units, commanders and individuals who had performed exceptional 
exploits.’”637 
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Politicians tripped over each other to praise MacArthur and President 
Roosevelt gladly used him “to perk up civilian morale” in the dark months after 
Pearl Harbor.638  To lose this general to the enemy would be too damaging to 
national confidence to even contemplate.639 While in Washington, the President 
brought Churchill into a discussion on MacArthur’s fate with Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson. The Prime Minister shared his telegram ordering General Lord Gort to 
relinquish his command at Dunkirk and return to England so as to prevent his 
capture and deny the Germans a propaganda coup. The President read the telegram 
with great interest and Stimson asked to borrow it. “It may be (for I do not know),” 
wrote Churchill, “that this influenced them in the right decision which they took in 
ordering General MacArthur to hand over his command to one of his subordinate 
generals, and thus saved for all his future glorious service the great Commander 
who would otherwise have perished or passed the war as a Japanese captive. I 
should like to think so.”640 Roosevelt added a Congressional Medal of Honor and 
public announcement of MacArthur’s new command of Australia’s defense to both 
entice MacArthur and reaffirm his high standing in the minds of the American 
people.  
 The promise of aid must have also motivated the President. MacArthur 
appeared ready to sacrifice himself – with his wife and young son – to demonstrate 
his faith in the promise that Roosevelt knew to be false. Unexpectedly questioned at 
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a press conference on the yet-to-arrive aid, Roosevelt aberrantly stammered: “I 
wouldn’t do any --- well, I wouldn’t --- I am trying to take a leaf out of my notebook. I 
think it would be well for others to do it. I --- not knowing enough about it --- I try 
not to speculate myself.”641 For ten years Roosevelt had not mustered the political 
will to either prepare Philippine defenses or to build the navy needed to break 
through during a war with Japan. “So the neglect of the Philippine defenses,” 
explained George C. Marshall, “was the matter of the fact that our country had never 
appropriated the money for the equipment and the material that was needed, 
because it takes at least almost a year to get most of these things, and a year and a 
half or two years to get the others after the act is once passed.”642 The capture of 
MacArthur would have triggered questions Roosevelt would not want to answer.  
 Corregidor broadcasted to the soldiers on Bataan and the Philippine people 
explanations for MacArthur’s move to Australia. As a U.S. Army history noted, “A 
large part of the faith in the timely arrival of reinforcements had been based on the 
presence of General MacArthur.” 643  Ramsey noted the profound effect of 
MacArthur’s departure: “Some hailed it as a prelude to a counterinvasion, clinging to 
the old stories about the hundred-mile-long convoy. But others, worn out from 
weeks of fighting, hunger, and sickness, saw it as abandonment. MacArthur had 
saved himself, they grumbled, and left them behind to die.”644 
 On 14 March, MacArthur and his party arrived at Del Monte’s airfield in 
Bukidnon Province on Mindanao. Villamor observed, “He must have lost 25 pounds, 
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living on the same diet as the soldiers on the Rock, and looked gaunt and ghastly.” 645 
He seemed surprised there were no planes ready to carry him to Australia. Four 
planes had been sent, one crashed, one turned back, and two never made their 
destination. Finally, at 2000 hours on 16 March, two B-17 bombers piloted by 
Lieutenant Frank Bostrom and Captain Bill Lewis arrived from Darwin to pick up 
MacArthur and fly him south.  
MacArthur left a letter for Quezon: “The United States is moving its forces 
into the southern Pacific area in what is destined to be a great offensive against 
Japan. The troops are being concentrated in Australia, which will be used as the base 
for the offensive drive to the Philippines. President Roosevelt has designated me to 
command this offensive and has directed me to proceed to Australia for that 
purpose.”646 He asked Quezon and his family to join him there. Three days later 
Bulkeley and his PT boats picked up Quezon and his entourage at Zamboanguita 
Beach on southern Negros. 
On Corregidor, as USAFFE placed all troops on quarter rations – about 1,000 
calories per day – Romulo reported: “On March 17th we learned MacArthur had 
entered Melbourne as a hero.”647 Twenty-four hours later, while riding a train to the 
continent’s south coast, the general accepted command of the Southwest Pacific 
Area (SWPA). Later, on 24 March in Washington, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
designated the entire Pacific theatre as an area of American strategic responsibility. 
At the end of the month the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff organized the theatre into the 
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Southeast Pacific Area, the Pacific Ocean under Admiral Chester Nimitz, and SWPA 
under MacArthur.  
Switching trains in Adelaide Station on 20 March, MacArthur gave a short 
speech to the press: “The President of the United States ordered me to break 
through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the 
purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a 
preliminary object of which is the relief of the Philippines.”648  In other words, he 
had not abandoned his troops; he had done his duty and obeyed direct orders from 
the Commander-in-Chief. He did not run away, he ‘broke through’ enemy lines – in a 
way, he had advanced. Most importantly, he was going back. MacArthur concluded: 
“I came through and I shall return.”649 That day the Japanese bombed Port Moresby 
in New Guinea, and Roosevelt promoted Wainwright to Lieutenant General and 
command of all the forces in the Philippines. 
 MacArthur’s memorable line was more than an act of self-aggrandizement.  It 
was a calculated attempt to stave off defeat in the Philippines by influencing several 
audiences simultaneously. First, of course, he wanted his soldiers in the Islands not 
to think badly of him and to fight on in some desperate hope their situation could be 
reversed. Secondly, he wanted to openly defy the Japanese and show that at least 
they could not defeat him, and in fact should fear his return.  Third, and most 
importantly, he wanted to publicly commit the United States to return to the 
Philippines. Lastly, he wanted to assure the people of the Philippines that their 
struggle against the invaders was not over. In his memoirs, MacArthur explained he 
                                                        




believed the phrase ‘I shall return’ worked magic on the Filipinos: “It lit a flame that 
became a symbol which focused the nation’s indomitable will and at whose shrine it 
finally attained victory and, once again, found freedom.”650 Time must have polished 
his memory however for as Ramsey described the mood in Bataan: “America had 
failed to defend the Philippines, and the promised relief had never appeared. A trust 
had been violated, a confidence betrayed.”651 
 
Tokyo, D96. R-953 
 The day after MacArthur’s departure – a move not made public for another 
week – Tojo again spoke of independence for the Philippines. Though records 
indicate he was preoccupied with Thailand, he prepared a schedule for Philippine 
‘independence’ in November 1943. 652  Tojo believed America’s earlier public 
promise of independence had set high Philippine expectations that prevented the 
country from embracing “the Japanese side.”653  Therefore, on 13 March he set out 
on a two-week tour of the occupied lands in Southeast Asia with stops planned for 
Manila and Davao.654  The next day he gave a speech: “The Philippines and Burma 
would have independence ‘after they have evidenced their cooperation with the 
empire,’ but ‘military affairs, foreign affairs, economics, and other affairs shall be 
placed under the firm control of the empire.’”655 
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In March, the War Ministry (Rikugun Sho) tasked the Kempeitai to establish 
sections to process and hold the hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs in Japanese 
hands. Section One would run camps in Japan, China, Korea, Manchukuo, Formosa, 
and the Philippines.656 The War Ministry issued administrative regulations but left 
camp commanders free to determine how to run their camps. Inadequate resources 
and imperially sanctioned punitive attitudes towards surrendered soldiers pushed 
many camp commandants to violations of the Geneva Convention.  
 
Central Luzon,  D97, R-952 
In Manila, the Kempeitai established its headquarters in the Jai-Alai Club, 
before moving to Villamor Hall at the University of the Philippines, and finally to 
Fort Santiago on the Pasig River.657 Observant Filipinos noticed two types of 
Kempeitai. 658 Elite officers worked as special agents in field cases, often in civilian 
clothes, closely associated with the Special Service Agency or Military Intelligence 
(Tokumu Kaikan). The regular, uniformed Kempeitai worked as guards or enforced 
military law. The Japanese executed two types of trials: military court (gumpo kaigi) 
and civilian court (gunritsu kaigi). As the war turned against them, they began 
special courts martial (tokubetsu gumpo kaigi) that permitted no legal 
representation for the defendants.  
A day before Tojo began his trip, on Luzon, Xu Jingcheng established the 
Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League, or Kang Fan, with 
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himself as chairman. He created cadres for separate Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets 
Alliances among Workers, Store Employees, Youths, Women, and Cantonese.659 The 
groups spread south to Bicol, then to the Visayas and Mindanao. Their mission was 
to “keep up the spirit of the Chinese through propaganda” and after about a month 
they began printing a secret newspaper The Chinese Guide (Huaqiao dao bao). Under 
editors Zhang Siming and Huang Nanjun, the paper grew from 350 issues in Manila 
to over 3,000 copies across Luzon. The Kang Fan also supplied money, medicine, 
materials and manpower to the Hua Zhi. It passed intelligence to its Manila Unit 
including targets for assassination to deter Chinese from collaborating with the 
enemy.660  The Hua Zhi killed Tang Yunde and Liu Yuheng of the Japanese-created 
Chinese Association (Huaqiao xiehui). An attack on association president Zeng 
Tingquan (Justo Cabo Chan) on 4 December 1944 failed but killed many people 
around him.  
 Secret organizations for and against the Japanese made Manila a very 
dangerous place. Yay Panlilio recalled: “Friends of other days now could be divided 
into three classes: those who had fallen away and could no longer be depended on; 
those who held aloof and would keep for the day when all could be explained; and 
those who fell in step, knowing the score, ready to pay the price – but not stupidly.” 
661 In March, while the Japanese searched for Romulo, Yay left the KZRH radio 
station and kept walking. After four days she made her way out of Manila into the 
hills past Rizal, to the hut of a farmer named Igi, and into the grip of malaria. 
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Southern Luzon, D98, R-951 
With his army concentrated in Bataan, Homma could only send small patrols 
to deal with insurgents elsewhere. In Bicol, they identified Barangay San Nicolas in 
Canaman, Camarines Sur, as ‘gerilyado’ (guerrilla area).662 Soldiers and Ganaps 
searched the town looking for guerrilla leaders. Late on 15 March, the Japanese 
attacked a gathering of San Nicolas citizens attending the wedding of Venancio 
Borlagdan and Blandina Obstaculo.  A sudden flare preceded a barrage of 
machinegun fire. The attack lasted for three hours before the soldiers ransacked and 
burnt the town. Antonio P. Estrada, then sixteen-years-old, later described “the 
exodus of barrio folks from San Nicolas to the town center of Canaman,” the men, 
women, children old and young, moving in single file with their personal belongings 
salvaged from burnt homes. “We stayed in the school and houses of relatives,” 
Estrada remembered.  
There were guerrillas in the area, motivated by basic concerns. In Libmanan, 
Camarines Sur, a long-time Japanese immigrant named Miyahira Berto owned a 
sari-sari store. When he fell behind on his electric bill, the electric company owner, 
Patricio Genova, cut off his power.  When the Japanese troops arrived, Berto got 
them to imprison Genova.663 Berto failed to appreciate that Genova’s granddaughter, 
Matea Abante, was the wife of thirty-three year-old Elias Madrid, “a rich man in his 
own right, and heir to one of the biggest land-based local fortunes.”664 He witnessed 
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the poor treatment of his father-in-law in prison and secured his release with a cash 
fine – or bribe – of P800 along with a sack of rice and some gasoline.  
Elias Madrid, a close friend of guerrilla leader Leon S.A. Aureus from nearby 
Libmanan, began coordinating with Dr. Sancho Manubay, Felix Malapo, Luis Los 
Baños, and Canaman Mayor Damaso R. Requejo. By the end of February, they 
decided to form a guerrillas unit and recruit someone with military experience to 
lead them. Madrid chose his nephew, Philippine Army Finance Sergeant Juan Q. 
Miranda. At Madrid’s house in San Nicolas, Canaman, on 2 March, they finalized their 
plans. Six days later, Elias, his brothers Modesto and Policarpo, Raymundo Martinez 
and Leon San Aureus met with Miranda in San Nicolas. Miranda agreed to lead the 
group. San Aureus, a reporter, became group executive officer and chief of 
propaganda. Elias Madrid became finance officer, using his own money. The group 
chose for its name the Tangcong Vaca Guerrilla Unit (TVGU), and became the first 
armed resistance unit in Camarines Sur. In two days they recruited over two-dozen 
new members. San Nicholas Mayor Damaso Requejo became an associate while 
simultaneously mediating with the Japanese on his citizens’ behalf whenever they 
were in danger. On 13 March, the TVGU conducted their first operation, a demolition 
of the Tucbasan Bridge connecting Libmanan and Naga. Unsuccessful attempts to 
blow nearby railroad bridges followed.  These actions brought on the Japanese 
attack on the wedding in San Nicholas. 
On 20 March, the TVGU retaliated by ambushing two buses carrying Japanese 
soldiers, losing two guerrillas to shrapnel from grenades. The Japanese increased 
patrols on the Naga-Pascacao road, but locals joined the TVGU in greater numbers. 
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At 0500 hours on 28 March, they ambushed a train in Manalas on the Naga-Sipocot 
line, killing six Japanese soldiers and taking their weapons and arresting a suspected 
informer named Delfin Nepomuceno.665 Japanese reinforcements arrived firing 
wildly and killing three civilians who were gathering metal from the destroyed train. 
One of those killed was prominent citizen Jacinto Ursua, turning his kinship network 
against the Japanese. The following month the TVGU liberated 27,000 to 35,000 
sacks of rice stored in a Japanese warehouse in San Juan and distributed much of it 
to the people. They then sent patrols under Lieutenant Simeon Ayala and Sergeant 
Tomas Servidad to drive out Ganaps harassing citizens in remote barrios in 
Libmanan. Two days later a patrol led by Lieutenant Wilfredo San Sebation killed 
eighteen Ganaps in Cabinitan, Ragay.666 That day, the TVGU began issuing a 
mimeographed newspaper, The Voice of Freedom, edited by Aureus under his pen 
name, Rosau Eulanes.  
 
Northern Luzon, D102, R-947 
Ilocos Norte Province Governor Ablan traveled to the neighboring Apayao 
Province to use Praeger’s radio to contact Quezon whom he thought was still on 
Corregidor. On 19 March, he sent a message asking for P100,000 for his government 
workers who had not been paid since December.667 Upon receiving this message, 
and unable to fulfill the request, Quezon authorized Ablan to “issue emergency notes 
as previously authorized by your provincial treasurer and district or fiscal auditor 
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for payment authorized expenditures.” 668  Teodoro Agoncillo noted, “The 
significance of this development lies in the fact that not only did Alban’s outfit grow 
into a full-blown resistance group, but more importantly it led to the imposition of 
discipline upon those who, as independent guerrillas, had committed acts of 
brigandage, rape, and murder against their pawn people.”669  Indeed, Ablan 
prepared orders for his deputy, Lieutenant Feliciano Madamba, to reorganize his 
growing force into three geographical sectors, each with one leader for direction 
and several towns for support.  
Ablan requested immediate supply of quinine and medicine to fight cholera 
and dysentery, He claimed his guerrillas had so far killed 600 Japanese soldiers in 
Ilocos Norte and boasted that despite the Japanese occupation of Laoag and San 
Nicholas, his free government still functioned in the hills. He noted that the Japanese 
had sent General Ricarte to visit Bitac, a town badly damaged for its resistance.  
Ablan reported: “Every day the hatred of our people against the Japs becomes more 
intense as they rob our homes, destroy property, kill civilians, and rape our 
women.”670 
The acts of rape especially incensed Filipinos across the Islands. It seemed 
that almost everyone knew of a woman like twenty-four-year-old Manileño 
Gertrude Balisalisa.671 When the Japanese forcibly drafted her husband, an engineer, 
to work on bridges, she was sent to the local commander’s quarters to work as a 
housemaid. Japanese officers raped Balisalisa and a number of other women in 
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house several times every day. The officers forbade the women from speaking to 
each other and punished them with physical beatings. At least one was shot trying to 
escape. After the war, Gertrude’s husband disowned her, and took her two children 
away.672  
By this time Japanese soldiers were habituated to the exploitation of 
conquered women. Since the 1920s in Korea, the Japanese had sexually enslaved 
tens of thousands of mostly non-Japanese women.673 In 1932, the Japanese military 
in China recruited and compelled women to serve as sex workers they called 
‘comfort women’ (juugun ianfu).674  The program failed to prevent widespread rape 
of local women. In December 1937 in Nanking, Japanese soldiers raped between 
20,000 and 80,000 women and girls (while massacring 250,000 to 300,000 people) 
as part of their subjugation campaign.675  Within two years the War Ministry worked 
to provide a least one comfort woman for every 100 soldiers.676 In July 1941, the 
army requested 20,000 comfort women for 700,000 troops in China and Southeast 
Asia – a ratio of one woman or girl for every 35 men.677 
In the Philippines, at first, most comfort women were not recruited but 
forcibly abducted from their homes or off the streets and kept in army run stations 
and garrisons.678 Records indicate that each company-sized Japanese unit detained 
about ten young women or girls during the occupation, and soldiers raped each girl 
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five to ten times a day.679 The unpaid women also had to clean, wash clothes, and 
cook. With an average age under 18 years old, the Filipinas were younger than the 
women taken by the Japanese in other occupied countries.680 
In cities, the Japanese military exploited areas when “indigenous prostitution 
seems always to have flourished.”681  As Theresa Kaminski noted, “Prostitution and 
gambling, both run from cabarets, continued with the cooperation of the police and 
other city officials.”682 Hartendorp added: “Cabarets and houses of prostitution 
sprang up all over Manila. The principal American residence districts, Ermita and 
Malate, were crowded with these establishments.”683 Every day the Manila Tribune 
advertised: “Wanted: waitresses, hostesses, dancers; good-looking and up-to-date 
girls preferred,” “Wanted: mestiza waitresses with pleasing personality,” “Wanted: 
complaisant hostesses, apply personally,” “Secretaries, girls for Japanese Navy Club, 
Tokyo Saloon,” “masseuse (specializing in prostate massage),” “young and single 
barbers,” and “massagist [sic].”684 Many Filipinas took these jobs to prevent their 
families from starving. 
The Japanese army, “always wary of the danger of espionage, especially when 
there was an active guerrilla resistance,” imported girls from Japan, Korea, China, 
Spain, Russia, Indonesia and Westerners caught in conquered territories.685 George 
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Hicks reported prices charged in Manila as ¥3.50 per night for Koreans, ¥5.50 for 
Japanese, ¥11 for Hispanics, and ¥13 for Americans.686 One observer noted: “The 
Japanese were always stressing in their propaganda that the Filipinos were 
Orientals and should consider themselves fellow-Orientals with the Japanese; but 
they did like mestizas.” 687 
Sometimes, the Japanese simply used the forcible enslavement of women and 
seizure of property for use as brothels as a means for exerting their power. Through 
the first year of occupation Auxiliary Bishop Monseigneur William Finnemann 
openly opposed Japanese ‘comfort women’ practices.688  In early October 1942, a 
Japanese commission went to him and announced that they intended to turn the 
convent of Holy Spirit Sisters in Mindoro into a brothel. As Fertig related: “The Japs 
approached Monsay. Finnemann, Bishop of Minchoro [sic], with the proposition that 
he turn his girls college with all the girls over to them as a red-light house. He 
refused. Later invited on board the transport he was brutally murdered. Story given 
by Fr Reith with request it be made public at home.”689 On 19 October, the Japanese 
arrested Father Finnemann. After seven days of beatings and starvation he still 
refused to sign over the convent. The Japanese finally threw him into the seas off 
Verde Island near Batangas, and reported that the bishop had committed suicide. 
To the common Japanese soldier, however, the use of comfort woman was 
not seen as an evil act. Just as they were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their 
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Emperor, they expected women also had a duty to sacrifice. Their attitudes are 
revealed in their recollections long after the war. Kaneko Yoichi, a prefecture in 
Yamaguchi, recalled how Korean women followed his unit in Yichang, China, 
balancing their suitcases on their heads. During lulls in the fighting engineers hastily 
constructed “rush huts” patrolled by sentries with fixed bayonets. Soldiers would 
line up to take turns with the women until an alarm signaled another Chinese attack. 
He recalled how with “trousers still lowered, soldiers would run helter-skelter,” 
while the women rolled over and covered themselves with their suitcases in 
desperate hope of protection from incoming rounds. 690  With almost fond 
melancholy, Yoichi recalled: “The soldiers put a bit of their dreams in their brief 
interludes with the comfort women between battles.”691 
In a sign that they were aware that Filipinos did not share their cultural 
values, the Japanese Propaganda Corps organized a unit of writers, “the Pen Corps” 
(pen butai).692  The unit sent Miki Kiyoshi to the Philippines in March 1942. A 
philosopher of Buddhist and German ideas trained in Kyoto and Europe, Miki spent 
the rest of the year observing Philippine culture.693 He wrote that Filipinos exhibited 
a resignation resembling the Japanese concept of subjective nothingness, but 
without depth. They exhibited politeness without philosophical context. He felt that 
the Spaniards and Americans had given Filipinos an inferiority complex that they 
compensated for with empty habits of making speeches and wearing expensive 
clothes. These observations reinforced those of other published authors. Advisor to 
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the Fourth Philippine-Japan Student Conference Matsushita Masatoshi, for example, 
declared Filipinos were “an abundant source of human resources that could be 
harnessed for the benefit of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”694 
 
Central Luzon, D103, R-946 
 By now Luzon crawled with USAFFE stragglers, some trying to reach Bataan, 
others attempting to escape that peninsula. Many – except Philippine Scouts – fell in 
with any guerrilla outfit they found.695  Only Horan’s and Thorp’s guerrillas, 
however, could claim official status conferred by USAFFE and MacArthur. These two 
groups began competing for recruits and prestige. Their growth was haphazard. In 
Neuva Vizcaya, for example, Major Parker Calvert, Lieutenant Arthur Murphy and 
Private Grafton Spencer arrived at Lusod Sawmill southwest of Baguio after failing 
to get through to Bataan. They found Filipino soldiers who asked to join Calvert. 
After organizing an ad hoc outfit, Calvert ventured north to Bontoc and reported to 
Horan. He had been unaware Thorp’s group was nearby. 
Thorp’s position improved tremendously on 20 March when a USAFFE team 
under Major Llewellyn Barbour completed a daring trip by PT boat and cross-
country guides to deliver a two-way radio.696 With the radio came Technical 
Sergeant Bill Brooks to operate it, demolition specialist Sergeant Albert A. Short, and 
two Philippine Scouts all of whom opted to stay with the guerrilla leader.697  
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 Meanwhile on 21 March, MacArthur’s train reached Kooringa in far south 
Australia and he finally learned there was no army waiting for him. Shocked and 
disappointed, he arrived at his new headquarters in Melbourne the next day to find 
he commanded three hundred and sixty U.S. Army personnel. He monitored reports 
of four days of heavy Japanese bombing on Bataan and Corregidor that put out of 
commission freezers holding 24,000 ponds of caribou meat, endangering USAFFE’s 
food supply.  
 Severe shortages forced the Mayor of Manila to order price controls on a 
variety of commodities with harsh penalties for violations.  It would be months 
before the PEC sent special Department of Agriculture and Commerce agents to 
enforce the price controls before finally establishing the Economic Police Division 
from the Bureau of the Constabulary in May 1943.698 In the meantime the mayor’s 
action unleashed growth in black markets. The population that had previously only 
worked around Japanese authority now began resisting Philippine government 
edicts. The legitimacy of the administration collapsed. 
The food shortages revealed Japanese miscalculation. Their armies had 
gained control over Southeast Asian territory that produced sixty-seven percent of 
the world’s rice.699 Tokyo’s new colonies alone provided seventy-five percent of 
Japan’s rice, before American submarines interdicted supply lines. Yet early on 
Luzon faced a critical and increasing shortage in rice that compromised government 
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control and legitimacy. Few things were more important to the people than rice. As 
one observer noted, “It is the staple food of the Filipino. It is the thing that occupies 
his attention more than any other. Rice planting in the lowlands is an occasion for 
song, for love, and for neighborliness.”700 
In March, the Japanese Military Administration (JMA) announced a program 
to introduce to the Philippines quick-growing Taiwanese rice called horai, and 
forecasted a three hundred percent increase in national rice production.701 Over the 
next eight months the Japanese controlled media published glowing reports of tests 
that proved how easily the rice grew in the Islands. In August, for example, the 
Manila Tribune reported on a 4,000 acre model farm under Ota Development 
Company: “From this model farm at least two crops are expected annually and the 
production will be used for meeting military requirements in the Philippines. It was 
disclosed that the rice crop from this model farm is expected to reach 100,000 
bushels in 1942 and 750,000 bushels in 1944.” 702 The JMA publicized planting of 
horai across the Islands to make the country self-sufficient in 1943. Until then, Japan 
would ship in rice from Vietnam to make up for shortages.  
Rice was only one of the JMA’s concerns. Between 27 March and 7 April, it 
announced the “military-commissioned management of the Japanese developed 
mines.”703 The JMA established the Philippine Mining Association to enable the 
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Japanese military to reorganize, rebuild and operate local mines.704  This association 
oversaw legal changes to allow the Japanese to seize “enemy-held assets” defined as 
property owned by enemy countries or citizens, property used by the U.S.-
Philippine forces, and all public or semipublic property of the Philippine 
government under the management of the military. Following the pacification of 
Panay, Ishihara Sangyo engineers entered the copper mines in Antique only to find 
facilities wrecked by “the enemy.”705 The Philippine Mining Association would have 
to hire 2,000 local workers under Japanese supervision to rebuild the works. 
The Japanese navy put the Ota Development Corporation in charge of rubber 
plantations in Cotabato, vegetable farms in Calamba, and confiscated lands for a 
slaughterhouse to provide the military with beef. Ota also ran rice plantations in 
Mandaluyong and Pangasinan for the horai experiments. It partnered with the 
Furukawa Plantation Company to run copra farms in Mindanao, and with Daido 
Boeki to produce salt in Manila. The Furukawa Plantation received the 2,300-
hectare International Harvester abaca plantation along with lumber companies and 
cotton plantations.706 
The JMA also created the Philippine Research Commission (Hito Chosa Iinkai) 
to recommend policies on economy, politics, ideology, education, religion and 
race.707 The Commission examined the racial division of power – Spanish mestizos 
dominated the government, Chinese merchants dominated commerce – that 
marginalized Filipinos. To bring the Filipinos into their proper place in the new 
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order, the commission recommended replacement of the concepts and practices of 
democracy and individualism with new concepts of morality (dotoku), justice (seigi) 
and moral justice (dogi) to harmonize senses of duty and freedom.708  The 
commission also recommended building upon the Filipino sense of kinship to create 
a form of Japanese polity (kokutai) with propaganda casting the head of state as a 
father caring for the national family.709  In this way they hoped to foster feelings of 
duty and sacrifice in the Filipinos.  
The Japanese Army’s Religious Section brought Catholic Bishop Taguchi from 
Tokyo to meet with Manila Archbishop Michael J. O’Doherty. Although Religious 
Section publicized the meeting in a positive light, “the archbishop showed very little 
willingness to cooperate with the Japanese, and was in effect confined to his 
quarters in the archdiocese headquarters for the duration of the war.”710 Quezon 
later explained O’Doherty refused cooperation “on the ground that he had had no 
opportunity to consult with his parish priests, and as they were all Filipinos and he 
was an American of Irish birth, he did not know how they would take it from 
him.”711 The Japanese found the archbishop’s two Filipino deputies, Auxillary Bishop 
Guerrero and Father Rufino C. Santos, more receptive. O’Doherty had in fact 
instructed Guerrero “to deal directly with the enemy and to do everything to protect 
the Church from harassment.”712 Yet as historian Terada Takefumi noted, Guerrero’s 
collaboration would exceed O’Doherty’s wishes and he was relieved of his Church 
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duties when the Americans returned. Father Santos learned to avoid the Japanese 
but the Kempeitai later arrested him and he was only saved from execution by the 
timely return of U.S. forces.  
 Relations with the Catholic Church would remain problematic for the 
Japanese. Already, as Romulo noted, “It was a common sight to see our priests 
praying over the ashes of the churches.”713 The day after MacArthur declared Manila 
an open city, the Japanese bombed the capital and apparently deliberately targeted 
the Catholic Santo Rosa and Santa Catalina colleges and a number of churches. 
Kempeitai swept Nuns and priests into prisons and camps. The decision to turn the 
Santo Tomas campus into a prison camp also insulted Catholics. As one Manila 
resident later noted, “Every Catholic student in every Catholic school knows that the 
University of Santo Tomas is the largest and oldest university in Asia and in the 
Philippines.”714 
 
Central Luzon, D112, R-937 
On 29 March, in the forests between Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlak, a 
number of prominent Philippine Communists leaders with about two hundred of 
their followers “armed with paltik, balisong [homemade knives], bolos, and few 
rifles” met to organize a new guerrilla force.715 Among the leaders in attendance 
were Dayang-Dayang, Bernardo Poblete (aka Banal), Lope de la Rosa, Eusebio 
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Aquinbo, Mariano Franco, Casto Alejandrino, and Luis Taruc.716  They voted to 
create a new “People’s Army to Fight the Japs,” in Tagalog Hukbong ng Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon that became known by the acronym Hukbalaháp, or Huks for short. 717  
Following a Leninist model, they elected Alejandrino, Dayang-Dayang, 
Poblete and Taruc to the Military Committee with Taruc as chairman and 
Alejandrino as deputy.718 Vincente Lava, from the Philippine Civil Liberties Union’s 
underground Free Philippines group, officially took over for Taruc as chief executive 
of the Communist party. Mateo del Castillo, later the political commissar, defined for 
the Huks the war as the military phase of the United Party Front effort to overcome 
the Japanese, Americans, and Philippine government and create an new 
independent communist state. Influenced by the Chinese communists, they would 
accept short-term cooperation with opponents when it suited them, and indeed they 
even worked with the Japanese at times, but their ultimate objectives were never to 
change. A U.S. Army assessment noted, the Huks “will probably remain a difficult 
problem during reoccupation and possibly afterwards.”719  
The Huk leaders issue two guiding documents, The Fundamental Spirit of the 
Hukbalaháp and The Iron Discipline. The first called for mutual equality and love 
between the Huks and the people.  The second demanded that Huks follow orders. It 
was an unbreakable code that made the Huks respected and feared. As one history 
noted, “While the Japanese apparently ruled, the Huk actually governed.”720 
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According to neighboring guerrillas, however, many under Huk command – 
“including Taruc himself” – chafed under the exacting Communist regulations.721 
Taruc wrote, “I tried to avoid anything in myself that might divide our ranks and 
weaken the leadership of our people’s army. I tried to become a better Communist. I 
adjusted myself to Party discipline, irksome though it was, and tried to share the 
mind and outlook of my comrades of the Politburo and the High Command.”722  
Even so, the Huks effectively controlled their territory. The AMT and KPMP 
assisted by uniting to form the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). “The Huk 
organization had a wide mass base and a political sophistication that other 
resistance groups had never had. Its leaders, who came from the lowest stratum of 
society, were zealous fanatics who understood the needs, customs, and aspirations 
of the people,” Leonard Davis explained, “The method of indoctrination into the 
aims and purposes of the Huk was so thorough – ranging from lectures to writing 
textbooks and preparing historical pageants – that the people under the Huk 
sovereignty grasped the simple message, and could not help believing that a new 
vista had been opened up in which they, and not the landlords, were in control.” 723 
Agoncillo offered reasons for the Huks’ success.724 First, coming from the 
oppressed strata of society, the Huk leaders understood their people and what 
motivated them. Second, as ideologues, they were highly motivated in their work 
and willing to enforce the fanatical discipline. “Oftentimes,” he wrote, “it was 
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necessary for them, in what they considered to be the interests of the movement, to 
liquidate those suspected, rightly or wrongly, of posing a danger to the 
organization.” 725  When it suited, however, they would ally with well-to-do 
capitalists like Vincente Bernia of Manila, said Blackburn, “because they could be 
used since the Japs wouldn’t suspect that these people with money and position 
were playing footsie with the Huks. They were bringing arms out of Bataan into 
Arayat, and in large quantities.” 726 Intense propaganda, indoctrination and ruthless 
methods helped convince the population to support the Huk program of 
“requisitioning and pressure as a way of systematically ruining the wealthy.” 727 This 
was seen as a step towards revolution. 
The ‘popular front’ policy attracted a large following. “Its growth was 
spontaneous,” Taruc reported, “Whole squadrons [see below] came overnight from 
towns and barrios.”728 Competing guerrillas observed: “Some of its leaders were real 
zealots, and some of their followers were truly inspired by the Marxists ideal, but 
most ordinary Filipinos who became Huks did so for reasons that had little to do 
with Marxist metaphysics.”729 The starving came for food, the vulnerable for 
protection, victims came for revenge, and even some criminals for looting. Food was 
the strongest incentive. In their area, Lizzie Collingham noted, “Good weather 
ensured a rice bumper crop and many recall the period of 1942 to 1947 as the 
period in their lives when food was most plentiful.”730 
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As Taruc explained, “The Huk was organized on the basis of squadrons, 
composed of approximately 100 men each. The squadron was subdivided into 
platoons and squads. Two squadrons made a battalion, and two battalions a 
regiment.”731 Notable among the Huk guerrilla organization was a unit called 
Squadron 48, also referred to as the Wa Chi, a Chinese outfit. Among the merchants, 
teachers and newsmen who filled its ranks were veteran guerrillas from Canton.732 
The number 48 came from two Communist armies in China, the New Fourth Army 
and the Eighth Route Army. The unit provided training for all Huks both militarily 
and politically. 
The reputation of the Huks remained a politically sensitive subject even long 
after the war. William J. Pomeroy wrote idealistically of them. Other guerrillas 
entertained a different opinion. Lapham wrote: “The vaunted idealism of the Huks 
existed mainly in the imaginations of those Western ‘progressives’ who see a 
reincarnated George Washington whenever some bloodstained bandit comes out of 
the jungle, rifle in hand, and starts talking about ‘freedom’ and ‘social justice.’”733 
Taruc admitted, “errors were made and that innocent people died.”734  According to 
some estimates the Huks killed 5,000 Japanese – and 20,000 Filipinos. 735 Many of 
their members accepted this as the price of social justice. “Others were like Carlos 
Nocum,” wrote Lapham, “who joined in order to fight the Japanese but who disliked 
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Marxist dogmatism and discipline so much that he and his men switched over to my 
LGAF forces in 1942.”736 
As one of its first acts, the Huks sent Alejandrino, Sampang and Benedicto 
Sayco to Bataan to meet and coordinate with MacArthur not knowing he had already 
left the Islands. Li Yongxiao claimed to have been with the Huk delegation and 
reported that they met Major Claude Thorp’s executive officer, Captain Mackenzie, 
who took them to see Thorp on Mount Arayat.737  There, Lapham recalled seeing 
four or five particularly hard looking Huks arrive and believed one of them was Luis 
Tarlac, though others thought it was Casto Alejandrino.738 “They asked Thorp if he 
would be their military advisor,” Blackburn learned, “they would run the political 
side of things. Thorp said that he wouldn’t be the military advisor, but that he’d run 
the whole damn show. This didn’t sit well at all, and it resulted in quite a bit of 
friction between Thorp and the Huks.”739  
Thorp was building his own team. The mayor of Prac brought Colonel Mario 
Pamintuan to him, quickly followed by Tomas Lumanlan and Francisco Ocampo. 
From Timbo came Eugenio Soliman.740 Thorp moved his group to a plateau on 
Mount Pinatubo and established camp, known as Camp Four or Camp Sanchez, in 
sight of Clark Field.  
Japan ended the month by bombing the clearly marked American field 
hospital No. 1 at Bataan, killing fifteen patients and administrators. The deliberate 
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act so enraged Filipinos that in the evening Japanese army officials broadcast an 
unprecedented apology on Philippine radio. Quezon then broadcast from Melbourne 
that he had left the country so as to work with MacArthur: “I call upon every Filipino 
to keep his courage and fortitude and have faith in the ultimate victory of our 
cause.”741 
On April Fool’s Day, the first reinforcements promised to Homma arrived in 
Luzon. Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi and his 35th Brigade of the 18th Division, 
augmented by the 124th Infantry Regiment, came from Borneo. Homma added 
service troops from the 14th Army to form the Kawaguchi Detachment.742 Four days 
later the 5th Division’s 9th Infantry Brigade and the 41st Infantry regiment under 
Major General Saburo Kawamura arrived from Malaya. Again, Homma bolstered this 
group with supporting units to form the Kawamura Detachment. He planned to use 
these new detachments to conquer the southern Philippines.743 
On 2 April, as Japanese troops invaded Hollandia in New Guinea, SWPA sent 
the submarine SS-196 Searaven with ammunition to Corregidor, but it would arrive 
too late.  The next day the forces defending Bataan endured six hours of heavy 
shelling. Ramsey recalled, “I was horrified and shaken by shellshock; it seemed that 
it would go on forever, this brutish killing and maiming, and that there was nothing I 
or anyone could do to stop it.”744 A determined Japanese assault breached the lines 
of the Philippine 41st Infantry Division. In the evening, Homma sent representatives 
to deliver a message: “follow the example of Singapore and Hong Kong and accept 
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an honorable defeat.”745 Wainwright refused. Homma advanced towards the key 
terrain in Bataan, Mount Samat.  
 
Southern Luzon, D116, R-933 
 At midnight in Bicol, the TVGU moved to destroy a large rice mill owned by 
Dona Flaviana Aspe de Ocampo and used by the Japanese Association to provide rice 
to the Japanese Army. Thirteen guerrillas ordered the police guards at the mill to 
hand over their weapons, shooting and killing one who refused. The raiders then 
killed Doña Babeng and her daughter Rebecca Ocampo because “their tongues were 
not too friendly to the guerrillas.”746 The ruthless act scared the Filipino elite. “In an 
area where people were nearly universally pro-American,” wrote Barrameda, “the 
killings, nevertheless, sent shock waves, primarily because of the prominence of 
some of the victims. The killings did tend to reinforce the upper-class notion about 
all guerrillas being power-mad and gun crazy.”747  The line between resistance and 
revolution became unclear. 
 
Bataan, D118, R-931 
 Two days later, the defense of Bataan began to crack. MacArthur radioed 
Wainwright, “If food fails you will prepare and execute an attack upon the enemy.” 
748 He wanted I Corps on the west to deliver a diversionary artillery barrage while II 
Corps assaulted forward to Olongapo Road and turned towards Subic Bay. If the 
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attack failed to break through, some men could still pass through the Japanese lines 
into the Zambales Mountains to fight on as guerrillas. Stenographer Rodgers later 
asked: “Who can say that the troops would have suffered more than they did in 
prison camps?”749 
On 5 April, the Japanese took Mount Samat from the Philippine 21st Division. 
USAFFE forces were spread thin, starving, and ravaged by disease. Homma 
completed the organization of the Kawaguchi and Kawasura Detachments for use on 
other islands. The barely trained Philippine 61st Division (two infantry regiments 
and one artillery regiment) held Panay, three regiments were on Negros, a 
provisional brigade and regiment on Cebu, and one regiment each on Leyte and 
Samar.750  No reinforcements could reach these units. That evening the submarine 
SS-185 Snapper delivered 20 tons of food to Corregidor and evacuated 27 
intelligence and communication personnel. Wainwright doubled rations for troops 
so the Japanese would not capture the food. 
 Early on 7 April, a Japanese bomber hit an ammunition truck parked by field 
hospital No. 1 at Bataan. Other aircraft returned to bomb and strafe the hospital 
clearly marked by red crosses and killed eighty-nine soldiers and nurses and 
wounded another hundred-and-one. Along the front, Homma’s troops attacked and 
forced Wainwright’s II Corps back along the San Vicente River. Twenty-four hours 
later the USAFFE troops made a temporary stand along the Alangan River until 
Japanese tanks forced them back again. Realizing the end was near, troops in Bataan 
destroyed their ammunition and supplies. A number of soldiers risked the shark-
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infested waters and tried to swim to Corregidor. American sailors scuttled the 
submarine tender Canopus, tug Napa, and floating drydock Dewey on the Bataan side 
of the bay.  The sub Seadragon delivered 20 tons of food and removed the last 
twenty-one radio intelligence personnel. 
USAFFE medical supplies, particularly malaria treatments, ran low. At the 
war’s start, the Philippine Department Medical Supply Depot held 4,500,000 five-
grain (.325 gram) quinine sulfate tablets in stock, a 30-day supply.751 USAFFE 
authorized a quinine prophylaxis regimen of two tablets daily for the Philippine 
Scouts in Bataan and certain rear area units, but supplies were deemed insufficient 
to cover Philippine Army divisions.  During the retreat to Bataan, forces abandoned 
or destroyed stocks of quinine and other medical supplies in Manila.752 In February, 
“sickness rates began to rise abruptly.”753  By the end of March, the Chief Surgeon, 
Luzon Force, reported 1,000 cases per day of malaria, each requiring three to four 
days of intravenous treatment with quinine.754 In addition, some sixty percent of the 
medical personnel at the hospitals became incapacitated with malaria. 755 
Conservative estimates are that 24,000 soldiers (twenty-five percent of the total 
force on Luzon) suffered malaria by April, sixty percent with P. vivax, thirty-five 
percent with P. falciparum, and five percent with both strains.756  
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Lapham believed, “Bataan was more a medical disaster than a battlefield 
defeat.”757 “Many a man’s hands were black, swollen and cracked from pellagra,” 
Donald Willis recalled, “others could hardly eat because of sore mouths from scurvy. 
I saw many men with their legs swollen to twice their normal size from beriberi.”758 
Army doctors urged prolonged bedrest for victims of beriberi and special dietary 
and vitamin regimens.759 Conditions made this impossible. The Army recommended 
treating malarial dysentery with immediate intra-muscle injections of 10 grains of 
quinine bihydrochloride to be followed by a regimen of quinine or atebrin [a 
synthetic substitute for quinine also known as mepacrine dihydrochloride] with an 
additional orally ingested two percent sodium bicarbonate for diarrhea. 760 
MacArthur’s forces ran out of the needed medicine. A regimental surgeon reported: 
“almost every man in Bataan was suffering, not only from the effects of prolonged 
starvation, but also from one or both of the acute infections that plagued us 
throughout the campaign, viz, dysentery and malaria. I have seen men brought into 
the battalion aid stations and die of an overwhelming infection of dysentery or 
cerebral malaria before they could be tagged and classified for evacuation.”761 
 Disease favored no side in this war. The Japanese suffered from 
unsophisticated medical support. Their medical officers failed to recognize ‘scrub 
typhus’ and misdiagnosed it as Wewak fever, Hansa fever or malaria. Headquarters 
established no standard treatment for tropical diseases and soldier support 
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depended “a good deal on the whim of the individual medical officer.”762  They did 
not use intravenous quinine for cerebral malaria, had no mepacrine, no prophylactic 
injection against tetanus, no sulfaguanidine for dysentery, and no penicillin.763  
Malnutrition aggravated disease.  As in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, “Vast 
quantities of vitamin tablets and injections were used, but its seems they proved of 
very little use; beriberi, night blindness, and other signs of deficiency were 
common.” 764 
Homma pushed forward. Lacking food, medicine, ammunition, and space, the 
defenders were finally out of time. On the morning of 9 April, USAFFE’s II Corps 
commander, General Edward P. King, sent a truce bearer to the Japanese lines in 
Bataan. The Nagano Detachment commander demanded that King appear 
personally with his staff officers. From Australia, MacArthur radioed Wainwright 
that “under no conditions should Bataan be surrendered; any action is preferable to 
capitulation.”765  At 1230 hours King defied MacArthur and Wainwright and gave up 
his 75,000 American and Filipino soldiers – the greatest number of men 
surrendered in U.S. history. “Thus,” reported the Japanese, “the enemy’s forces on 
Bataan Peninsula lost the heart of their command system.”766 Wainwright was left 
with 10,000 men in Corregidor to fight on. 
 A number of soldiers in Bataan, however, refused surrender. They chose 
instead to take their chances escaping through the enemy lines to continue fighting 
                                                        
762 Meirion and Susie Harries, 374. 
763 Ibid. 
764 Ibid. 
765 Sylvia L. Mayuga, “Wit at war,” Philippine Inquirer, February 27, 2016 
766 Blackburn Papers, 227. 
 
192 
as guerrillas. In what remained of the 26th Cavalry Regiment, Captain Joe Barker told 
Lieutenant Ed Ramsey, “Don’t suppose I’d last long in prison camp.”767 Together 
they worked their way down rivers and up to the ridge of Mount Mariveles carrying 
only a few rations and .45 caliber automatic pistols. Ramsey recalled, “Everyone’s 
lungs ached, everyone’s stomach was empty. The effort to climb was more than we 
could bear, yet we had no purpose now except to reach the ridge line.”768 They 
picked up a lost American private, dodged Japanese patrols straddling their path, 
and worked northward from Bataan to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenberg.  
Robert Lapham with the Philippine Scouts struck out north from Bataan with 
soldiers Albert Short and Estaban Lumyeb stealthily through the Zambales foothills.  
They passed close by Camp O’Donnell and saw it was now a prison camp. In a 
nearby barrio Filipino civilians mobbed the three men. “The experience forced us to 
face facts at last,” said Lapham, “it was impossible to hide from Filipino civilians; we 
had to trust them.”769  In Lupao, Nueva Ecija, the small group met Sergeant Estipona 
and four or five other soldiers of the 26th Cavalry. Exhausted, Short and Estipona 
remained in Lupao while Lapham and Lumyeb searched for another base farther 
north.  
At the 11th Division headquarters Major Robert Volckmann and signal officer 
Captain Donald Blackburn agreed to escape north to the high country.770 They went 
with Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble to General Brougher to ask permission to 
leave his unit. The general did not give his overt authorization but said, “If I was a 
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younger man, I’d entertain the same thought.” 771 Thinking smaller groups made 
smaller targets, Volckmann and Blackburn went together, Moses and Noble traveled 
separately. 
Volckmann found that his orderly had mistakenly emptied his musette bag of 
iodine, quinine, and first aid supplies, leaving only a change of underwear, a pair of 
socks, toilet articles, a towel, lighter flints, a small bottle of lighter fluid, gun oil, 
cleaning patches, and a sketch map.772 Blackburn recalled, “I really hadn’t thought 
about quinine, or malaria, or dysentery, or beriberi, or any of those things. As a 
result, when we left our division, we were very ill prepared. We didn’t have any 
medicines to speak of. It was just an oversight on out part. We had some quinine, but 
we didn’t have very much.”773   
Amid near confrontations with Japanese patrols and difficulties in hacking 
through mountainous jungle, one particular hardship haunted the men.774  “For 
anyone who has never gone hungry for a long time,” recalled Volckmann, “I’m sure it 
is hard to understand this continual thinking about food. To us, however, regardless 
of Japs and all other dangers, food meant life or death.”775  Filipinos provided food 
and shelter on their route. Americans Corporal Alfred Bruce of the 31st Infantry and 
three lieutenants Volckmann remembered as Whiteman, Petit, and Anderson, along 
with a number of Filipino soldiers joined them. A Filipino Scout, Jose Maddul from 
Ifugao, Mountain Province, whom they called Bruno, became an exceptionally 
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valuable member of the team.776 Whiteman and Bruce made it as far as Banban near 
the Dinalupihan-Olongapo road where they became too sick to continue. They were 
never seen again. 
Lieutenant Russell D. Barros of the 91st Infantry Division and some other 
stranded American officers arrived in the Sierra Mountains near Rizal and joined 
Marking’s guerrillas. Marking and his deputies Leon Cabalhín, Anacelto San Juan, 
Teófilo Salvador led a group spread across central Luzon in Laguna-Rizal, Batangas, 
Cavite, and Bulacan. They swore their followers to the U.S. Army’s oath of 
enlistment.777 They found Barros as one “whose legs were raw from ankle to knee 
with tropical ulcers, and who had the best of intentions and forever said and did the 
wrong thing and somehow muddled through without getting killed.” 778 
Marking wrote a statement of purpose: “We, ‘Marking’s Guerrillas,’ believe it 
is the right of every Filipino to walk in dignity, unslapped, unsearched, untied; to 
speak freely of honor and injustice alike; to assemble freely’ to mold our destiny as a 
people. We believe that we owe our allegiance to America, and that the only flags to 
fly in this sweet air are the Stars and Strips and the Philippine flag until such time as 
the Philippine flag flies alone.”779 He based his guerrillas in Kanumay and began 
sabotaging the facilities in the Cavite Navy Yard. He also sent Chinese mestizo 
Marcelino Abuyog (Li Junliang) to Manila with orders for all Chinese guerrillas to 
join his force.780 In March, Liu Binwu (Lao Pin-heh or Roman S. Hao) joined Marking 
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and trained at Antipolo before he received a CVP team in Manila to lead in 
demolitions and ambushes.  
The soldiers transitioning into the jungle gained new appreciation for its 
dangers. They embraced the cover of “lush forests in which we had hid and carried 
on our coast watching.”781 Yet they found its incessant dampness played havoc with 
their equipment. Stahl wrote, “The constant high humidity and moisture got into the 
bowels of our radio and shorted out critical parts.” 782 Intense humidity ate away 
clothes and shoes and caused rashes. Rattan thorns stuck the hands and feet and 
broke, leaving part under the skin. “They would invariably become infected and 
cause an ulcer,” Willis remembered, “In the tropics most small cuts or scratches will 
turn into an ulcer if not constantly tended to. For lack of better medicine, we kept 
the scratches open with several applications of hot coconut oil every day. The 
scratches and leech bite then healed quickly.”783 
 The jungle held millions of small, biting creatures whose constant noises 
could make men go mad during the pitch-black nights. Others learned to find 
comfort in the cacophony of insects and dread in any abrupt quiet. “I knew,” said 
Ramsey, “that the sudden silence meant Japanese foot patrols.”784   Leeches 
presented a relentless nuisance. “Squeezing through small crevices – shoe and 
legging eyelets – they buried their heads in the flesh and began to suck blood,” Steve 
Mellnick remembered, “They apparently anesthetized the skin because we rarely 
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felt their presence.” 785 Willis added, “They were so numerous along the trail that 
you could see them on the leaves of the trees and on the blades of the cogon grass, 
waving their thin bodies in the air, trying to find a passing victim to latch onto.”786  
As Fertig described life in the jungle: 
“In this green, wet mildewed snarl of a world, the little 
wounds the leeches make do not heal. Scratches do not 
heal. There is no way to keep the wounds dry; there is 
no sun to help the healing. The little wounds therefore 
grow larger, and rotten. They become tropical ulcers 
and the flesh in time rots away to expose the shiny-
white bone which quickly yellows with lymph and blood 
and ooze. It is easy to die in the world of the jungle, 
although death is apt to come slowly, beginning with the 
first fevers of any of a considerable number of 
diseases.”787  
Sickness afflicted the men quickly. After three days on the Dinalupihan-
Olongapo road Volckmann got “violently sick” and said, “I became so weak that I 
finally begged the rest of the party to go on without me, but they would not 
listen.”788  Blackburn recalled: “During the second week dysentery and malaria hit 
us, and this was just after we had gotten out of the Bataan Peninsula.”789  They found 
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sojourn with the Guerrero family outside Dinalupihan where the head of the 
household brought a doctor friend with liquid quinine uria. The doctor treated 
Volckman and Blackburn for malaria, yellow jaundice and beriberi. 790 Blackburn 
later reported, “I guess we got down to well under 100 pounds. We were like 
skeletons, and the food wasn’t that appetizing.”791 Mao Tse-Tung likened the 
relation of guerrillas to the people to that of fish and the sea. Lose the support of the 
people, and the guerrilla, “like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.”792  This 
was certainly true for the Philippine guerrillas. The Guerreros were just one of 
countless Filipino families who offered them indispensable life-sustaining aid. 
 When lacking modern medicine, the natives offered traditional remedies. 
Fertig recalled: “The Filipinos say that you never get malaria unless you’re hungry. 
You have it all the time, but it doesn’t hit you until you miss a couple of meals and 
get run down.”793  That did not hold for the Americans. At Haliap, on Luzon, people 
who fell ill were thought to have displeased their ancestors. For a minor illness, a 
shaman attempted to placate the deceased through a bacci ritual in which he offered 
tapoy, betel nut and other foods spread on a blanket. “On several occasions,” 
recalled Volckmann, “while visiting some of our camps, I became ill. Without asking 
me the pagan priest came in to play bacci for me. I recovered, so I never questioned 
their beliefs and customs.”794 More severe illnesses required the forced feeding, 
ritual killing, roasting and eating of a dog.  Some dismissed such practices as 
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primitive superstition but Blackburn thought they had psychological merit “because 
the ritual distracted the sick man from his troubles and showed him ‘that even 
strangers sincerely wanted him to get well.’”795 He also found that respecting the 
native practices helped connect the guerrillas with the people. 
 Not that many guerrillas were any better trained in medicine. Faced with his 
first bout of the alternating malarial fever and chills, Ramsey took thirteen quinine 
pills. “The dose nearly killed me, and by morning I was delirious,” he wrote.796  
Confused and stumbling in “horrible isolation and fever,” he believed he was about 
to be captured. “I took my pistol from the holster,” he remembered, “slipped off the 
safety catch, and pressed the muzzle to my temple. My finger was on the trigger, and 
I began to squeeze. But my mind would not let me.”797 At the last minute he turned 
his despair into anger against the Japanese and vowed to continue. Many others 
similarly exhausted, sick, starving, and facing dreaded uncertainty, must have 
perished. 
The guerrillas noticed other significant cultural practices among the tribes. 
Betel nut, for example, played a part in many customs. “It releases a mild narcotic 
that deadens pain and fatigue, and it’s a symbol of social acceptance,” a native 
explained to Mellnick, “Chewing betel to an Ata [natives near Davao] has the same 
significance as breaking bread to an Arab: it implies friendship. If an Ata female 
offers her betel nut bag to a man, she is implying that his attentions are welcome.” 
                                                        
795 Mary Ellen Condon-Hall and Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the 
War Against Japan (United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services) (Washington D.C.: 
Center of Military History, 1998), 360. 
796 Ramsey and Rivele, 103. 
797 Ibid., 104. 
 
199 
798 Partaking in betel nut routines often help cement bonds between guerrillas and 
the tribes. 
Travelling through this jungle world, Corporal John Boone of the 31st Infantry 
Regiment came across Barker and Ramsey near Dinalupihan. He told them that, 
under MacArthur’s orders, Thorp had gone into the hills north of Fort Stotsenberg to 
“enlist any Filipinos and Americans who want to join into a guerrilla force that’ll 
carry on the war behind Jap lines.”799  Noticing that Private Gene Stickland was too 
sick to continue, Boone also told of a camp near Thorp where he could receive 
medical care.  
The brothers Bill and Martin Fassoth had offered their large sugar plantation 
deep in the Zambales Mountains near Clark Field as a safe oasis for the escapees 
from Bataan.800  Their Spanish-Filipino neighbor Vicente Bernia brought supplies, 
money, and medicine through his contacts with the Catholic Church in Manila.801 
Barker, Ramsey and Strickland made it to the camp and stayed long enough to 
recover from their various illnesses. There they learned of the horror of the Bataan 
Death March.  
On 9 April, the Japanese marshalled the USAFFE prisoners taken in Bataan 
for a movement to prison camps. The Japanese had expected 25,000 POWs but 
found 75,000 starving, sick and exhausted prisoners. Instead of marching fourteen 
miles to small camps, they decided to march the men sixty-five miles to larger 
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camps and the rail station in Balanga for further movement. To house the prisoners, 
the Japanese hurried construction of camps at Santo Tomas and Fort Santiago in 
Manila, Camp O’Donnell near Capas in Tarlac, Camp Cabanatuan in Nueva Ecija, Los 
Baños Internment Camp on southern end of Laguna Bay, Casissang and Davao Penal 
Colony in Mindanao, Puerto Princesa in Palawan, and Corregidor.802 
Many of the starved and ill soldiers faltered on the march only to be beaten 
or killed by guards. “One elderly captain begged a guard to put him out of his misery 
with a single shot,” survivors recalled, “a young American soldier was taken from 
the line and forced at gun point to beat the captain and bury him alive. The young 
soldier later committed suicide.”803  Up to 18,000 prisoners may have perished on 
the Bataan Death March. A number managed to slip away, often sheltered by 
Filipinos, to join the resistance. Blackburn remembered the Filipinos “people were 
horrified at what they observed, and were terrified of the Japs. They just despised 
them.” 804 
 
Cebu, D123, R-926 
 With Bataan captured, Homma confidently launched his assault on the southern Islands. He 
planned to send the Kawaguchi Detachment to take Cebu and the Kawamura Detachment to seize Panay. 
Then, the two detachments would join the Miura Detachment already in Davao to conquer Mindanao.805 
The evening of 9 April, coast watchers on Cebu spotted three Japanese cruisers and eleven 
transports off shore. The ship carried 4,852 well-trained and battle-tested troops of the Kawaguchi 
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Detachment.806 The convoy split during the night and at dawn the larger portion landed close to the island 
capital, Cebu City. Several B-17s from Australia ineffectually challenged the landing. USAFFE’s 6,500 
poorly trained and equipped soldiers were too thinly spread to defend any one beach on Cebu. “I had no 
idea of being able to stop the Japs,” explained Brigadier General Bradford Chynoweth, “but I thought we 
could spend two or three days in withdrawal.”807 Then he would transition to preplanned guerrilla warfare. 
Lieutenant Colonel Howard J. Edmands commanded about 1,100 members of the Cebu Military 
Police Regiment defending Cebu City’s 150,000 residents.  Their mission was to hold long enough to allow 
the demolition teams to complete their work and then fall back into the hills.808 A pattern repeated: the 
Japanese advanced, the defenders withdrew. The Kawaguchi detachment reported defeating “several 
thousands of enemy” and “the subjugation of strategic positions on the island by the nineteenth.”809  Yet 
Cebu’s defenders remained intact with their arms, ammunition and supplies. On 19 April, Homma sent the 
31st Independent Infantry Battalion to relieve the Kawaguchi Detachment to prepare for operations on 
Mindanao. Wainwright had conceded Cebu three days earlier and ordered Major General William Sharp to 
re-establish the Visayan-Mindanao Force.810 
On Cebu, thirty-three year-old American Harry Fenton, born Aaron Feinstein, 
was a popular radio announcer on KZRC in Cebu City, well known for his anti-
Japanese broadcasts. He had served as an enlisted man at Sternberg Hospital before 
leaving the Army to marry a Filipina. When the war began, Fenton claimed a 
commission from Chynoweth and went into the hills and used his celebrity to unite 
several small bands of guerrillas in north Cebu. Reports indicated that Fenton 
“trusted no one… Except for those nearest him, no one seemed to like him.”811 
Another guerrilla said, “He’s a madman. He’s insane with hatred of the Japs. Anyone 
found with a single Jap yen in his pocket he immediately condemns to death. The 
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same for anyone found living in occupied or controlled territory. And anyone who 
refused to submit to him he calls an enemy collaborator, and has him shot. He 
doesn’t believe in issuing money. But troops are not paid. His goods are not paid for. 
He rules by martial law.”812 
In southern Cebu, a thirty-seven year-old Mexican-American mestizo and 
mining engineer James Cushing – who’s brother Walter was a guerrilla in northern 
Luzon – claimed a commission as a captain from Chynoweth. He raised a guerrilla 
force around a core of trained USAFFE personnel and built a reputation for 
protecting civilians and fighting alongside his men. He was liked and respected. In 
September, Cushing would lead 1,000 guerrillas – the “Cebu Patriots” – with mortars 
against a Japanese garrison in Toledo. Considering Fenton and Cushing, Salvador 
Abcede reported: “They are not compatible. Cushing is sound and able. He has the 
good will of everyone around him. Fenton has none. Cushing and Fenton have 
nothing in common except both are American nationals.”813 
 
Luzon, D124, R-925 
The guerrilla 14th Infantry Regiment (two battalions) operated in the upper 
Cagayan River region. To their west, Wainwright had promoted Horan to full colonel 
on 7 April and reflagged his organization as the 121st Infantry. “Taking advantage of 
the weakness of our garrison force,” the Japanese observed, “these units were 
engaged in disturbing public peace.”814  Homma’s headquarters tracked “several 
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hundred defeated enemy troops” in the mountains of central Luzon east of the 
upper Cagayan River and about 3,000 more in the Zambales Area north of Bataan.815 
To the south in Bicol, “several hundred defeated enemy troops and malcontents had 
changed into guerrilla units and were disturbing the peace” around Legaspi, Mount 
Isarog, and Daet.816 Around Luguna Bay southeast of Manila, guerrillas reportedly 
operated in increasing numbers.  
On 10 April, Homma sent his 16th Division, the Nagano Detachment, and the 
4th Division to mop-up the USAFFE remnants.817  The next day the 16th Division on 
the west coast received the Ikuta Detachment and the 20th Infantry Regiment to 
clean up around Bagac, Canas Point and Quinan Point. The Nagano Detachment 
swept near Mariveles along the Sisiman Bay, while the 4th Division cleared west of 
Cabcaben and prepared for the capture of the fortress of Corregidor.  
Simultaneously, the 65th Brigade concentrated to mop up west of Mount Samat. 
Homma’s units cleared southern Bataan in seventy-two hours. The 4th Division and 
the Army Artillery Unit then joined the Army Air Unit for an assault on Corregidor. 
On 13 April, the 65th Brigade went to east-central Luzon, the Nagano Detachment to 
west-central Luzon, and the 16th Division south of Manila.818 
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The next day, as ten B-25 and three B-17 bombers moved from Australia to 
Mindanao and 350 Filipino POWs died on the march from Bataan, officials in 
Washington debated what to do with Quezon and his government. Under Secretary 
of State Sumner Welles sent a memorandum to Presidential Political Advisor Stanley 
Hornbeck. “The President has informed me that he thinks it highly desirable for 
President Quezon under present conditions to remain in Australia with his 
Government,” wrote Welles, “He feels that in Australia the Philippine Government in 
exile will be able to undertake effectively the kind of propaganda and intelligence 
work which the Governments of Norway and the Netherlands, et cetera, are able to 
undertake in London because of geographical proximity.”819 Three days later 
Hornbeck countered, “Australia appears less suited for the engaging in the type of 
propaganda which would be of help to our side in relations with the Philippines 
than is the United States. More than 1,000 miles from the Philippines, Australia has 
no system of communications with the Philippines, has no American press or 
Philippine press, and has more limited broadcasting facilities than this 
country.”820 Besides, the coming winter in Australia would likely aggravate Quezon’s 
tubercular condition. Roosevelt would have to reconsider. 
Meanwhile on Luzon, escapees from Bataan increasing made contact with 
guerrillas. “Most Americans have merely assumed that guerrilla activity in the 
wartime Philippines must have been initiated by U.S. escapees like me,” Lapham 
wrote, “and that we then coaxed or bullied Filipinos into supporting us. This was not 
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the case at all.”821  Most American soldiers escaping Bataan looked to either join U.S. 
groups or to escape to Australia or China. “Overwhelmingly,” Lapham wrote, 
“Filipinos came to us and begged us to lead them and help them fight their 
oppressors.”822 When Lapham reached Umingan, retired Philippine Constabulary 
sergeant Juan Desear, farmers Juan Marcos and Emilio Casayuran, and grocer 
Filadelfo Macaranas asked him to lead them in guerrilla warfare. “Training or no,” 
Lapham said, “they were all willing, even eager, to risk their lives to badger the 
Japanese invaders, and they assured me that they knew at least ten or fifteen others 
who would join us and bring rifles with them.”823 He accepted their pleas to be their 
leader.  
Across the Islands many Filipinos chose – or did not choose – to invite 
Americans to lead them. These Filipinos generally saw the American soldiers as men 
with expertise in military tactics, organization, and leadership. Others thought that 
having an American in charge meant a chance to receive recognition and material 
support from MacArthur. With faith in his promise to return, these Filipinos 
suspected that alliance with Americans would be beneficial in the long run. Still 
others had a more immediate reason for wanting an American in charge: pre-war 
politics, culture and class divided many native guerrilla groups. While these divides 
often made cooperation difficult between Filipinos, all could agree to follow an 
American outsider. 
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For the chosen guerrilla leaders, the burden was heavy. They needed to be 
one with the Filipinos. “The guerrillas were fighting for not only for family but also 
for a larger cause – the life of their nation… I, an American, was heading their 
crusade for liberty and the life of their nation, and it was a heavy responsibility,” 
Ramsey explained, “Yet ultimately I was nothing but a symbol. A Paraclete 
reminding them of the promise of salvation. That promise had been made by the 
man whom they trusted more than any other and in whose distant shadow I stood: 
MacArthur.”824 As numerous memoirs attest, each American came to feel the weight 
of wearing the mask of MacArthur’s agent.  
Lapham embraced the role. He made Umingan his base and sought out local 
influential Filipinos. He met the chief of police, several businessmen and plantation 
owners and learned that the mayor was pro-Japanese. “Two concerns were of vital 
importance to them: first, we should not fight with the Japanese near Umingan, for 
they might take reprisals against civilians; second, something decisive had to be 
done about roving bands of former soldiers and outlaws who were terrorizing local 
civilians.”825 The link between action and reprisal would become clear to guerrilla 
leaders in due course. 
 
Cebu, D125/R-924 
On Cebu on 11 April, a Japanese patrol stopped a car carrying Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, his 
son and two soldiers. Quezon had left Abad Santos with written authorization to act as his representative. 
The Japanese took him and his son to a prison camp near Cebu City. Before the end of the month, Major 
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General Kiyotake Kawaguchi arrived to escort the two by ship to Lanao on Luzon. Abad Santos repeatedly 
refused orders to collaborate with the Japanese.  
 The day after Abad Santos’ arrest, Cebu guerrillas destroyed their last boat, 
PT-35. On Mindanao, the crew of PT-4 also scuttled their boat while overhead, a U.S. 
17th Pursuit Squadron P-40 flown by Lieutenant John Brownwell scored the last 
shoot down of a Japanese aircraft in defense of the Philippines. Meanwhile the Death 
March on Luzon left Balanga on 13 April and reached Orani the next day, 
overwhelming the available facilities. The Japanese took one large group further 
north to a warehouse in Lubao. More would be sent to San Fernando. Behind them 
the constant bombardment of Corregidor took its toll. Seventy defenders died when 




 At dawn on 16 April, the 4,160-man Kawamura Detachment landed near Iloilo on southeast 
Panay. A smaller force landed to the north at Capiz. A final landing force came ashore forty-eight hours 
later near San Jose on the southwest coast. The landings went unopposed. Across the island Colonel Albert 
Christie’s 7,000 defenders executed their pre-planned sequential withdrawals until they reached the 
mountains where, in accordance with Operation Baus Au, they were to wage guerrilla warfare.826 The 
Japanese reported “very little enemy resistance” and completed the occupation of all designated strategic 
points in four days.827  Their two converging columns seized Capiz and the copper mines around San Jose 
intact. However, they found USAFFE forces had reduced Iloilo City to ruins. Still, by 20 April, Kawamura 
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considered the campaign over.828 Homma sent a hastily assembled 1st Independent Infantry Battalion of the 
Independent 33rd Battalion to relieve the Kawamura Detachment to prepare for Mindanao.      
For Christie, well organized in the mountains, the campaign was yet to begin. He had abundant 
arms, ammunition, and fresh water along with 500 head of cattle, 15,000 bags of rice, hundreds of cases of 
canned goods, and adequate fuel.829 He began hit-and-run raids that brought a Japanese punitive expedition 
to San Jose. When a Filipino reported Japanese troops approaching, Christie organized a company ambush 
armed with bolos, spears, bows and arrows that killed a large part of the enemy force and caused the rest to 




 In Washington, Roosevelt revisited the situation with Quezon. He floated an 
idea of inviting the Philippine Government in exile to sign the United Nations Pact. 
State Department representatives cautioned that such a move would “be equivalent 
to formal recognition by us at this time of the independent status of the 
Philippines.”831 The United States would forfeit leverage in gaining Philippine 
cooperation in the war and could, in fact, lose Quezon to some kind of settlement 
with Japan. Welles suggested it would be wiser to wait until they could set a policy 
for the independence of all countries occupied by the Japanese. But, he allowed, if 
the President thought the move necessary for the Filipino morale, then he should go 
forward. Five days later Roosevelt announced he would not push for the Philippine’s 
immediate independence. “I am, of course, a firm believer in carrying through our 
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promise of independence to the Philippines,” he wrote, “but I do not think we should 
modify the present law by a step which might be considered to hold out a promise 
to them for immediate independence if, for example, the war were to terminate 
early in 1943. There might be a period of repair and adjustment for two or three 
years for which the United States should be responsible.”832  
 
Australia, D132/R-917 
 On 18 April, MacArthur formally accepted appointment as the Commander in 
Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area. Even before leaving Corregidor, he had sent staff 
members to Australia to coordinate with the Allied command. G-2 Staff Executive 
Officer Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith worked with Royal Australian Navy 
Captain R.B.M. Long to transform their highly effective Naval Coastwatch Service 
into MacArthur’s vision of an inter-service intelligence, propaganda and special 
operations activity.833 Princeton grad Merle-Smith, a well-connected New Yorker 
from an Oyster Bay patrician family and former Third Secretary of State under 
Woodrow Wilson, was an exceptional choice for an effort “severally handicapped by 
jealousies” between services, departments and nationalities. 834  MacArthur 
supported him in turf fights against bureaucratic inertia. Merle-Smith began work 
on an outline for an allied organization to be known as the Allied Intelligence 
Bureau (AIB). Australia promised £45,000, and the Allies worked out command 
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arrangements. Even so, AIB requests to Allied military authorities for “technical 
radio personnel” were met with the reply “none available.”835  
 
Manila, D132/R-917 
That afternoon the Japanese army and Kempeitai in Manila suddenly 
rounded up all consular officials of neutral countries and hauled them off to prisons. 
Any white person on the streets of Manila received curses, slaps and kicks.836 
Slowly, rumor spread of a remarkable event. Early in the day Brigadier General 
Jimmy Doolittle had led sixteen U.S. Army Air Force B-25 bombers in a thought-to-
be-impossible launch from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet and bombed Tokyo, 
Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya and other cities before escaping to China 
and Russia.  
As people in Manila learned of the Doolittle Raid, they understood the 
Japanese fury. Hundreds were arrested. Chick Parsons was taken from his consular 
office to the dungeons of Fort Santiago. After some time, he got word out to Helge 
Jansen, the American ‘honorary consul’ of Sweden whose wife was the actual 
Swedish consul. Jansen notified Panama of Parson’s predicament.837  Officials 
protested to Japan about the treatment of their consul. The Japanese transferred 
Parsons to the prison at Santo Tomás.  At the end of May, a friendly doctor 
persuaded Japanese officials to let Parsons rest at home for one week. Parsons 
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would never speak of what happened to him during his month in prison, but he had 
emerged missing several fingernails on his right hand.838   
 The day after Doolittle’s attack, President Quezon and his party left Australia 
aboard the steamer SS President Coolidge bound for the United States. He notified 
Washington he accepted Commissioner Sayre’s and Secretary of War Stimson’s offer 
of 31 December 1941. Villamor met the wheelchair-bound Quezon before his 
departure. Quezon told him: “Jess, there is nothing I can do in Australia but vegetate. 
You know I am not made for that. My place is in the United States. I must urge them 
to continue the struggle. They owe us a debt which must be paid. The Philippines 
must be reconquered.”839 Villamor asked what he could do to help. Quezon 
responded: “Go to the United States, and tell los animáls – those animals – in 
Washington how badly help is needed in the Philippines.”840 
MacArthur radioed to Washington regarding Quezon’s voyage: “Due to his 
presence aboard, the ship is being convoyed to limit of jurisdiction of this area. 
Request that necessary orders be issued to insure convoy for remainder of voyage. 
This is considered essential not only for his actual protection but because of the 
political repercussions which might follow if every safety precaution were not 
taken.”841 
 
Southern Luzon, D133/R-916 
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On 19 April in Bicol, Faustino Flor led his Camp Isarog Guerrillas in an attack 
on Iriga and drove that town’s mayor, Manuel Crescini, to seek refuge in Naga. With 
intelligence supplied by a group under the Oligquino brothers and Adolfo Caro, Flor 
decided to push his attack against the Japanese platoon garrison in Naga. Miranda 
agreed to assist. Reports described the garrison as “trained professionals with 
superior weapons and greater firepower” who manned prepared defensive 
positions at the Mabolo, Puente de Naga, and Cogante bridges, and in the railroad 
station.842 
Coincidentally, Vinzons attacked the forty-man Japanese garrison at Daet on 
29 April, with 100 men of the VTG, including six American miners who wore 
lieutenants’ bars, aided by 150 other guerrillas.843 Hartendorp reported, “The attack 
at Daet was reportedly provoked by Japanese brutality in that area, where they shot 
down men, women, and children, just for being on the road or to see them jump, and 
by the abuses of Japanese-appointed Filipino officials.”844 Vinzons’ attack effectively 
distracted the Japanese from taking action against Flor.  
 The next morning, Flor opened his assault. Miranda and the TVGU arrived in 
the afternoon. On the second day, 65 men of Captain Damaso Dianela’s Camp 
Tinawagen Guerrillas joined the fight. Lieutenant Jose Hernandez, son of a former 
Camarines Norte governor, arrived with a small band from Cabusao. The 
Buenaventura Plantado group came. Felix (Baro) Espiritu led men from Camaligan, 
and Ricardo Gordenker brought a band from Mount Isarog. Isabelo Payte led Isarog 
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tribal bowmen firing flaming arrows across the Naga River into buildings occupied 
by the Japanese. Of the 1,000 guerrillas in the attack, only about 200 carried rifles, 
shotguns, paltiks, or other firearms.845 Many of the smaller units would remain as 
parts of the larger ones from this point on.  
 The guerrillas fought to the center of Naga and freed foreign nationals held in 
the provincial prison. They also liberated the inmates’ forty-two wives and children 
held in Manley’s house near Puente Colgante. The Japanese moved acting governor 
Villafuerte, his seven children, and his pregnant wife from the governor’s house to 
the capitol building. Japanese resident Sasaski burned to death in a warehouse set 
afire in Tabuco.  
 On 2 May, Vinzons’ deputy Turko stood ready to capture Daet.846 That 
evening in Naga, as his wife began hemorrhaging, Villafuerte sent a letter to the 
Japanese commander asking that they be released to the guerrillas. Japanese 
soldiers with them managed to kill and cook a stray dog to feed the Villafuertes. The 
guerrillas tighten their grip on Naga and cut the water supply to the capitol building. 
Before dawn on 3 May, the squad of Japanese soldiers in the capitol building broke 
out, taking the Villafuerte family with them. At sunrise, the guerrillas claimed 
victory in Naga.  
The guerrillas arrested six Japanese-Filipino families in Naga and sent them 
to a camp in Curry, Pili.847  Japanese resident Tancing Kitaguchi and her five 
daughters were not arrested but they had their house and belongings burned to the 
                                                        
845 Hartendorp, Vol. I, 133. 
846 Barrameda, 26-27. 
847 Ibid., 32. 
 
215 
ground. Guerrillas took Ancieta Pinon, Tancing’s mother and Kubato’s wife, to a 
TVGU camp to serve as a cook and washerwoman.  
The escaping Japanese commandeered a fishing boat to take Villafuerte, his 
wife, and oldest son Peping to Legaspi. At sea, Mrs. Villafuerte again began 
hemorrhaging and her husband convinced the Japanese to go ashore at Vito, Siruma. 
He did not know guerrilla Elias Madrid’s wife and family were there. The party 
landed at 1900 hours on 4 May, into the middle of a santacruzan ritual. The Japanese 
soldiers fired into the air, perhaps to disperse the crowd. Guerrillas fired back. The 
Japanese retreated to the jungle’s edge and a nightlong firefight ensued. At 2200 
hours Elias Madrid gathered a squad of guerrillas and headed to Vito in a pumpboat. 
Upon arriving near midnight, he rushed to his wife’s house, and the Japanese stole 
his pumpboat and got away. The victorious guerrillas executed Villafuerte, his wife, 
his son, and their companions – beheading the corpses of Villafuerte and Crescini 
afterwards. 848 
 
Central Luzon, D135/R-914 
Barker and Ramsey tired of the Fassoth Camp and its refugees’ defeatism and insubordination. 
They were determined to find Thorp and join his organization. Though still seriously ill, Private Strickland 
made them promise to take him along. The three departed with Negrito guides who agreed to take them to 
Thorp’s camp near the remote Timbo barrio near Mount Pinatubo. The small party arrived at their 
destination on 21 April and the shivering Strickland told the officers, “I told you I’d make it.”849 On their 
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second day in camp, twenty-one year-old Gene Strickland died, simply worn out by malnutrition, illness, 
and fatigue.  
 The fall of Bataan had shaken Thorp. Lapham wrote, “It has been alleged that at this juncture 
Colonel Thorp simply gave up. That is not what happened. We had general discussion about various 
possible actions, and at length Thorp brought it to an end by announcing that we could all do as we liked: 
surrender to the Japanese, stay with him, or strike out on our own.”850 Thorp would fight on, for now. Eager 
arrivals like Baker and Ramsey helped keep Thorp going.  
 Volckmann and Blackburn, overcome by illness, returned to the Guerro 
family home to recover. “They knew that if they hid us and shared their scanty 
means with us,” recalled Volckmann, “the Japs would surely torture and kill them if 
they found out. Not an easy decision to make, particularly for a man with a family to 
care for.”851 On 23 April, Guerro contacted his prewar employer, a Mr. Demson, who 
moved the refugee soldiers deeper into the mountains to a camp away from all main 
trails he ran with well-made buildings of bamboo frames and woven split-bamboo 
walls. The two Americans settled in for a fortnight to recover their health. 
Meanwhile ‘bandits’ raided Demson’s newest camp, killing his wife, wounding his 
son, and stealing their belongings.  
The incident attracted Japanese patrols searching for the culprits. Volckmann 
and Blackburn spent days hiding in a nearby creek bed. Guerrero related his 
observations on how the Japanese conducted their search: “They moved down those 
trails that they could find, and each time they passed a house or an evacuation camp 
they sprayed it with bullets and kept on going.”852 “I thought Guerrero had a lot of 
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guts,” Blackburn remarked.853  Before month’s end, the Guerrero family departed, 
leaving Volckmann – now also suffering beriberi – and Blackburn to recuperate at 
Demson’s camp. Then on 5 May, Demson and his son ceased sending supplies and 
vanished.854  
 For five days, the Japanese shelled Corregidor with a huge 240mm Type 96 
howitzer they had brought to Bataan. On 25 April, as Japanese bombers hit the port 
at Darwin in Australia, they added nightly artillery bombardments to the daily 
shelling against Corregidor. Fifteen of Wainwright’s men died when two shells from 
the Type 96 howitzers destroyed the entrance to a command tunnel.  
The Japanese 65th Brigade’s Lieutenant General Akira Nara requested 
Lieutenant Hitomi’s propaganda unit “for the purpose of getting the Philippine-
American guerrilla forces in northern Luzon to surrender as well as persuading the 
local people to cooperate with the Japanese Army to restore law and order.”855  With 
help from some surrendered U.S. Army officers, the propaganda unit enjoyed 
success in the Mountain Province and Ilocos area through 18 August. To counter 
them, Governor Ablan established an intelligence network under former Office of 
Publicity and Propaganda officer Pedro F. Alviat to collect information and print a 
newssheet to distribute in the region. 
Events in Luzon affected Japanese propaganda activities even in Tokyo. 
Akiyama Kunio worked in the War Ministry press section and the Cabinet’s public 
information center. A reporter told him that a Viscountess in Shinagawa watching a 
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line of POWs commented, “The poor things. How sad to treat the Americans this 
way.” 856  Tasked to raise Japanese civilians’ “fighting spirit,” Kunio seized upon the 
comment as evidence that too many of his countrymen still felt the “Americans and 
the British were superior.”857  He later explained: “I felt that I fully understood the 
kind of feelings of compassion of the Japanese lady who had commented, ‘the poor 
things.’ But something happened in the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines. The 
Americans were very familiar with the terrain, as they had used that area as a 
training ground. Japanese forces faced difficulties in capturing it. Two infantry 
battalions in landing craft landed on the right flank of the enemy, but they were cut 
off and come under heavy attack. One of our scouts saw American soldiers killing 
our wounded soldiers by rolling over them with a bulldozer.”858 True or not, such 
tales from the Philippines fed the War Ministry’s media. 
Meanwhile Homma continued to bombard Corregidor. In the early evening of 
2 May, 1,600 sixty-two pound bags of gunpowder in the Geary gun battery magazine 
exploded, killing fifty-six soldiers and wounding hundreds more. The next day the 
submarine SS-190 Spearfish removed twenty-seven soldiers, nurses and civilians 
from the beleaguered island as 2,000 Japanese soldiers prepared to board fifteen 
barges across the bay in Bataan. 
 
Mindanao, D142/R-907 
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Homma turned to Mindanao. He planned a multi-pronged attack: the Miura Detachment would 
drive from from Davao and Digo; the Kawaguchi Detachement would land at Cotabato and Parang and 
move east and north; and the Kawamura Detachment would land in the north near Macajalar Bay and strike 
west to meet Kawaguchi and south through central Mindanao.859  Ultimately, the three detachments would 
link up near the center of Mindanao along the Digos-Cotabato stretch of Route 1. 
By 28 April, Lieutenant Colonel Reed Graves of the 101st Division (PA) expected the Miura 
Detachment in the Cotabato-Davao Sector to attack. 860  A battalion of the 10th Independent Garrison 
Regiment had arrived to relieve the Miura Detachment. Graves could not feel comfortable. An American 
reported, “Most of the men who fought on Mindanao never fired a live round before they went into 
battle.”861 There had not been enough ammunition to train. When the Miura Detachment attacked, however, 
Graves managed to hold them until the evening of 2 May when his commander, Brigadier General Joseph 
P. Vachon, ordered his withdrawal.862 
Early on the morning of 29 April, the Emperor's birthday, the Kawaguchi Detachment put 4,852 
men ashore near Cotabato and Parang ninety miles west of Davao. Units of the 101st Division (PA) under 
Lieutenant Colonel Russell J. Nelson augmented by Constabulary troops put up a surprisingly robust 
defense until Japanese aircraft forced them to fall back. 863  Kawaguchi marched east toward Pikit, 
threatened Graves troops holding the Miura Detachment and forced their withdrawal.864 For five days 
Kawaguchi and Miura pushed their better-armed and supported troops against and around the USAFFE 
positions and gained control of southern and western Mindanao. 
On the morning of 3 May, the day Stillwell began his epic retreat in Burma, 
the Kawamura Detachment landed on Macajalar Bay in north central Mindanao, one 
hundred and twenty-five miles northwest of Davao.865 For six days the Japanese 
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advantages in artillery and aircraft undermined Fil-Am attempts to hold defensive 
lines or counterattack. 
 
Manila, D149/R-900 
 On 5 May, Tojo arrived in Manila. Collaborationists in government 
orchestrated a warm reception covered by a supportive press. Nearly 400,000 
people, many waving Japanese flags, greeted the Prime Minister. Bands played along 
his route. Tojo told the crowd at the Luneta: “I am glad to state that upon my arrival 
in this country, I see everywhere tangible evidence of your growing desire to 
cooperate more closely with the Imperial Japanese Government. I note with great 
satisfaction that you are actively forging ahead in your tasks of creating the New 
Philippines and under the circumstances, I am convinced more than ever of the 
propriety of your early independence.”866  Commissioner of Justice Jose Laurel led 
cheers of ‘banzai!’.  
During his meeting with Tojo, Presiding Officer of the PEC Jorge Vargas 
expressed how happy he was that Filipinos and Japanese were working together to 
create a new Philippines. He explained, “We have been an orphan in Asia, a spoiled 
child among the Asian peoples. Living in an alien culture, we have forgotten our 
innate culture, but Japan has pulled us up to the level of a member of the Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”867 He added, “Japan’s victory means liberation of 
the Philippines. Only then will we attain our objective as an independent nation 
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under Japanese leadership.” 868 After three days, Tojo returned to Japan without 
visiting Davao, while newspapers advertised the second shipment of rice from 
Saigon to Manila.  
Tojo likely received a briefing on the ongoing effort to convert the Araullo 
High School in Intramuros into a new Constabulary Training Academy. Selected 
cadets underwent a three-month course, under Japanese supervision, to become 
effective and willing members of the law and order force. “From the Filipino point of 
view,” Agnocillo noted, “the creation of the Academy was a preparation for 
retaliatory measures to be taken by the Academy graduates, upon the insistence of 
the Japanese, against the guerrillas or, as the Japanese called them, bandits.”869 To 
oversee the new constabulary forces, the Military Administration under Director-
General General Yoshihide Hayashi created the Department of Peace and Order.  
To help guide occupation policy, the JMA established the Philippine Research 
Commission (Hito Chosa Iinkai). It acknowledged American achievements in 
individual rights, local government, and general secular education but found faults 
with each.870  Education, for example, centered on liberal ideals, law and literature, 
and led Filipinos away from the manual labor the Japanese felt suited them. 
Filipinos lacked any sense of self sacrifice and duty to the state. The JMA had to 
eradicate the Western influences perverting Filipinos and re-educate them in 
attitudes appropriate to their proper place in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere. 
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To meet these objectives, the JMA created the Government Training Institute 
to inculcate administrators in “moral, intellectual, and physical’” ideals that would 
“make them better fit to perform their duties under the New Order.”871 They were to 
teach a new Japanese influenced language called ‘Nippongo’ in all schools, and 
exorcise all non-Japanese ideas from textbooks.872 Commissioner of Education Claro 
Recto received orders to reopen schools under the supervision of a Japanese-
Filipino committee. He targeted the first day of June for the start of the new school 
year but a lack of teachers and an unwillingness of parents to send their kids to the 
schools undermined his efforts. As late March 1943 only 1,227 of 8,724 elementary 




Following a bombardment of 16,000 shells, just before midnight on 5 May 
Homma hit the east side of Corregidor with 2,000 infantrymen. Intense defensive 
fire killed or wounded 1,200 of the assaulting force. Yet by 0930 the next morning, 6 
May, the Japanese achieved a solid toehold on the island fortress. Counterattacks by 
U.S. Marines failed to dislodge the invaders who were now reinforced with tanks.  
At 1230 hours, a representative from Wainwright under a flag of truce 
crossed the Japanese lines near Cavalry Point to arrange a meeting to discuss the 
surrender of Corregidor and all the forces defending it. An hour later Wainwright 
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arrived at the left flank of the Japanese 4th Division to surrender. He sent a message 
in code to General Sharp granting him command of all USAFFE forces outside 
Corregidor. The Japanese escorted Wainwright to Cabcaben but because he only 
offered to surrender Corregidor, they sent him back and continued to attack.874  
Later that day General Short radioed MacArthur from Mindanao: "North front in full 
retreat. Enemy comes through right flank. Nothing further can be done. May sign off 
any time now.875  
Wainwright informed Homma that he only commanded Corregidor and had 
no authority to instruct the other forces to surrender. Chief of Staff General George 
C. Marshall, however, had promoted Wainwright to command all forces in the 
Philippines and Homma had seen the general order issued by Wainwright 
announcing his assumption of USAFFE command.876 Homma demanded Wainwright 
surrender all forces or face continued attack. The American general honestly 
claimed he had no way to communicate such an order; deputy senior signal officer, 
Colonel Theodore T. Teague and his fifty signal officers and 662 enlisted men had 
destroyed all their radio equipment. 
Finally, Wainwright agreed to coordinate the unconditional surrender of all 
USAFFE forces in the Philippines. At 2345 hours, a white flag flew over the 
headquarters on Corregidor. Five minutes later, over the Philippines Broadcasting 
Network from Manila, Wainwright instructed all American commanders in the 
Islands to lay down their arms. 
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7 May – 9 July 1942 
 
With Wainwright’s surrender, MacArthur lost all awareness of developments in 
the Philippines. There, refugee soldiers who refused to surrender wandered the jungles 
fighting disease and starvation. Meanwhile Japanese occupation practices insulted 
Philippine cultural sensitivities and incited resistance.  
 
Manila, D151, R-898 
Homma provided airplanes to send Wainwright’s staff to coordinate the 
surrender of subordinate USAFFE units across the Islands.877 Teams of Japanese and 
American officers reached Cebu on 14 May, Panay on 19 May (where they also 
discussed surrender of Negros), Leyte on 22 May, Negros and Samar on 25 May.878  
Japanese garrison units followed the negotiators.  
The day after Wainwright’s surrender, the Japanese unloaded 6,000 
American and Filipino prisoners from barges at the yacht club on Dewey Avenue in 
Manila. They planned a march through town to the rail yard to impress the local 
population. “When the Australian and British prisoners had walked through 
Singapore they had been jeered at: so had the Dutch in Batavia,” one historian noted 
before adding, “The Manileños did jeer at those ragged troops, but their very 
raggedness seemed to symbolize something more profound the fraying of American 
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confidence, of Manila’s confidence in America. Many Manileños ran behind Japanese 
guards and offered the prisoners cigarettes and food – it was like a sentimental 
gesture to an old friend leaving, perhaps never to return.”879 
 
Panay, D152/R-897 
Within days of Wainwright’s surrender Brigadier General Christie agreed to 
follow orders and surrender the Americans of his 61st Division (PA), but before the 
Japanese arrived on 19 May he granted his Filipino soldiers permission to head into 
the hills. Few followed his order. Christie had Division G-3 Captain Macario Peralta, 
Division Engineer Captain Leopoldo Relunia, and 3rd Battalion, 63rd Regiment 
Commander Captain Julian Chaves promised not to organize guerrilla resistance for 
two months after he surrendered so as not to provoke retribution upon prisoners. 
Peralta led his soldiers into northeast Panay, Relunia moved to eastern Panay, and 
Chaves went to central Panay. Two other Filipino officers led more men to other 
areas: Braulic Villasis to Capiz and Cririlo Garcia to the northwest. Disorganized 
independent bands roamed freely. Over four months, however, Peralta gradually 
brought the far-flung units under his command, under the banner of the 61st 
Division, and managed to contain the small Japanese garrisons in San Jose (Antique), 
Capiz, and Iloilo City.   
Peralta was a thirty year-old regular army officer and a 1935 graduate of the 
University of the Philippines with majors in law and ROTC. “People who have known 
him report that he is a strong character, a good organizer, aggressive, sure of himself 
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to the point of being cocky, and a strong nationalist,” SWPA noted, “He tends to be 
impetuous, lacks experience, is on occasion arbitrary and sometimes lacks follow-up 
on his ideas. He wants the Panay guerrilla organization to be a purely Filipino 
accomplishment.”880 Indeed, Peralta tolerated Americans who came to his island but 
excluded them from his organization.  SWPA remained suspicious of his nationalism 
and accused him of pursuing “self-aggrandizement at all costs and under any 
conditions.”881 
Iloilo province’s Governor Tomas Confesor had escaped detention in Manila 
weeks earlier and returned to southern Panay. The other two provincial governors 
in Antique and Capiz surrendered, but Confesor moved his government into the hills 
to organize resistance. “He is impetuous,” U.S. Army intelligence reported, “and was 
known as the ‘stormy petrel’ of Philippine politics because of this trait alone.”882 
Confesor established a police force known as the Provincial Guards and a messenger 
organization that rivaled the remnant 61st Division guerrillas. He remained in his 
province to reconstruct civil government beyond Japanese control and even 
conducted radio broadcasts of news to the citizens. 
The people of Panay gravitated to Confesor. In contrast, Peralta, Relunia, 
Cirilo Garcia, Jurado, Guarinia, and the other 61st Division officers were Tagalogs 
from central Luzon and thus outsiders. They shared neither kinship nor sympathy 
with local people. When Peralta declared martial law on Panay, he entered into a 
prolonged contest of authority with Confesor.  
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Also in Iloilo, Juanito Ceballos raised fifty armed, demobilized soldiers. He led 
them to rural Zarraga in search of Judge Vincente Mapa who had once sentenced 
Ceballos to prison for theft. They found the judge and executed him. The band killed 
the abusive hacendiero Sabas Gustilo. Such actions drove the local elite into the arms 
of the Japanese for protection.883  Ceballos then turned across the Iloilo Plain to hunt 
down the politically powerful Lopez brothers but ran into an ambush on 16 July and 
was captured and executed.  
Iloilo was home to more than 3,500 Chinese, the second largest Chinese 
community in the Philippines.884 Teachers Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimei of the 
Chinese Commercial Secondary School (Huashang Secondary School) had organized 
the National Defense Drama Club in 1935 to spread anti-Japanese sentiment and 
support the boycott of Japanese goods. The next year they founded the Chinese 
Salvation Association (Yilang huaqiao Jiuwang xiehui). Now the Association turned 
Chinese youth towards guerrilla warfare. Leftists Zhang Jisheng and his brother 
Zhang Guamian established a bookstore and reading club which Wu Zhaisheng (Wu 
Yuan), Gong Taoyi and Wu Jinshui (Chen Qinghai) turned into the National Salvation 
Society in 1938 to mobilize students and shopkeepers.885 The Japanese invasion 
either drove the Society’s fifty members underground or to other islands.  Before 
the Japanese invaded Panay, a Kang Fan delegation arrived in Iloilo with Cai 
Zhensheng, Guo Jian and Ji Rongfang “to organize the underground activities in the 
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island.”886 After Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimie left for other islands, the Kang Fan 
established the Southern Island Branch of the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and 
Anti-Puppets League on 7 July and began publishing the underground Southern 
Island Guide (Nandao dao bao) newspaper.  
 
Mindanao. D153/R-896 
Visayan-Mindanao commander Major General Sharp hesitated to surrender 
his command to the Kawamura Detachment. He felt well positioned to wage an 
irregular warfare. He drew hope from Quezon’s broadcast from radio station KGEI 
in San Francisco on 9 May: “Our nation will not for long remain in bondage. The 
American forces will redeem their pledge. Led by their able general, they will rescue 
the Philippines. Stand firm for your freedom is not lost. The United States through 
its great President. Franklin D. Roosevelt, has pledged not only her armed might but 
also the total redemption of our land. I am here to work for the fulfillment of that 
pledge within the earliest possible time.”887  His hope proved to be misplaced. 
Early in the year, 81st Division Commander Brigadier General Guy O. Fort 
tried to bolster his forces in Lanao, Mindanao, by organizing thousands of Moros in 
defensive positions along highways in the south. Motivated young Muslim men 
under their own leaders formed the Moro Bolo Battalion paid by USAFFE.  When the 
Japanese landed at Davao, the untrained Moro forces quickly dissolved. Remnants, 
however, became active guerrillas in Lanao and Cotabato.  
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Before Corregidor fell a young, Moro lawyer named Salapida Pendatun along 
with his brother-in-law Datu Matalam Udtog organized an untrained Bolo Battalion 
in the vicinity of Catabato. Pendatun was a classmate of Peralta at the University of 
the Philippines and became a First Lieutenant in USAFFE. His unit included Datu 
Aliman and his brothers-in-law Datu Mantil Dilanglan and Gumbay Piang. Armed 
with knives, the battalion set out to block the Digos-Kabacan Road but crumbled 
before the enemy advance.888  
In Pikit, Japanese sentinels publicly bayonetted to death two American 
priests after seeing a few Filipinas by custom kissing the priests’ hands. The 
Japanese put their bodies in sacks, tossed them in a river, and continued plundering, 
raping and killing civilians.889  Similar atrocities committed in Midsayap and 
Kabacan in Cotabato province – events known as the Judgement of Knives (Juez de 
cochilio) – terrorized the population and spurred the Bolo Battalion’s men to reform 
as guerrilla bands in July and August.  
 Pendatun selected as his executive officer Major Edwin D. Andrews, a thirty-
seven year-old American mestizo. A graduate from the Philippine Constabulary 
Academy, Lieutenant Andrews commanded the Zablan Airfield when the war 
started and had known Villamor.  With Pendatun, Andrews received 200 rifles from 
Assemblyman Manuel Fortich and helped defeat Japanese garrisons at Kibawe, 
Maramag, Valencia, Mailag and Malaybalay.890 By the end of 1942, they would have 
2,400 men in Bukidnon province and more in the surrounding areas. Andrews 
                                                        





would brag: “We had a police headquarters with its G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. We had 
the necessary services such as quartermaster, medical, transportation, ordinance 
and finance. We had a regular hospital running with six doctors and twenty nurses, 
in short a regular force functioning under the leadership of this young Muslim 
lawyer.” 891  
With this support, Sharp remained reluctant to surrender Mindanao. On 11 
May he received word from MacArthur: “Orders emanating from General 
WAINWRIGHT have no validity. If possible separate your forces into small elements 
and initiate guerrilla operations.”892 When Wainwright informed Sharp that Homma 
would not accept his surrender unless all U.S. forces in the Philippines capitulated, 
Sharp radioed to MacArthur that he would surrender. SWPA coincidentally lost 
contact with Praeger’s radio on Luzon.893 As an officer on the SWPA staff noted, 
“One by one the thin, uncertain lines of communication between General 
MacArthur’s reconstituted headquarters in Melbourne and the tortured Philippines 
three thousand miles to the north were fading into silence.”894 
Even after Sharp’s surrender, according to U.S. Army, estimates, “ninety-five 
percent of [Mindanao] was free of enemy occupation or patrols.”895  Many 
Americans with military and civilian expertise still remained at liberty on the 
islands. The geographically vast island held numerous food centers. The small 
Japanese garrisons in the coastal cities of Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan and 
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Surigao had only a few roads available to the interior. In Dansalan, Short held the 
Japanese at bay through 27 May.  His decision to surrender, Keats wrote, “was so 
complete and sudden that civilians and army remnants were stunned and 
demoralized.”896  
 Many men refused to follow Sharp into captivity. Mining stock millionaire 
speculator Samuel J. Wilson, owner of Wilson Building in Manila, was a recalled 
Navy lieutenant in Lanao when he learned that the Japanese had interned his wife 
and his kids in Santo Tomas prison. He set out to join the resistance. Jordan Hamner, 
Charles M. Smith, and Athol Y. “Chick” Smith were mining engineers on Masbate 
Island. They obtained a sail boat and escaped to Panay. When Cebu fell they moved 
to Mindanao and accepted commissions in Sharp’s army to build roads. When Sharp 
surrendered they made their way to a camp on a plantation owned by a Mr. 
Deishcer near Rgounggan or Momungan where stray Americans gathered.897 
 Some who followed orders to surrender had second thoughts. Private Robert 
Ball and Sergeant Knortz surrendered at Malaybay but later escaped to join the 
guerrillas. To help encourage whites to surrender, the Japanese released from Davao 
prison camp a German citizen, Waldo Neveling. He opted to head into the jungle to 
join whatever guerrillas would have him.  
Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, an American mining engineer and 
Army reservist on Luzon recalled to active duty in early 1941, was constructing an 
airfield on at Kolambugan, Lanao, in Mindanao when he heard Sharp had 
surrendered. Fertig joined Navy Chief Petty Officer Elwood Offret and Army Captain 
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Charles Hedges and headed to the Mirayon province near Alanib. The three men 
sought to link up with 81st Division commander Brigadier General Guy Fort.898 
When they reached the house of Salvador Lluch, a trader between the lowland 
Christians and mountain Moros, they were told Fort had also surrendered. The men 
learned of Drieshcer’s Camp and headed that way. 
 
Central Luzon, D160/R-889 
Homma sent the 32nd and 35th Independent Infantry Battalions of the 10th 
Independent Garrison Unit and the Miura Detachment to mop up enemy remnants 
on Mindanao while the Kawaguchi and Kawamura Detachments prepared to depart 
the Philippines for other theaters.  The Nagano Detachment (62nd Infantry 
Regiment, 21st Infantry Regiment) moved to Negros, Bohol, Leyte and Samar.899 The 
2nd Independent Infantry Battalion joined the Nagano Detachment to garrison Cebu 
and Panay. Four days earlier a detachment of the 65th Brigade, 3rd Battalion 51st 
Mountain Artillery Regiment, and the 3rd Trench Mortar Battalion, reported the 
completion of mop up activities in west-central Luzon. At midmonth a detachment 
from Olongapo with officers from Sharp’s staff arrived to subjugate the Visayas and 
Mindanao.900 Meanwhile, reconnaissance elements from the 16th Division went to 
Mindoro and Marinduque. 
“By the time the island fortress of Corregidor finally surrendered on May 6, 
1942,” wrote Meirion and Susie Harries, “the besiegers, outnumbered three to one, 
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were almost as short of ammunition as the besieged. The campaign had also put 
some of the weakness of the [Japanese] High Command on show – most 
conspicuously the clashes of personality, differing priorities, and individual 
ambitions.” 901 If concerned, Homma tried not to show it. He saw his mission now as 
mopping up defeated and isolated USAFFE units. Guerrillas were still a matter of law 
and order for the Philippine government and constabulary. Homma expected 
USAFFE units stranded behind the lines and acting as guerrillas to follow 
Wainwright’s orders and surrender, once informed of those orders. Indeed, after 
receiving a personal letter delivered by messenger from Wainwright, Horan obeyed 
and surrendered.902 “After his surrender,” remarked Blackburn, “he came out into 
the villages and campaigned for the surrender of the Americans. Big help! He was 
responsible for coining the phrase, ‘misguided elements.’”903 Many men respected 
Horan’s authority and laid down their arms; many more, Filipino and American, 
opted to fight on. 
Horan’s operations officer, Walter Cushing, chose to remain. He took 
command of the 121st Regiment and dispersed it into small groups. Captain William 
Peryam took over a large part of the unit.904 Cushing used his radio from the Batong 
Mine to monitor news which he then distributed in a newssheet he called The Echo 
of the Free North.905 
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In Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya, Colonel Warner also received a message from 
Wainwright and agreed to surrender his reconstituted 14th Infantry Regiment. 
Filipino Major Nakar assumed command of the troops who refused to surrender and 
established a new base in Isabela. Pursued by Japanese patrols that harassed and 
punished nearby civilians, Nakar dispersed his men among the population to obtain 
food and shelter and avoid the destruction. 906  Meanwhile, he moved his 
headquarters to Madela, Nueva Vizcaya, and concentrated on getting a radio. 
Captain Parker Calvert and Lieutenant Arthur Murphy had only recently 
gathered remnants of the 43rd Infantry Regiment in Begnuet from Philippine Scout A 
and B Companies manned by Igorots from the Bontoc and Ifugao. Japanese patrols 
kept them from linking up with Warner near Nueva Vizcaya. Calvert decided to 
move north to Bontoc to join Horan, only to find that he had surrendered. Horan, 
however, left orders for Calvert and Murphy to also cease resistance. After much 
debate, they ignored his orders. Parker opted to seek out colonels Moses and Noble 
who were rumored to be back in the area after failing to get through to Bataan.  
Other scattered guerrilla bands appeared in La Union, Abra and Ilocos Sur. 
Japanese troops from Corregidor arrived at Illocos Norte searching for Alban. They 
brought old General Ricarte and several American officers to deliver speeches 
urging the guerrillas to capitulate.  
 
Visayas, D161/R-888 
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The Japanese met resistance almost everywhere. On Dumaran Island off 
Palawan, American mestizo brothers Alfred and Paul Cobb ran a cattle ranch.  About 
the time Wainwright surrendered, the brothers organized a guerrilla Home Guard to 
provide law and order on Dumaran Island and in northeast Palawan. The Cobb 
Group headquartered in Danlig. 
The Japanese invaded Dumaran, seized the capital of Puerto Princesa, and set 
to work building an airstrip using American POWs from Manila. The island 
government collapsed and brigands roamed the countryside. Occasionally the 
Japanese sent out patrols on foot and by boat and made efforts to seize the rice 
harvest. Guerrillas occasionally ambushed the patrols but focused more on keeping 
order, protecting civilians, and supporting the extra-legal government.  
On Mindoro, twenty-six-year-old Senior Inspector of the Romblon-Mindoro 
District Constabulary Major Jose M. Ruffy commanded sixty constabulary troops 
near Pinamalayan when the Japanese arrived. Civilian volunteers increased his 
group to about 250, half armed. Ruffy organized four companies into a Bolo 
Battalion headquartered near Naujan.  
Japanese troops entered Bohol’s capital of Tagbilaran and seized manganese 
mines on nearby Panglao and Guindulman islands. Captain Victoriano Blancas 
surrendered his USAFFE garrison, leaving Bohol Governor Agapito Hontanosas to 
the Japanese. Blancas’ Executive Officer and Adjutant, First Lieutenant José M. 
Maneja, refused to surrender a led followers into the mountains to a base he called 
“Camp Liberty.”  The Volunteer Guard, formed prior to the war by Quezon’s order, 
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joined them to form a Bolo Battalion. Armed with the signature curved knives, they 
acted mostly as couriers, cargadores, and sentries.  
 The cargadores, native bearers who transported supplies across the jungles, 
became unsung heroes of the resistance. “Wearing brief loincloths and amulets, they 
ate with their fingers and indicated the time of day by pointing to the sun,” Steve 
Mellnick later remembered, “They described longer periods of time in terms of suns 
and full moons. They had no concept of seasons – only wet and dry spells. 
Surprisingly, they had a word for every digit between one and twenty. They 
possessed remarkable strength. A four foot, ninety pound [Mindanao native] Ata 
would carry a seventy-five pound load all day without complaint.” 907 They seemed 
to always be present and ready to assist guerrillas. At least one guerrilla would 
admit, however, that advance parties of armed guerrillas providing security during 
movements “would also recruit laborers, sometimes, I fear, with a bit of 
‘persuasion.’” 908 
Without telephones or radios, the guerrillas heavily relied heavily on 
couriers or runners to carry messages, often over very long distances. Even short 
distances on maps translated into long travel times when complicated by steep hills, 
dense jungles, or treacherous rivers. Messengers had to be physically tough, familiar 
with the territory and the people, able avoid both the Japanese and the dangers of 
the jungles, and trustworthy. Incredibly, as with cargadores, sufficient numbers of 
volunteers applied. Most had wanted to fight but lacked proper arms. “The runners’ 
main importance was quite different anyway,” Lapham reasoned, “since I always 
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had more volunteers than I knew what to do with, making runners of a considerable 
number gave them a chance to do, and feel they were doing something useful.”909 
Without the hand delivered messages guerrillas remained isolated, even 
from neighboring insurgents. Ramsey once wrote of his closest fellow guerrillas: “I 
had been out of touch with Putnam and Lapham for months and did not even know 
whether they were still alive.”910 By habitually exchanging the latest information 
with people along their paths, the messengers established a network – the “jungle 
telegraph” – that rapidly spread news among the people. 
As Volckmann recalled, communication networks could be complicated: 
“Three east-west and three north-south message routes were established, linking 
the district commands with GHQ, USAFIP, N.L. Message centers or relay stations, 
manned by a non-commissioned officer with four to six men, were located ever four 
to six hours hiking distance along each of these routes.”911 They called the runner 
system the Land Communication Company. Blackburn added, “We had way stations, 
or message centers, set up every four to six hiking hours, depending on terrain. And, 
we kept nine men and a noncom in each of these message centers.”912 Using miners’ 
helmets with carbide lamps they moved at night. Messages marked ‘rush’ went out 
day or night. A message from Ilolcas coast reached Kalinga, about 225 miles distant, 
in two days. A message traveling over seventy miles from Kiangan to La Union – 
seven days hard march over mountains – took two days. Centers copied the 
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information in each message so that Volckmann could identify and adjust to any 
messages that fell into enemy hands. 
Messengers pulled extra duty as scavengers, sentries and spies. “Our couriers 
are real heroes!” wrote Mellnick, “They enter Davao City, call on friendly officials, 
borrow money, and buy clothing, medicines, and salt. Then comes the dangerous 
part – smuggling the stuff out of the city! They can usually hide the medicines among 
vegetables, but they have trouble smuggling three tons of salt each week! The Japs 
are aware of our salt problem and inspect all vehicles leaving the city.”913 Like the 
cargadores, the messengers were all natives. 
 
Central Luzon, D168/R-881 
North of Bataan, Colonel Thorp conducted patrols with his Luzon Guerrilla 
Force (LGF) from his base on the slopes of Mount Pinatubo. Four days after Japan 
completed its conquest of Burma, 24 May, Thorpe returned to Timbo with a large 
entourage of staff and companions that included a number of women.  Two weeks 
earlier Joe Barker and Ed Ramsey, who limped with an infected jungle ulcer on his 
foot, had had arrived in the camp to wait for the colonel’s return. Colonels Moses 
and Noble arrived shortly after them with ideas for a guerrilla force.  
Barker and Ramsey spent their days putting together a guerrilla band to be 
part of Thorp’s force. Ramsey recalled, “In every village we sought out men with 
military or police training, and these we commissioned as officers. There were few 
of them, however, and often we substituted with local government officials or 
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people who had had some higher education.”914 In nearby Timbo refugees built a 
new base a mile and a half up river from Thorp. Baker and Ramsey made an eager 
young Filipino volunteer named Processo Cadizo a sergeant in their organization. 
News reporter Alejandro Santos and policeman Fausto Alberto came in from Manila. 
Philippine scout Claro Camacho also became a key aide and ran the headquarters.  
At Thorp’s base Ramsey observed how much the guerrillas were a Filipino 
outfit. “While we waited, the people of Timbo were wonderfully kind to us,” he 
recalled, “There were over a hundred of them, Filipino soldiers and their families 
who had fled from Fort Stotsenberg to the safety of the mountains.”915 The refugees 
fed the Americans, provided medical aid, and offered companionship and 
entertainment. Through bonds of pity and kindness, they drew the Americans into 
their community and common cause. Ramsey wrote, “Up until this time I had 
thought of the Philippines only as a post; now I began to see it as a place, and a 
people. We had failed in our defense of them, leaving them in the hands of their 
enemies. They ought to have owed us nothing; instead they were sharing what little 
they had with us and risking their lives to help us.”916 Baker and Ramsey 
rededicated themselves to carry on as guerrillas.  
Ramsey went to Thorp to report his nearly completed new camp. The colonel 
no longer resembled the stout man Ramsey remembered at Fort Stotsenberg. “Now 
he was thin and rather frail, worn out from months in the jungle. His hair had gone 
                                                        
914 Ramsey and Rivele, 114. 
915 Ibid., 98. 
916 Ibid., 100. 
 
241 
completely white, and his manner was merely gruff.”917 Thorp then received a 
report that the Japanese were coming. Filipino refugees scattered from the camp. 
Thorp sent his Americans out among friendly native families. A local Negrito named 
Pandora and his wife and two children housed Ramsey. They were small people who 
lived in a riverside hut and wore only loincloths. Pandora spoke very little Tagalog 
and Ramsey understood none of his native dialect. The family went about their daily 
lives, making arrows and tending to the children. “I felt an isolation more intense 
than I had ever known,” wrote Ramsey.918 He began to drift into dark thoughts. “I 
was going to be a guerilla, and I did not even know what that meant,” Ramsey 
recalled, “Fighting behind Japanese lines, no weapons, no organization, no army – it 
was madness. I would be captured and shot, or worse, and I had no one to blame but 
myself.”919 Many guerrillas entertained such thoughts.  
Meanwhile in the mountains northeast of Manila many of the young ROTC 
guerrillas were also hungry and disillusioned and began returning to their homes. 
With the fall of Corregidor, cadet leaders Eluterio Adevoso and Miguel Ver knew 
they had to rally their troops. They moved their headquarters into the Sumulong 
Rest House and renamed their group, “The Hunters.” Adevoso assumed the nom de 
guerre ‘Terry Magtanggol.’ He organized a raid on a building in the Union College of 
Manila used by the Japanese as an armory. Disguising themselves as Japanese 
soldiers, the Hunters duped a janitor into letting them into the building, slipped past 
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the guards, and got away with all 136 rifles. They then moved their newly armed 
force to a new camp at Malabanca.  
Months later the Hunters would try to repeat their tactics at the Mapua 
Institute of Technology but the Japanese captured two of their members. Under 
torture, the boys broke. A Hunters’ sergeant spotted the two boys leading a Japanese 
patrol towards their base camp in Antipolo and warned Ver who disregarded the 
report. On the morning of 4 July, the Japanese attacked. Although the Hunters killed 
twenty-five Japanese soldiers, Ver also fell dead. The Hunters lost sixty rifles, two 
machine guns, a Browning automatic rifle, and much enthusiasm.920 
 
Leyte, D168/R-881 
The Japanese landed unopposed on Leyte on 24 May and took over the island 
within 24 hours. Colonel Thomas Cornell, the Leyte-Samar commander, surrendered 
his Provisional Regiment of the 91st Division. A Sergeant Terraz escaped surrender, 
formed a guerrilla band, and led it until the Japanese killed him. Sergeant Antonio 
Juan took over the guerrillas but was also killed in battle. The unit then split 
between Circiaco Centino and Filemon Pabilona.  Second Lieutenant Alejandro 
Balderian promoted himself to lieutenant colonel, took supplies from camp at Jaro 
and organized a guerrilla unit in Northern Leyte.  Isabelo Centino, who had fought 
under Balderian, joined his father, Circiaco Centino, and both civilians claimed the 
rank of major. The Centino guerrillas in Jaro, Pastrana and Palo in northeast Leyte 
became part of Balderian’s group. First Sergeant Pabilona promoted himself to 
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lieutenant colonel and expanded his guerrillas to control the area near San Miguel, 
Babatngon, Alangalang and unoccupied Tacloban. 
Off southern Leyte, U.S. Navy Yeoman Lieutenant Gordon A. Lang, Major 
Porfirio E. Jain and Lieutenant Jose Nazareno formed a guerrilla group on Panaon 
Island. Jain took over Lang’s group. Lieutenant Blas Miranda (alias Colonel Briguez) 
started another guerrilla group in the area from Palompon to Baybay. Technical 
Sergeant Felic Pamanian assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel and established a 
band of guerrillas in the Mount Capoocan area of Northern Leyte, joined soon after 
by another band under USAFFE Captain C. Corpin from Biliran. 
 
Southern Luzon, D168/R-881 
Before Cornell surrendered, he triggered a competition among guerrillas in 
southern Luzon by appointing Lapus as commander in Bicol, pending contact with 
the more senior officer Sandico.921  By the time Sandico appeared in late May, Lapus’ 
Guerrillas were a robust outfit of several hundred men based in Carachayon that 
attracted aggressive Japanese patrols. Lapus  moved his group to Dolos, assigned 
seventeen men to protect Governor Escudero, and temporarily disbanded his unit. 
Lapus’ weakened state convinced his deputy, Sayoc, to secretly cooperate with 
Escudero to overthrow him. When he found out, Lapus fired Sayoc.  
 
Manila, D168/R-881 
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While Homma conducted his mop up operations across Luzon, members of 
the collaborationist government worried about the persistence of the resistance. On 
20 May, Assemblyman Benigno Aquino had written Vargas to insist that he call 
Japanese attention to the dangers of the “bad elements, otherwise known as the 
USAFFE’ in Central Luzon.922 Many Filipinos however wanted the administration to 
address the problem of Japanese abuses. Four days after Aquino’s letter, ten-year-
old Lita Yumol walked to school with her little brother past a Japanese sentry point. 
She had learned not to smile, to bow deeply and formally to the soldiers, and to 
make certain her brother did the same.  “There have been cases when people, even 
children, who fail to do this are stopped or called back and slapped on both cheeks; 
then told to bow low,” Lita noted, “And father has warned us of this.”923 
Slaps in the face were a particular point of cultural contention. “In their 
penchant for slapping non-Japanese Asians about,” Dower wrote, “Japanese soldiers, 
especially enlisted men, were treating others in the same way their superiors 
treated them. Racial arrogance came together here with the all-too-human transfer 
of oppression; and although such practices made the Japanese hated, these were 
crude rather than atrocious acts.”924 Yet from the Filipinos’ perspective such 
behavior permanently alienated them from the Japanese. Numerous such acts gave 
weight to rumors of atrocities that further infuriated Filipinos and increased their 
resistance. 
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 Witnesses like Lapham testified that the Japanese “arrested, maimed, and 
murdered Filipinos by the tens of thousands and did so in myriad horrible ways: 
whipping them, starving them, setting fire to the hair in their armpits, pulling out 
their fingernails, giving them showers of boiling water, abusing and killing their 
children in front of them, and chaining them to slabs of iron in the burning midday 
sun so that they slowly fried to death.”925 Villamor detailed several specific 
incidents: a young Filipina who slapped back at a Japanese soldier on Rizal Avenue 
in Manila was stripped and left tied to a pole in the city square; a boy in Negros was 
tied up in a house that was then set afire and he was burned alive; a guerrilla caught 
on Panay was skinned.926 Suspected guerrillas across the islands had lips or ears cut 
off, hands soaked in gasoline and set fire, soles of feet cut open and before being 
forced to walk in sand.  “There was the ‘cutting’ torture,” Panlilio added, “The Jap 
would rush the victim with bayonet or saber, as if to dispatch him permanently, then 
would deflect or pull the thrust to inflict a lesser wound or slice off only a nick of 
flesh. A slip meant death, but what of it?” 927 
In other ways, Japanese indifference reinforced the perception that they their 
disdained Filipinos. During their invasion the Japanese destroyed the Misamis water 
and power station and never repaired it. It remained a powerful symbol. “With all 
their promises to the Filipino people about the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ they made no 
attempt to help rebuild any of the damaged property,” Willis recalled, “As a matter 
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of fact, they usually pulled out any plumbing, wiring, pipes or machinery and 
shipped it off to Japan. I noticed that was true all over the Philippines.” 928 
News of each insult, slap, atrocity and destruction inflicted on any Filipino 
radiated across kinship networks and brought entire clans against the occupiers. 
Families across the Islands united in resistance. Over months and years this fostered 
a new identity. Families and clans or town, though carrying the separate banners of 
the Huks, Chinese, USAFFE groups, or local guerrillas, shared the experience of 
being targets of Japanese hostility because they were Filipinos.  
 
Negros, D170/R-879 
On 26 May the Japanese landed at Dumaguete, capital of Negros Oriental, the 
last unoccupied province. When Davao fell Colonel Roger Hilsman, Sr., commander 
of the 101st Division in Mindanao, went to Negros to organize a provisional force. He 
had planned a “little Bataan” defense of Mount Kanlaon, but fell ill in March and was 
sent to Cebu. Hilsman’s operations officer, Major Salvadore Abcede, and other staff 
officers had thought the “little Bataan” defense a bad idea. When cavalry Colonel 
Robert MacLenan arrived to take command the staff convinced him to divide Negros 
into five sections for guerrilla warfare. To prevent having to surrender his command 
with Wainwright, MacLenan relieved all his subordinate American commanders and 
replaced them with Filipino officers. Abcede received the 2nd Battalion, 74th Infantry, 
southwest from Isbela, and the rest went to majors Ernesto Mata, Pullong Arpa, 
Francisco Gomez, and Fortunato Roque. 
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When the Japanese landed on Negros in April, Hilsman made a surprising 
return and reclaimed command just as Wainwright surrendered. Eight days after 
Corregidor fell, Hilsman surrendered and ordered his units to do the same. Arpa and 
most of his men, Gomez with a token force, and Roque with a larger force obeyed 
Hilsman’s orders. Mata and Abcede refused and led their men into the mountains of 
Marapara and Kanlaon.  Abcede said Mata “refused to surrender. But he was goaded 
by the Americans into giving his men the choice between surrender and resistance. 
Most of the officers gave themselves up but the enlisted men fled.” 929 
By 20 May the Japanese reached Bacolod on the north coast of Negros where 
the 1,000 men left from the original 4,500-man Negros Force waited. The guerrillas 
burned Banago Wharf, the Diza Electric oil deposit, the Socony gasoline tank at 
Santo Niño, and the alcohol tank near the Bacolod-Murcia Central railroad yard.  
Facing superior Japanese force, Abcede disbanded most of his troops with orders to 
be ready to regroup when called. Meanwhile what he termed ‘wild units’ used 
resistance as a “pretext for plunder.” 930  Abcede regrouped his troops and 
‘liquidated’ the bandits. 
In Dumaguete, the students and faculty of Silliman University were widely 
known as champions of the free government movement. They now felt threatened 
by arrival of the Japanese. American Henry Roy Bell, a popular physics professor 
and former athletic director on the staff since 1921, organized the evacuation of 
university equipment and personnel to Malabo and Lake Balinsasayao. Upon first 
meeting Bell, Villamor said, “I had expected the cartoonist’s concept of a professor: 
                                                        




slim, stooped, eyeglasses perched precariously on the bridge of his nose, an absent-
minded look on his face, but the man who stood before me, sipping cool juice from a 
coconut he held in his hand, was robust and vigorous, looking more like a professor 
of physical education than of physics.” 931 
Bell was indeed active. He assisted the creation of a free provisional 
government in south Negros to support resistance. He set up a camp at Malabo west 
of Dumaguete and helped organize a number of Silliman students and alumni there 
into several Bolo Battalions. A former student and later ROTC instructor at Silliman, 
Major B.N. Viloria led one battalion and an USAFFE lieutenant who escaped from 
Mindanao led another. High school teacher Felix Estrada and Leon Flores were each 
appointed as captains and given command of battalions closer to Dumaguete. Victor 
Jornales and Sergeant David Cirilo assumed command of two more. All were under 
Bell’s guidance.  
The Japanese occupied the outer fertile horseshoe plain of Negros and drove 
guerrilla bands into the central rough interior and south coastal mountains in the 
north, central (east and west slopes), and south. Poor logistics and communications 
plagued the guerrillas. “Thus, limited and immobile,” SWPA reported, “the guerrillas 
suffered proportionately more from Japanese terror raids and destructive attacks 
then they did on Panay, Mindanao, Samar, or even Luzon.”932 
Bell prioritized efforts to establish radio contact with any U.S. forces. Before 
the arrival of the Japanese, he moved all the parts needed to build a radio set from 
the university and buried them in the mountains near Dumaguete. With the help of 
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experienced USAFFE radioman Lieutenant Louis Vail, an American mestizo from 
northern Negros who escaped prison in Fabrica, he recovered the parts, assembled 
a radio, and tried to contact the outside world.933 According SWPA G-2, not until 28 
February would the War Department report efforts to establish coded 
communication with an unknown radio operator on Negros who turned out to be 
Bell. 934 Meanwhile, the professor’s guerrillas kept the small Japanese garrisons 
largely confined to Dumaguete, Bais, and Tanjay.  
 
Mindanao, D175. R-874 
On Mindanao, a Japanese infantry battalion entered Lanao province and 
established a garrison at the old American base Camp Keithley. A Kempeitai squad 
and a JMA liaison office from the Davao Branch along with a telecommunications 
unit settled in Dansalan. Lieutenant Yusuke Goto commanded the liaison office and 
took charge of administration and business matters while civilian Seiji Kogo of the 
JMA ran special operations and assignments.  
A large part of the Japanese plan to subjugate Mindanao rested with the 
island’s Muslim Moro population. Kogo established and maintained direct contacts 
with the influential Moro leaders in central Mindanao.935  Goto arranged to bring a 
garrison battalion to Parang, Catabato.  He also brought the second son of influential 
Lanao Muslim Domocao Alonto, Madiki Alonto out of the University of the 
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Philippines, and a leading Cotabato Muslim politician, Ugalingan Piang.  Seeing his 
son in Japanese hands, Alonto surrendered and offered passive cooperation. Piang 
convinced many Moros near Goto’s headquarters to lay down their arms. 
Cotabato was also home to a community of 1,500 Chinese, largely 
Kuomintang loyalists. In 1939 leftists Wu Wenguo, Lin Zhengren and Huang Ruihua 
created the Cotabato Chinese Mutual Aid Society (Gudao huaqiao huzhushe) to 
boycott Japanese goods, collect money for China, and push Kuomintang-Communist 
cooperation.936 When the Japanese invaded, the Society evacuated its seventy 
members and families inland to Pilayan. They formed three small resistance units 
and tried to avoid the Japanese and malaria. On 6 June 1944, the Japanese would 
surround and capture the force, and execute twenty-nine members the following 
day. A remaining part of the society in Lebak tried without success to join local 
guerrillas. 
 
North Central Luzon, D178/R-871 
 When Horan surrendered, Walter Cushing set out across Luzon in search of 
other guerrillas. In Tarlac province, he received help from a Spanish manager of a 
sugar processing operation who produced alcohol for the Japanese. In Manila, he 
discovered several Philippine officials still loyal to the exiled government who 
provided Cushing with false documents identifying him as a priest, a Spanish 
mestizo, and an Italian mestizo. Through bluff and luck, he narrowly avoided 
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Japanese troops on several occasions. The next month Cushing managed to contact 
guerrillas in La Union and Ilocos Sur before making his way back to Abra. 
By this time Russell Volckmann had been desperately ill for weeks. On the 
last day of May he wrote in his diary: “For the first time in my life, I realize the value 
of health. To my disgust, many of the nights I have almost hoped not to wake up in 
the morning.”937 He vowed to get beyond the malarial ridden lowlands and into the 
mountains to regain his health.  In early June, after more than a month recuperating 
and hiding in the Guerrero’s jungle shack, Volckmann and Blackburn went with their 
host to his family home. A local doctor came to examine both men and injected them 
with shots. After three more days, they felt better and had just begun eating again 
when word came that the Japanese were returning. Volunteers carried the two 
officers back to the Guerro evacuation camp.  
By mid-June Volckmann was finally able to stand and soon began walking a 
little more each day. Petit and Anderson came and told him of Bill and Martin 
Fassoth’s camp in the Zambales Mountains.938 By then the brothers, along with Bill’s 
wife Catalina, had saved 104 of the roughly 400 Americans known to have escaped 
the Bataan Death March.939 They even brought in a doctor and medical supplies to 
care for the sick and injured soldiers. Volckmann thought, “It sounded too good to 
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be true.”940 On 22 June, despite pleas from the Guerrero family, the two Americans 
headed for the Fassoth camp. The sick men stumbled into the camp after a long 
day’s march and found a large main building surrounded by several smaller ones. 
“When we got there – we had a hell of a time getting there because both Volckmann 
and I, during the stay at Guerrero’s, came down with malaria, yellow jaundice, and 
beriberi,” Blackburn recalled, “The illness hit Volckmann real bad. What do you call 
it, dysentery and hole [sic] nine yards, so we lost weight. I guess we got down to well 
under 100 pounds. We were like skeletons, and the food wasn’t that appetizing.” 941 
Between fifty and eighty Americans lounged about the camp on bamboo cots 
listening to a radio tuned to KGEI out of San Francisco. The neighbor Bernia 
continually risked his life to purchase abundant supplies for the camp, often on 
credit from patriotic merchants.942 Blackburn thought the soldiers in camp treated 
the Fassoth brothers badly and were “very derogatory of Bernia.”943 The refugee 
soldiers ate rice and salt twice a day. The lack of vitamin B in the diet did nothing for 
Volckmann’s beriberi and, he said, “my ankles and my feet became so swollen that I 
could hardly walk, and I couldn’t even get my shoes on.”944 After breakfast on their 
first morning in camp, a big red headed sergeant, Red Floyd, walked up to 
Volckmann and Blackburn and said, “Now, look, let’s get the name of the game 
straight, if you guys want to stay here I want you to recognize that there is no such 
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thing as rank. The war is over.”945 Blackburn and Volckmann thought better of 
engaging in an argument. 
By June, Homma had established the Manila Defense Force with a relatively 
small number of permanently assigned active duty troops: one infantry battalion of 
the 37th Infantry Regiment (relieved first by the 35th Independent Regiment and 
then by the 141st Infantry Regiment) and the 4th Cavalry Regiment.946 The regular 
units of the Japanese army were needed elsewhere. The violence then existing in the 
Philippines were a matter for the police. In subjugating the Visayan Islands and 
Mindanao from April through early June, the Japanese reported losses of only 114 
men killed (including four officers) and 321 wounded (six officers) in return for 
capturing 9,278 prisoners along with 3 planes, 58 aircraft cannons and guns, 52 
machine guns, 4 light machine guns, 4,600 rifles, 374 trucks, and 16 automobiles.947 
By the end of May the 47th Infantry Battalion (minus one company) sailed from the 
Manila Defense Force to Davao to join the 17th Army.948 In the months ahead three 
other companies of the 40th Infantry Battalion would leave Manila for Sumatra.    
The Japanese garrisons occupied strategic cities and towns, subjugated the 
residents, established control of transportation and communications, and began 
exploiting resources. The garrisons were too strong for guerrilla forces but their 
lines of supply appeared vulnerable. The Japanese 63rd Lines of Communication 
Sector Units therefore reorganized their installations around Manila.949 They aimed 
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to increase local production of war materials, repair infrastructure sabotaged by the 
retreating Americans, and gather and maintain stocks of supplies. Short on 
manpower, in early 1942 the Japanese imported 2,000 aborigines from Formosa, 
the so-called Takasago Volunteer Corps, and organized them into the Formosan 
Labor Service Corps for work in the supply depots and the air sector units in the 
Philippines.950 The Imperial Army also supported the supply system by repairing 
roads and railways with the ad hoc Army Road Unit (the 38th and 39th Field Railway 
Units) and the Army Railway Battalion (3rd Battalion of the 6th Railway Regiment) 
that had begun by reopening the Damoritis and Tarlac line on 16 January. In return, 
line of communication units provided personnel, field hospitals and “local coolies” 
to combat and line units – especially after March.951 Still, the Japanese lacked 
numbers to defend all their infrastructure all the time, and the guerrillas knew it. 
To foster better relations with the populace, the Japanese granted amnesty to 
tens of thousands of Filipino POWs. The mass release served several purposes: it 
advertised good intentions, possibly pacified native families, bolstered the available 
work force, and signaled to Filipino guerrillas that they too could lay down their 
arms and return to their normal lives. For Japan, however, the war was taking a 
dramatic turn. Four thousand miles away, the U.S. Navy would destroy the heart of 
the Japanese carrier force at the Battle of Midway from 4 to 6 June.  
On 5 June, Chick Parsons was one of those unexpectedly paroled and sent 
home under armed guard from the Santo Tomás prison. The Japanese authorities 
ordered him to gather his family with one trunk and one suitcase for shipment 
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‘home’ to Panama as part of an exchange of citizens with neutral Latin American 
countries.952 Parsons knew there would be a customs inspection before departure. 
The discovery of any printed material could get him and his family shot. 
Unbeknownst to him, however, his wife packed his intelligence file in their suitcase.  
Adding to his difficulties, Katsy’s mother Blanche refused to go. Her son Tommy 
Jurika was a POW on Cebu and she refused to leave the country without him.  
The Parsons family sailed with eight other civilians under constant armed 
guard on a Japanese military hospital ship to Formosa. There they underwent 
inspection. Only by having his smallest child sit innocently on their suitcase did they 
avoid having soldiers find his intelligence file. Distracted inspectors let the Parsons 
get on a captured American aircraft flying to Shanghai.  There they embarked on the 
Conte Verde bound for Singapore and Lourenço Marques in Portuguese East Africa 
where officials completed the citizen exchange. The Parsons finally boarded a U.S. 
chartered repatriation ship, the Swedish MS Gripsholm, bound for Rio. 
 
Visayas, D182/R-867 
On Negros, fifty-year-old Assistant Inspector General of the Philippine Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Gador had become the 7th District Commander (Negros 
and Siquijor) when war began. However General Sharp fired him because Gador 
could not get along with his junior commanders. Sharp transferred Gador’s staff to 
Mindanao. In June, Gador returned to Negros claiming Sharp had sent him back to 
organize guerrilla resistance. He then went into the hills and appeared inactive. 
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Meanwhile thirty year-old Major Hermenegildo Mercado, one of Peralta’s classmates 
at the Infantry School, organized guerrillas around Guilhulngan and north into 
Negros Oriental. He would join Gador in September but break away the next month 
after an apparently serious argument. The two men remained hostile thereafter. 
On nearby Bohol, Philippine Army Third Lieutenant Ismael P. Ingeniero 
organized what would become that island’s largest resistance group, the “Behind the 
Clouds” guerrillas. Ingeniero had once served under Gador.  U.S. Army intelligence 
reported: “Ingenerio is described as a weak character, and inclined to take orders 
from Gador, whom he alone recognized as commander of Negros Oriental.”953 
Reports indicated he had been happily absent during the Japanese invasion while 
visiting his wife in Panay and added: “It is said that Ingeniero obtained command by 
a quasi-political deal and through the support of Senator Carlos Garcia.”954 
  Others noted that Ingeniero “was somehow getting things done.”955 He 
communicated with Cebu and, aided by Governor Conrado Marapo and Senator 
Carlos Garcia, rallied the people on Negros. Villamor later reported that under 
Ingenerio: “All able-bodied men aged 16 to 60 drilled daily and stood guard, without 
arms but with sharp bolos hanging from scabbards tied around their waists, at 
guard houses one to two kilometers apart. Some women as well, those up to 30 
years of age, also drilled, and, to feed the soldiers each Boholano family was giving 
each month: one ganta of rice, one chicken, two eggs, and ten centavos.”956 By May 
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1943, Ingeniero had 4,000 guerrillas under 194 officers and blocked the enemy 
garrisons at Tagbilaran and the Guindulman manganese mines.  
On Mindoro, a mysterious group led by a resident of Tamarraw named 
Romerius, thought to be a former chief of police of San Jose, arose in mid-1942. The 
Romerius Group reportedly did considerable damage to the Japanese supply around 
southwest Mindoro. 
 
Central Luzon, D186/R-863 
 Outside Manila, Marking heard stories of increasingly harsh treatment by the 
Japanese of 115 American prisoners, mostly pilots and engineers, held in the Cine 
Lumban movie theater, a makeshift prison in Laguna.957 He decided to liberate those 
prisoners and secured the cooperation of the Lumbang mayor who agreed to turn 
off the town’s lights and prevent all local dogs from barking on the night of the 
attack. (As one guerrilla said, “If there was one constant in the Philippines, it was 
that any given time and place one to a dozen dogs would be barking. Most Filipinos 
like dogs, and rural families usually had one or two, but why they howled so 
relentlessly I never knew.”958) On the moonless night of 11 June, Marking led forty-
five guerrillas in boats across the Laguna de Bay, tied up the mayor for appearances, 
and took up positions around the prison. “Marking shot a sentry, signal for a tensely 
aimed volley,” Agoncillo reported, “and guerrillas sprang into the clearing to shoot 
and bludgeon the remaining guards and grab their guns.”959 However, only one 
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American POW, George Lightman, answered Markings call to freedom. A U.S. Army 
captain among the prisoners ordered the rest to remain where they were. Marking 
left with Lightman and some captured weapons. In the following days, the Japanese 
executed ten of the remaining POWs as punishment for the one who escaped. 
 Meanwhile, hunted and aware of Chief Justice Santos’ fate, in mid-June, 
Manuel Roxas surrendered to Japanese authorities in Davao. As Quezon’s former 
Secretary of Finance and an eleven-year Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
there were few more prominent men in the Philippines. A colonel named Jimpo 
rushed Roxas to Manila. Knowing Roxas served as a liaison between Quezon and 
MacArthur, Kempeitai chief Colonel Akira Nagahama decided to execute him for 
suspicion of leading Mindanao resistance and intent to lead guerrillas in Luzon. A 
political tug of war erupted. Old friend Commissioner of Justice Jose Laurel 
demanded the Japanese release Roxas saying he was too valuable to execute. 
Laurel’s protests delayed a decision on Roxas’ fate into August. By then new 14th 
Army chief of staff Colonel Takaji Wachi ordered an English-speaking priest, Father 
Gen Kawahara, to investigate Roxas. Kawahara reported: “Roxas’ influence turned 
out to be far greater than we had originally imagined” and concluded that he should 
be spared so the Japanese could “win him over to our side.”960 
Northwest of Manila, Thorp convinced Barker to join his Luzon Guerilla 
Force at Camp Sanchez. By the end of May, he had two new organizations, Squadron 
111 in Umingan and Squadron 300 in Lupao. Thorp issued General Order Number 1 
making Captain Wilber Lage his adjutant and Sergeant Bill Brooks his official 
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radioman. He reorganized the LGF into four geographical sectors: northern Luzon 
under Captain Ralph Praeger; west central Luzon under Captain Ralph McGuire; 
southern Luzon under Captain Jack Spies; and, now, the East Central Luzon Guerrilla 
Area (ECLGA) under Captain Joe Barker.961 Ed Ramsey would be Barker’s adjutant 
and Bernard Anderson his Chief of Staff. Lapham, commanding guerrilla companies 
to the north, became Thorp’s inspector general. With these arrangements, as the 
senior U.S. Army commander, Thorp felt ready to find and bring all other groups on 
Luzon under his umbrella. 
Praeger was well positioned to scavenge guns and ammunition from the 
fields around Bataan. “He also liquidated spies and collaborators energetically and 
undertook some sabotage,” recalled Lapham.962 Stretching his authority, on 4 July, 
Praeger would commission Apayao Governor Marcelo Adduru as a major in the U.S. 
Army and make him executive officer in their combined Cagayan-Apayao Guerrilla 
force.  
By the end of May the veteran Chinese communists had assisted the Huks in 
establishing a Political and Military Training School on Mount Arayat in Central 
Luzon.963 They used Mao’s and Chu-teh’s Fundamental Spirit of Guerrilla Tactics and 
Snow’s Red Star Over China as manuals. The Chinese were vital to the Huks.964 The 
Huks signed an agreement allowing the Hua Zhi freedom of action in return for food, 
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intelligence, guides and a promise to coordinate with the Huks and help train them 
in guerrilla tactics.965 
The Hua Zhi moved to Bataan in June to gather weapons. In July it regrouped 
on Mount Pasbul on the Bataan-Pampanga border for training in tactics and political 
indoctrination using Mao’s The Guerrilla War and The Strategic Problem in Anti-
Japanese Guerrilla War. In early September the unit would return to Mount Arayat 
with seventy-eight armed men. Their record of combat actions would be 
surprisingly sparse: an ambush and capture thirty-two Japanese in San Isidro on 8 
December; killing thirty-seven Japanese at the cost of five killed and three wounded 
at Kanunpa in January 1943; ten more engagements, killing 286 Japanese and 
capturing twenty-four while suffering nineteen killed, eighteen wounded, and six 
missing in February, March and April.966  Even more surprising, Bernard Anderson 
reported to SWPA that the Hua Zhi was “100 percent pro-American, pro-Filipino and 
pro-Chinese Chungking [Nationalist] regime.”967 
 In late June, Thorp sent Barker, Anderson, and Pettit to liaison with the Huks. 
The delegation arrived on 7 July. Barker presented letters from Thorp offering 
USAFFE recognition and promising support if they joined his command.968 The West 
Pointer tried to impress the Huks with his command presence and promises of 
salaries and support once they established lines of communication with Australia. 
Taruc perceived Barker to be an irritating elitist who was trying to coerce the Huks 
into subordination. At the time the Huks claimed about 10,000 members in Bulacan 
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and Pampanga, far outnumbering Thorp’s small headquarters.969  “We told them 
that we would follow them militarily, but that we must be free to have our own 
political program which had as its objective democracy and independence,” Taruc 
reported, “We told them we would not put Filipino patriotism on sale for back-pay 
promises.”970  
The Huks were fighting a different war. The Americans wanted to defeat the 
Japanese and restore the pre-war Philippine government; the Huks remained intent 
on preventing the return of the colonial government and in effect overturning the 
pre-war government. They were able to base their positions in the recent Atlantic 
Charter issued by Roosevelt and Churchill that promised the right of self-
determination to all people. Still, only Anderson’s diplomatic mediation enabled the 
two sides in Luzon to agree on a loose collaboration. “Given these fundamental 
disagreements,” Lapham wrote, “the best the conferees could manage was a paper 
promise to ‘cooperate’ and share equipment and supplies, while allowing the Huks 
‘independent action’ on ‘organizational and political matters.’”971  
After this meeting, letters signed by Thorp, Barker and Ramsey circulated 
across northern Luzon announcing Huk-USAFFE cooperation and demanding all 
local citizens surrender their weapons to the Huks. “Barker and I were reluctant to 
believe the reports of this deception,” Ramsey wrote, “until we saw the letters 
ourselves bearing bad forgeries of our signatures.”972 Friction rose.  Lapham 
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recalled: “Early in the war a small Huk unit and a small unit of my own met, talked in 
a friendly fashion, ate supper together, and all went to bed. When my men awoke 
the next morning the Huks were gone, and so were our guns and supplies.”973 He 
added: “Early in the war we spent as much time fighting the Huks and various pro-
Japanese individuals and groups as we did combatting the Japanese themselves.”974 
Lapham concluded, “In my experience with them, the Huks were shrewd, 
formidable, and above all, treacherous adversaries.”975 
North of Camp Sanchez near Umingan, between severe bouts of malaria and 
dysentery Lapham established a second base he called Camp Manchuria in honor of 
its remoteness. This base operated in parallel with his first camp in Lupao, Nieva 
Ecija. Lapham had left Thorp two months earlier with one hundred men, and now 
commanded nearly double that number organized in two companies in the separate 
camps. He promoted himself to major; Ramsey followed suit. Filipinos filled his 
ranks. Federico Doliente came to Camp Manchuria with ten men. “If Johnny Marcos 
was our best recruiter and trainer in 1942, Doliente proved to be the best fighter” 
Lapham remembered, “Soon he became my most trusted companion on patrols.”976 
Lieutenant Juan Pajota formed several squadrons in central Nueva Ecija. Jeremias C. 
Serafica arrived with fifty armed guerrillas, and Lapham soon made him commander 
of Squadron 207 in the Cuyapo-Guimba-Munoz area of central Luzon.977  
                                                        
973 Lapham and Norling, 134. 
974 Ibid., 98. 
975 Ibid., 133. 
976 Ibid., 33. 
977 Ibid., 38. 
 
263 
Lapham soon learned that Umingan’s collaborationist mayor was threatening 
his citizens for information on the guerrillas. Sergeant Doliente volunteered to 
handle the matter and. set out with a patrol one night. A few days later at sunrise he 
returned to Camp Manchuria with the a gunnysack as a present for Lapham. Inside 
was the mayor’s severed head. “I am not especially squeamish,” Lapham confided, 
“but that experience was a shock.”978  
Just when it seemed Thorp was getting command of the northern Luzon 
guerrillas, he faced a challenge. One of the highest-ranking men to escape the Bataan 
Death March was Colonel Gyles Merrill of the 26th Cavalry Regiment.979 He had 
collapsed but natives dragged him into the bush before the Japanese noticed. Locals 
hid him and nursed him back to health over several weeks and Merrill made it to the 
Fassoth’s camp to recuperate. Like Anderson and Spies, he tried to persuade the 
Fassoth brothers to convert their camp into a guerrilla base under his command, but 
Bill and Martin refused. Merrill believed himself to be the senior U.S. Army officer 
left in the Philippines. Later in the summer he struck out to establish a base north of 
Manila Bay from which he could eventually command all guerrillas in the Islands. 
With him went Colonel Peter Cayler, Captain Crane, Captain Kadel and Private Leon 
Beck. They would form the Zambales Guerrillas and recruit into their ranks a local 
college-educated farm boy, Ramon Magsaysay, who would later become President of 
the Philippines.980 
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Meanwhile hardships mounted for Filipinos. In June, the Japanese-run 
National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) began rationing rice. Initially about 2.5 
pounds per person per day, by October the ration would fall to a little more than half 
a pound per person per day and later drop further still.981 
 
Australia, D207/R-842 
In Melbourne, MacArthur craved information from the Philippines. He heard 
nothing. Then the AIB received reports that allied coast watchers heard transmissions 
from someone named Bell on Negros. 982  In late June the Federal Communications 
Commission station KFS at San Leandro, California, near San Francisco, received a radio 
message addressed to MacArthur from a station calling itself VCJC.983 Suspicious of a 
Japanese trick, the San Francisco station ignored the traffic before finally forwarding the 
repeated calls to the Army Signals Intelligence Service who then passed it to the War 
Department for a lengthy authentication process. By coincidence, Lieutenant Colonel 
Joseph K. Evans served as the G-2’s Chief of Southeast Asia section at the War 
Department after leaving the Deputy G-2 position at Fort Santiago in Manila. He had 
helped Willoughby establish a secret intelligence network of Americans and Filipinos 
with a crude cypher code to report from behind enemy lines after an invasion.984 As the 
G-2 later noted: “Under the impact of the Japanese occupation, the American network 
disintegrated; the men were either killed or interned. Many Filipino agents, however, 
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managed to survive and formed a nuclei of resistance and a skeleton for the 
‘underground.’”985  Evans verified the authenticity of the source of the message: it was 
from Peralta on Panay.986 Unfortunately the sender’s weak radio could only communicate 
when atmospheric conditions were just right, meaning it sometimes took weeks to 
exchange messages.  
Coincidentally SWPA Assistant G-2 Colonel Merle-Smith had submitted his 
plan for the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) on 8 June in a memorandum to the 
Commander in Chief Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey with 
MacArthur’s enthusiastic endorsement. At Blamey’s suggestion the Allied command 
appointed Colonel G.C. Roberts, the director of Australian Army intelligence, to lead 
the AIB, but MacArthur ensured his control over operations by placing U.S. Army 
intelligence officer Major Allison Ind as Robert’s deputy. 
On 2 July, Merle-Smith tasked Ind to draft a directive organizing the AIB and 
four days later Roberts signed and issued it.987 Ind spelled out the new organization’s 
mission: “Obtain and report information on the enemy in the Southwest Pacific Area, and 
in addition, where practicable… weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of 
morale, and … render aid and assistance to local efforts in the same and in enemy-
occupied territories.”988 First, the AIB would have to gain an accurate awareness of the 
state of the resistance in the Philippines.  
Ind organized the AIB in four sections with Section C, under Captain 
Commander Eric Feldt of the Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve, handling 
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field intelligence. He further divided Section C into three regional sub-sections: 
Northeast Area, the Philippines (PRS), and the Netherland East Indies. On 20 July 
SWPA moved from Melbourne to Brisbane where the AIB occupied several floors in 
the Heindorf House office building. Guards on the ground floor limited access to the 
AIB; guards on the PRS floor kept out the rest of the AIB. The PRS communications 
team worked in shifts of one officer and two or three enlisted men. According to 
Radioman Technical Sergeant 4 Bob Stahl, a teletype connected the desks in the 
code room to “some mysterious location where a radio station transmitted and 
received our messages.”989 “The guerrilla movement was just beginning and radio 
traffic was sporadic,” recalled Stahl, “This made my job very boring, with nothing to 
do but read books, work crossword puzzles, or sleep.”990  Ind took charge of the PRS 
and started to sort out the reported radio contacts. 991 
 
Southern Luzon, D213/R-836 
As June came to a close, Cararines Sur guerrilla leader Lieutenant José 
Hernandez delivered to Vinzons from Wainwright’s personal secretary, Lieutenant 
Robert Silhavy, a request for a meeting. Vinzons agreed to meet in Barcelonita, 
Camarines Sur, on 8 July. He granted his troops a fifteen-day furlough before 
heading to the meeting accompanied by his father and provincial governor Basilio 
Bautista. A former guerrilla named Villaluz betrayed Vinzons enabling the Japanese 
to capture him. They paraded him before a crowd in Labo before putting him in the 
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prison in Daet.992 A week later the Japanese arrested Vinzons’ wife, Liwayway, and 
children, Alex and Aurora. Vinzons still refused to collaborate. He smuggled out a 
single written message: “Tell Rafael Quiñones, fight and continue.”993 Qiñones was 
first Vinzons’ protégé in the Young Philippine Party in Basud. For another week, 
they tried to get him to turn collaborator but he still refused. Finally, on the night of 
15 July garrison commander Major Tsuneoka Noburo confronted Vinzons with a 
paper signed by fifty natives identifying him as dorobo – bandit – and threatened 
him with death. Vinzons replied, “Nothing can make me happier than to die for my 
country, Major. You will too…”994 He was interrupted by the thrusts of Noburo’s 
bayonet. Vinzons died that night. His family was never seen again. 
Vinzons’ deputy, Sergeant turned Major Francisco Boayes rallied the 
scattered Vinzons’ Travelling Guerrillas (VTG).  The dark Syrian-descended Boayes 
nicknamed ‘Turko,’ was a five-foot-five grade school educated former boxer who 
had served as Vinzons’ driver and bodyguard. Another band of guerrillas from 
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, under Juan Q. Miranda joined Turko. Miranda had already 
absorbed the small guerrilla band under Lieutenant Leon Sa Aureus and his brother. 
Turko intended to continue uniting the guerrillas in Bicol.  
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10 July – 5 October 1943 
 
Slowly, leaders of several guerrilla groups established radio contact with 
MacArthur’s new Allied Intelligence Bureau that faced the daunting task of verifying 
these contacts. At the same time the Japanese efforts to exploit the Islands had caused 
economic depression and famine. The increased hardship further alienated the 
population and government from the Japanese administration and led many Filipinos 
to recruit Americans into the resistance. 
 
Northern Luzon, D215/R-834 
Before Lieutenant Colonel Everett Warner surrendered on Luzon, he passed 
his radio set to Captain Guillermo Nakar of the 14th Infantry Regiment. Through 
June, Nakar used the radio repeatedly trying to contact SWPA. On 10 July, a coast 
watcher in Java had picked up a faint Morse code signal that he passed up the chain 
of command. Ten days later MacArthur’s G-2 read the message.995  Nakar sent to 
MacArthur: “Detachment of Fil-American forces – we have not surrendered and are 
actively raiding northeast towns of Pangasinan, including Dagupan.”996  
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A senior SWPA officer later described Nakar’s report: “His message was the 
first clear proof that loyal Filipinos, led by MacArthur’s soldiers who had escaped 
capture, still fought on. It dramatically confirmed MacArthur’s faith that they would 
and he determined to do all in his power not only to support it but in time to exploit 
it as a powerful adjunct to Allied arms.”997 It was a critical moment for the SWPA 
commander. “I had acquired a force behind the Japanese lines that would have a far-
reaching effect on the war in the days to come,” MacArthur noted in his 
characteristically grandiose manner, “Let no man misunderstand the meaning of 
that message from the Philippines. Here was a people in one of the most tragic hours 
of human history, bereft of all reason for hope and without material support, 
endeavoring, despite the stern realities confronting them, to hold aloft the flaming 
torch of liberty. I recognized the spontaneous movement of free people to resist the 
physical shackles with which the enemy sought to bind them. It was a poignant 
moment.”998   
Finally Nakar received a response: “The courageous and splendid resistance 
maintained by you and your command fills with pride and satisfaction. It will be my 
privilege to see that you and your officers and men are properly rewarded at the 
appropriate time. – MacArthur.” 999 The SWPA commander promoted Nakar to 
Lieutenant Colonel. The AIB had a new mission: arrange and coordinate support for 
Nakar and any other loyal guerrillas on the Islands. 
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PRS leader Allison Ind began piecing together other sporadic messages from 
the Philippines.1000 On 7 August, he received a worrisome report from Nakar: 
“Intelligence report reveals that enemy has detected the existence of our radio 
station, possibly by geometric process, and detailed a large force to look for us.”1001 
After a message on 22 August, Nakar went silent.1002   
By now the JMA plans for the Philippine economy were failing.1003  They now 
understood the impact of losing the eighty-four percent of Philippine pre-war 
exports that went to the United States.1004 They had also forfeited eighty-percent of 
the country’s taxes paid by the imprisoned Americans and other Westerners who 
had made up only one percent of the pre-war population.1005 Those were the people 
who had carried key business and government administration burdens. Instead of 
compensating for the collapse of these government revenues, Japan remained 
determined to exploit the country economically.   
“While the Japanese government presided over an ever-worsening food 
situation at home,” Lizzie Collingham noted, “as the occupying power in south-east 
Asia it succeeded, in an astonishingly short space of time, in running down the 
entire region, pushing back the progress which had been made towards modernity 
and re-establishing its pre-colonial isolation, undoing the process of urbanization 
and driving the hungry population back into the countryside to undertake 
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subsistence farming.”1006 Most Filipinos now lived below subsistence levels. They 
had too few jobs and too little wages to support economic growth. “The jobs still 
open to them had been scaled down, salary-wise, to the point of ludicrousness,” 
Villamor reported, “A telephone operator in Manila receiving 120 pesos before the 
war was now getting 15 pesos for the same work. Public officials used to monthly 
salaries of 300 pesos were lucky to now get 40 to 50 pesos.”1007 Japanese 
monopolized commerce by paying front men worthless occupation scrip.1008 
A new Federation of Filipino Retailer Associations received power to control 
retail prices but this failed to correct problems with supply. “In terms of managing 
the food supply,” wrote Collingham, “the occupying administration’s greatest 
mistake was to allow the rice industry to disintegrate.” 1009 The JMA assigned 
retailers to the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) to set rice production 
and distribution. A new Federation of Rice Growers Cooperative supported their 
efforts. A new Food Control Association did the same for other foods. Other 
cooperatives controlled livestock and fish. Non-food commodities fell under the 
control of the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Association. As 
one Philippine historian said, “Most of the associations were headed by Japanese, 
with Filipinos as token members of the various boards.” 1010  None of the 
organizations allowed free market practices.  
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On 19 July, a mission of cotton specialists arrived in Manila from Japan.1011 
They followed a mission sent in May that sank aboard the Taiyo Maru before it 
reached the Philippines. The next day the JMA endorsed several policy plans: 
“Outline for Implementing Projects for Increasing Cotton Production in the 
Philippines,” “Outline for Implementing Projects for Cotton Cultivation in the 
Philippines for the Year 1942,” and “Outline for Projects to Increase Cotton 
Production in the Philippines.” They sent the Outlines to the Executive Commission 
who approved five-year targets for producing 100,700 U.S. tons of cotton per year 
by cultivating 1,124,330 acres of farmland.1012 Their goal was not to satisfy Filipinos 
but to support the Japanese war effort. Calculating the domestic demand of cotton in 
the Philippines at 16,670 tons, the Japanese believed the Islands could produce 
83,340 surplus tons of cotton for use elsewhere in the Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere.1013 To accomplish this they would reclaim idle land and convert 
fields used for forests, rice and sugarcane, no matter what the impact on the 
Philippine economy. The JMA assigned cultivation districts to nine cotton 
companies. As Yoshiko Nagano noted, the goals were impossible to reach.  
 
Northern Luzon, D220/R-829 
Meanwhile, the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon travelled through the Mountain 
and Ilocos provinces with American officers calling to the guerrillas to 
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surrender.1014 By mid-summer the Hitomi embraced a mix of punitive tactics – 
conducting raids, making arrests, taking hostages, and demonstrating firepower – 
while still spreading propaganda.1015 This ‘hostile propaganda’ strategy persuaded 
117 guerrillas to surrender, led to the arrests of another sixteen, and captured two 
machine guns, 116 rifles, 39 pistols, and 21 hunting rifles.1016  
In July, Hitomi had moved his unit into Ilocos Norte. There he was shocked to 
see guerrillas shoot and kill an American officer he brought to convince them to 
surrender. Prewar provincial governor Roque Alban still commanded guerrillas 
with his lieutenants, schoolteachers Feliciano Madamba and Isabelo Monje. Local 
assemblyman Edwin T. Medina, who had been defeated in elections twice by Alban, 
supported the Japanese and accepted their appointment as governor. Medina’s 
followers also cooperated and took leading positions in the constabulary.  
Hitomi now used all his weapons: the circus techniques, hardline activities, 
visits by General Ricarte, and freed Philippine Army doctors to provide medical 
support to locals. In August, Monje surrendered. One hundred and twenty-five 
guerrillas followed, twenty-three pledging to cooperate with the Japanese.1017 
Hitomi arrested fourteen more and reported capturing 86 pistols, 51 rifles, and 2 
pieces of heavy artillery. Local Constabulary forces joined the Furuki Battalion in 
sweeping the guerrillas. The Japanese declared Ilocos Norte cleared on 12 August.  
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During July the Japanese Fourteenth Army reported increasing lawlessness 
on Mindanao.1018 As SWPA knew, “The Moro problems on Mindanao have long been 
a source of discontent and unrest.”1019  The long fraught relations between Lanao’s 
hill-dwelling Muslim Moros and coastal Christians were unraveling. The mountain 
people considered lowlanders soft and fearful; lowlanders thought of mountain 
people as ignorant barbarians. For centuries they exchanged raids for food, goods 
and women. For the last four decades, the Philippine Constabulary had managed to 
keep peace.  According to Fertig, “During the period of American rule in the Islands, 
the number of lowland women carried off to Lanao’s mountains was more or less 
minimal, but the sudden intrusion of the Japanese resulted in a kind of legal vacuum 
which was immediately filled by ancient custom, and the paying-off of old 
scores.”1020  
The U.S. Army had long noted differences between Moro tribes: “The 
Maranao (Lanao) Moros are perhaps the bravest, proudest and most intelligent of 
the Philippine Moro groups: Maranao (Lanao), Maguindanao (Cotabato) and the 
Tao-Sugs and Samals (Zamboanga and Sulu).  Intelligence, courage and pride, 
however, do not make the Lanao Moro either a valuable ally or a dangerous enemy. 
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His intelligence is more nearly sly cunning, going hand in hand with treachery.  The 
Moro has little respect for the Christian Filipino and may always be antagonistic 
towards him.”1021  Their small villages built around farms held kinship networks 
loyal to their leaders. Interrelated communities elected a Datu. Knowing these 
differences helped in identifying possible allies.  
The Japanese suspected Americans were behind the Moro unrest. Indeed, 
many of the more troublesome natives were pro-Americans on the eastern portion 
of the Island where chief Datu Tambuyong headed a large kinship network in Taglibi 
area (eastern Jolo).  Family leader in the Luuk-Talipas Sector in western Jolo, 
Captain Arolas Tulawie, also became pro-American.  
The JMA brought former Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu Teofista 
Guingona and his assistant Ciricaco Raval to Davao. They appointed Raval – a 
Christian – provincial governor. The Imperial Army promised to “wipe out the 
malignant Moro elements” and “win the hearts of powerful chiefs.”1022  Negative 
views of Moros were not unique to the Japanese. American guerrilla Charles Hedges 
reported: “These hills Moros live according to the Koran as interpreted by some 
illiterate, flea-bitten imam who heard from some crooked hadji what was supposed 
to be in the Holy Book. What they get out of it boils down to polygamy, slavery and 
brutality.”1023  
The garrison battalion in Dansalan began a subjugation campaign by 
attacking Wato on the western edge of Lake Lanao, killing twenty-four villagers and 
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burning eight homes despite no evidence of any local involvement with the guerrilla 
movement. This and following operations turned the people against the Japanese. 
Reprisals and heavy-handed actions to terrorize the population in Cotabato 
persuaded many former Bolo Battalion members to form guerrilla bands.  Datu 
Aliman gathered 600 men between Kidapawan, Cotabato, and Mount Apo, Davao 
province. Datu Mantil Dilangalan, with his two brothers, raised 1,000 men (half 
armed) in the Midsayap-Dulawan-Pikit area. From Midsayap to Lebak, twelve year 
U.S. Navy veteran Major Matas led 500-man Christians in ‘Matas Militia’ force. He 
became known as “the God of Midsayap,” and “was reported to be brave determined 
but reckless and defiant.”1024  
In August, Datu Salipada Pendatun led the first attack on the Japanese 
garrison at Pikit, Cotabato. Success brought many new men to join his group. With a 
larger force Pendatun attacked Kabacan and secured the Digos-Kabacan Road by 
September. Gradually Aliman, Dilangalan, and others united under Pendatun’s 
command. Most went with him to Bukidon. Others opposed Pendatun, describing 
him as an anti-American lawyer and self-promoted brigadier general “deeply 
involved in Moro politics and protected by a princely family.”1025 His chief of staff Ed 
Andrews had once been a student at the FBI school in the United States and had 
served in the Constabulary intelligence section before the war.1026 When the 
Japanese invaded he took to the hills before finding his old friend and joining the 
guerrillas. He was known for his fierce hatred of Americans. “Perhaps,” John Keats 
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wrote, “the mestizo had never got over a racial insult suffered during his training 
days at flying fields in the southern United States.”1027 
Elsewhere on the Mindanao, Wendell Fertig, Elwood Offret and Charles 
Hedges reached a Moro village ruled by Datu Soong. Young men in the village 
wanted to kill the Americans, but the Datu brought out letters of commendation he 
had once received from Lieutenant John J. Pershing and General Arthur 
MacArthur.1028  He provided guides to lead the party on to Deischer’s Camp where 
they found about thirty American soldiers and sailors who had given up on the war. 
The camp was an unhealthy, muddy mess lacking proper sanitation but the men 
intended to hide there for the duration. Fertig remembered, “They resented officers, 
would not take orders, and would do nothing but sit there, rotting in the jungle, 
living off the store of Army rations which Deischer, an old prospector and boar 
hunter, had somehow acquired.”1029 Fertig and his group, now including Jordan 
Hamner and Charles Smith, moved on and stumbled into the home of Mrs. 
MacMichel, an old Moro widow of an American Spanish American War vet. Her 
open, sunny home seemed to keep Hedges’ malaria in remission. 
On the Fourth of July, Fertig sat on a high hill near Dansalan looking down on 
the National Road. Below him the Japanese paraded a long line of ragtag and malaria 
ridden POWs, in hopes of impressing the citizens of Mindanao. At the head of the 
column they placed Brigadier General Short in an open truck. The POWs shambled 
forward tied together foot and hand with telephone wire. Whenever they lagged, 
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Japanese guards beat them or jabbed them with bayonets fixed on their long rifles. 
When they fell they were stabbed.1030 Watching from above, Fertig decided he 
would never surrender. He would fight.  
U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Ernest McClish had arrived in Misamis Oriental 
in November 1941 to command a regiment but the unit’s supplies were sunk in 
Manila Bay. When Wainwright demanded surrender, Governor Pelaez told McClish 
his unit was the only thing maintaining law and order. McClish recalled, “I couldn’t 
surrender and let the province fall apart!”1031 He organized guerrillas in Imbatug, 
Bukidnon. Americans Lieutenant Robert Ball, Lieutenant Anton Haratik, and Captain 
William Knortz joined him to organize more units in Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. 
The guerrillas ambushed a Japanese patrol near Medina, but returned the captured 
soldiers to the Japanese with a proposal: “Keep your men out of my territory and I’ll 
keep mine out of yours!” 1032  Both sides kept the informal truce. The free 
government ran schools, courts, tax collections, trade and began printing money. 
McClish reached out to find other guerrillas and found Fertig. 
 
Negros, D229/R-820 
By July, Salvador Abcede’s guerrillas centered around Kabankalan with much 
of their prewar supplies and at least 600 rifles, making them one of the best armed 
guerrilla units in the Philippines. With many of their officers born and raised on 
nearby plantations, they were able to maintain supply sources. Former Bacolod 
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mayor Alfredo Montelibano acted as Governor of Free Negros. “Under his 
management the civil government of resistance had grown into a stability that was 
amazing in time of war,” said Abcede, “Free Negros not only had treasurers and 
auditors, it had officials in the municipal level, including policemen and clerks, 
fiscals, and judges.”1033 Locals sent about twenty percent of all food gathered in the 
area to the guerrillas.  
One person who met him described the twenty-nine-year-old Abcede as 
having “a rather shy self-effacing look. Yet he had about him the air of quiet 
confidence. He looked like a leader.”1034 Abcede had graduated from the University 
of the Philippines in 1936 with a reserve army commission, entered active duty in 
the Philippine Army in 1939, and quickly became the ROTC commandant at Silliman 
University on Negros.  Promoted to lieutenant colonel at the start of the war, he 
received a battalion command. A U.S. Army estimate said: “He organized his 
[guerrilla] force early after surrender and has always led his men into the attack. He 
is aggressive and often given to snappy judgments but is never afraid to admit 
mistakes. He is hearty and frank and well liked throughout Negros...”1035  
Captain Enrique Torres, now major, formed a unit under Abcede near 
Sinalbagan. Major Hermenegildo Mercada, a thirty-year-old classmate of Peralta at 
the Infantry School, organized anther group of guerrillas that extended from 
Guilhulngan north to Negros Oriental during May and June.  When these units 
retreated into the mountains, many families went with them.  
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A man known as Puring, thought to be Philippine Army Private First Class 
Casiong Gemillan, led a lawless band with about fifty USAFFE weapons in the hills 
west of Valiohermoso, Negros Oriental, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental.1036 His 
deputy was his brother, illiterate ex-convict Margarito Gemillan. SWPA reported: 
“They have attacked the Japanese and have also interfered with the nearby guerrilla 
activity and molested civilians in the vicinity.”1037  Reportedly, Puring died fighting 
Abcede’s guerrillas and his brother took over the organization. The Puring guerrillas 
would melt away during the fall of 1944. 
Killing Puring was just one example of how guerrillas had to provide law and 
order by assuming the duties of police, judges and juries. “This was no easy task,” 
wrote Lapham, “No code of law anywhere governs the activities of guerrillas, and 
where we were, there were no effective courts or judges either.”1038 Even so, the job 
of providing security was vital in winning popular support. Lieutenant Colonel Claro 
Lauretta of the Constabulary commanded the battalion in Davao City. “Do you know 
what happens when no one will enforce law and order?” he observed, “The strong 
take from the weak: food, belongings, wife, and even life! We shot half a dozen such 
‘bandits’ before the men began to behave! We then faced urgent survival problems: 
shortages of food, salt, clothing, and medicines. As we solved those, new ones 
cropped up. When people asked me to legalize births, deaths, and marriages, I 
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established a civil government. It’s now set for the long pull.”1039 People tended to 
follow whoever provided for their safety. 
Providing law and order led to hard decisions. “We had no jails; we could not 
afford to waste time, men, food, and money paying jailers to look after prisoners; 
and nobody ever joined a guerrilla band because he wanted to guard prisoners 
anyway,” Lapham wrote, “Consequently, punishments for misdeeds had to assume 
forms other than confinement. For some minor offenses, a man might be punished 
by being put on KP or assigned to look after the horses, but for something serious 
there was usually little real choice between setting an accused free (with perhaps a 
stern lecture) and executing him.”1040 Lapham decided on three offenses that earned 
a death sentence: “looting, rape, and giving aid and comfort to the enemy.”1041 He 
later admitted, “I never kept records of the uglier cases we had to deal with.”1042 
 All guerrilla leaders had to make similar decisions. In the Filipino TVGU, 
Barrameda observed, “Deemed capital crimes were treachery or treason (to TVGU, 
by working against its interests) and crimes against chastity (as rape was then 
classified; such crimes normally carried with them the death penalty).”1043 A TVGU 
commander said, “In the Third Battalion under Captain Leon Aureus if one is found 
wanting he was immediately separated from the group by firing squad.”1044 While 
the guerrillas found such measures necessary to their success, they would make 
incorporation into MacArthur’s U.S. Army command impossible. 
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Central Luzon, D237/R-812 
Colonel Hugh Straughn refused to surrender his Fil-American Irregular 
Troops (FAIT) guerrillas around Antipolo. He gained support from local civilians 
and soldiers escaping Bataan. Expanding south and east of Manila, Straughn brought 
other guerrilla groups under the FAIT umbrella including the President Quezon's 
Own Guerrillas (PQOG) and the Hunter's. He began negotiations to recruit Marking’s 
Guerrillas. 
Outside Manila, Yay Panlilio had arrived at Markings camp in July. She 
recalled her fist sight of him: “Tall, well-muscled, but lean, Major Marcos V. Augustin, 
alias Marking, stood with his fists on his hips, his feet planted wide, and his head 
high and a little back.”1045  The twenty-nine year-old Irish American-Filipina 
immediately caught his eye. She had skills Marking was lacking. “And I was a 
woman,” she noted, “not a juicy morsel, but there are times when any old horse 
looks like fresh meat.” 1046  Panlilio continued, “Hotly we looked at each other. I saw 
a fighting man. He saw a defiant woman. We burst into laughter, having found each 
other.”1047  Soon, they were lovers. Marking promoted them both to colonel and 
appointed her co-commander of his Guerrillas. 
Panlilio wrote, “I had tried, since the Japs had landed on the Islands, to fight 
them in my own way, on my own. It had been impossible. Now, like thousands of 
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others before and after me, I took the only course open: I became a guerrilla.”1048 
Panlilio and Marking made for a volatile mixture. “No better combination could have 
come out of a desperate situation: Marking with his brawn and bravado, and Yay 
with her intellect and woman’s intuition,” explained Agnocillo, “Where Marking was 
raw, Yay was polished. Marking, brusque and uncouth, was a man of action who 
seldom, if ever, thought of consequences. Yay, a civilized woman, was calculating 
and sophisticated. Yay furnished the necessary rein to Marking’s extravagant 
enthusiasm.”1049  A U.S. Army report observed: “The leader of the group is Marcos 
Villa Agustin [Marking], but the backbone of the organization is a woman known as 
Yay Panlilio.”1050  Under her influence Marking accepted an offer to join Straughn 
with an appointment as commander of the FAIT 1st Brigade. The organization had 
grown from seventeen original members to over one hundred and fifty.  The raid on 
Lumban prison in Laguna had increased their stock of firearms from seventeen to 
sixty thirty-caliber rifles. Now they dreamed of bigger things.  
After Miguel Ver’s death, Terry Adevoso reassembled the Hunters guerrillas. 
Many of the former ROTC cadets rallied to revenge their fallen leader. In August, 
Adevoso led an ambush of 200 Japanese soldiers along the road from Rizal and 
Laguna. When the firing was over they reported counting 127 dead enemy 
soldiers.1051 The victory kept the Hunters in the field and won renewed popular 
support. Arms, supplies and recruits increased. In the next few months Adevoso sent 
groups out to expand the organization. Each group took a new name into their new 
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areas: Birds of Preys (Limbás), Cobra (Cobra), Eagles (Aguila), Hawk (Lawin), 
Hornets (Putakí), Shark (Patíng), Vipers (Ulupóng), Wild Cats (Musang), Wild 
Buffaloes (Támaraw) and Lapu-Lapu, (after the Visayan who killed Magellan in 
1521). The Hunters spread from Rizal to Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, and Tayabas.  
Lieutenant Juan Pajota, a 91st Infantry Division (PA) veteran, escaped from 
Bataan to return home to Nueva Ecija.  He was small in stature but steady, tough, an 
unassuming. He was also not ready to stop fighting the Japanese. Pajota sought out 
the guerrillas operating in his home province under Lapham.  The American 
commander saw in Pajota “a very unflamboyant guy with a natural bent for 
leadership. He was resourceful, organized and extremely imaginative.”1052 Author 
Hampton Sides added: “He knew all the mayors of all the barrios. He was familiar 
with the realities on the ground, every quirk of the water buffalo paths, every river 
bend. Whatever men or arms might need to be mustered, Pajota had the political 
wherewithal to make it happen.”1053 Lapham commissioned Pajota to raise several 
squadrons in central Nueva Ecija. Soon, he had “eyes” and “hands” in every village. 
Every successful American guerrilla commander had at least one man like Pajota. 
 
Manila, D237/R-812 
 The Japanese Imperial Headquarters, irritated with the difficulties in 
managing the Philippines, held Homma accountable for the failure to take the 
Islands on schedule and removed him from command. On 1 August, Lieutenant 
General Shizuichi Tanaka arrived in Manila to take charge of the 14th Army. A 
                                                        




Shakespeare scholar at Oxford for three years, he had served as a military attaché in 
the United States and Mexico and had led the Japanese delegation in the victory 
parade in London after World War I. He had even met Douglas MacArthur. He also 
had served as a Kempeitai commander during tours in China.  
Manila that August appeared tranquil. One of its residents reported, “it is an 
uneasy kind of peace; tension and fear are still ever present because the Japanese go 
on midnight or early morning raids of neighborhoods looking for guerrillas that they 
had been informed reside or are hiding in that neighborhood.”1054 The Japanese 
sought to separate the people from the guerrillas.  They would routinely bring an 
anonymous Filipino with a bag over his head to a line-up of local men. Anyone 
pointed out by the masked person was quickly carried off to Fort Santiago. “If the 
young man resists and fights, he is tackled and bayonetted,” Isabel Yumol 
remembered, “And if his family comes to his aid, they, too, are bayonetted. But 
sometimes the Japanese do not need any reason. They just come and choose a house 
at random to raid and harass or take away the household head and massacre the 
whole family when there is resistance.”1055 
 The Japanese use of rewards and punishments often led guerrillas to both 
suspect the people and fear bringing retribution upon them. Relations became 
trickier in September when the Philippine Executive Commission issued Executive 
Order Number 77 ordering the establishment of JMA-directed ‘neighborhood 
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associations’ to police resistance to occupation policies.1056  Over the next nine 
months, the JMA created 13,192 neighborhood associations in and around Manila 
alone containing 900,000 members.1057 A guerrilla noted, “If a person wanted to go 
from one town to another, before he could leave the barrio, he had to have a pass 
stamped by the barrio lieutenant, then take it to the municipality and the Japs would 
pass on it; then he could go to the next town where the Japs would again stamp 
it.”1058 The guerrillas realized they could trust very few people in the cities; they had 
to look to themselves for support. 
 
Australia, D243/R-806 
MacArthur’s G-2, Charles Willoughby, pressed the AIB to strengthen the weak 
line of communications with the Philippines that frustrated both MacArthur and left 
the guerrillas isolated. Ind recalled, “G2 left little doubt in our minds: the obvious 
precariousness of the equipment in the Islands, the lack of secure ciphers and, above 
all, the contradictory nature of the information that was beginning to come out 
underscored the need for an observer placed there and controlled by GHQ.”1059 The 
first question was who to send.  
At Amberly Field near Brisbane, Major Joseph McMicking, Jr. introduced his 
friend Jesus Villamor to Ind. Villamor had said he wanted to go back to the 
Philippines. Convinced he was serious, Ind arranged Villamor’s immediate transfer 
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to the 81st Air Depot Group.  A few days later Villamor was at his new desk when AIB 
Controller Colonel Roberts handed him a directive initialed “O.K. MacA”:  
“1. Establish a net for military intelligence and secret services 
throughout the Islands. 
2. Establish a chain of communication, both local and to Australia. 
3. Establish an eventual escape route to accommodate evacuation 
of selected individuals in the interest of future planning. 
4. Develop an organization for covert subversive activities and 
propaganda for use at the appropriate time. This same organization 
will also be used for passive resistance and simple sabotage. 
5. Locate and contact individuals known to be loyal. 
6. Establish the rudiments of the net, to be formulated upon the 
‘cell’ system for mutual protection. 
7. Establish a radio transmitter for contacting Darwin on matters of 
transportation rendezvous only. 
8. Conduct an intelligence survey of a general nature to obtain 
information on: 
 a. Japanese political intentions 
 b. Japanese military intentions 
 c. Japanese civil intentions 
 d. Japanese military, naval, air strengths; dispositions, 
equipment, quality, morale, training etc. 
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 e. Japanese operatures [sic] of future significance.” 1060 
It was a tall order; Villamor accepted the mission. He wanted to enlist friends 
then in the United States. SWPA denied him the sons of General Vincente Lim, MIT 
graduate Luis Lim and Annapolis-trained Roberto Lim. They also denied requests 
for West Pointers Colonel Jaime Velasquez and Colonel Tirso Fajardo. For six days 
Villamor traveled around Australia evaluating hundreds of Filipinos and selected 
eight for special training at Brisbane’s Victoria Barracks under Australian Army 
Captain Allan Davidson: Rodolfo Ignacio, Delfin YuHico, Patricio Jorge, Dominador 
Malic, Emilio Quinto, Susano Amodia, Virgilio Felix and Pedro Cariago. 
 
Northern Luzon, D246/R-803 
Guerrillas who had not been in Bataan, like Walter Cushing, Ralph Praeger, 
and Guillermo Nakar, had conducted an flurry of attacks following Wainwright’s 
surrender. The Bataan escapees, on the other hand, were largely inactive. As 
Lapham explained: “For me, the first eight or nine months of the war were by far the 
hardest because I was sick so much of the time. Like many others, I was already 
beset with malaria and dysentery when I came out of Bataan in February.”1061 Just 
the sight of capable men ravaged by illness could discourage action. In August, 
American miner Patrick O’Day reported to Volckmann for duty. Blackburn noted, 
“He was a civilian engineer and an unsavory character.”1062 Volckmann recalled, “He 
stood over six feet tall and normally weighed well over two hundred pounds, but 
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fever, dysentery, and hard traveling had taken so much out of him that he now 
looked like a walking skeleton. I’m sure that when we met him he didn’t weigh over 
a hundred and forty pounds, and he looked so weak and thin that it didn’t seem he 
could stand up against a stiff breeze.”1063  Such men needed to recuperate with 
Filipino families or at bases like the Fassoth camp before entering the fight..  
Years later Che Guevara would observe: “The doctor’s role in guerrilla 
warfare is a highly important one. Not only does he save lives, but he strengthens 
the morale of the sick and wounded.”1064 The U.S. Army already understood how 
notorious tropical diseases of the Philippines could cripple military operations. In 
1899 ten percent of the U.S. troops fell ill with fever and diarrhea within three days 
of arriving in the country, and a third were ill by the end of a week.1065  By the time 
Arthur MacArthur’s 2nd Division had completed twenty-one days on campaign, 
despite several rest periods, 2,600 of his 4,800 soldiers were sick with “sore or 
rotting feet, low-grade fever, diarrhea, parasites, headaches, chills, fainting, chronic 
fatigue, skin diseases, tropical ulcers, and psychological depression.”1066 It was not 
unusual to see fifty to seventy-five percent of field unit personnel on sick reports.1067  
General Samuel Sumner, 1st Brigade, Cavalry Division, V Corps, reported that every 
time his troops took to the field for more than a few days, “sick reports go up 
alarmingly, averaging over fifty percent, and a considerable proportion of this 
number are permanently incapacitated from further duty. I am forced to keep this 
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fact prominent in all my operations in this section.”1068  
Even after the fighting ended, doctors noted that American soldiers 
succumbed to a tropical malaise they termed melancholy or nostalgia. The Army 
Surgeon General reported: “Residence in the tropic regions at or near the sea level is 
unfavorable to the health of Northern races. …In my opinion, nobody – no white 
man – lives in the tropics over a long period who does not deteriorate in practically 
every way.”1069 Concern became so great that in 1934 Congress restricted soldiers’ 
tours in the Philippines to not more than two years.   
Peace or war, the most dangerous malady in the Islands was malaria. Though 
generally limited to between the 45° south and 45° north latitudes, malaria, killed 
more people worldwide than any other disease.1070 The term covered illnesses 
produced by four different microscopic parasites introduced into the blood by 
several species of mosquitoes. The Philippines were home to anopheles flavirostris, 
maculatus, balabacensis and mangyanus mosquitoes that breed in various typs of 
water, live in and near forests, and attack their victims between 2000 and 0100 
hours, the time period closely associated with guerrilla operations.1071 Another 
indigenous breed, anopheles litoralis, uniquely breeds in coastal areas in salty or 
brackish water.  Normally these malarial mosquitoes live only below 600 meters 
elevation (2,000 feet) where most of the Islands’ population centers and military 
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installations reside.1072  The anopheles mosquitoes are especially hard to combat 
due to their lack of buzzing noise and their ability to bite without causing pain that 
would attract the immediate attention of their victims. Many variables can cause the 
incubation period between initial bite and onset of malaria symptoms to range from 
a typical period of six to ten days to as long as several months.1073 Even then “full-
blown attacks” would “probably continue from one to three years, for it was known 
that suppression even for as long as two and a half years does not influence the 
ultimate course of the disease.”1074 
While the quickness, severity and duration of the symptoms can vary, 
malaria is almost always harshly debilitating to physical effort. Typically, victims 
first suffer a period of chills that left untreated become 'paralyzing shivering,' 
followed by a burning fever with headaches and great thirst, and finally ‘drenching 
sweats’ as the fever breaks.1075  The fever can be quotidian, or daily, or tertian, that 
is appearing every other day. As the parasite multiplies and destroys red blood cells, 
the spleen becomes enlarged and tender. The anopheles mosquitoes in the 
Philippines carry two of the four particular malarial parasites – Plasmodium 
falciparum and Plasmodium vivax.1076  P. vivax exists in thirty percent of the 
archipelago and causes a fairly benign tertian fever, with normally eight to ten 
relapses. The P. falciparum strain, covering eighty percent of the Philippines, causes 
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a severe tertian fever and is commonly associated with malignant cerebral malaria 
that can cause a sudden, fatal collapse. As one medical researcher explained: “In the 
Philippines, where such deaths are not uncommon, the man who falls unconscious 
in the field is said to be a victim of ‘Mindoro lightning.’”1077  
Another common mosquito in the Philippines, the aedes aegypti, carries both 
yellow fever and dengue fever.  After an incubation period of three to six days, 
yellow fever produces a roughly four-day period of moderate to severe fever, 
headaches, muscle pains, nausea, vomiting and possible hepatitis and hemorrhagic 
fever. Even today epidemics of dengue fever break out across the Philippines about 
every three to four years.1078 Victims suffer “an initial three or four-day febrile 
paroxysm [feverish convulsions] of very sudden onset, a remission, which comes on 
or about the fourth day, and a terminal rise of temperature for two or three days – 
“the saddle-back temperature course.” 1079  Aches and pains concentrated in 
attachments of muscles at the joints, soreness behind the eyes, inability to 
concentrate, insomnia, extreme fatigue and loss of appetite are common symptoms. 
As a result, Army physicians noted, “The malaise and depression are generally so 
great that the patient keeps his bed voluntary.”1080  
Before World War II the U.S. Army had some experience – and some success 
– in fighting conditions that caused tropical diseases. It spearheaded improved 
sanitation, vector control and improved treatment in Panama and Hawaii after the 
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Spanish American War. In Panama City between 1904 and 1935 the Army’s efforts 
reduced the percentage of population morality resulting from malaria from a yearly 
average of 12.3 percent to 0.5 percent.1081  While the Army had similar success in 
Manila, the Medical Corps reported that “malaria control measures in Bataan had 
not been impressive” before 1941.1082  Unfortunately, when prewar plans to defend 
Manila quickly collapsed, the soldiers found themselves exposed to disease in 
Bataan. 
Dysentery often amplified the symptoms of malaria and dengue fever. This 
illness has many forms, all characterized by infection of the intestines causing 
“mucus in bloody discharges from the intestine.”1083 The Philippine guerrillas 
commonly experienced malarial, bacilliary, and amoebic forms of dysentery from 
parasites ingested while drinking unclean water, eating contaminated food, or 
touching unclean hands to the mouth. Protozoal dysentery, first pathologically 
described in the Philippines in 1900, produced chronic diarrhea, “colicky pain, a 
distended and painful abdomen, with furred tongue and loss of appetite.”1084 
Leishmanian dysentery, also found across the archipelago, produced in its victim 
“persistent fever, anemia, and cachexial [a wasting loss of weight] condition with the 
ultimate enlargement of the spleen and liver.”1085  Signs of infection usually appear 
about three days after contamination and last for ten days. Of particular concern, the 
victim of dysentery suffered the risk of severe dehydration due to the volume of 
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fluid passed by diarrhea, vomiting and sweats. 
 Americans were not the only ones vulnerable to mosquito-borne illnesses: 
natives felt the affects too. After the Japanese established control they began forcing 
captured Filipino soldiers to take an oath of loyalty and assigned them to three 
constabulary companies in Langnan, Bontoc and Lubuagan.  These locations 
compelled the Ladies Club in Baguio to complain to provincial Governor Hillary P. 
Clapp: “Our soldiers from the mountains are not used to the lowlands, and the 
mosquitoes. They are dying. Won’t you do something to get them out of the 
lowlands?” 1086   Despite some local immunity, people from one area of the 
Philippines remained vulnerable to diseases in other areas. 
Even without disease, the guerrillas faced maladies brought on by their 
inadequate quantity and quality of diet. Beriberi was common and described by the 
Army as: “A disease of nutrition which is attributed to inadequate ingestious [sic] 
absorption or utilization of the heat labile portion of the vitamin B complex which is 
usually designated B-1 or Thiamin.”1087  Lack of this vitamin – abundant in beans 
and peas – affected nerves, brought on weakness, and could cause paralysis and 
congestive heart failure. The chronic malnutrition suffered by the guerrillas greatly 
increased their susceptibility to infections and parasitic disease. 
The little medical training provided to the soldiers who became guerrillas 
made diagnosis and treatment of their illnesses difficult. Yet even professional 
medical personnel would find it challenging to identify correctly the ailments 
plaguing these troops.  Because the malarial parasite is in the blood, for example, it 
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can harm any and all bodily organs and produce symptoms that mimic a host of 
other diseases.1088  In addition the Philippine guerrillas could be, and often were, 
infected by both P. vivax and P. falciparum along with many of the other tropical 
illnesses in the islands.  A successfully diagnosis and treatment of one illness would 
often just replace one causative parasite with a second or third.  
Beyond physical infirmities lurked a more treacherous malady. By the time 
Ramsey arrived at the Fassoth camp it had better sanitation, plenty of food, a doctor 
and a nurse, but even these were not enough for some. He watched camp personnel 
try to nurse one lieutenant back to health. “Instead,” Ramsey noted, “he was 
obsessed with the idea that his government had deserted him and left him helpless 
before his enemies. And so, while everyone around him was regaining weight and 
health, he continued to decline until finally, for no reason the doctor could identify, 
he died.”1089 Blackburn identified the lieutenant as Bell, an engineer from the 
University of Colorado 1090  Whether this “strange malaise” resulted from a 
combination of illnesses, Ramsey noted, “It drove home to me once again the truth 
of which I was already aware, that mind and attitude together shape will, and the 
when the will is lost, defeat follows.”1091 The escaping from Bataan needed time to 
recover mind and body. In the meantime first guerrillas would soon reach their own 
limits of endurance. 
 
Visayas, D244/R-805 
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Between 8 and 26 August, as Americans and Japanese battled from the 
Aleutians to New Guinea, a succession of uprisings that began in Negros spread 
across the Philippines. In response, the Japanese prepared an autumn campaign of 
subjugation to pacify all the islands by the end of the year.1092 A major part of the 
plan was the sudden round up and re-imprisonment of the Filipino POWs previously 
granted amnesty. That effort was designed to acquire labor began on Panay in 
August and angered the Filipinos. Japan simply could not spare any more military 
manpower for the Philippines and faced a growing labor deficit at home.  Haseba 
Sueto of the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipbuilding Works recalled, “By 1943 the 
shortage of labor had become the most pressing problem at war plants.” 1093 When 
he forcibly brought 820 laborers from China, he was met by “representative from 32 
war plants all over Japan” asking for workers.1094 The Japanese would also send 
over 30,000 Allied POWs to Japan “to work in coalmines, factories and other 
locations”; 3,526 of them would die before in the end of the war.1095 
Guerrillas contributed to the JMA’s demand for more workers in the Islands. 
For nearly a year they had delayed the opening of copper mines in Chobutan, Pilar-
Cadiz, and Sipalay that the JMA had allotted to Mitsubuishi Kogyo and Ishihara 
Sangyo. Attacks led by Carlos Amores severely curtailed output from the important 
Nihon Kogyo manganese mines in Busuanga. While working as a security guard at 
the mines, Amores secretly organized hundreds of guerrillas armed with pistols, 
                                                        
1092 “Record of Operations in the Philippines, Part II,” Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 5. 
1093 Carry, 104. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 Edward J. Drea et al. Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Records, 
(Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and 
Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006), 31-32. 
 
297 
knives and clubs. They attacked and killed all twenty or so of the Japanese 
employees at the mine and most of the Japanese residents in town.1096 The guerrillas 
then sealed the mine with dynamite and destroyed stocks of ore before being driven 
into the hills.   
Despite such problems, on 22 August, Ishihara Sangyo delivered its first 
shipment of iron ore from the Larap Mine (Kalambayangan mine). Over the previous 
six months they had accomplished a great deal with the assistance of a man named 
Pastrana who had managed the mines before the war for the Lepantao Company. 
They stripped from mines at Paracale equipment including two diesel train engines 
with track, eight barges, two towing launches, power-generators, power lines, and 
building items to get Larap operating.1097 They scavenge other equipment including 
two 600-hp diesel generators from local gold mines. The objective exploitation of 
Philippine resources had begun, but guerrillas aimed to stop it. 
Under army protection, Mitsui Kozan began extracting copper ore from the 
Mankayan Copper Mine in northern Luzon.1098 To get the mines working, the JMA 
and Fourteenth Army Headquarters stripped ten idle gold mines around Baguio of 
materials formerly imported from the United States. They hired a Japanese resident 
of Manila who worked as a machinist at the Balatoc mine to oversee the transfer of 
power generators from mines at Suyoc and Balatoc.  
With the mines heavily guarded, guerrillas attacked the transport of ore 
along the Naguilian Road through Baguio towards Poro. “As a result,” one historian 
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wrote, “not only was the transport of materials, equipment, and extracted ore, 
slowed down, but the availability of truck drivers and general workers was also 
seriously affected.”1099  
In Bohol, guerrillas abducted and killed Japanese employees at the Nihon 
Kogyo manganese mine.1100 Surviving workers fled. Production halted. Only after 
Japanese soldiers arrived to increase security and coerce workers did limited 
production begin again. The guerrillas had, however, disrupted Japanese 
exploitation of resources, interrupted employment necessary to the occupation 
economy, and diverted the Japanese military from preparations to defend the 
Islands from MacArthur’s return. 
The Tai Kogyo Company won the contract to operate the Toledo copper mine 
on Cebu but guerrilla activity delayed operations there for eight months.1101 In mid-
1942, Cushing and Fenton decided to combine forces and established dual command 
on the island. Fenton assumed administrative command with headquarters in 
Maslog.  Seven miles away Cushing took charge of the combat guerrillas from a base 
at Mangalon Heights. They organized their units into battalions and staff sections 
along U.S. Army lines. “The Cebu area long enjoyed the reputation for having killed 
more Japanese than any other area,” SWPA would note, “In their efforts to stamp out 
Japanese and Japanese sympathizers, the men, reportedly under Fenton, went to 
extremes and many wanton killings of innocent citizens were reported.”1102 
Suspecting local power politics coloring such reports, MacArthur’s staff commented: 
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“Although there was a certain amount of killing and destruction, it appears possible 
that this feature was exaggerated by Kangleon, Fertig, Parsons, and Ingeniero, who 
had ambitions regarding Cebu.”1103  
Guerrillas on Panay conducted similar acts of intimidation. When the 
Ishihara Sangyo Company tried to recruit 2,000 workers to reopen the vital copper 
mine in Antique, few came forward.1104 From 23 to 27 September, guerrillas 
attacked the mine killing between twelve to sixteen Japanese employees.  Only 
efforts of the Japanese air force broke the guerrilla siege. By the end of the year the 
Japanese army had to garrison the area around the mines and guard 385 POWs who 
were brought from Manila to get the mines operating again.   
Representatives of Taiwan Takushoku, Kurha Boseki, Toyo Menka, and Toyo 
Boseki companies arrived in Negros to develop cotton fields.1105  Here too, guerrilla 
activity foiled plans and eventually forced a retreat to Luzon. The JMA adjusted by 
redrawing districts so as to assign all nine cotton companies working in the 
Philippines land on Luzon for their operations. Still, at the height of the planting 
season in October, only 1,688 acres had been planted. 
On 20 August, the Negros guerrillas elected Professor Bell to organize their 
forces. He recruited local Chinese merchant Manuel Sy Cip to obtain supplies. After 
getting his organization up and running, Bell sought an experienced officer to take 
charge. He asked Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Gador, then hiding in Negros’ central 
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mountains, but he declined.1106 Bell then found Constabulary Major Placido Ausejo, a 
fifty-one-year-old Silliman University graduate, to assume command. “He is 
disciplined, mature in judgment and a good organizer,” noted U.S. Army intelligence, 
“all excellent assets in establishing a guerrilla movement about to go wild.”1107  In 
October, Ausejo named his 1,000-man guerrilla force the 75th Regiment and placed 
his headquarters in Malabo. It became a well-disciplined and popularly supported 
unit.  
On nearby Negros Siquitor, a retired Philippine Scout, Major Benito Cunanan, 
had organized two battalions of guerrillas and in August, drove off the first of 
several attempted Japanese landings. Greater challenges for Cunanan would come 
from Gador. 
A contretemps raged on Panay where Peralta competed with Confesor for 
leadership. The two sides fought over personnel, supplies, money, citizens’ rights, 
and control of the Provincial Guards.1108 Peralta had the more powerful force. He 
had started with about 2,000 soldiers and grew his organization into the 8,000-man 
Free Panay Guerrilla Forces (FPFG). Confesor’s long-time political foe, assemblyman 
Jose Zulueta, joined Peralta. Confesor retained authority derived from the people’s 
loyalty and stood guard for their rights against guerrilla transgressions. The contest 
devolved to an uneasy balance: Peralta would try not to interfere with government 
rule and Confesor’s Provincial Guards as long as Confessor saw that seventy-five per 
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cent of taxes collected on Panay went to Peralta. With this, nearly 15,000 united 
guerrillas held at bay more than 5,000 Japanese troops on Panay. 
 
Central Luzon, D254/R-795 
Outside Manila in August, Harry McKenzie, an American miner married to 
Filipina named Mary with a six-year-old son, arrived to join Lapham. “Harry was a 
proverbial diamond in the rough: he had little formal education but was faithful and 
dependable,” Volckmann recalled, “I soon made him district commander of Nueva 
Ecija as well as my executive officer – in effect, my right-hand man.”1109 Mary’s 
cousin, Manuel Bahia, became Harry’s adjutant.  
Volckmann and Blackburn had by now spent two months recuperating in the 
Fassoth camp and wanted out. The camp wallowed in despair. “I mean, most of the 
talk that you would hear was, ‘They’re not ever coming back. How are we going to 
survive?’” Blackburn recalled, “and, ‘People don’t give a damn.’ They were trying to 
survive and had their doubts about that. They didn’t have a spark to start thinking 
about anything like resistance or guerrilla warfare.” 1110  The refugee soldiers 
rejected military rank, order and discipline and were outright belligerent.1111 
Sanitation literally went out the window. Through leadership by example, the two 
officers gradually reasserted rank and structure and instituted a program of slit 
trench latrines.  
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Bernia told the two Americans that an increasing number of armed bandit 
gangs calling themselves guerrillas, some with Americans, were abusing people in 
the area. “He felt the need to get something organized to control all of this,” 
Blackburn wrote, “He pointed out this group with Merrill and Cayler, and asked Russ 
and me to accompany him to visit them to discuss these problems.”1112 Volckmann 
and Blackburn were eager. They started north on 18 August. Again, locals along the 
route fed and sheltered them and at times provided carabao carts for travel.  
Bernia took the Americans to Natividad where they met Colonel Gyles 
Merrill. “They had recently moved him to the Natividad area,” wrote Volckmann, 
“but it was obvious to us that the colonel was still in bad shape.”1113 Blackburn and 
Volckmann ran into prewar acquaintances Colonel Pete Cayler and Captain George 
Crane who were staying with some other Americans as guests of a Chinese mestizo 
family named Jinco. After three days the two officers decided to find Thorp and 
Merrill drafted a message to give him. When it was time to move the two men were 
reluctant. “I hadn’t tasted food like that even before the war,” said Blackburn, “The 
Jinco daughters prided themselves on their cooking, and I’m telling you, those 
Chinese gals could really put it on. They were beautiful girls.”1114 Fine food, fresh 
linen, and comfortable beds tempted them to stay, but Volckmann and Blackburn 
again headed north.  
On 20 August, the party came across Wainwright’s former cook who swore 
he had recently seen the general on a train headed for Manila where he was to be 
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shipped to Formosa. That evening Volckmann and Blackburn arrived at Thorp’s 
camp near Timbu, west of Fort Stotsenburg. The colonel struck his visitors as being 
willfully uninterested in the war and irritated by the arrival of anyone determined 
to fight.1115 Volckmann and Blackburn delivered Merrill’s message. Volckmann 
recalled, “Thorp burst into a rage because the letter seemed to assume that Merrill 
was the supreme commander of guerrillas on Luzon.”1116 “He believed that he was 
the only legitimate one authorized to do this,” observed Blackburn, “He assumed a 
very arrogant attitude about it.”1117 Whether Merrill realized it or not, Thorp had 
received his authority directly from MacArthur. In a series of messages and 
diplomatic exchanges, Merrill accepted recognition from Thorp as subordinate 
commander in Zambalese.  
At Thorp’s camp Volckmann took note of a group of men around him. “Many 
became extremely pessimistic, firmly convinced that we had no chance to survive – 
to them it was only a question of time and events.”1118 Illness easily tipped these 
men into despair. Yet Volckmann spotted a second group who seemed more 
‘determined and optimistic’ per day, defying desperation. Finally, Volckmann 
identified a third group: “Some individuals’ minds became so confused and distorted 
that it was hard to imagine they had once been normal Americans. They sank to the 
level of beasts, and became so self-centered in their fight for existence that they 
would stop to anything, regardless of the effect on others. Stealing, cheating, lying or 
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even murder cam easy to them if to their distorted minds it seemed to be to their 
advantage.”1119 
After two days, Volckmann and Blackburn concluded: “Thorp had no 
brains.”1120 Upon learning that Moses and Noble and earlier passed through and 
headed north, they decided to find them ask for a guide to lead them through the 
central plains. Thorp agreed to have them escorted as far as Hukbalahap territory. 
Volckmann and Blackburn spent another day with Thorp and witnessed a Japanese 
attack. On 24 August, they departed with their Filipino guide, nicknamed Kid 
Muscles. They skirted around the internment camp at Camp O’Donnell before 
reaching the camp of sixty year-old Huk leader Esuebio Aquino who had felt slighted 
by Thorp.1121  After Volckmann declined Aquino’s offer to become his military 
advisor, the Huk offered quarters and food for the night and a guide to take them 
farther north in the morning.  
 
Washington, D265/R-784. 
 Chick Parsons arrived with his family in New York City on 29 August. He 
reported to the Navy and learned he had officially been missing in action. Parsons 
settled his wife and children with family in North Carolina and reported to duty in 
Washington, D.C. where he delivered the intelligence file he had assembled in Manila 
to Colonel Joseph Evans in Army G-2.1122 Parson got word to old friends like Peter 
Grim, his boss from the Luzon Stevedoring Company, of his return to the living. 
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Grim, now a U.S. Army Transportation Corps colonel in Brisbane, brought Parson’s 
story to the attention of the Allied Intelligence Bureau.1123 At the time the Army 
headquarters in Washington focused on the pending landings in North Africa. Given 
the lack of Army units in the Pacific, the burden of collecting and analyzing signal 
radio intelligence fell to MacArthur’s Central Bureau Brisbane.1124 They needed help. 
Before the end of the year, SWPA sent a message to Washington: “SEND PARSONS 
IMMEDIATELY – MACARTHUR.”1125 
 
Northern Luzon, D268/R-781 
Thorp by now led the most wide-ranging guerrilla unit on Luzon. 
Headquartered at Camp Chavez on Mount Pinatubo at Timbo, Pampanga, the Central 
Luzon Guerrilla Force (CLGF) had become well organized and staffed. He scheduled 
a conference of his district commanders for 29 August at his headquarters.1126 A 
Tagalog runner named Rodriguez betrayed the meeting to the Japanese, but he got 
the date wrong. The Japanese raided the site twenty-four hours too early. Thorp 
escaped with his headquarters to Santa Juliana in Tarlac province where former 
mayor Marcos Laxamana, the uncle of Thorp’s secretary and mistress Minang, 
greeted them.  
Near La Paz, Tarlac, Volckmann and Blackburn met guerrillas who brought 
them to Robert Lapham’s headquarters on 1 September. They found him confined to 
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bed with fever and tended to by an African-American veteran of the Spanish 
American War, Mr. Brunch, who “carried a lot of influence in the area. He was a big 
help to Lapham with food and other things.”1127 Volckmann and Blackburn learned 
that Moses and Noble had established a base farther north. Lapham provided guides 
and, on 4 September, they continued to march north.  
 A timely warning from a native enabled Volckmann’s party to escape a 
Japanese ambush along their path before he and Blackburn reached a camp near San 
Nicolas established by Walter Cushing’s brother, Charlie – a “very placid, pleasant 
sort of fellow.”1128 They found among the sick guerrillas recovering in the camp 
malaria-ridden Lieutenant Rufino Baldwin who had been with the 11th Infantry 
Regiment on Bataan. After recovering Baldwin moved on to the Itogon mining area 
to raise his own guerrilla force. Volckmann and Blackburn also met two American 
miners, John French and Herb Swick. When Cushing said Noble and Moses were 
near Bokod in Benguet, Swick agreed lead the way there.  
As Volckmann and Blackburn journeyed through the mountains near 
Benguet, they felt invigorated by the crisp, clean air. It was an area as yet untouched 
by the Japanese. They came across veteran Irish miner American Patrick O’Day who 
shared a house with a Belgian priest. Malaria and dysentery had reduced O’Day to “a 
walking skeleton.” 1129  A native arrived with a message for Volckmann and 
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Blackburn from Moses and Noble asking to meet at Barrio Benning where Benguets, 
the southernmost of the Igorot peoples, lived in grass houses raised on stilts.1130  
On 9 September, Blackburn and Volckmann finally met Moses and Noble who 
brought along Captain Parker Calvert and Lieutenant Arthur Murphy. The two 
colonels briefed their visitors on the situation in northern Luzon. In nearby hills 
Walter Cushing led the 121st Regiment, Nakar commanded the 14th Regiment, and 
Calvert had the 43rd Regiment.  Praeger led guerrillas in Cagayan province. They 
believed Ablan still had a force in Ilocos Norte. Philippine Army Captain Ali al 
Raschid led guerrillas in Kalinga province. Lieutenant Rufino Baldwin was building a 
command in Benguet. To the north more guerrillas followed Bado Dangwa, the 
former transportation executive. It sounded impressive but disorganized. 
Volckmann asked the obvious question: was Moses, the senior American officer, in 
command of all these guerrillas? “No,” he answered, “to date we have been 
surveying the situation and have been resting to get our health back. As yet we 
haven’t decided the question of taking over command.”1131 They thought Volckmann 
and Blackburn needed more rest too. The next day Herb Swick led Volckmann and 
Blackburn to a doctor near Barrio Uding. Moses and Noble headed back north. 
Four families resided near the abandoned mines around Uding. The elderly 
Pearsons were Americans who had come from the Itogon Mine south of Baguio 
accompanied by their son, his wife and the Moule family. Also from Itogon came 
Filipino Dr. Biason, who had studied in Minnesota, and his wife, a nurse from 
Wisconsin. “After a few hours with them I felt that I had been lifted into a new 
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world,” Volckmann wrote, “and that I was father away from the war than at any time 
since it began.”1132 Their crude houses, with running water from a nearby stream, 
used a water-powered automobile generator for a radio and lights. Each night a 
different family fed the visitors.  Biason and his wife tended to the officers. 
Volckmann began to regain his health but Blackburn’s illness lingered.  
Swick took Volckmann to the abandoned Bodok mines where a caretaker 
kept a house and mill in good order. Volckmann recovered material from some 
machine belts to repair his worn-out shoes. At the nearby mining camp at Barrio 
Equip he encountered the Belgian priest who shared his dwindling supply of canned 
goods and O’Day, Private Gattie and a miner named Harris. The 6,000-foot high 
camp had good air and an abundance of food. “In addition to mountain rice, we had 
cabbage, camotes, pork, chicken, beef, and once in a while a little coffee,” Volckmann 
recalled.1133 Blackburn was soon well enough to join them at Camp Equip and 
brought with him a message from Noble and Moses calling for a meeting in 1 
October.  After two weeks at Equip, Volckmann and Blackburn set out to meet Thorp 
at Barrio Caraw.  
Meanwhile, Walter Cushing left his 121st Infantry Regiment area around 
Abra and La Union Province and went to Kabugao, Apayao, to see Praeger and 
deliver intelligence reports. Praeger used the Buhay Mine radio to relay the reports 
to SWPA, including the first details of the Bataan Death March. Cushing then, 
ignoring Praeger’s warnings, set out to find guerrilla units causing hardships to 
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civilians in the Isabela province.1134 Near Jones, Cushing and three of his men 
accepted an invitation to dinner at a local farmer’s house. As they left the dinner, a 
Japanese patrol waiting outside the house shot and killed Cushing and his men. As 
told to Volckmann: “Cushing fell wounded, and though riddled with bullets, he 
managed to empty all but one round from his .45 revolver into the Japs. The 
remaining round he put through his head.”1135 
 The Japanese sent patrols into Abra that captured most of Cushing’s officers, 
including his successor, Captain William Arthur. Major George Barnett managed to 
avoid the Japanese and rallied the remnants of Cushing’s guerrillas in the area 
northwest of San Fernando, La Union. Seizing the initiative, he dodged enemy 
patrols to harass their lines of communications.   
 
Mindanao, D279/R-770 
On Mindanao, a Muslim force under Manalo Mindalano attacked a Japanese 
garrison at Ganassi. In response, on 12 September, Lieutenant Sunao Yoshioka led 
an infantry attack against guerrillas reported near Tamparan on the west shore of 
Lake Lanao. The company ran into an ambush by bolo-wielding Moros and suffered 
nearly complete destruction.1136 Months of fighting  
followed. The Japanese at Ganassi in Lanao opted to remain in their garrison and 
avoid antagonizing the local Moros.  
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Colonel Utsunomiya Naokata arrived in Manila to assume duties as the 
Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of the General Affairs Department in the JMA. He 
came intending to deal with the Philippine elite “as gentleman in order not to insult 
their character.”1137 In accordance with this approach, on 20 September the 
Japanese Army Department of Information tried to demonstrate their country’s 
ancient ties to Christianity and the Philippines. It sponsored a Catholic mass at San 
Marcelino as a farewell to members of the Religious Section who were about to 
return to Japan. They dedicated the mass to medieval Japanese feudal lords 
Takayama Ukon and Naito Joan, Christians who escaped persecution in 1613 and 
settled in Manila. Five members of the Religious Section stayed in Manila at the 
University of San Tomas seminary.   
By now the Japanese Army suspected that the Church supported the 
guerrillas. For four months Bishop Taguchi drafted four documents to guide 
Filipinos towards Japanese interests: “Trends in Religious Propaganda in the 
Philippines,” “Memorandum on the Necessity of Religious Instruction in the 
Philippines: The Issue of Public Schools,” “Proposed Agreement Between the 
Japanese Imperial Government and the Vatican,” and, “Concerning the Proposed 
Agreement with the Vatican Regarding the Catholic Church in the Philippines.”1138 
The military then demanded he remove all foreign priests from duties in the Islands. 
Foreign Caucasians comprised slightly more than half of the priests and nearly one 
out of ten of all administrators in the Church in the Philippines. Taguchi knew the 
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Vatican had promised in 1926 to place Philippine priests in the Church hierarchy, 
schools, and parishes. Removing the foreigners and appointing Filipino priests could 
satisfy the military, please the Island’s Catholics, and divide the Church from the 
guerrillas. Taguchi decided to risk irritating the Vatican and follow JMA orders.  
There were other Church reforms that could potentially win Filipino support. 
Many Filipinos had long resented special tax exemptions enjoyed by the Church on 
its vast estates. For many also the legal mandate requiring all children to attend 
Catholic education in public schools was an irritation. Bishop Taguchi proposed 
legal changes to allow taxes on all Church property not used for religious activity 
and to make Catholic education optional in public schools. Contrary to the wishes of 
the Japanese military, however, he argued that the Church must be allowed to still 
operate Catholic schools. Taguchi also insisted that changes in Church policies had 
to be done with Vatican approval. He joined Toyoaki Ono of the Religious Section 
and Belgian priest Father Bromman of Manila along with Tokyo-appointed former 
Chancellor to France Ken Harada in a special emissary mission to the Vatican to 
push the reforms.  
Outside Manila, Ramsey had fallen so ill that Barker carried him back to the 
Fassoth camp. There, Captain Warshal, an escaped Army doctor, tended to Ramsey 
while Barker assessed the camp. The Fassoths were now hosting more than one 
hundred American refugee soldiers. None seemed anxious to leave. As Ramsey 
recovered he tried to recruit the idle soldiers. Several bluntly told Ramsey: “We’re 
not guerrillas. If we’re captured we will be treated as prisoners of war. But if they 
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take us with you, we might all be killed.”1139 Not one soldier volunteered to go with 
Ramsey; some told him to leave and not come back.  
Ramsey began to consider trying to lead guerrillas and asked Barker what he 
knew about guerrilla warfare. Barker admitted, “I guess I was absent the day they 
taught that at the Point.”1140 In fact, the U.S. Army did not teach irregular warfare. 
Ramsey surmised, “But we’re cavalrymen and we understand shock, surprise, and 
mobility, and I guess that’s what guerrilla fighting is all about.”1141 They would look 
for other sources of information. 
Thorp learned from the Hukbalahaps. “Through contact with the Huks,” 
Ramsey recalled, “Barker and I managed to obtain a copy of Mao’s book on guerrilla 
warfare, and we passed it back and forth, studying it in our spare time and 
discussing its lessons over meals and on the march.”1142  Mao said, Ramsey noted, 
that guerrillas had to “stay on the defensive but assume the initiative, take 
advantage of the terrain and the fact that the Japs are fighting in a foreign country 
among a hostile population. We have to stay flexible but organized and avoid 
pitched battles. Most of all, we have to build our credibility and get the people on 
our side. We fight only when we have the advantage, but we don’t take on the enemy 
directly.”1143 Barker balked at the political purpose behind Mao’s operations. “Our 
job isn’t to start a revolution,” he noted, “it’s to prepare for MacArthur’s invasion. 
We’re military men, not politicians.”1144 
                                                        
1139 Ramsey and Rivele, 136. 
1140 Ibid., 100. 
1141 Ibid. 
1142 Ibid., 112. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Ibid., 112-113. 
 
313 
Like other guerrilla leaders, Ramsey and Barker learned through trial and 
error. Volckmann explained: “We all had to learn the hard way. Every mistake, when 
the chips were down, cost plenty, and the cost in this game was lives and equipment. 
From the beginning of our overt operations against the Japs I had the opportunity to 
observe and analyze the many related factors as they affected guerrilla warfare and 
resistance movements in general. My conclusions at that time seemed sound, and 
today as I review them my convictions become even more firm.”1145 
Travelling south of Porac, Ramsey suffered a malarial fit as he arrived in a 
barrio where terrified locals informed him that a Huk war party was in town. 
Assisted by Cadizon, he climbed into a hut to meet the Huk patrol leader. A dozen 
armed Huks grabbed him just before he passed out from illness. He awoke in a dark 
hut hearing Huks outside arguing in Pampango dialect. Cardizon said a Huk 
lieutenant was saying Tarluc had denounced Ramsey as a German spy and ordered 
his execution.1146 Cardizon then dragged Ramsey under the rear of the hut into the 
cane fields and jungle ahead of the pursuing Huks. Before they made it back to their 
base, the Japanese raided nearby Timbo, burned the village to the ground, and 
scattered the inhabitants.  
In Porac, their new area of operations, Barker and Ramsey reached out to 
known anti-Japanese civilians. They recruited five local leaders. Barker cast his eyes 
on a bigger prize: Manila with its supplies, money and intelligence. Alejandro Santos 
and Fausto Alberto volunteered to go to their homes in Manila and establish 
guerrilla cadres. Japanese propaganda covered Manila in an attempt to deprive the 
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guerrillas of support. “Garish, gigantic billboards now plastered the city, the 
guerrillas said, proclaiming ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ and ‘Drive out western 
imperialism,’ and setting forth, painfully, the rules and regulations under which the 
Filipinos were expected to live.”1147 Kempeitai Colonel Akira Nagahama had drawn 
up a list of specific targets for bounty hunters, headed by the names Thorp, Moses, 
Noble, Praeger, McGuire, Barker and Ramsey.1148 
Santos and Alberto found civilians in Manila already forming resistance 
groups. By the end of the month they were funneling vital information to Barker, 
who bundled it and sent it by messenger to the southern islands for relay to SWPA. 
Local volunteers – men and women – acted as couriers. “They went understanding 
full well that if they were caught they would be tortured for information and then 
executed. Many we never saw again.”1149 Determined to see for himself the situation 
in the capital, Joe Barker snuck into Manila at the end of October.  
Dennis Molintas, a farm school principal and army reserve major who had 
not been activated, arrived at Bokod and reported to Moses who authorized him to 
raise a guerrilla company. Later in the year Moses would combine Dangwa’s force 
with Molinatas to form the 12th Infantry Regiment. Volckmann commented: 
“Dangwa was undoubtedly the most influential and respected native in the 
Mountain province and was admired and respected by the natives throughout North 
Luzon. He possessed an unusual understanding of his people; he was just, and his 
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word was as good as gold. To the majority of the natives, his word was law.”1150  
Moses then formed the 66th Infantry Regiment in Baguio and other communities 
from the 43rd Infantry, the 11th Infantry, and the 12th Infantry regiments. Ever 
present danger tempered any satisfaction he might have felt with his growing 
guerrilla force. Before the end of the month, hostile patrols killed Captain Jack Spies 
while moving south to assume his designated command.  
In Manila on 20 September, Begnino Aquino moved to get an armed Filipino 
force on the side of the Japanese and collaborationist government. He sent a seven-
page memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces outlining a 
plan to issue a P5,000,000 bond to buy arms and ammunition for the Constabulary. 
Once armed, Aquino wanted to use the native force “to diminish the activities of the 
lawless elements. The way we can combat this campaign is by informing the people 
of the true state of affairs and by specifically convincing them that in no way can 
America win this war.”1151 The Japanese did not act on the plan, indicating their 
doubts that armed Filipinos would fight against the guerrillas.  
In Pampanga, Major Emilio Hernandez brought in four guerrilla units to join 
Lapham’s organization. Captain Gemeniano de Leon became commander of 
Squadron 206. Lapham promoted Sergeant Albert Short to lieutenant and appointed 
him district commander for northeastern Nueva Ecija and southern Nueva Vizcaya 
provinces. Short recruited Captain Carlos Nocum and his small band of guerrillas. 
Lapham designated them Squadron 311. Soon after, Japanese patrols hit their area 
hard and pushed the guerrillas back twenty-five miles into Pantabangan. “Short was 
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shot in the arm during a skirmish with a rival band of Filipino guerrillas,” Lapaham 
recalled, “and while he was still weak from his wound the Japanese renewed their 
pursuit. In attempting to escape from them, he was shot and killed.”1152 
One evening in Pantabangan, ill with malaria, Lapham sat on the edge of hill 
and gazed at the distant barrios. “Never in my life have I felt so alone, so misplaced, 
so utterly estranged from normal human existence.”1153 He saw his forces as 
hopelessly disorganized and scattered. As Lapham noted, “When the physical 
resources of troops have been sapped by chronic disease and protracted semi-
starvation, their will to fight declines along with their ability to do so.”1154 Idle 
moments magnified fears and tested the guerrilla leaders. The remedy was to be 
active.  
 Truckloads of Japanese unloaded near Umingan and spread out into the 
jungle. Natives reported that the patrols were going to raid Camp Manchuria in 
revenge for the beheading of the collaborationist mayor of Umingan. Lapham’s men 
slung their ailing commander into a hammock and took turns carrying him away. 
Several times he ordered his men “to put me down beside the trail and let me die in 
peace.”1155 Esteban Lumyeb repeated: “Not now, sir. We can make it. You will see, 
sir.”1156 One night in a house just outside Umingan, the Japanese arrived just as 
Lapham and his bodyguard Lalugan escaped out the back door.  
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The Japanese had opened an intensive campaign in northern Luzon that 
drove a number of guerrillas to surrender. According to Agoncillo, “One of them, 
Lieutenant Leandro Rosario, actively collaborated with the enemy and pointed to 
Nakar’s hideout.”1157 On 29 September a Japanese patrol from Baguio conducted a 
raid near Jones, Isabela, and captured Nakar and his radio. It involved more than 
betrayal. Radio contact with MacArthur had elevated Nakar’s stature and increased 
his desire for communication. Without codes, however, he had to provide “long and 
detailed instructions for codes and deceptive timing to mislead the Japanese.”1158 
The long transmissions enabled Japanese direction-finding equipment on ships off 
shore to accurately plot the source of Nakar’s signals. After that, it was relatively 
easy to find the major.  
 The Japanese hoped to gain Nakar’s cooperation but he refused. Even after 
months of torture he still held out. Finally, in October 1943, they beheaded Nakar in 
the North Cemetery in Manila.1159 Without their leader, most of his 5,000 men 
surrendered; the rest dispersed into the mountains.1160 What was left of the 14th 
Infantry passed to Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Enriquez, commander of the 2nd 
Battalion. Enriquez concentrated on intelligence coordination with the 43rd, 121st 
and 14th Infantry Regiments. He daringly located his headquarters inside a Nacoco 
Store (a trading post authorized by the Japanese) in Baguio. It was a brilliant choice 
as agents posing as salesmen could easily come and go bringing intelligence.1161  
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Across the Islands, guerrilla groups allied and adjusted alliances. In Bicol, 
Turko merged his VTG with Miranda’s TVGU guerrillas around 24 September.1162  
Under their strict policies against rape and other crimes, Turko “never once 
molested any civilian.”1163 He moved his troops from Camarines Norte to Camarines 
Sur in hops of leaving their bad reputation behind. Turko tried to justify his men’s 
repute as part of guerrilla warfare. “But rape can never be an inevitable extreme 
measure or put more bluntly, a war policy,” Barrameda wrote, “Neither is the public 
humiliation and killing of non-combatants, collaborators as they may have 
reportedly been.” 1164 After several months, however, Turko withdrew the VTG from 
the TVGU to again become an independent group. 
On Negros, Lieutenant Colonel Gador’s habit of promoting relatives to senior 
positions irritated many of his officers. Mercado withdrew his force from Gador’s 
command. Meanwhile on nearby Negros Siquijor, Benito Cunanan’s men continued 
to drive off attempted Japanese landings and even assassinated the Japanese 
appointed governor.  In October, Cunanan agreed to join his guerrillas to Ausejo’s 
75th Regiment as the 4th Provisional Battalion. 
In northeast Palawan, Alfred and Paul Cobb continued to expand their 
guerrilla Home Guard out of Danlig with a unit on Dumaran Island. Alfred made 
contact with American airmen from the 48th Material Command hiding on Cuyo 
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Island. Some of these men agreed to join the force on Palawan, others would connect 
the group to Amores on Busanga. They collected food, arms, boats, and other 
supplies and drafted plans for attacking Puerto Princesa.  
 When Carlos Amores led the uprising against the Japanese occupied 
manganese mines in Busuanga-Coron on Palawan, he went to Danlig to ask to the 
Cobb Brothers for aid. He returned to Busuanga but Japanese counteraction, and a 
lack of food, forced him to leave with about a hundred men for Sibaltan in northern 
Palawan. There he joined with the Cobbs as C Company in the Palawan Special 
Battalion. This brought the Cobb Group to about 150 armed men. There would be no 





7.  Divisions 
6 October 1942– 6 January 1943 
 
As MacArthur’s headquarters prepared to send agents into the Philippines, the 
now numerous guerrilla groups experienced friction over territory, supplies, and 
authority. Conflict arose over many pre-war political and social divisions. With the 
hardships of occupation, no sign of MacArthur’s promised return, and impactful 
Japanese counterinsurgency operations, Filipino resistance entered a trying time.  
 
Mindanao, D303/R-746 
On 6 October, Japanese troops on the inter-island streamer Tular tried to 
dock at Misamis City harbor but were surprised and driven off by guerrillas firing 
from the town’s old Spanish fort under a suddenly-raised American flag.1165 
Developments on the island caught them by surprise.  Former USAFFE soldiers, 
Philippine Constabulary, Philippine Scouts, U.S. Navy, and civilians had formed 
numerous hometown barrio bands east of Misamis Oriental, north of Agusan and 
Surigoa. “They were led by natural leaders,” SWPA later reported, “who assumed 
their responsibilities for various reasons – personal aggrandizement, banditry, 
desire to fight the Japs or establishment of law and order.”1166 Private First Class 
Clyde Abbott of the 14th Bomb Squadron and Lieutenant Pedro Collado of the 
Philippine Constabulary had led Filipino guerrillas in a successful attack on a 
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Japanese patrol out to establish a puppet government in Balingasag.1167 Yet many of 
these groups, like those led by U.S. Army Air Corps veterans Master Sergeant James 
McIntyre at Claveria and Master Sergeant Alfredo Fernandez at Malitbog, refused to 
cooperate with each other. 
The Japanese had remained focused on Moro bands like those around Lake 
Lanao under datu ‘Brigadier General’ Busran Kalaw.  Though he was reportedly anti-
American, he was actually just anti-anyone not Moro.1168 Weak bands under Manuel 
Fortich and Vincente Leuterio appeared in southern Bukidon and reached out to 
Pendatun who was waging a successful campaign with 2,400 men to drive the 
Japanese out of Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia and Mailag before the end of the year. 
Meanwhile other groups formed in northeast Mindanao: Macario Diaz in Masgad, 
Major Garcia in central Surigao, and Captain Tomanning at Lianga. A U.S. Army 
assessment noted: “These small groups were loosely controlled and behaved as 
bandits in their areas. They inflicted damage against property, refused to submit to 
each other and gave the guerrillas a bad name generally. It appeared as though 
establishment of order in these areas would be difficult.”1169  
When the Japanese invaded, American mestizo Luis Morgan (also known as 
William Morgan and Morgan Morgan) was a lieutenant in the Philippine 
Constabulary on Mindanao. One guerrilla described him as “outgoing but 
demanding, almost arrogant. He had a swashbuckling air about him, with a tommy 
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gun strapped across his chest.” 1170  Just before Sharp surrendered, Morgan received 
orders to take his troop from Kolambugan to Lake Lanano. Instead, he burned the 
sawmill at Kolambugan and headed for distant Baroy, picking up about four 
hundred Philippine soldiers along the way. At his destination, Morgan found the 
Christian town suffering from Moro raids. He reportedly gathered Baroy’s roughly 
thirty Moro men, women, and children into a warehouse and slaughtered them with 
machine gun fire.1171 He then set himself up as a warlord, demanding money and 
food for his men, and a new woman for his bed each night.  
Bill Tait, son of an African-American Buffalo soldier and a Moro woman, 
arrived in Lanae.  Tait had survived a troubled youth and now joined the puppet 
Bureau of Constabulary where he rose to the rank of lieutenant. Quickly tiring of the 
Japanese, however, he wandered out to join Morgan offering information on the 
disarray among the guerrillas across Mindanao.  
 In August, Morgan learned of Fertig nearby and sent Tait to him with a 
proposition. Morgan had gathered more men than any self-promoted captain 
leading some un-surrendered Filipino officers of higher rank to signal their desire to 
take over his operation. To keep his command, and perhaps expand it, he proposed 
to spread a rumor that MacArthur had sent a brigadier general to Mindanao to 
command the resistance. He asked Fertig to show up at Baroy and claim to be that 
general. Fertig would get to play the boss while Morgan ran the show as Fertig’s 
Chief of Staff.  Tait asked Fertig to come see Morgan to discuss the plan. 
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Fertig, however, had ideas of his own. He had assumed that eventually one of 
the guerrilla bands would come to him seeking his leadership and experience. Only 
then, from a position of strength, would he join any group. Morgan was welcome to 
come see him, Fertig told Tait, while he considered the offer. Two weeks passed and 
civilians grew more resentful of Morgan’s heavy-handed acts while rivals clamored 
for his command. On 10 September, Morgan at last came to Fertig. Maintaining a 
voice and posture suited to his superior rank, the American officer grilled Morgan 
on why he had not followed orders and gone to Lake Lanao. He asked Morgan for 
plans and staff studies, tables of organization and equipment, and battle rosters.1172 
When a humbled Morgan returned three days later with the requested information, 
Fertig was wearing the silver stars of a brigadier general, fashioned by a Moro 
silversmith from local coins.  
Fertig decided to accept command of Morgan’s guerrillas, but not as a 
figurehead. He designated Morgan’s force as the 106th Regiment. Headquartered at 
Misamis, Fertig set out to bring all guerrillas in Mindanao under his command. 
Captain Joaquin Dismal in nearby Misamis Occidental asked his help to attack a 
Japanese garrison. Fertig sent Morgan and Tate and they successfully cleared 
Misamis Occidental and the north coast of Zamboanga. Meanwhile fifty-one year-old 
Lieutenant Colonel Ciriaco Mortera brought his remnant constabulary force to join 
Fertig and became the 105th Division in Lanao and Misamis Occidental. 
 From his headquarters on 18 September, Fertig issued a proclamation 
addressed to “The United States Army Forces in the Philippines” from the “Office of 
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the Commanding General in the Field of Mindanao and Sulu.” 1173 He announced 
Morgan had cleared and occupied Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga and 
raised the American and Filipino flags. He proclaimed the reestablishment of the 
Philippine Commonwealth Government authority in the liberated areas under 
Military Authorities. Where civil laws conflicted with military laws, military laws 
would prevail. Finally, Fertig signed the declaration as “W.W. Fertig, Brigadier 
General, USA, Commanding Mindanao & Sulu Force.”  
 Fertig suspected that Morgan resented his command and, given time, would 
work to replace him. In the meantime, he had to get Morgan away from the men. He 
decided to send him on a trip around Mindanao to find and recruit all the various 
guerrillas into his organization. If Morgan succeeded, it would prove his loyalty. If he 
failed, Morgan would look weak and incompetent. If something unfortunate 
happened on the trip, it would be a problem solved for Fertig. Over the next few 
months while Morgan was gone, Fertig would improve his units and gain their 
loyalty, organize a civil government, and get Charlie Hedges to organize Lanao 
province.  When McClish and Ball arrived in Misamis, Fertig sent McClish to 
command the guerrillas in northeastern Mindanao with Childress along as his chief 
of staff. Ball remained at Fertig’s headquarters and later became district 
communication officer.  
Fertig conducted a whirlwind inspection of Misamis Occidental. He found the 
motor pool Hedge’s had run before the surrender still in good order. His men got the 
province’s telephone system running again. Chief Petty Officer Offret, who knew a 
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thing or two about engines, supervised the reopening of the coconut oil factory in 
Jimenez that had employed many local citizens. The oil would be vital to Fertig’s 
operations.1174  
Fertig’s command rapidly absorbed a number of guerrilla bands in Mindanao. 
On the central north coast near Cayagan between Talakag and Sumilao, the 
American Air Corps enlisted men who had formed small guerrilla groups now left to 
find their way to Australia.1175 U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Bowler 
recruited and combined their bands supplied with arms and equipment from 
prewar stocks. These became Fertig’s 111th and 112th Regiments of the 109th 
Division. Major Manuel Jaldon organized guerrillas around Alubijid, Misamis 
Oriental, into the 109th Regiment. Eventually the 111th, 112th, and 117th Regiment 
formed in this area. 
Bowler reported that western Mindanao was an ideal area for guerrillas with 
good terrain, supportive people, and few enemy troops. “My principal assets are 
anonymity, lack of roads, and friendly neighbors,” he told Fertig, “The Japs know we 
operate in the hills, but they estimate our potential at five percent of what it is! If 
they ever suspected my true manpower, courier system, supply areas, and 
intelligence net, they wouldn’t rest until they had destroyed the organization!”1176 
He determined to stay hidden as much as possible and only fight the Japanese when 
he had no other choice. “Communities provide us with shelter, information, and 
food, and we never involve them in operations,” he said, “When the Japs sweep 
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through friendly barrios, my men fade into the hills; if necessary, they bury their 
arms and become farmers!”1177   
 When Steve Mellnik joined the unit, he observed: “Though Bowler’s personal 
qualities did much to stimulate guerrilla cohesion, it was local leadership – 
Americans who settled in Mindanao after the Spanish-American War – that enabled 
Bowler to expand the organization. Following USAFFE’s surrender, those veterans 
left their ranches and businesses and established ‘free’ communities in the 
mountains. When remnants of USAFFE units coalesced into guerrilla groups, the old-
timers volunteered for active duty. Some served in command capacities, others 
performed supply, administrative, and intelligence functions.”1178 
Fertig instituted a training program focused on tactics and individual soldier 
skills. For the staff, he prioritized basic administrative procedures, “careful to record 
service information so that someday his men could collect back pay.”1179 Civilian 
volunteers used crudely fashioned molds to shape curtain rods into .30 caliber 
bullets. In a shed in Dipolog, Lieutenant Sol Samonte worked feverishly to find the 
right mixture of quicksilver from thermometers and other chemicals to make 
fulminate of mercury for percussion caps.1180 Until he succeeded, they used match 
heads. They used an old ordnance factory in Jimenez to produce new ejectors for 
Enfield rifles from old springs. In a rice mill near Oroquieta, a handpicked crew 
carved hardwood in plates for printing money for the Government of the Free 
Philippines – notes that (without authority) promised redemption at face value after 
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the war. Outside Bonifacio on Panguil Bay, high school student and International 
Correspondence School of Scranton Pennsylvania graduate, Geraldo Almendres, 
filled the floors of a Nipa hut with scavenged parts from radios and a movie sound 
projector in an attempt to create a long-range transmitter and receiver. Finally, 
Fertig had his men try to manufacture soap, an item in great demand across the 
island, to trade on Negros for sugar needed to produce fuel.  
 In response the 6 October ambush of the streamer Tular at the Misamis City 
docks, the Japanese sent the 10th Independent Garrison’s five battalions to the 
Mindanao District and the 11th Independent Garrison’s four battalions to the 
Visayan District. The 16th Division still garrisoned Southern Luzon and the 2nd 
Regiment and 4th Battalion of the 65th Brigade occupied Northern Luzon.1181 Colonel 
Yashinari Tanaka commanded western Mindanao under General Morimoto. They all 
believed ‘General Fertig’ held Misamis with 7,000 guerrilla troops.1182  
 Meanwhile, Fertig was finding it difficult to govern people who had routinely 
relied on direction from their leaders before acting on even mundane problems. 
War magnified his dilemma. When Morgan confiscated boats, fishermen objected, 
and the local economy and diets suffered. Fertig decided he had to create a new 
civilian government to deal with these problems and recruited the highly respected 
judge Florentino Saguin to become chief of state.1183 Others stepped forward to fill 
administrative positions. Fertig sought an alliance with the local Catholic Church but 
Irish Jesuit Father Calanan could offer only his sympathy while insisting the Church 
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maintain outward neutrality. Unofficially, many priests and nuns became vital 
agents for Fertig.1184  To encourage cooperation, he ordered his headquarters 
personnel to attend weekly mass. Wisely, he also actively courted the support of the 
Doña Carmen Ozámiz and her family, the highborn Spanish mestizo kinship network 
that long held sway in the province.  
Men came out of the hills to join Fertig. Millionaire Sam Wilson arrived and 
took over the printing of money and kept meticulous books for the Treasury. Robert 
Ball arrived and was put to work with the radio development section. Kenneth 
Baylay, sick with malaria, escaped with thirteen other patients from a field hospital 
before it fell to the Japanese. He spent months wandering through Moro country, 
saw his best friend and fellow traveler John Grant speared to death by Magahats, 
and wound up with Pendatun. Sensing hostility from Andrews, Baylay left with 
American Leonard Merchant to join Fertig.  He reported a very capable West Pointer 
and World War I veteran named Colonel Frank McGhee was working on 
Pendantun’s staff. 
Seeking food and money, Roy Bell arrived unexpectedly from Negros. Fertig 
agreed to send food, military supplies and Mindanao Emergency Currency to 
Negros.  In return, Ausejo’s 75th Regiment pledged itself to Fertig’s command. Bell 
helped Almendres and Ball construct a radio. When the transmitter started working, 
Ball used a code cylinder Fertig carried to tap out a Morse code message to the 
world: “WE HAVE THE HOT DOPE ON THE HOT YANKS IN THE HOT 




PHILIPPINES.”1185  They failed to realize that without a crystal, their transmitter slid 
across a broad band of frequencies.  Even so, Fertig’s message was heard – at the 
radio station KFS in San Francisco. When operators heard the message full of slang 
in obsolete code broadcast on multi-frequencies, they dismissed it as some Japanese 
effort to jam Allied radio traffic. Any response would let the enemy know the 
transmission was working so they ignored Fertig’s desperate call.  
The notion that the Japanese would dupe the Allied high command by false 
radio communication was not a product of feverish imaginations. In September 
1943, the Japanese captured a thirty-four-man Portuguese-Australian intelligence 
team in Timor and used their radio to feed false information to the oblivious Allied 
higher headquarters for the rest of the war.1186  
 
Central Luzon, D304, R-745 
A prisoner tortured by the Japanese in Luzon, broke during the first week of 
October. He confessed to serving as a runner for the Fassoth camp and gave away its 
location. Fortunately, he got word to the Fassoths before the Japanese arrived. The 
camp disbanded. A local Negrito with three young wives took Ramsey, Doctor 
Warshall and Martin Fassoth to a hut in the higher hills. When the men returned, 
they found only burnt remains of the camp and the throat-slit bodies of a number of 
guards. They met up with Bill Fassoth and learned that after the expected Japanese 
raid many men returned to the camp. The Japanese then returned to finish the job, 
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killing thirty Americans and capturing five more.1187 Bill decided to surrender to the 
Japanese for fear of what they might do to his family.  Ramsey said his goodbyes and 
headed for John Boone’s camp.  
By now the dangers posed by the Japanese was well known. “They would 
take into custody and hold as hostages the immediate members of the families of the 
known or suspected guerrillas,” recalled Volckmann, “publicly announcing that 
unless the banditos surrendered, their loved ones would be tortured and all their 
property confiscated. A means more penetrating and effective could not possibly 
have been conceived, for while the average Filipino has very little national or state 
feeling, his family ties are strong and sacred to him.”1188  
On 23 October, as the Americans began to battle the Japanese for Henderson 
Field on Guadalcanal, word arrived at Thorp’s camp that Minang’s uncle, ex-mayor 
Laxamana who had welcomed them to Umindang, had been captured. Before his 
guerrillas could move, however, a Japanese attack captured Thorp and his 
headquarters on 29 October. The guerrillas believed Laxamana had betrayed Thorp 
for money. “The guide he had chosen for Thorp, Andres de la Cruz, was released at 
once by his captors and given back his gun, though the others remained ‘hog tied,’” 
Lapham noted, “Laxamana received a handsome reward for his treachery. 
Afterward, he was protected by the Japanese and helped to invest in real estate from 
which he made a great deal more money, though he may have eventually ended his 
inglorious career buried alive by guerrillas.”1189  Minang avoided prison and 
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eventually became guerrilla Ray Hunt’s lover and companion. Lapham said, 
“Understandably, he esteemed her highly.”1190 Lapham, Anderson and Ramsey took 
over Thorp’s organization.  
Thorp’s capture erased his arrangement with the Huks, though they still 
escorted Anderson south to organize guerrillas.  The Huks would fight some 
Americans and maintain decent relations with others.  Merrill routinely made deals 
with them “because he admired their pugnacity.”1191 Blair Robinett, Joe Barker, and 
William J. Gardiner also worked with the Huks.  Blackburn, Volckmann, Crane, 
Anderson, Ramsey and James Boyd remained wary.   
Clay Conner served in Anderson’s new Squadron 155 in Luzon, commanding 
a band of several hundred Negritos.  He openly admired the Huks’ organization, 
arms and leaders. “Yet he soon began to notice that he was almost always raided by 
the Japanese within a day or two after Huk contact,” recalled Lapham, “Then he saw 
Huks go into small barrios and take guns away from USAFFE guerrillas there. 
Finally, when he was saved from a Huk ambush only by the loyalty and quick wits of 
some of his Negrito followers, the last of his illusions about these smart, brave, 
‘progressive,’ anti-Fascist warriors evaporated.”1192 
It is interesting to note how the Negritoes who averaged less than five feet 
tall were considered unusually short. Yet, as Parsons noted the average Philippine 
guerrilla stood only five feet and two to six inches tall, weighed about a 110 to a 
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120-pounds, and was between seventeen and twenty-three years old.1193 They often 
wore uniforms taken from the fallen Japanese and from a distance were almost 
indistinguishable. Parsons learned one quick method of identification – Japanese 
never went barefoot and Filipinos seldom wore shoes. In theory, they earned the 
same pay as American soldiers, but they received maybe ten to fifty pesos of script 
each month, which they called tinghoy – worthless – because there was nothing to 
buy. 1194 
Carlos Romulo studied the Japanese soldiers taken prisoner early in the war. 
He reported: “His weight is from 95 to 125 pounds; his height is five foot-three 
inches; his age is twenty-three; his length of military service is one and a half years. 
He comes, as a rule, from the farm.”1195 Villamor noted differences between 
Japanese troops. “The [regular army] Japanese soldiers in Luzon were well-built, of 
better than average height, and looked well-fed and well-groomed,” he noted, “They 
were in much better physical appearance than the transient casuals coming from 
Japan and proceeding to the front, who were younger, weaker, and smaller. One 
agent reported seeing a whole battalion of these soldiers, and not one of them was 
over five feet in height.”1196  
The Japanese field units enjoyed advantages in firepower, training, 
experience, and unit cohesion over the guerrillas. In addition to naval gunfire, 
aircraft, and sometimes tanks, the Japanese were routinely armed with .30 caliber 
water-cooled machineguns, so-called “knee mortars,” automatic rifles, rifles, and 
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grenades.1197 According to a U.S. military intelligence officer, the Japanese arms 
“were of first-rate design and construction” with firearms as effective as Allied 
weapons but simpler to use.1198  “And the Japanese soldier had the advantage over 
the American and Filipino,” observed Romulo, “because he is used to living on 
almost nothing. We were willing to strip comfort to the minimum. But to him that 
minimum was a luxury.”1199 
The regular troops were noted for their prowess in battle. B. David Mann 
fought in Bataan in 1945 and later wrote, “Japan’s leaders blundered many times 
during the war, but no one can dispute that the individual Japanese infantryman was 
among the best the world has ever seen. For tenacity, determination, bravery, and 
devotion to cause, he has few if any peers.”1200 As Yuki Tanaka explained: “The new 
military ideology – which placed so much weight on the concepts of no surrender, 
loyalty through blind obedience, and honor in dying for the emperor – spread 
throughout the Japanese armed forces with little apparent resistance.”1201 One 
soldier, Yutaka Yokota, explained: “There’s an old expression, ‘Bushido is the search 
for a place to die.’ Well, that was our fervent desire, our long-cherished dream. A 
place to die for my country. I was happy to have been born a man. A man of Japan. I 
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don’t care if it makes me sound egotistical, but that’s how I felt. The country was in 
my hands.”1202   
In their study of the Japanese soldier, Meirion and Susie Harries, saw in such 
blind courage a paradoxical weakness. “The utter disregard for danger was rooted 
not in hope but in resignation to the inevitability of defeat,” they wrote, “‘Dash 
forward bravely and with joy when meeting difficult situations,’ urged one of the 
most famous Bushido texts. ‘Common sense will not accomplish great things. Simply 
become desperate and crazy to die.’”1203  Veteran Suzuki Murio later admitted, 
“Soldiers like me had no idea why we were fighting this war. We were treated as 
nothing more than consumable goods.”1204  
As quickly as possible the Imperial Headquarters stripped away top line 
units from the Philippines for use on other fronts. Newer, greener, Japanese 
conscripts and reservists arrived to take over occupation duties.1205 In 1940 regular 
army professionals outnumbered reservists int he Japanese army by a ratio of 2.4 to 
1; by 1943 the army contained 1.5 reservists for each regular army soldier.1206 One 
guerrilla recalled: “The Japanese occupation army was made up of conscripts, not 
regular army troops, and they were not the bravest of soldiers. A few bursts of rifle 
and submachine gunfire from a concealed position would disperse them quickly. On 
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one occasion, however, they came after us in force and routed us completely.”1207 
Lapham watched his enemy closely and concluded, “Their maneuvers were broad, 
general sweeps, often appearing to be field exercises for green troops fresh from 
Japan.”1208 As in training exercises, the Japanese operated on exact and predictable 
timetables. Field officers told Quezon, “Everything with them is like a railroad time 
schedule.” 1209 
Typical of Japanese tactics was their raid on Claver, Mindanao, on 30 
November 1943. One witness described it: “A Japanese cruiser and several small 
craft shelled the town and the surrounding hills. They sent landing craft with assault 
troops ashore and moved inland to a distance of about three miles. Only two of our 
men were killed but the administrative personnel had to move quickly in order to 
get back into the hills before getting cut off.”1210  The Japanese soldiers appeared 
reluctant to either venture beyond the range of their naval gunfire support or to stay 
long in guerrilla controlled territory.  
 The green troops were less than imposing. Lapham noted, “The Japanese 
disliked going into the jungle at night so nocturnal ambushes were rare.”1211  
Ramsey was confident that Japanese patrols “must have hated” operating in his base 
region “for the Balagbag jungles were alive with snakes and leeches and the rains 
had swollen the streams to torrents.”1212 Others recalled Japanese patrols as 
“chronically noisy” and said, “We could often hear their conversations and their 
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clanging equipment long before we encountered them.” 1213  Many guerrillas 
assumed their enemy tried to avoid contact. An enlisted soldier of the 32nd Regiment 
from Osaka gave credence to this impression. He said, “Why die when you’ve 
already lost? I guess if you’ve been long on the battlefield, you know instantly 
whether the enemy’s going to shoot or not. Anyway, that was my philosophy: As 
long as I don’t fight, I’ll make it home. I believed in that.”1214  
 Many of these soldiers were not only green; they were almost children. In a 
poignant interview, Hanada Miki, six-year Red Cross nurse, recalled the soldiers 
sailing on her hospital ship for the Islands, in violation of the Geneva accords, 
because the U.S. Navy sank so many troop ships. “We transported many student 
soldiers to the Philippines,” she recalled, “Since they were told, ‘Books are 
unnecessary,’ they left many of their favorite books on board. Giving up works by 
Ishikawa Takuboku and Herman Hesse must have felt as if they were bidding 
farewell to their youth. The books were heavily underlined. Images of their faces as 
they gallantly saluted upon disembarking are burned into my memory.”1215 
To compensate for these weaknesses, the Fourteenth Army relied on 
numbers. In September 1943, for example, they sent 1,500 soldiers on a three-
pronged attack in Iloilo province in Panay, at Sara and San Dionisio, Nueva 
Invencion, and Barotac Viejo.1216 The troops would surround their targeted area, 
“then the patrols cut through, over and over again, like cutting pie.”1217 The 
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guerrillas could not withstand such numbers, especially when backed by airpower. 
The Japanese would target unprotected villages that supported the guerrillas. “Fifty 
Japs could surround a town,” Yay Panlilio wrote, “one town after another or several 
towns at the same time – surprise it, pouncing by truckloads, dumping men there at 
dawn, or creeping into sentry position before day broke. Anybody could come in. 
Nobody could go out.”1218 
To maintain their numbers, the Japanese forced many Filipinos into 
Volunteer Guard organizations. Often guerrilla reports of high Japanese casualties 
masked the number of Constabulary, ronda, or ‘yuin’ Filipino auxiliaries 
included.1219 In fact, the Japanese would often remove or destroy their dead to 
prevent them from falling into guerrilla hands. One guerrilla reported that the 
Japanese habitually threw their dead into native huts and set them on fire. “One 
such occasion,” Panlilio recalled, “a farmer passed by after the Japanese had left and 
among the half-charred bodies, one still moved, still groaned.” 1220 
 Lacking the ability to completely destroy the resistance, the Japanese tried to 
achieve psychological domination. “The new masters were brutal and arrogant,” 
wrote Villamor, “They slapped people around at the slightest provocation. They 
bathed in the nude in the public plazas, shocking the Filipinos. They plundered, 
commandeering stocks of palay and corn, destroyed and dismantled private homes 
for firewood.” 1221  Rapes, tortures, and executions were means of cultural 
domination. When they rebuilt the Forbes Bridge in Iloilo City on Panay, for 
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example, the Japanese forced anyone passing over the bridge “to bow from the waist 
down before the sentinels representing the Emperor of Japan.” 1222  
 Yuki Tanaka of Hiroshima University has argued: “in literal terms, Japanese 
soldiers were obviously the physical perpetrators of such atrocities. In psychological 
and ideological terms, they were also the victims of an emperor system that 
legitimized such atrocities in the name of the emperor.”1223 Within Japan enlisted 
soldiers were considered a low social class, but in the colonies they represented the 
emperor, the highest possible position in society.1224 Tanaka explained, “This led in 
many cases to unbalanced psychological states: extremes of self-abnegation in 
relation to the Japanese domestic hierarchy alternating with excessive self-regard in 
relation to colonial non-Japanese. The repressed resentment of the former was often 
expressed in violence toward the latter.”1225 Violence towards the subjected people 
also helped reinforce a martial self-image among green troops. Before joining the 
guerrillas, Panlilio recalled talking to a Japanese officer who was angry at seeing one 
of his sentries sharing photos with Filipinos on the street. “Look what your country 
is doing to our army,” he said. “You mean you have to keep them away from the 
people?” she asked. He nodded and said, “Otherwise they go soft.” 1226 
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 On 11 October Captain William L. Osborne and Captain Damon J. “Rocky” 
Gause, completed a 159-day journey of over 3,200 miles from the Philippines to 
northern Australia via Palawan, North Borneo, Tawi Tawi, and Makassar Strait.1227 
Dodging violent storms and the Japanese navy, the two officers escaped Corregidor 
and Bataan on a 20-foot sailboat rather than accept surrender. Delivered to 
Brisbane eleven days later, the barefoot and tattered escapees reported to 
MacArthur who exclaimed, “Well, I'll be damned.” It was the “first direct personal 
information from the Philippines” brought to SPWA.1228 
On 21 October, the AIB created a special Philippine Sub-Section under Major 
Ind to supply, fund, and communicate with the guerrillas1229 Since July Ind and 
McMickling had worked on a plan to insert a team of agents into Mindanao. Now, the 
new sub-section reworked the plans for “a) re-establishment of radio 
communications with the Islands; b) intelligence collection by means of clandestine 
agents or parties; c) establishment of escape routes for PW; and d) establishment of 
lists of emergency supplies to be run into the Islands by air or submarine.”1230  One 
of the first pans considered by AIB, drafted by Lieutenant C.V. Hurley, U.S. Navy 
Reserve, was to “organize, train, and equip a commando force of one thousand 
Moros officered by about a dozen naval or marine officers and NCOs” to harass 
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Japanese garrisons in Mindanao.”1231 With input from Villamor, AIB decided to try 
something else.  
The AIB drew up plans for inserting a team into the Islands code named 
Operation PLANET to be led by newly promoted Major Villamor. SWPA reported: 
“Although he was young and lacked experience, MAJ Villamor was capable and 
moved by intensely patriotic motives.”1232 He sent the AIB the names of five soldiers 
he wanted on his team: Patricio Jorge, Emilio Quinto, Defin YuHico, Dominandor 
Malic, Rodolfo Ignacio.1233 Their mission was to establish “a net for military 
intelligence and secret services throughout the islands: organize a chain of radio 
communications, both within the Philippines and to Darwin in northern Australia; 
locate and contact influential persons known to be loyal; and develop an 
organization for covert subversive actions and sabotage.”1234  Captain Davidson 
prepared the team in mornings of physical training, infiltration techniques, 
navigation and sabotage courses, and afternoons and evenings learning Morse code, 
cypher systems and radio communications.1235 
The AIB realized that radios were critical for coordinating the guerrilla 
resistance and operator skill was a very large part of long distance 
communication.1236 While the distance a signal can travel depends on the power of 
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the transmitter, many other factors also come into play. The guerrillas’ radios used 
short wave frequencies (1.6 to 30MHz) that travel by one of two possible paths, 
ground wave or skywave. Ground wave required low power and was useable 
twenty-four hours a day with minimum interference at night but it was generally 
limited to five to ten miles in range. Skywave, also called skip propagation, bounced 
the signal off the ionosphere – a layer of atmosphere thick with charged particles 
fifty miles above the earth – to receivers beyond the horizon for ranges up to 
thousands of miles. To effectively employ skywave, however, operators had to 
calculate the right choice of frequencies, the intended signal path, interference from 
solar radiation, and the right choice of antennae. To utilize ground wave, they 
usually employed a vertical rod antenna; skywave required a wire antenna, usually 
a half-wave dipole perpendicular to the target station. The better skilled the 
operator, the better the chance of successful long-range communication. Most 
guerrillas started with no skills in this area. 
Instead of military radios, the AIB equipped the PLANET team with civilian 
models used by the Australian coast watchers: the Australian 3BZ and ATR4.1237  Perhaps 
this choice resulted from ongoing shortages of military radios or perhaps it was payback 
for Australian funding of the AIB. In any case, the radios were well suited to guerrilla 
requirements. The 3BZ, manufactured by Amalgamated Wireless, was a new design of 
the reliable “teleradio” first fielded in 1935 and used by more than 200 coast watcher 
stations.1238 Improved with changes suggested by field operators, the 3BZ had a 
                                                        
1237 Ind, 121. 
1238 “The 3BZ Coast Watchers Wireless Set,” VK2DYM’s Military Radio and Radar Information Site, at 
http://www.qsl.net/vk2dym/radio/3BZa.htm accessed 2 November 2014. 
 
342 
transmitter with six crystal channels, a two-crystal channel CW (Morse code) and AM 
(voice) transmitter at 10 to 2.5 MHz.  The receiver had five tunable frequency bands (or 
four bands plus one crystal channel) allowing general coverage from 200 Khz to 30 Mhz. 
The crystals enabled precise frequency usage. The 3BZ could use 6- or 12-volt batteries, 
AC or DC power, or a pedal generator based on a bicycle frame. The three 16-inch by 10-
inch by 10-inch steel boxes for the transmitter, receiver and power unit together 
weighed less than 200 pounds and fit through a submarine hatch. Most importantly, the 
3BZ was mildew, rot and fungus resistant. It was an excellent tool for the guerrillas, if the 
AIB could get them to the Philippines. 
The Radio Corporation of Melbourne supplied, when available, the ATR4 – the 
Australian Transmitter/Receiver Model 4 portable radio.1239 It included a battery-
powered single-channel crystal transceiver operating between 5.5 and 7.5 Mc/s 
providing both CW and AM transmission.1240 The transceiver and radio, originally 
designed for the Royal Australian Air Force, weighed a combined twenty-three pounds 
and fit into a backpack.  The model ATR4B was “tropic proofed” like the 3BZ.  
Power limitations in the 15-watt 3BZs, however, normally restricted range to 
about 400 miles.1241 The range of the 1.5-watt ATR4s was even shorter even though 
initial AIB parties reported, “surprising results of over several hundred miles are being 
obtained by some of our parties.”1242  
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To span the roughly 3,600 miles separating the Philippine guerrillas and SWPA in 
Australia, PLANET included an 80-watt transmitter specially built by the U.S. Army 
Signal Corps.1243 Emillo Quinto, the highly skilled former communication officer on 
the Don Isidro and chief operator of the General Headquarters floating wireless 
station on the Arcturus, would operate it. Villamor described Quinto’s set as a specially 
modified ATR4 transmitter combined with a Dutch built NEI receiver.1244 The PLANET 
manifest listed two “Transmitters, 80-watt complete with spare parts and spare 
tubes.”1245 Later teams would carry the commercially available HT-9 transmitters built by 
Hallicrafters of Chicago, Illinois. These 13-inch by 30-inch by 13-inch 165-pound sets 
boasted a five-frequency 75-watt AM voice and one 100-watt frequency CW Morse code 
transmission capability.1246 Agents were to use the HT-9s, Dutch built 30-watt NEI-II/IIIs, 
or specially built radios for establishing relay base stations to communicate directly with 
SWPA and use the 3BZs and ATR4s for local guerrilla stations, intelligence operatives, 
coast and air watchers. 
Submarines proved harder to get. Adjustments to worldwide requirements had 
left the Southwest Pacific Force (SoWes-Pac Force) based in Australia with just 20 
submarines, 12 in Brisbane. 1247 MacArthur’s staff had to barter with the Navy for their 
hard-pressed boats. “In return for submarine assistance, it was agreed to obtain for 
the Navy specific naval information and to establish coast-watch stations at points 
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specified by Navy to provide information on shipping lanes and traffic densities, and 
later to provide targets for submarines.”1248 
 In Washington, a valuable help to AIB plans was lost due to racial politics. 
Director of the Office of War Information (OWI) Elmer Davis asked President 
Roosevelt to allow Japanese-Americans to enlist in the military to counter Japanese 
propaganda that framed the war as a racial conflict in “the Philippines, Burma, and 
elsewhere.”1249 Powerful people in the administration resisted sending Japanese 
American soldiers into the Pacific Theater and limited them to support and 
intelligence roles.1250 The potential for such recruits to serve on insertion teams 
remained unexplored.  
The AIB completed its plans for obtaining supplies, communications, personnel, 
training and transportation for the insertion of a team of agents back into the 
Philippines. Because of “the somewhat uncertain military capacity of Philippine 
guerrillas at this time,” it worked with the Army Signal Corps to prepare separate 
radio networks for the AIB insertion teams, coast-watchers, and guerrillas.1251 From 
the start, therefore, SWPA intended to run its intelligence collection effort as 
separate from the guerrilla resistance as possible.  
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 For a month Volckmann and Blackburn pressed Moses and Noble to take 
charge of the guerrilla effort, but Moses demurred. 1252 On 1 October, however, the 
colonel had changed his mind and declared he was assuming command of all 
guerrillas in north Luzon as the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North 
Luzon (USAFIP-NL). He paired leaders and units: Governor Ablan and Praeger in 
Apayao; Enriquez’s 14th Infantry in Nueva Vizcaya; George Barnett in La Union; 
Robert Lapham and Charles Cushing (brother to Walter and James) in Pangasinan 
and Neuva Ecija; and Dennis Molintas in Benguet.1253 Moses sent Volckmann, with 
Blackburn as his executive officer, to command three groups around Benguet.  He 
also ordered all units to begin coordinated attacks against the Japanese at 0100 
hours on 15 October.1254  
On 11 October, Volckmann arrived at Barrio Tocod to coordinate with 
Baldwin. Blackburn, after detouring to Uding for more shots from Dr. Biason, joined 
them on 14 October. At midnight the next day, in accordance with Moses’ orders, 
Baldwin successfully attacked and destroyed Japanese garrisons at Sanhiglo and 
Balatoc that guarded the Itogon mines. “There were certain utilities and other 
installations between Itogon and Baguio which were also designated as targets for 
sabotage or destruction. The 15th was when everything was to go up in smoke.” 1255 
Volckmann wrote: “I had now only to wait for reports from the other areas and hope 
that our plans had been carried out there with equal success.”1256 He then sent 
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Blackburn to coordinate another meeting with Moses and Noble and to pick out a 
new base for their headquarters. After the colonels met, and Volckmann received 
reports on the results of his attacks, he departed for Praeger’s base to use his radio 
and relay reports to Australia. 
Arthur Furagganan, a Filipino who had studied sound engineering in 
California, had joined Praeger’s headquarters the previous March. Praeger had his 
men scour northern Luzon for radio parts and after five months Furagganan 
converted a set from the Kabugao post office into a long-range transmitter. A radio 
operator from Brazelton and Globe Wireless, Domi Caluen, spent September 
unsuccessfully trying to contact SWPA. Furagganan then stripped down the set and 
rebuilt the transmitter.1257  Finally on 20 October, Brazelton and Caluen made 
contact with KFS, an event that surprised the guerrilla radiomen more than it did 
the War Department.1258 
Praeger now reported that his Cagayan-Apayao Force (CAF) guerrillas had 
contained the Japanese and were protecting local governments in Cagayan and Apayao. 
He added: “I can organize 5,000 able-bodied trainees, R.O.T.C.s and intelligence men 
provided we would be furnished arms and ammunition.”1259  He also passed word to 
MacArthur that Lieutenant Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble had escaped capture 
on Bataan and had organized 6,000 guerillas north of Manila.1260 The AIB quickly moved 
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to exploit this development by working out a code with Praeger and sending him a long 
list of intelligence priority requirements.  
Two days after Praeger’s contact, Noble and Moses visited Volckmann on 
their way to Praeger and his new transmitter.1261 The next day Volckmann went to 
see Blackburn at Uding where American refugees held a surprise birthday party for 
him. That night, however, Volckmann assessed his situation and became troubled. 
He wrote: “To my mind it was just a question of time and how much the Japs would 
take before they came boiling out into the mountains to try to wipe out the guerrilla 
menace.”1262 When Blackburn considered the attacks of 15 October, he said, “In fact, 
what happened throughout the entire operational area was insignificant. But, what 
was significant, is that it alerted the Japs to presence of the guerrillas.”1263  
 The implications for the families in Uding were clear. Traveling to the Bodok 
Mines, Volckmann noticed many deserted homes – a sign the Japanese were about. His 
party then found the Lusod sawmill badly damaged and looted.  He decided this would be 
his new base.  Over the next week Blackburn put their camp in order and restored the 
local phone lines. Volckmann, Blackburn, and their bodyguards Bruno and Emilio, 
welcomed a mine mechanic named Deleon, an elderly native woman who served as their 
cook, and a young man who volunteered as a guide. Volckmann instructed local barrio 
leaders to provide men and supplies for his nascent guerrilla network and issued script 
that promised reimbursement from the United States government.1264 Across northern 
Luzon, guerrilla actions picked up. 
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To the south, by October, Marking’s Guerrillas were also growing into a large 
outfit of “full-time fighters in the hills; part-time saboteurs, working for the enemy 
and undoing all they had done; propagandists writing, printing, passing their down-
in-black-and-white defiance; men and women training themselves as intelligence 
agents, learning to observe and retain and evaluate what they saw and to convey the 
information accurately and quickly; a countryside, bending its back to a double load: 
the Jap army that took by force, and their own patriotic army that begged, begged, 
begged.” 1265 
Moses did indeed bring a Japanese counterattack. In the first week of 
November, Japanese patrols forced Baldwin’s guerrillas out of the gold mining area 
south of Baguio. The patrols then entered Bodok moving south. More Japanese 
troops were on west bank of Agno River. The Japanese moved in force against 
Volckmann at his headquarters in Lusod. Shells hit the camp. “This convinced me,” 
he noted, “that they had definite information about our presence and the location of 
our headquarters.”1266 From 10 to 15 November, as the Japanese came closer, 
Volckmann moved his headquarters farther up the mountains. From his new 
vantage point he watched the enemy move all about his previous location. They 
questioned natives about Volckmann and Blackburn by name. Their soldiers 
combed the area for five days. “Well, they were constant,” remarked Blackburn, 
“And, boy, they were everywhere. We could find hobnail boot prints 
everywhere.”1267 At one point a patrol of fifty troops passed them within a stone’s 
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throw. On the sixth day, the Japanese – Volckmann counted 350 soldiers – departed. 
The Americans headed for Uding, which they found thoroughly ransacked and 
burnt.  
Volckmann headed north. “The Japanese were still in the area,” he reported, 
“and as we went along we could see numerous native villages going up in 
smoke.”1268 He pushed on towards the town of Equip in hopes of linking up with 
Moses and Noble but found it empty and smoldering. Volckmann then retreated 
south towards Ifugao, but took care to spread the word that he was heading north. 
“Through bitter experience we had learned never to disclose our true route to the 
natives,” he wrote, “Though the majority of them were quite loyal, Japanese torture 
had a way of making them talk. Then too, with the price the Japanese had placed on 




The Japanese Fourteenth Army transferred the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon 
to Panay to support the 170th Independent Infantry Battalion at Iloilo, Capiz and San 
Jose. The task was formidable: separate the people from what were increasingly 
strong guerrilla units. Unlike Luzon, where diverse native ethnic groups had long 
adapted to living among a strong foreign governing sect, on an island like Panay the 
people were more homogenous and independent.  Convinced that his higher 
headquarters would not appreciate his “wait and see” arguments designed to 
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convince the Filipinos to sit out the war, Hitomi hid them. When the Imperial 
Headquarters sent two female reporters, Kikuko Kawakami and Tsuyako Abe, to 
visit and report on propaganda efforts in the field, Hitomi arranged a charade in 
which he gave locals an impassioned speech in Japanese about the Greater Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere while his interpreter delivered his ‘wait and see speech’ in the 
native language.1270 The reporters left unaware of the deception. Hitomi received 
credit for the surrender of thirty American officers and 1,000 men of the 61st 
Division.1271   
The Japanese army’s daily treatment of Filipinos undermined all efforts by 
propagandists to build ties with the people. As Blackburn noted, “When the Japs 
came they mistreated the hell out of the people in those barrios where Americans 
had been, and the natives who had fed them, or in any way had indicated that they 
were sympathetic to the guerrillas.”1272  In Iloilo, Panay, thirteen-year old Tomasa 
Solingnog was asleep at home when Japanese soldiers arrived to drag her off. Her 
father jumped to her defense. “My father was struck with a sword by Captain 
Hiruka,” she recalled, “I ran to where he lay and embraced him only to find out that 
his head was already severed from his body. I cried hysterically, but the Japanese 
mercilessly dragged me out of our house.”1273  They took her to a two-story house 
with many women and a bathroom in every room. At least four men raped her each 
day and also forced her to do laundry. “I cannot remember for how long I was inside 
the mess house,” she later testified, “because I felt that I was already losing my mind. 
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I’d always remember my father and then I’d cry.”1274 She eventually escaped only to 
be found by a Japanese officer who made her his mistress and servant.1275  
The Kempeitai established two comfort stations in Iloilo: No. 1 Comfort 
Station which charged ¥3 an hour for officers and ¥1.50 for a maximum 30 minutes 
to non-coms and paramilitary, and the upmarket Asia Hall that charged ¥6 each 
hour for officers and ¥2.50 per 30 minutes for NCOs.1276  Residents remembered 
“truckloads of women” brought in, including a number from Korea and Formosa.1277  
The Iloilo Sanatorium inspected the women and girls for health. “Unlike the Koreans 
and Chinese, these women had not been given Japanese names, because the 
Japanese found Hispanic or indigenous names easy to pronounce and 
remember.”1278   
In the face of such events, Peralta determined to reinforce his position by 
establishing reliable direct communications with SWPA. He had Mariano Tolentino, 
head of the Bureau of Posts radio station in Iloilo, move a transmitter, three 
receivers and spare parts to his headquarters in Sara.1279 When these sets proved 
incapable of reaching Australia, Tolentino secured a more powerful transmitter 
from an abandoned British freighter in the port at Iloilo. On 30 October, Tolentino’s 
men broadcast un-coded messages for MacArthur and Quezon that were picked up, 
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again, by KFS in San Francisco, which responded in the clear the next night and 
relayed to Royal Australian Air Force station KAZ in Darwin.1280  
Peralta claimed command of 8,000 guerrillas and announced: “[We] control all 
Panay interior and west coast. Civilians and officials ninety-nine percent loyal. Supplies 
could be dropped [by aircraft] away from towns, and subs could make coast anywhere 
more than twenty miles distant from [larger towns].”1281 This announcement of a large, 
organized and effective loyal resistance seemed too good to be true. 
In Brisbane, Merle-Smith told MacArthur the message was “probably bona fide, 
but mixed with exaggeration.” 1282  In Washington, Colonel Evans of Army intelligence 
asked Chick Parson for his opinion on the validity message received by the Mackay 
Radio Monitoring Station at San Francisco claiming to be from Macario Peralta in Panay. 
Did he think it authentic or a Japanese trick? Parsons thought it probably real but 
believed the only way to be certain was to send someone with extensive knowledge of the 
Islands, culture, and languages into the Philippines to verify the situation on the ground. 
In other words, they needed to send someone like Parsons. Evans asked if Parson’s was 
volunteering, and Parsons answered that he probably was. 1283 He began working on a 
proposed plan to reach Peralta. On 17 December the Navy would notify SWPA they were 
willing to send Parsons. 1284 
Still suspicious of a Japanese ruse, KAZ did not respond until 5 November when 
the station informed Peralta that his message had been received and passed to MacArthur. 
Knowing Peralta was without a cypher, SWPA hesitated to communicate further. Peralta 
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signaled: “All codes destroyed before surrender but we have cipher device M-94. We 
have sweated blood to contact you and tell you our needs. Are you going to let us down 
now [?] Query LT COL Velasquez, now reported to be with President Quezon, and I 
were classmates at the division staff school at Baguio. He may suggest names or places 
we encountered there for use as key phrase for cipher device M-94. Pending such do you 
object to enemy information in the clear[?] Query LT COL Macario Peralta Jr. 1527 
Commanding Visay(V).” 1285 
The War Department notified SWPA of their efforts in “developing possibility of 
cryptographic system with both Peralta and Praeger.” 1286 After a few more weeks KFS 
forwarded to Peralta a message from the War Department: “Break the coded message 
using as key word in combination cipher device M-94 followed by double transposition 
in the name of place where President Quezon and Governor Confesor last dined 
together?”1287 After several weeks Peralta’s headquarters was able to solve the riddle and 
construct a code to begin secure communications with SWPA.  
Peralta immediately sought SWPA’s approval to unite Philippine guerrillas in 
a Fourth Philippine Corps under his command.1288 He had already begun reaching 
out to Ausejo on Negros (who chose to stay with Fertig), Miranda on Leyte, Merritt 
on Samar, and Abcede on Negros. He placed the 61st Division under Relunia and – he 
thought – cut an agreement with Fertig that Panay, Palawan, and the Visayas minus 
Samar and Leyte would be under his Corps. Peralta’s claim of a Corps built around 
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the 61st Division with 8,000 men impressed MacArthur.1289 Those numbers dwarfed 
the 800 Japanese troops on Panay based around the capital. Peralta claimed to 
control the interior and west coast where SWPA could deliver supplies by ship or 
submarine. He also reported capturing, trying, and sentencing to death Panay’s 
puppet governor, ‘Hernandez of Capiz,’ and awaited MacArthur’s okay to carry out 
the execution. In the meantime, he said he had installed Confessor as governor. 
Finally, Peralta informed SWPA that he had declared martial law on Panay and 
requested authority to print money. This posed a problem for SWPA as Peralta was 
clearly exceeding military authority. The responded: “As regards your military 
forces your authority is defined by military laws and regulations with which you are 
acquainted. As regards civilian communities and populations you have no authority 
except that which permits you to take action to preserve the safety of your 
forces.”1290 
Peralta’s communications also indicated something interesting to SWPA – he 
had no Americans in his organization. Indeed, he deliberately left them out because 
he wanted this fight to better position the Filipinos for independence after the war. 
The apparent braggadocio, extra-legal acts, and hyper-nationalism concerned SWPA. 
The impression led Ind, for example, to urge  
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that any parties inserted into the Philippines to avoid “contacts and possible 
entanglements with the undoubtedly energetic and ambitious Peralta.”1291 
SWPA G-2 would later report: “In the exchange of messages with GHQ during 
November, December, and January, Peralta apparently assumed that GHQ had no 
radio contact with or knowledge of Fertig.” 1292 It was soon evident that Peralta was 
attempting to assume command across the Islands. No matter how unlikely, this 
raised the possibility that if any one Filipino leader successfully united all guerrillas 
under their command, they might reach accommodation with the collaborationist 
government and the Japanese. A united nationalist command, therefore, could take 
the Philippines out of the war. A single Filipino leader could also pose postwar 
problems for U.S. relations with the Philippines. These fears made for uneasy 
relations between SWPA and Peralta. 
 
Visayas, D335/R-714 
Peralta eyed Mindoro to the north.1293 USAFFE had no garrison there before 
the war and the Japanese easily chased its small constabulary into the hills.  By late 
1942 the scattered constabulary coalesced into a guerrilla band. “Many reports on 
guerrilla activities in Mindoro are unclear or ambiguous, but it is clear the 
conflicting ambitions of guerrilla leaders have led to increasing friction between 
groups and have prevented effective unification of command,” U.S. Army intelligence 
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noted, “In an effort to extend their powers, guerrilla leaders have inducted civilians 
to a point where they have been unable to arm, feed or pay them. As a result the 
civilian population has carried a heavy burden; in some areas willingly, in others 
under compulsion.”1294  
One of the largest guerrilla groups on Mindoro was under Constabulary force 
commander, Major Ramon Ruffy, who as a Batangueño from Luzon was seen as an 
outsider. The other large group was under Captain Estaban Beloncio who was an 
army reservist and school principal in Oriental, Mindoro, called to active duty with 
the Philippine Army. Ruffy had the loyalty of the trained constabulary soldiers; 
Beloncio had the people. The two grew hostile towards each other. In September, an 
American army radio technician Sergeant Charles H. Hickok had arrived and 
organized about thirty loyal Filipinos. The larger guerrilla organizations 
undermined his position. In November, Hickock reached out to Panay for backing 
and Peralta authorized him to take charge on Mindoro as part of the Fourth 
Philippine Corps and to restrict operations to gathering intelligence.  Peralta then 
replaced Hickok with a Filipino. 
 On Negros south of Panay, Abcede continued to build his guerrilla forces in 
the mountains around Tanjay. He reached out to Bell’s ROTC guerrilla force from 
Silliman University near Dumaguete. Philippine Army Captain Enrique Torres – 
promoted to major with the guerrillas – formed a unit for Abcede near Sinalbagan 
and began battle with the Japanese near Buenavista. By November, Abcede claimed 
7,000 people in his organization, though many were families who joined them in the 
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hills. He accepted his old classmate Peralta’s offer of a promotion to lieutenant 
colonel and inclusion in the Fourth Philippines Corps. With Peralta’s urging, Abcede 
tried to recruit guerrillas under Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Mata in the north and 
Ausejo in the south.1295 A SWPA assessment of the twenty-nine-year-old Mata noted: 
“He is believed to be a good officer, is young, brave and believed to be well liked.  He 
is reported to be a good organizer, but has been hampered by want of competent 
junior officers and the efficiency of the organization was never excellent as a 
result.”1296 
 To the east of Panay on the island of Romblon, Philippine Merchant Marine 
Captain Constantine C. Raval, had begun working for the 61st Division as early as 
March. In November, he began organizing a small band of guerrillas on the island. 
Though it was a fragile organization with little to do, it was valuable to Peralta. 
Romblon served as a strategic stepping-stone for reaching Luzon. Peralta gladly 
absorbed Raval into the Fourth Philippine Corps. 
 Only Marindduque, north of Panay and east of Mindoro, eluded Peralta. 
Japanese troops had landed on the island on 7 July and easily drove off the small 
Philippine Constabulary garrison under Lieutenant Sofronio T. Untalan. The 
garrison surrendered on 20 July. Peralta would need to insert agents if he was going 
to raise any guerrillas on Marindduque.  
During the summer, lawyer and congressional representative Cecilio A. 
Maneja returned from Leyte to his home island of Bohol. He gathered guerrillas in 
the east and south into the East Bohol Battalion. When he realized how divided and 
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mutually suspicious the island’s other guerrilla groups were, he arranged a meeting 
of all leaders at Batuan in November. The conference produced an agreement for all 
Bohol guerrillas to unite under Philippine Army Major Ismael Ingeniero. They also 
agreed to form a free government on the island. 
Luzon, D329/R-720 
On 1 November, the Japanese in northern Luzon launched a tenacious 
campaign in retaliation for Moses’ guerrilla attacks two weeks earlier. “They were 
often led by Filipinos who knew the trails throughout the area where we were 
operating,” Blackburn recalled, “And from November 1942 to August 1943, the Japs 
were constantly mopping up the mountains and coastal areas.”1297 The campaign 
disrupted and isolated the northern Luzon guerrillas. 
Closer to Manila, Ramsey recruited Second Lieutenant John P. Boone from 
the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Force (ECLGF) and promoted the former corporal 
to captain, claiming the authority from Thorp.  Boone had been with the 31st 
Infantry Regiment when it surrendered in Bataan, but escaped from Cabanatuan 
prison camp to join the guerrillas. Leading a small band, the good-natured Boone fell 
in love with a woman he held prisoner after his men executed her husband for 
collaboration.1298 Ramsey performed their wedding ceremony.  
Nearby, Lapham now had squadrons numbered by location: Pangasinan 
100s, western Nueva Ecija 200s, eastern Nueva Ecija 300s, Tarlac 400s, and so on. 
Growth was haphazard. One day a man claiming to be Captain Edades walked into 
Lapham’s headquarters.  Several Filipino guerrillas recognized Edades as a 
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Philippine Army officer who had attended West Point. He looked and talked the 
part. Lapham gave Edades a command north of Umingan and the captain soon 
eliminated collaborationist Ganaps. Pleased, Lapham sent Doliente with his 
guerrillas to assist Edades in ambushing the Japanese. Edades instead ordered 
Doliente to attack a fellow guerrilla, the young Telesforo Palaruan. “Fortunately,” 
Lapham recalled, “Doliente knew his own countrymen better than I did.” 1299 
Doliente hesitated and informed Lapham who went to see Palaruan. Now suspicious, 
Lapham took Doliente to confront Edades. “It was soon evident that he was not the 
real Captain Edades at all but a mere con man.”1300 Lapham ran ‘Edades’ out of his 
command only to find he moved a short distance to continue his act and rob from 
local citizens. “This time we brought his career to a sudden end, which so outraged 
his wife that she threatened to take the whole story to the Japanese,” Lapham 
reported, “Whether she would have done so, nobody knows, for she abruptly 
disappeared and was never seen again.”1301  
Ramsey received a note to meet a colonel who had formerly been part of 
Wainwright’s staff and was now in hiding. Weakened by malaria and dysentery and 
down from 160 to 120 pounds, Ramsey rode a carabao sled to see the colonel. He 
found the man residing in the nice home of wealthy Filipino planters who played 
host to a half a dozen other American officers. The men, wearing repaired and 
pressed khaki uniforms, were in far better shape than their visitor. Ramsey 
explained Thorp’s organization and offered to transport them back with him to join 
                                                        
1299 Ibid., 52. 
1300 Lapham and Norling, 53. 
1301 Ibid., 53. 
 
361 
the guerrillas. After a pause the colonel said, “I knew Thorp before the war. Good 
man. Do give him my regards when you see him.”1302 Feeling worse than before, 
Ramey made the long ride back to his camp nursing a silent resentment for men 
who chose comfort over duty.  
 
Mindanao, D334/R-715 
On Mindanao, Fertig renamed his command to fit MacArthur’s pre-invasion 
designation of the island as the 10th Military Independent District (10th MID). His 
situation was good. Schools had not yet reopened, but that aided recruitment. Food 
was plentiful: pineapples from Del Monte plantations near Cagayan de Misamis; 
potatoes and temperate climate vegetables from the Bukidnon hills near Talakag 
and Claveris, Misamis Oriental; coffee and rice from the Panguil Bay area and east 
coast of Surigao. The 10th MID needed to develop trails and water transportation to 
connect the areas free of Japanese, to supply and bolster the civilian economy and 
win over the population. They started clearing carabao trails from Misamis Oriental 
and Balingasag into central Bukidon to transport salt and chinchona bark needed to 
combat malaria. Additional trails from Talakag would carry food to troops in 
Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon.  
 Fertig went with Morgan to Vatali and recruited a loose guerrilla 
organization into the 121st Separate Regiment (Zamboanga City-Basilan Island) of 
the 10th MID.  Morgan went on to Zamboanga and sent Lieutenant Abdulrahim Imao, 
a Moro from Jolo, to organize guerillas on Sulu. Imao went with Sergeant Ursula 
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Simpek and arrived on Siasi in December. They organized a small number of 
guerrillas with a few arms and on Christmas Day attacked a weak Japanese garrison 
in town and captured thirty rifles and some ammunition. Although the Japanese 
conducted aggressive counterattacks, the unit survived. 
 
Southern Luzon, D336/R-713 
In Bicol, Dinasco O. Dianela organized a guerrilla band on the east coast near 
Caramoan. He claimed to have been a U.S. Army captain and was known to have led 
sixty-five men in the assault on Naga in May. When the Japanese came in June to 
eliminate the guerrillas, Dianela reached a truce with the occupiers. He agreed not to 
bother a Japanese platoon left to garrison Caramoan, and in return the Japanese 
ceased their efforts against him. The truce held until November when the Japanese 
began arrests and harassment of civilians including guerrillas. From his base in 
Camp Tingawagan, Dianela prepared to go back on the warpath. 
On 8 November, Miranda led sixty-seven men of several TVGU squads in a 
two-and-a-half hour ambush of a convoy in Taguild, Pamplona. They killed Colonel 
Susumo Takechi (the Japanese commander in Naga), two captains, two lieutenants 
and between 168 and 200 enlisted men.1303  Five days later, the Japanese 
commander in Libmanan, Colonel Inuye, sent a letter: “Capt. MIRANDA BANDIT 
CAPTAIN, Libmanan, Camarines Sur: You are making the people in the mountains 
believe that you are helping the American people and that you will be the one to give 
them freedom. You forget that you are Filipino, an Oriental. You want to serve the 
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white people who had escaped already from the Orient. Bear in mind that we are 
determined to have peace and order in the place at all costs, even to the extent of 
sacrificing worthless lives.” 1304  
That day, the Japanese in Camarines Sur ordered all residents of Libmanan, 
Pamplona, Sipocot, Lupi, Ragay, Del Gallego, Gainza, Camaligan, Cabuso, San 
Fernando, Milaor, Minalabac, and Bula “to concentrate themselves in their 
respective town centers within 72 hours.”1305 After three days, guided by paid 
informers, large formations of Japanese soldiers, Ganaps, and collaborationist 
Bureau of the Constabulary troops began a two-week sweep of the mountains in 
search of guerrilla bases. “They killed unknowing men, women and children of all 
ages whom they chanced upon,” Barremda reported, “torched even the lowliest hut 




In Manila on 30 November, the head of the JMA Department of General 
Affairs, Colonel Naokata Utsunoniya, met with JMA branch chiefs. They discussed 
the small groups under former USAFFE officers who had been disrupting peace 
since August and now seemed to be coordinating their activities.1307 These bandits 
were upsetting Japanese efforts in the Philippines. The JMA had to refocus on its 
goals. Utsonomiya prioritized the extraction of copper and said: “The conditions 
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under which such developed mineral resources are being transported to Japan 
cannot be termed favorable, and I see no room for optimism in the future.”1308 Force 
ratios favored the Japanese. Conditions favored the guerrillas.  
The Japanese sought to balance conditions with networks of informers 
Volckmann described their methodology. First, they gained the support of a 
prominent citizen, usually with money or favors. That prominent citizen would then 
recruit others he thought could be persuaded or bought with lesser sums of money 
or favors. “This system became so effective in some areas,” Volckmann noted, “that 
civilians could not cooperate with the guerrillas without being reported to the 
Japs.”1309 In Luzon, these collaborators often came from the social revolutionary 
Ganaps. 
 By this time the Ganap political movement, the social movement once praised 
by American Governor-General Frank Murphy, had adopted a new identity.1310 Yay 
Panlilio described them as a Japanese-trained Sakdal “Philippine Fifth Column” 
given free range to loot their countrymen. “At one time the Sakdals, or Ganaps as 
they were sometimes called, had been nothing more than discontented farmers,” she 
explained, “There had been a reason for their discontent. Under the cacique system 
– an absentee landlord system – they had labored in an economic slavery that had 
kept them in debt years ahead of their hours.”1311 The peasants suffered severe 
exploitation: “Their food had been measured by the handful; their wives had but one 
good dress, none too good; their children were rickety, and pale and potbellied from 
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hookworms and roundworms. They bathed wounds with the liquid from boiled 
guava leaves because they could not afford pennies for mercurochrome. What little 
the landlords left them, the usurers took. Usually landlord and usurer were one and 
the same person.”1312  When Benigno Ramos turned Sakdal and Ganap membership 
rosters over to the Japanese, “few could escape collaboration even if they would, the 
majority believed that their day had come.” 1313 
On the first anniversary of the war the Japanese staged a big parade in Manila 
with the mandated participation of all government employees. They ordered free 
streetcar rides and held free showings at the Lyric Movie Theater of a documentary 
of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Attendees reported, “When President Roosevelt’s 
picture was shown, the audience clapped and cheered but when Hirohito’s picture 
was flashed, no applause. The Japanese officers pounded the floor with their sabers 
until the lights came on and the audience driven out of the show.”1314 
The veneer of goodwill failed to cover the depth of affronts. According to 
Villamor, “One year after the Japanese entry into the city, murder, rape, and attacks 
on small children were still commonplace.”1315  Furthermore, as one historian noted, 
“With the press completely in their hands, the Japanese began to exercise thought 
control.”1316  Their military moved from censoring the press, to putting all 
newspapers under the Manila Simbun-sya run by the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo 
Nichi Nichi.  “The new company,” the Japanese announced, “has been established for 
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the purpose of further clarifying the invulnerable position of the Nippon Empire, 
now in the midst of the creation of the New Order in Greater East Asia, of making 
more thoroughly understood the purpose of the Military Administration in the 
Philippines, and of propelling with greater force the materialization of the New 
Philippines.”1317 
Nearly simultaneously, the occupying administration outlawed the existing 
Philippine political parties. In their place, the PEC’s Executive Order No. 109 created 
a new group called “the Association for Service to the New Philippines” (Kapisanan 
ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas), better known by the acronym KALIBAPI. Two 
days later the administration announced the purpose of the new organization was 
“to assist the Filipino in fully comprehending the significance of, and in 
strengthening his adherence to, the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia by 
subordinating himself and his interests to those of the Philippines.”1318  Article 5 
explained the order was designed: “To adhere strictly to the policies of the Imperial 
Japanese Forces in the Philippines in their administration and to render service in 
the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”1319  Benigno 
Aquino, current Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, became Director-General of 
the KALIBAPI.  “In the LGAF we quickly reached ‘understandings’ with the 
KALIBAPI,” wrote Lapham, “just as we did with the Philippine Constabulary, and 
they often became quite useful to us.”1320  
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Northern Luzon, D366/R-683 
On 8 December, Volckmann and Blackburn, suffering a severe malaria attack, 
set up a new camp near Kiangan where they occupied a thatch hut. Near their camp 
were three American women, United Evangelical Church missionaries Miss Myrtle 
Metzger and Miss Lottie Spessard, and wife of a missing American lumberman, Mrs. 
Kluge.  Miss Spessard, a nurse, looked after Blackburn. Their indispensable aide 
Bruno, now in his hometown area, secured supplies on credit through a local man, 
Mr. Herrin, who brought sugar, beans, cooking grease, coffee, tobacco and soap.1321 
Bruno also acquired a supply of native rice wine known as tapoy. Natives boiled rice, 
drained it under banana leaves into an earthen jar, covered it with a locally 
concocted powder, and fermented it for several days. Through trial and error, 
Volckmann happily discovered that a bar of the resulting powder was good for 
making ersatz hotcakes.  
Bruno travelled in and out Ifugao where his father had been a tribal chief and 
his kinship network was strong. Spessard, Metzenger and Klug, informed 
Volckmann and Blackburn of a merchant named Formuka in Kiangnan they could 
trust. Through Formuka they found a man named Lanag who ran the city dispensary 
and could get medicine.1322  The two men also relayed information about everyone 
in town. “There were a lot of Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary in the 
area who had their weapons,” Blackburn noted, “They were apprehensive as to what 
the Japanese were going to do. They wanted to get out of their homes, but they 
didn’t know where to go, or what to do. We began getting a flood of these people 
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coming to us.”1323 About thirty of the well-trained and loyal troopers filled 
Volckmann’s ranks. 
 Local Chief Timicpao of Kiangan was a relative of Bruno. “He wore a G-string, 
had all kinds of gold nuggets draped around his neck, as was extremely alert and 
astute,” wrote Blackburn, “I would say if he was not in his 90s, he was pretty close to 
it, but just as sharp as any guy you’ve ever seen.”1324 Timicpao offered full support to 
the Americans and helped build their camp. He also warned of a fiercely belligerent 
Chief Kimayong in nearby Haliap. Volckmann and Blackburn decided to visit this 
chief but found him to be a “little, short, meek, mild tempered fellow” in his 30s.1325 
The chief assured them, “You’re not secure where you are. I want you to come and 
live at my place. You don’t want to live in this camp. I can guarantee your safety 
better than Timicpao, because I have more control of my people. I don’t have 
anything against Timicpao, and if I did, this is no time to get all excited.”1326 The 
Americans negotiated a long-lasting truce between the two chiefs and enjoyed 
support from both. 
 Bruno brought news from Luzon and overseas. He reported that the Japanese 
were conducting a strong propaganda campaign, broadcasting a parade of military 
victories and calling on Filipinos to join in the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their 
theme: “The Americans will never be able to return to the Philippines – they have 
been defeated at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Forces.”1327  This was 
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background to a renewed offer of amnesty to Filipinos who surrendered, turned in 
the arms, and handed over the Americans. 
The Japanese also put three companies of the Bureau of Constabulary in 
Blackburn’s district at Bontoc, Lubuagan, and Kiangnan. Filipino POWs, promised 
freedom if they would join the Constabulary, manned the units. “They were the sons, 
uncles, grandfathers, fathers, or whatever, of the people that we had, and they knew 
this interior better than we did,” observed Blackburn, “So, I said, ‘I’ve got a problem. 
I’ve got to get control of that Constabulary.’”1328 He found that the Constabulary 
commander in Kiangnan, Captain Emiliano Dunuan, and his  Sergeant Pedro Dunuan 
were fellow veterans of the 11th Infantry of the 11th Division. Blackburn sent word to 
them to patrol in his area and they would meet. He told them, “This is kind of silly, 
you’re looking for us.  Why don’t we help each other and when the time comes, I’ll 




On Leyte, Blas Miranda worked to unite the resistance groups in four 
municipalities around Ormoc: Albuera, Merida, Palompon and Baybay. He called a 
conference of the neighboring guerrilla leaders to expand his organization and 
dissuade banditry and collaboration. The attendees, including senior officers Major 
Marcos Soliman and Captain Aristoteles Olaybar, agreed to work together as the 
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Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces (WLGWF) under Miranda’s command.1330 
The WLGWF organized six regiments under colonels, one per town with two in 
Ormoc, with Miranda assuming the rank of general.  They recruited the justices of 
the peace from each town to serve as regimental judge advocates.1331 Miranda also 
secured the cooperation of collaborationist Mayor of Ormoc, Catalino Hermosilla. 
Rafael Omega later testified in an affidavit that Miranda’s guerrillas killed all the 
“enemies” of Hermosilla.1332 
Meanwhile on Negros, Bell and Abcede again asked Gador to assume 
command of all guerrillas. Gador declined, saying he first needed SWPA to officially 
offer the appointment because he did not want to be held responsible for existing 
conflicts between the guerrillas. Former First Lieutenant Ernesto Mata accompanied 
Abcede to Panay to see Peralta. After a strong pitch, they decided to join the Fourth 
Philippine Corps, bringing Negros into Peralta’s orbit.  Peralta appointed Abcede as 
commander of the 72nd Division (Negros) with Mata as both his chief of staff and 
regimental commander. Gador was out in the cold.  Later Abcede reorganized his 
force as the 73rd Provisional Division in Negros Oriental and Mata became the Chief 
of Staff in the District Headquarters while also serving as the commander of the 72nd 
Division until a replacement could be found. Gador belatedly responded on 11 
December with a memorandum claiming his command over all forces on Negros 
based on what he said was an appointment he had received from General Sharp. 
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On 12 December KAZ in Darwin was able to exchange coded messages with 
Panay. 1333 Peralta received instructions from SWPA: “as our intelligence unit 
covering the maximum territory you can perform great service.”1334  He began to 
spread his network through the Visayas into Luzon. Two areas on Luzon seemed 
promising: Bicol in the south or Batangas on the northwest coast. The first required 
securing Masbate Island, then in turmoil due to disputes among guerrillas. The 
second required Tablas Island and Mindoro or Marindduque.  
In Bicol, Lapus received an emissary from Peralta, the Fourth Philippine 
Corps Chief of Staff Colonel Leopoldo Relunia, who was also a Bicolano. Relunia 
explained that, in accordance with MacArthur’s wishes, Peralta needed an 
intelligence net on Luzon. He wanted Lapus to anchor this net and offered to make 
his guerrillas the 3rd Battalion, 67th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division 67th Infantry 
Regiment, Fourth Philippine Corps and promote Lapus to major.1335  Lapus accepted 
and began forwarding all his reports to Panay.  
Governor Escudero had provided Lapus with extra-legal provincial 
government and supplied him with P20,000 from provincial funds. Now, however, 
Escudero accused Lapus of “embezzlement and banditry” and broke with the 
guerrilla leader. Escudero then accepted an offer delivered by Crisoldo de la Paz 
from Colonel Straughn to serve as a colonel in the FAIT. Taking with him the 
seventeen-man bodyguard provided by Lapus, Escudero built the most powerful 
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guerilla force in Sorsogon province, peaking at 1,500 men. Eventually, Escudero’s 
men would fight pitched battles with the Lapus group. 
MacArthur later wrote: “Four months after the message from Colonel Nakar, 
in November, Major Macario Peralta, Jr., formerly of the 61st Philippine Division, 
radioed us that he was taking command of the fighters in the Visayas.”1336  On 17 
December, MacArthur radioed Peralta:  
“Your action in reorganizing Philippine army units is deserving of 
the highest commendation and has aroused high enthusiasm 
among all of us here. You will continue to exercise command. 
Primary mission is to maintain your organization and secure 
maximum amount of information. [Combat] activities should be 
postponed until ordered from here. Premature action of this kind 
will only bring heavy retaliation upon innocent people.”1337  
This order contradicted guerrilla orthodoxy. As Mao argued, attacks were crucial 
maintain the initiative, and the loss of initiative lead to “the danger of defeat and 
destruction.”1338 
Lapham also agreed with the need for aggressive guerrilla action. “We could 
give peasants a reason to be grateful to us,” he said and added, “we could stimulate 
their loyalty to their own government and to the United States, and we could cause 
them to fear us more than our foes.”1339 As Hitomi learned with the Japanese 
propaganda outfit, the people needed to see someone address their concerns. 
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Lapham concluded, “In crises, notoriously, people everywhere look not for more 
discussion but for leaders who will reassure them and then act.”1340  
SWPA gave priority to intelligence gathering that supported its operations. 
The guerrillas, on the other hand, needed the support of the population for 
sustenance and protection. To win over the population, guerrillas needed to 
demonstrate potency that only came from attacking the enemy. As Fertig put it: 
“The [Filipino] population wants to see dead Japs. Without public support, no 
guerrillas.”1341 Establishing radio communications had brought the guerrillas 
authority but also placed them within the chain of command, subjecting them to 
higher headquarters priorities at the risk of their own. 
 MacArthur’s message further restricted Peralta: 
“You cannot – repeat cannot – operate under provisions of martial 
law in the Philippines occupied as they are by the enemy. It is not 
– repeat not – practicable to issue money. You should issue to 
your men certificates showing that the United States owes them 
pay as accrued. Similar certificates can be used as required 
showing purpose. The United States will honor them in due 
course of time. The enemy is now under heavy pressure and 
victory will come. We cannot predict date of our return to the 
Philippines but we are coming. Will cover other matters in 
subsequent messages.”1342 
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These instructions unknowingly favored Confesor against Peralta and the 
restrictions on printing money would be problematic for all guerrilla leaders. Three 
days later, SWPA received a response: “Field Marshal MacArthur from Lieutenant 
Colonel Peralta. Missions assigned us will be accomplished. Humblest soldier had 
blind faith in you and America.”1343 ‘Field Marshal’ was the rank MacArthur wore 
when he was out of the U.S. Army and worked only for Quezon. 
 SWPA soon passed another message to Peralta: “General delegation of 
authority to Combat Team Leaders to execute spies by ‘drum-head Court Martial’ is 
not authorized by our Rules of Land Warfare. For the protection of the forces under 
your command and the civilians in territory under your control and to avoid excuse 
for barbaric reprisal by the enemy, it is essential that your activities conform with 
orderly military procedure, with treaty obligations of the United States and with the 
rules of Land Warfare which govern actions of officers of the United States 
Army.”1344 Villamor recalled that Willoughby privately said: “Probably ample to 
make some of our departed Judge Advocates General stir restlessly in the 
graves.”1345  The refinements of established military rules of engagement clashed 
with the ugly reality of guerrilla war.   
Lapham described his world of irregular combat: “It is a mean, dirty, brutal 
struggle to the death, devoid of any principle or sentiment save to survive and 
win.”1346 It took too much food and too much manpower to keep prisoners. Their 
ability to move quickly and quietly was compromised by having any captives in tow. 
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Yet releasing prisoners meant endangering guerrillas, their bases, and their families. 
Ramsey noted: “Each unit was dealing with the issue on its own, which meant that 
some prisoners were being executed while others were being released. In the latter 
case the result was almost always raids, which meant the capture, torture, and 
killing of our own people.”1347 He issued instructions: “It is the policy of the guerrilla 
forces to execute prisoners who threaten us. There is nothing else we can do.”1348 He 
explained, “Consequently, whenever one of our units captured a Japanese or a 
Filipino collaborator or spy, he was interrogated briefly and then killed.”1349  
The guerrillas also dealt harshly with spies, collaborators and betrayers. 
Ramon Magsaysay recalled receiving orders from Captain Ralph Maguire to 
liquidate any captured collaborators.1350 “Those who were spying for the Japs were 
apprehended and eliminated; every effort was made to find the kingpins in every 
spy net that was uncovered,” Volckmann recalled, “After six months of such 
intensive effort the majority of the informers or spies had fled and were seeking 
cover within localities strongly garrisoned by the Japs.”1351  Killing a Filipino could 
also bring retribution from members of his kinship network. Magsaysay warned 
McGuire: “Liquidate on member of a family, and his entire tribe will turn against us 
and our cause. I warn you at the end of this war you will have another war on your 
hands if this order goes through.”1352 
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SWPA, of course, could not authorize such action. The officers making the 
decisions risked severe punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. “I 
knew the Japanese would almost certainly execute me if they ever caught me,” 
wrote Lapham, “but that my own country might punish me after the war for fighting 
the enemy I simply could not imagine. I thought about a lot of things from 1942 to 
1945 – survival, my possible contribution to eventual victory, day-to-day practical 
problems – but never about my hypothetical legal status. It could not have worried 
Filipino guerrillas much either; otherwise, there would not have been scores of 
thousands of them.”1353  By not formally bringing the guerrillas into his army – and 
not establishing a system of pay and allowances for them – MacArthur actually 
helped protect the guerrillas from legal punishment for their actions.  
In many ways, engaging in the blood sport of guerrilla warfare provided its 
own forms of punishment. Traveling the Islands, Ramsey witnessed an execution in 
Colonel Manahan’s Mountain Corps Regiment. The executioner declined to use a 
rifle, opting for a bayonet instead. He forced the prisoner to kneel, stood behind him, 
and thrust the bayonet downward behind the left collarbone and into the heart. 
“The man died almost instantly,” Ramsey observed.1354 Silently, the executioner 
wiped the blood off his bayonet on a palm leaf and went back to his daily duties. 
Ramsey later saw that the executioner was an undersized, fifteen-year-old boy. The 
men feared the boy and the thought of him haunted Ramsey. “He was the 
executioner,” he thought, “but it was I who had created the policy. He was merely 
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the instrument of my own decision, one that involved a violence more intimate and 
personal than anything else I had experienced in the course of the war.”1355  
Unlike regular army commanders, guerrilla leaders could not pass their 
problems to courts or a higher command. Blackburn recalled a captain in the 
Cagayan Valley accused of raping a girl. “I had the evidence, the torn underwear, and 
an abundance of testimony. He used the excuse that the parents were collaborators, 
which they weren’t, and that that gave him the right. So, we formed a company in 
the town and executed the captain in front of all the people. By God, if you’re not 
letting your people get away with these things, then this gets around.”1356 
 
Luzon, D378/R-671 
In Bicol, TVGU leader Miranda sent Lieutenant Vicente Villa to San Narciso, 
Tayabas, to seek out Captain Epifano Vera in hopes of securing weapons. They 
discovered the captain had been captured and executed by the Japanese. Gaudencio 
V. Vera, a former cook with the Philippine Scouts who escaped home to Lucena 
when the Japanese destroyed his unit, now ran the Tayabas guerrillas with the 
assumed title of general. When Villa addressed the new leader without reference to 
his rank, Vera had him arrested and executed. “How Sergeant Vera managed to 
assume Captain Vera’s position taxes the imagination,” wrote Barrameda, “But to 
make the seemingly improbable truly outlandish, the guerrilla noncom soon even 
gave himself the rank of ‘General.’”1357  
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In late December, Captain Lorenzo Padua of the Camp Isarog Guerrillas 
invited TVGU leader Juan Miranda to Camp Isarog II to arrange a merger of their two 
groups. With Lieutenant Leon Aureus assuming temporary command in his absence, 
Miranda left on 20 December with an armed escort for Padua’s camp. He arrived 
midday on Christmas. The next day the leaders agreed to bring Padua’s Isarog 
guerrillas into the TVGU with Miranda as overall commander and Padua as his 
deputy. Barrameda reported: “The protocol was prepared on sheets of ruled pad 
paper by a strikingly beautiful intelligence officer in Padua’s camp, Lieutenant 
Constancia Estrada from the town of Baao, Camarines Sur.”1358 The teenage Estrada. 
a veteran of several guerrilla bands, had been twice captured and saw her brother 
killed while helping her escape. She was in Japanese hands on 8 December when 
Padua freed her while capturing Denzu Kuriyama, then acting as a Japanese 
interpreter. Padua executed Kuriyama. Miranda fell in love with Estrada at first sight 
and decided to remain awhile at Padua’s camp.  
 
Australia, D378/R-671 
On 20 December, after a five-month voyage ‘special messenger’ Lieutenant 
Franklyn H. Young, Jr., and Mr. Albert Klestadt made it to Australia with three Moro 
crewmen along with Young’s wife and child, and another woman aboard a 45-foot 
Moro boat. Young was am American mestizo in the Philippine Army who had spent 
time with Thorp and  had escaped Bicol in July, travelled through Samar, Leyte, 
Cebu, Negro, and Panay where he linked up with German born Klestadt, an 
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experienced yachtsman wanted by the Japanese for his work for the British Ministry 
of Information in the Manila embassy.1359 Together they headed on to Zamboanga 
and Australia. He brought with him a report for MacArthur from Thorp in Pampanga 
detailing “large guerrilla groups existing in central Luzon” and added “important 
and lucid information of enemy and guerrilla activity in the areas through which 
they passed.”1360 Taken to Melbourne, they briefed the G-2 personnel.  Villamor 
wrote: “During hours of interrogation, I learned from Young and Klestadt that the 
guerrillas they had seen were disorganized, ragged and hungry, moving about in 
small arguing groups, and desperate for some sign of recognition.”1361 
In Brisbane on 27 December, Jesus Villamor led his five-man team disguised 
as sailors handling cargo aboard the submarine SS-211 Gudgeon under.1362  Before 
departing, Villamor had an audience with MacArthur who told him, “I shall see you 
when you come back. Better yet, I shall see you upon my return to the 
Philippines.”1363  Lieutenant Commander William Shirley Stovall directed the Gar 
class submarine on its fifth war patrol towads the waters off Davao, Ambon Island, 
and Timor Island. 
 
Luzon, D389/R-660 
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Ensconced in Manila, Barker sent word to his ECGLF deputy Ramsey that all 
was well and he was swearing in new guerrillas recruited by Santos and Alberto. He 
also reported Thorp’s capture and that Barker was assuming command of the Luzon 
Guerrilla Force. Ramsey was to replace Barker in command of the ECLGF. “I ought to 
congratulate you,” Barker wrote to Ramsey, “since, according to our agents in 
Manila, you are now number two, behind me, on the Kempeitai’s death list.”1364 
Ramsey also learned that west central Luzon guerrilla leader Captain Ralph McGuire 
was dead. “One of his own men had cut his head off and taken it to the Japanese.”1365 
“We were not, as Mao had suggested, fish in the sea,” thought Ramsey, “we were 
minnows in an ocean infested with sharks.”1366 
Ramsey wanted to go to Manila but it was too dangerous. Under new Chief of 
Intelligence General Baba, Kempeitai chief Nagahama had stepped up a 
counterinsurgency program of “informants, raids, rewards and torture.”1367 Baba 
ordered Nagahama to use the Sakdalistas to create a network of secret informants 
called the Makapili – “out-and-out individual collaborators with the Japanese” – 
reporting directly to Baba’s headquarters.1368 Laurel and others protested the 
creation of this “volunteer militia of opportunists and Japanophiles” that Nicholas 
Tarling described as “the kind of people the elite had feared when they offered their 
collaboration in 1942.”1369 Nevertheless, within two months Baba had a composite 
sketch of Ramsey on his desk with a P250,000 bounty on the guerrilla’s head. After 
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organizing ECLGF units in Bataan, Ramsey headed north where he believed Lapham 
and Charles Putnam operated. Putnam was an American mining engineer who did 
double duty as an artillery captain in the Army reserve.  He had spent most of his 
forty-odd years in the Philippines and was well liked and respected in his area.  
 
Mindanao, D389/R-660 
On Mindanao, Jordan Hamner and Charles Smith reunited with A.Y. Smith 
who they found working for Morgan. For two months, the three pestered Fertig with 
a plan to sail to Australia when the monsoons began. Though he thought their 
scheme foolhardy, Fertig eventually gave his okay.  Their first attempt failed after 
two days but they returned to make better preparations and find a better boat.1370 
Morgan took Hamner to Naga to fetch a twenty-one foot batel sailboat. Locals 
supplied an eight-horsepower kerosene engine that would burn gasoline or fuel oil.  
Hamner and the Smiths reinforced the boat and installed the engine for use when 
the winds slackened. Two Filipino volunteers rounded out the crew: a Moro named 
Lakibul Nastail and a Christian named Eugenio S. Catalina. On 4 December, they said 
goodbye to Fertig and set sail from Labangan in southwest Mindanao for Australia in 
the boat they renamed Or Else. Before they cast off, Fertig gave Charlie Smith a radio 
call sign only the two of them would know. If Smith made it to Australia, he was to 
radio Mindanao using the call sign “MSF” for “Mindanao-Smith-Fertig.”1371 
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Against all odds, the Or Else arrived off the coast of Australia on 31 
December.1372 They had sailed through the Celebes Seas and the Morotai Straights, 
stopped for food and water in New Guinea and the island of Kai, and then straight 
south to Australia’s Cobourg Peninsula. They stayed one step ahead of the Japanese, 
dehydration, starvation, and some hostile natives along the way. After going ashore 
for water they headed west, came to the Cape Don lighthouse, and contacted coast 
watchers at 0300 hours on New Year’s Day. An Australian patrol boat called by the 
lighthouse delivered them to Darwin three days later.1373 At SWPA, Hammer and 
Charles Smith told of the existence of Fertig’s Mindanao guerrillas. MacArthur’s G-2 
reported: “This development was an important link in the future plans of 
intelligence coverage. Hamner and Smith were interviewed on 12 January, and it 
was discovered that Fertig had a radio and was attempting to contact Australia. He 
did not succeed until about 20 February.” 1374 
 By then Morgan had completed his recruitment tour of Mindanao and 
returned to Misamis. Fertig sent him out again on 12 January with eighty men of the 
General Headquarters Expeditionary Force to recruit bands in Leyte and Negros.  He 
tasked Morgan to spread the word that only guerrilla leaders with Fertig’s USFIP 
would be designated ‘authorized’ commanders.  
In Cotabato Province, Pendatun remained beyond Fertig’s command. He had 
grown his original Bolo Battalion of Moros into a diverse Muslim-Christian guerrilla 
movement known as the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force that controlled the Cotabato 
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Valley and southern Bukidnon. He maintained his friend Andrews as Chief of Staff. 
In mid-January, Pendatun attacked a Japanese garrison in Malaybalay from the 
south but promised support from guerrillas in the north under Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert V. Bowler never came and the attacked failed. 
Fertig promoted Clyde C. Childress, the 61st Division veteran, to lieutenant 
colonel and appointed him as the Chief of Staff of the 110th Division in Zamboanga. 
Childress managed much of Fertig’s supply operations: fuel for radios and rice from 
Surigao carried up the Cadabaran road or sailed on bancas to northern Mindanao. 
Fertig also created the ‘USFIP Navy’ with a large two-mast motor banca named 
Athena as its flagship under Captain Vincente Zapanta.1375 The guerrillas first armed 
Athena with a homemade smoothbore cannon but later used a 20mm cannon and 
.50 caliber machine guns. After several successful encounters with the Japanese, the 
crew would burn the Athena in mid-1944 to prevent her capture. Other boats in 
Fertig’s Navy included the inter-island passenger launch Treasure Island with a high 
superstructure and 75-horsepower diesel engine; the light tug Rosalia with a 50-
horsepower engine; the motor banca So What; the Nara; the CAPT Knortz; and the 
Narwhal. 
 Major Frank McCarthy, Jr. organized guerillas in the Malangas area of 
southern Mindanao and quickly extended his command to the Kabasalan area rich in 
rubber plantations. McCarthy’s men actively collected latex to use in trade. By 1944, 
Fertig would incorporate the group into his command as the 115th Regiment, under 
Major Angel Medina. 
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 On 6 January 1943, Fertig summarized reports from across the Philippines in 
his diary:  U.S. submarines patrolled the waters forcing Japanese ships to sail in the 
shallows to avoid them; ships sat idle in Manila with seventeen transports in the 
harbor for repair at one time in November; the Japanese collected all scrap metal for 
shipment to Japan; a large, unexplained explosion occurred at Fort McKinley that 
reportedly killed “seven truck-loads of Japs”; Filipinos paid a thirty-five percent 
luxury tax on everything; the boulevards in Manila were empty; American civilians 
remained interred in Santa Tomas College.1376 He also recorded a Japanese 
engineer’s discussion with a Filipino doctor: “Japan is now preparing for a long war, 
perhaps ten years. Manila is the paradise. In Japan everyone wears short pants with 
plenty of patches and no socks. Government ask more money but people cannot give 
for they do not have. Japan lacks raw material. No cotton, no iron. Dr. questions ‘But 
Japan is winning war?’ Oh, yes, but Americans very stubborn, will not hands up as 
Japan thought… We sink one American ship, Americans building three more in few 
days. In Japan take long time to build one ship.” 1377 
 
                                                        







8. The Aid 
7 January – 14 March 1943 
 
The insertion of the first team of agents under Jesus Villamor brought hope to 
the resistance and MacArthur alike.  Yet Villamor’s reported that the guerrillas were 
divided, unorganized and critically short of supplies. Moreover, the guerrillas’ methods 
and objectives were unacceptable to MacArthur, yet he needed their help. 
 
Luzon, D393/R-656 
By the first week of January 1943, the Japanese campaign against the 
guerrillas in Luzon seemed a success. In Abra Province on 4 January, their patrols 
captured the new commander of the 121st Infantry Regiment, Captain William G. 
Peryman. He joined Thorp, Nakar and others already in prison. Walter Cushing and 
Speis were dead. Negrito tribesmen had beheaded McGuire. The Fassoth camp was 
in ashes, its proprietors in custody. Barker was on the run in Manila.  Colonel Merrill 
was hiding in the Zambales Mountains. Colonels Moses and Noble moved in fits and 
starts. Volckmann and Blackburn seemed ready to fill the leadership vacuum but 
Ramsey and Lapham were not keen to be their followers. Lapham received 
reassurance from Thorp’s adjutant, Wilbur Lage, that he was not under Volckmann’s 
command, but still a part of Thorp’s organization.1378   
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In Bicol, Japanese units operated against Dianela’s Camp Tinawagan 
guerrillas south of Tabgan in Caramoan.  On 7 January, Captain Kaji raided Padua’s 
camp in Balayan where Miranda had stayed with his new love Estrada. The 
guerrillas killed Kaji but Miranda was shot in the left leg and Estrada helped get him 
to Camp Isarog to recuperate. They would spend the year together at various camps 
while the TVGU remained under Aureus.  
Near Manila, Ramsey had travelled with Boone to the west coast of Bataan to 
raise more guerrillas.  Villagers celebrated their arrival and many local men joined 
the ECLGF. Upon return to Dinalupihan, however, they received bad news. On 8 
January, the Japanese captured Barker’s bodyguard. After three days of torture, he 
told them where to find Santos and most of his staff in Manila. The next morning, 
they caught Barker and sent him to Fort Santiago. Shocked by the size of the ECLGF 
in and around Manila, General Baba accelerated his hunt for guerrillas in Luzon. 
“Thousands of people were being arrested,” Ramsey noted, “including hundreds of 
our operatives and senior officers. The Manila network had been dealt a heavy 
blow.”1379 Ramsey issued General Order Number 1 announcing his assumption of 
command of the ECLGF as of 13 January and the appointment of Fausto Alberto as 
head of the ECLGF Manila section. He restricted ECLGF raids and ambushes. “Our 
cadres were sternly discouraged from undertaking operations that would expose 
either them or the wider population to Japanese retaliation, though arbitrary 
reprisals aimed at intimidating the people occurred nonetheless.”1380 
                                                        
1379 Ramsey and Rivele, 152. 
1380 Ibid., 148. 
 
387 
Moses still thought he could unite the guerrillas under his command. He went 
with Noble to Adduru’s headquarters in Magabubong to bring the Cagayan-Apayao 
Guerrilla Force into the USFIP-NL. He then reorganized his staff: Thomas Jones G-1 
(personnel and administration), Praeger G-2 (intelligence), Noble as G-3 (plans and 
operations), and Adduru G-4 (logistics).1381  
One of Moses’s most reliable subordinates was Captain Ralph Praeger who 
led a growing outfit in the Cagayan Valley. Praeger radioed to SWPA: “Am 
conducting government with utmost care legally and morally devoid of politics and 
personal considerations. Military and civil authorities in perfect accord helping one 
another. I have provided all needs of the army composed of scouts, constabulary, 
and the Philippines Army in the Cagayan and Aparri. If I may be permitted I can 
organize five thousand additional men.”1382  Moses and Noble used Praeger’s radio 
to inform MacArthur that they had “unified command, and control six thousand 
guerrilla troops in provinces north of Manila.”1383  
Panay, D396/R-653 
In December, the Japanese Army had demoted and removed Lieutenant 
Colonel Senô from command of the garrison battalion in Antique, Panay, and 
replaced him with a veteran of Manchuria and China, Lieutenant Colonel Ryoichi 
Tozuka.1384 Reinforced with more troops and tanks, he continued mopping-up 
operations (sôtô) and punitive expeditions (tôbatsu) while preparing a major 
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assault against the heart of Peralta’s Fourth Corps. In early January, Tozuka 
launched his surprise attack (kantei sakusen) on guerrilla bases near Mount Dila-
Dila and Mount Baloy. He sought to capture 61st Division Commander Relunia as 
well his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Chaves, who also commanded the guerrilla 
63rd Infantry Regiment. Captain Toshimi Kumai, the adjutant of the Panay garrison, 
reported: “Even though the main forces had tanks deployed in the area, the results 
were not great. The troops only captured a guerrilla NCO and the mother of 
Lieutenant Colonel Chavez.”1385 
A campaign of burning, looting and killing ensued. Even so, the Japanese 
failed to prevent Chaves and his troops from withdrawing into the hills in good 
order. Captain Kumai described a typical experience of a Japanese patrol on this 
campaign. He was scouting along the Suage River with a twelve-man patrol when 
they had to cross a road in an open area surrounded by a banana grove. Lance 
Corporal Taniyama was on point followed by several soldiers from the radio section 
seventy yards ahead of the rest of the patrol. Suddenly a young woman appeared to 
their front, waved happily at the men, and disappeared quickly as they approached. 
“Instantly, there was a volley of shots from the surrounding trees. Lead shots hit 
Taniyama directly and killed him on the spot,” recalled Kumai.1386 After a lengthy 
exchange of fire with what appeared to be about sixty guerrillas on the edge of the 
jungle, reinforcements arrived and the guerrillas vanished. “In the dark chilly night, 
we found Taniyama’s beheaded body that had been thrown into a ditch,” Kumai 
continued, “We all searched for his head with our hands but finally had to return 





with only his headless corpse. As we stood around the remains of Lance Corporal 
Taniyama, we were seething with strong feelings for retaliation.”1387 
Sent to assist the operations in Panay, propaganda Lieutenant Hitomi was 
trying to turn policy into reality. He sent a “Report on the Civil Affairs of Antique 
Province” that noted that local law and order had begun to deteriorate when some 
300 surrendered Filipino soldiers who had been allowed to return home were re-
incarcerated as POWs in June 1942.1388 The people of Panay also resented the 
Ishihara Industries forcible recruitment of labor for their mines and harsh 




On 13 January, Wendell Fertig noted, “Believe there has been a very strong 
typhoon some place as the weather here is bad.”1389 The next evening, Skipper 
Stovall drew the submarine Gudgeon close ashore along the southern tip of Negros. 
There at Catmon Point, he landed the men of Villamor’s PLANET team and their 
equipment. Stovall then departed to reconnoiter the local islands, suffered a depth 
charge attack, and headed home to Brisbane. The first Allied Intelligence Bureau 
insertion into the Philippines was underway. 
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PLANET’s mission was to establish a guerrilla radio communications network 
centered in Negros. They were also to bring needed medical supplies and other items.1390  
As AIB had observed, “Medicine of all kinds is very scarce and costly.”1391 Losing one 
raft during his team’s insertion, however, Villamor opted to leave behind medical 
supplies and propaganda material so as to make room for his higher priority radios, codes 
and cypher equipment.1392 He carried his radios disassembled in four metal boxes, each 
twenty-three inches diagonally across so as to fit through submarine hatches. The 
individual boxes contained a battery, a transmitter; a receiver; and a collapsible 40-foot 
antenna, wire, and accessories. PLANET carried enough spare parts to operate for at least 
twelve months.1393 
After an eventful trek on foot towards Tolong, PLANET set its base near Sipalay 
on Catmon Point in a nipa hut looking southwest out on the Sulu Sea. With help from the 
ubiquitous Professor Bell, Emilio Quinto established radio station 4E7 with his 80-watt 
transmitter. During the night of 26 January, Quinto tapped out calls to ‘KAZ’ (RAAF 
Darwin) over 1,600 miles away.1394 After repeated attempts, KAZ responded and passed 
word to SWPA.1395 Elated to finally have a SWPA radio station in the Philippines, Ind 
reported to MacArthur’s chief of staff who replied, “The first to go in, but not the last. 
We’re on our way!”1396  
Almost immediately the ‘jungle telegraph’ spread the word, “is here! A party 
of Filipinos has landed. The general has sent Villamor to lead the resistance. Help 
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has come, at last. The re-invasion It is coming. American troops are on the way.”1397  
Negros guerrilla Higinio de Uriarte recalled, “The general rejoicing and enthusiasm 
caused by Villamor’s arrival were indescribable and impossible to control. Those 
who were in the know passed the news to their friends: these friends passed it on to 
more friends until practically all the mountains rang with the glad tidings.”1398 
Villamor represented the Aid, the beginning of the end of the war. 
Villamor was under SWPA orders to stay away from guerrilla politics and 
report objectively on personalities and organizations. The AIB later noted: “He 
arrived at the time the organizations of Abcede, Ausejo and Gador were full blown 
and Peralta and Fertig were attempting to gain control of Negros guerrilla 
affairs.”1399  Abcede arrived to meet Villamor. “I wondered if America was ever going 
to know that we were still fighting, that we had not surrendered,” the he said, “I 
control about seven thousand men, and every one of them has been waiting for an 
eternity to hear just one word – Recognition!”1400 Abcede had organized his troops 
in groups of thirty men with ten Enfield rifles and assorted other arms, to employ hit 
and run tactics and daily reconnaissance. He tasked snipers to fire at the enemy and 
kill at least one Japanese each day. Like other Visayan guerrillas, he often employed 
‘reverse ambushes,’ firing shots and retreating to lure the pursuing Japanese into 
traps.1401 
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 Abcede shared what he knew about the guerrillas across the Islands: 
Americans Ralph Praeger were in Cagayan Valley, engineer Walter Cushing was in 
North Luzon, Fenton and James Cushing ran things in Cebu, and Wendell Fertig 
operated in Mindanao; Filipinos guerrillas included Governor Ablan, Peralta, Manuel 
Enriquez, Nakar and his XO Lieutenant Edmundo Navarro, Abcede, Mata, Ausejo, 
Kangleon, Magsaysay and Gador.1402 Abcede complained, “Corporals are promoting 
themselves to sergeants, sergeants are becoming lieutenants, lieutenants are 
fancying themselves as captains. Overnight, some officers are turning into 
generals.”1403  
Ausejo arrived and confirmed much of Abcede’s reports. Villamor passed the 
reports to SWPA with “recommendations on the solution of local problems, 
particularly on the command situations, on supplies being sent the guerrillas, on his 
being given some authority to deal with some problems, and on dealing with Gador 
firmly.”1404 He was getting drawn into power struggles and SWPA hesitated to act on 
his recommendations. When SWPA refused to grant Villamor authority to settle the 
guerrilla disputes, Gador sensed an opportunity.  
Gador and Ausejo had remained beyond Abcede’s control. When Gador heard 
Fertig wore brigadier general’s stars, he proclaimed himself a major general. “Gador 
has assumed control of all the Philippines and is heading for trouble,” wrote 
Fertig.1405  “He controls an area between Concepcion and Libertad in Negros 
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Oriental,” complained Abcede, “and yet he wants to command all Negros. He wants 
the entire Philippines. A rumor has it that he threatens to liquidate anyone who 
defies his authority.”1406 As for Ausejo, Abcede reported: “He is diplomatic. He is 
mature. He has the loyalty not only of his soldiers but of the civilians, whose 
cooperation the guerrillas desperately need.”1407 Yet Ausejo had pledged to Fertig.  
It took twenty days for a courier from Ausejo to reach Abcede and only four to reach 
Fertig.  Villamor recalled, “When he thought of Fertig, Abcede became furious.”1408 
Abcede ranted: “Does he think that the Filipinos cannot fight or stay together unless 
they have an American leading them? How does Ausejo know Fertig is a bona fide 
representative of MacArthur?” 1409 Abcede had Peralta contact SWPA. On 10 January, 
SWPA replied to Peralta: “Will investigate identity and activities of Brigadier 
General Fertig and will advise you as soon as possible.”1410  MacArthur added: “You 
will continue to exercise the command, relay this [to] Gador, Ausejo, Fertig, and 
Cebu.”1411 
By now Peralta had drawn Bernard Anderson, the Free Philippines, the 
Hunters and some other guerrilla groups on Luzon into his communication net.1412 
PLANET had landed on Negros instead of Panay in part to avoid Peralta, but 
Villamor had to branch out to establish his radio network. Ind had instructed 
Villamor to keep his presence secret and send a “highly trained, thoroughly astute 
individual” to meet Peralta but avoid any of his attempts to take control of the 
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mission.1413 Villamor sent Delfin YuHico, with a miniaturized cypher system sewn 
into his shoes, to Panay.1414 In mid-January, he sent Bell with Bill Lowry to see Fertig 
on Mindanao. 1415 Upon his return, Villamor sent Bell with new codes to Cebu where 
Fenton and Cushing were reportedly attempting to repair a transmitter from radio 
station RCA. Villamor intended to go with Patricio Jorge through western Negros, to 
Mindoro, on to Luzon and then Manila. Quinto, Dominandor Malic, Rodolfo Ignacio 
would maintain the net control station in Negros for all the Islands.1416  
 Villamor felt he had to resolve the contest between Abcede and Fertig over 
Ausejo.  Abcede forced the issue in a message to Fertig: “Am informing you that our 
whole set-up in the Visayas has long been reported to War Department in 
Washington. Our instructions are coming from General MacArthur… Your laying 
claims to control Oriental Negros without controlling the whole island has (resulted 
in) unpleasant incidents. I can hardly blame Major Ausejo for hesitating to come 
under the control of this Headquarters. As an experienced officer, am sure you 




Fertig was preoccupied with the Moros in his area who had collected many 
weapons to go along with their increasing numbers. The 10th MD commander sent 
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forty-eight year-old American Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Hedges to deal with 
them. A pre-war captain in the reserve, Hedges had spent years working among the 
Moros in the Kolambugan Lumber Mills on the north coast of Lanao. He came back 
to active duty to command the Motor Transport Company in Dansalan. Fertig noted, 
“his experience before the war made him familiar with the local people. He has since 
shown his ability to get along with the Christians and to maintain the favor and 
support of the Moros.”1418  American educator Mr. Kuder volunteered to assist 
Hedges with the Moros. Through January, Hedges organized a number of Moros 
from the Bolo Battalion under Manalao Mindalano and the Marano Militia Force to 
create Fertig’s 108th Division.  
A number of prominent Moro leaders only slowly embraced Fertig. Busran 
Kalaw of Momungan, Datu Laguindab of Ganassi, Joseph Sanguilla of Mumay and 
Madakus, and Datu Buntalis of Masiu valued their independence. Kalaw was the 
prewar mayor of Mumugan, a former treasurer for Lanao Province, and an associate 
of Morgan. He eventually accepted command of Hedges’ 126th Regiment. Mindalano 
was a former school inspector known to be smart, brave and hot tempered and “was 
the first to fight the Japanese after the USAFFE surrender.”1419 He and his men 
became the 127th Regiment at Malabang.  Captain Macaurog Arumpac was the 
mayor of Lumbatan, a “clever, a little politico, a good manager” and a Mason.1420 He 
became commander of the 124th Regiment in Rupagon, Lanao. Major Anonngo 
Baguindaali was a popular leader and one of the first Moro guerrilla leaders and 
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took charge of Hedges’ 128th Regiment at Malabang. Fertig’s USFIP also formed the 
129th Regiment at Taraka, Lanao, and two Provisional Regiments with four separate 
battalions and five separate companies.  Chinese-Moro mestizo Lieutenant Naguib 
Guandy, the prewar mayor of Malabang, organized and led Moro resistance south of 
there.  He protected Christians along the Lanao coast and maintained good relations 
with the Japanese to protect his sources of supply.   
A U.S. Army assessment noted: “The efforts of Busran, Kalaw, Mindalano, the 
Sultan of Ganassi and many other to bring the Moros into line is a monumental 
tribute to their respect for the American people. They were supported in their 
efforts by very small allotments of arms and supplies from the guerrilla 
headquarters.”1421 Their units became Hedges’ 108th Division in Lanao Province. The 
Maranao Militia Force, the best-armed single group of guerrillas in Mindanao, 
remained a separate part of the 108th Division for political reasons. Christians 
dominated the 108th Division staff and commanded the 105th Regiment at Baroy 
under a Captain Barro. The 108th Regiment at Kauswagam under Major Felipe P. 
Quejada, and the 120th Regiment at Dalipuga under Captain Pedro Andres brought 
the division to 597 officers and 8,841 men. 
Major Rex Blow had been an artillery officer with the Australian Imperial 
Force when it surrendered in Singapore. He escaped with a group of prisoners from 
the Japanese prison camp at Sandakan, British North Borneo. Natives took Blow and 
the other escapees to Tawi Tawi in the Philippines. There they assisted Colonel 
Suarez commanding the Sulu Area until they were transported to Mindanao. Several 




men from the party were sent to Australia in early 1944 but Blow stayed behind to 
continue serving with Fertig’s guerrillas.1422 The Japanese attacked Tawi Tawi 
opposed only by Constabulary troops under First Lieutenant Alejandro Trespeces. 
When their stocks of food and other supplies ran out, he moved his remaining thirty 
men to Bato Bato. 
Meanwhile in Brisbane, Hamner and the two Smiths had arrived at SWPA 
headquarters and reported the work of Fertig on Mindanao. They convinced Army 
Intelligence to have KFS answer the incessant ‘hot Yanks’ in the ‘hot Philippines’ 
radio broadcasts. Subsequently during a morning brief Fertig’s radio operators told 
him they had heard “KFS calling MSF.” A shocked Fertig instantly knew Charlie 
Smith had gotten through and was calling him from friendly lines. 1423  He 
acknowledged the message and KFS responded: “if you know double transposition 
use as key first name of second next of kin and city of residence second next of kin 
and encode the following information.”1424 When Fertig used the name of his oldest 
daughter Patricia and their hometown of Golden, the code worked. Fertig could talk 
to SWPA, just like Peralta. 
Fertig reported to SWPA: “Have strong force in being with complete civilian 
support… Large number of enemy motor vehicles and bridges have been destroyed. 
Many telephone poles have been cut down, food dumps burned, and considerable 
enemy arms and ammunition captured. Thousands young Filipinos eager to join 
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when arms available. Ready and eager to engage the enemy on your orders.”1425  
KFS instructed Fertig to sit tight. 
About this time, the Japanese made a surprising radio broadcast in which 
they announced to the world that their aircraft had destroyed the guerrilla 
headquarters in Mindanao, killing General Fertig, and driving his forces into the 
hinterland.1426 Military intelligence officials in Washington took notice and began to 
doubt the source of the radio contacts from Mindanao.  Federal investigators visited 
Fertig’s wife and daughters in Golden, Colorado, to gather information with which 
they could confirm their contact’s identity using the last letter he had sent to her 
from Mindanao. Until then, Fertig heard nothing from SWPA. 
 
Manila, D403, R-646 
The Japanese high command reassessed its plans for the Philippines. Their 
first concern was Allied submarine missions into the Islands. The army and navy 
came to a new cooperative agreement by which the Imperial Navy agreed to “close 
or put under strict control, the straits wherever the conditions require,” while 
consulting with nearby army unit within its area of operations.1427  Their second 
concern was the still lagging cooperation of Filipinos who seemed uninterested in 
joining the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. To address this, Fourteenth Army 
Chief of Staff and director of the Japanese Military Administration, Lieutenant 
General Wachi Takaji, issued a statement: “in order to quicken national 
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independence …sixteen million citizens of the Philippines should liquidate their past 
focus on the reorganization of the economy and return as quickly as possible to 
their true East Asian indemnity both spiritually and intellectually.”1428 
General Baba, chief of the Japanese counterintelligence corps who shared a 
headquarters with Nagahama’s Kempeitai in Manila, laid out a plan for defeating the 
guerrillas. While army units conducted raids and patrols, the Makapili informants 
would spread out to spy on their fellow citizens. “Although very small in number,” 
Ramsey recalled, “the Makapili were insidious, for they were extremely secretive, 
wore no uniforms, and were indistinguishable from their countrymen in towns and 
villages.”1429 Baba stepped up raids on villages, increased the use of torture, and 
promised to pay for the severed heads of any guerrilla leader brought to his men.  
Carlos Romulo recalled that in their effort to convince guerrillas to 
surrender, “The Japanese had two overwhelming arguments: corps of trained 
bloodhounds, and food. The Japanese dogs could track the guerrilla down in any 
hiding place.”1430 Just hearing the baying hounds approaching was enough to 
convince many guerrillas that escape was futile. Romulo added: “The power of rice 
was even more sinister, Rice had become more valuable than gold.”1431  
 On 14 January, an Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference in 
Tokyo endorsed a document titled “Proposals Concerning Titles to Occupied 
Territories.” The policy draft recommended incorporation of “areas suitable as 
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Imperial territory, areas of strategic importance” into the Empire.1432 However, it 
argued, Japan should grant independence “upon areas as qualify for it in the light of 
their past political development, if this is deemed advantageous to the prosecution 
of the Greater East Asia war and the establishment of Greater East Asia.”1433 The 
proposal called for granting Philippine independence as a way of decreasing strains 
on the military. The officials believed a free Philippines would willingly police 
themselves and still provide support to Japan. Yet five months later, the Navy still 
argued against granting the Islands independence too quickly “for it will take time 
just to change the present leadership” and their pro-American views.1434  
In the meantime, the army placed three second-tier battalions in the new 17th 
Independent Garrison in Luzon’s Mountain Province and started organizing the 22nd 
Infantry Battalion in Baguio.  To address growing unemployment, the Philippine 
Executive Commission established a Bureau of Employment. As a first act the 
Bureau established a policy that one person could only work fifteen days at a time 
so as to allow others opportunities at employment.1435 It was another clumsy effort 
to centrally administer the economy. Major Matsunobu Mikio, an intelligence staffer 
in the Fourteenth Army, received orders to organize and train native Ganap party 
members at Fort McKinley into a labor battalion to support the military. This 
organization became known as the Yoin or Yuin, from the Filipino term from the 
initials for the “United Nippon.” Some Yoin even recieved arms and uniforms.  
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Luzon, D404, R-645 
On Luzon, Xu Zhimeng and some other members of the rightist Chinese 
Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (COWHM) and cadres from the Philippine 
Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League (PCAAPL) formed the Philippine 
Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (PCAJVC) from the Hungmen Restoration 
Committee at the end of 1942 or early 1943.1436 Wang Hounan, Chen Zhangtan and 
Zhuang Guodun came from the Anti-Puppets League. Wang Xixiong reported that a 
number of members came from the Hua Zhi. With 300 members, the PCAJVC 
concentrated on propaganda with the Chinese Commercial Bulletin (Qiaoshang gong 
bao), gathering food and other support for the Huks.1437 
By early 1943 the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP) claimed to 
have 761 men in Manila and its surrounding area, 89 more fully armed men in Bicol, 
and 260 in Iloilo on Panay.1438  The Luzon force remained in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya 
until December then moved south towards Rizal and Pampanga before joining 
Marking in late 1944.  
Also near Manila, Marking was down with malaria and Panlilio incapacitated 
with five abscessed molars. She saw the burden of command taking a toll on 
Marking.  “I found early that it was hard for him to bear the shackles of leadership,” 
she wrote, “as it would have been for anyone. And I made him hate me because I 
insisted on it.”1439 She refused to allow him to risk himself in combat. Moreover, she 
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insisted he control his men. She wrote: “Not every man knows the difference 
between commandeering and banditry. You can recruit and train the thousands to 
fire guns, but who among them can you trust to remain strictly honorable? A rifle 
should be a trust; actually, it is a power over the life and death.”1440 Panlilio used 
many tools of persuasion. As he recovered from malaria, one night Marking 
amorously said to her “I love you.” Panlilio responded, “Man, man, get away from 
me. We have work to do. We need sleep.”1441 
 
Palawan, D404/R-645 
On Palawan, the Cobb guerrillas merged with a group under former governor 
and reserve Philippine Army Medical Reserve captain, Higinio Mendoza, to form the 
Mendoza-Cobb Group. Mendoza had organized guerrillas just inland on the north 
coast. The cohesion of his group, however, was severely tested by dwindling men 
and food. In January, this new organization placed its headquarters in Tinitian and 
took on collaborationists in the Bureau of the Constabulary increased.  
 
Negros, D416/R-633 
Gador received a letter from Fertig announcing his claim to the command of 
all Mindanao and Visayan guerrillas. Fertig summoned Gador to Mindanao to 
discuss his place in Fertig’s organization. Instead, Gador asserted his seniority as a 
major general and announced his command of the Philippines.  Fertig ignored both 
Gador’s proclamation and promotion. 
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On 27 January, after three days of failed attempts to communicate with 
Australia, Quinto finally got through to SWPA.  He sent Villamor’s first message:  
“So far so good though have had several hair-raising 
experiences. Conditions pretty bad and very serious for our forces 
though not generally realized. Understand Peralta has placed 
Fourth Corps under Fertig in Mindanao but there’s still a lot of 
confusion. Suggest you renew order to minimize fighting for their 
and civilian’s sakes. Am in [Negros] but travel is very dangerous 
and at times almost impossible due to severe restrictions imposed 
by our forces and increased patrol activity of Japs. Besides am 
having personal difficulty due to my picture being in many homes 
however will still try to make [Manila]. Contact me thirteen GMT as 
soon as possible and give me latest dope.” 1442 
The next day SWPA responded in three parts, the first reading: 
“Warmest congratulations from CINC.  In view of present confused 
Luzon situation indicated in information summary, desire you 
remain [in Negros]. Concentrate on supplying information [and] 
advice on areas of responsibility and trust-worthiness main 
guerrilla leaders in Visayas and Mindanao, and advice [on] 
relationships with this headquarters and each other. Should Peralta 
and Fertig each be independent and report direct GHQ or one be 
recognized general coordinator[?] In view of uncertain outlook [in] 
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Luzon [and] Visayas, would you advice [sic] concentration 
Mindanao meager supplies we can send[?]”1443 
Parts 2 and 3 informed Villamor of Nakar’s and Thorp’s captures, Praeger’s 
radio contact, the possible loyalty of Luzon Constabulary chief Augustino Gabriel, 
Fertig’s control of Mindanao without a radio, and broken communication with 
Peralta. The message also granted SWPA permission to print scrip but prohibited 
guerrillas from imposing martial law. Both Villamor’s and SWPA’s communication 
reflected a lack of accurate situational awareness. 
At Catagena, Villamor asked Abcede for men to build his communications 
network and received fourteen volunteers. He decided to form three-man 
communications teams saying, ““The reports of agents in other areas of SWPA 
showed it never advisable to leave only two in a radio station; they almost always 
got into arguments. I wanted two men for the radio station I planned to establish, 
and the odd man as the ‘pacifier.’”1444 Before they went out, Villamor established a 
training program to pass along the skills his agents had learned at the Victoria 
Barracks. Lieutenants Modesto Castañeda, Enrique Abila, Roberto Luzuriaga, 
William Zayco, Arthur Zaycom, and Raymundo Teruel were the first to graduate 
from the program and deploy.  They went to the Philippine capital and reported 
back to Villamor: “Manila was infested with spies and puppet police. Throughout all 
of Luzon morale was low, and elsewhere it was not a great deal better.1445 The 
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Manila Tribune ran a large front-page story that all resistance had ceased. According 
to Blackburn, Villamor saw this article and “accepted it at face value.”1446 
Villamor began to appreciate differences between guerrillas and regular 
soldiers. Many derived from a difference in purpose.  As S.C.M. Paine noted, 
“Conventional warfare usually relies on a deliver-victory strategy, while 
insurgencies often pursue a prevent-defeat strategy – the operative concept of the 
latter being to survive to fight another day so that the impoverished long-distance 
runner can defeat the rich sprinter.”1447 Washington. Lee and other great generals 
were familiar with this Fabian strategy. Because their men did not have to hold the 
line in battle, guerrilla leaders relied less on discipline. They could embrace more 
flexible attitudes to keep men in camp.  When, for example, U.S. Army Lieutenant 
Russell Barros advised Marking and Panlilio to “keep the orders going” to 
subordinates so that they wouldn’t “break up or slow down,” the guerrilla leaders 
refused. “If they want to fight on,” Marking explained, “they find us first, tell us what 
they want to do; then we advise them on how it should be done, and finally we give 
them orders to go ahead and do it.” 1448 That was the guerrilla way. 
The guerrilla units routinely disbanded and sent men home to both avoid the 
Japanese and to lower logistical burdens. They also proved extremely flexible in 
dealing with the enemy. While fighting in Butuan, Mindanao, guerrillas under 
McClish and Childress fought the Japanese until both sides ran low on ammunition. 
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Then they negotiated a truce dividing the town, with both sides agreeing to share 
access to the single midtown store.1449 
Finally, guerrillas had to always consider their relation to the people. “First 
off, to be successful a guerrilla leader must become, in one way or another, the de 
facto ruler of the territory in which he operates,” explained Lapham, “Failure to 
achieve authority will defeat all his plans and hopes.”1450 That meant more than 
meeting the needs of the people in terms of law and order. To gain the loyalty of 
local officials and citizens required “that spies, collaborators with enemies, and 
anyone else who breaks down trust between himself and the local population must 
be eliminated or neutralized without pity.”1451  
 
Manila, D418/R-631 
On 28 January, Prime Minister Tojo spoke before the Diet in Tokyo. The next 
day papers in Manila published his speech. “Substantial progress is being made in 
the degree of cooperation rendered to the Japanese Empire by the people of the 
Philippines as well as in the restoration of internal peace and security,” Tojo 
announced, “Under these circumstances and on condition that further tangible 
evidences of cooperation are actively demonstrated, it is contemplated to put into 
effect the statement made previously in the question of Philippine independence in 
the shortest possible time.”1452 In celebration, the KALIBAPI declared a public 
holiday and scheduled pro-Japanese demonstrations for 8 February. Benigno Ramos 
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led Ganap Party representatives in public rallies across the Islands that “harangued 
the people with purple prose describing the nobility of the Japanese aims and the 
magnanimity in promising independence to the Philippines.”1453 On Mindanao, 
Fertig noted how on 11 February, “Both Tokyo and Manila have spent considerable 
time in their radio news broadcast telling about peaceful conditions in the 
Philippines; how the Filipinos are helping in the co-prosperity field while actually 
the Filipinos call it Prosperity-Ce-Tagalog, slang meaning ‘Your Prosperity.’”1454  
The combination of successful Japanese counterguerrilla operations and 
MacArthur’s orders to ‘lay low’ had created a sense of calm in many parts of the 
Islands the encouraged the Japanese and their allies. On 28 February, the Manila 
Tribune quoted Bengino Aquino as saying: “It is possible that some would say that 
since the war has not been ended, our attitude would constitute treason to America. 
If such be the philosophy advanced by some people, I would not hesitate to say that I 
do not care if I were called a traitor to America.”1455 
 By 30 January, the Japanese in the Philippines were more concerned with 
farm fields than battlefields. Friction had developed between the cotton growers 
and the JMA over policy and security.  In February, they created the Philippines 
Cotton Growers Association with Shozo Murata as chairman to replace the Japan 
Cotton Growers as the primary advisors to the JMA.1456  The JMA reported 23,150 
acres of cotton planted – an increase of almost 1,400% since October, but still less 
than three percent of their goal. Eighty percent of the cotton grew on Luzon, seven 
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percent in Negros. Traveling reporter Koichi Kayahara noted that the Japanese 
routinely failed to advance contracted farmers enough money for the costs of 
equipment, irrigation, planting, fertilizer, and insecticide – although they did pay a 
wage for irrigating and spraying insecticide.1457  As a result, ginned cotton would 
only reach twenty percent of the JMA’s 2,470-ton goal.  
On 20 February, the JMA approved the “Agenda for Implementing Cotton 
Cultivation Projects in the Philippines for the Year 1943,” and the “Agenda for the 
Determination of Cotton Cultivation Areas in the Philippines.” The plans built upon 
policies adopted toward the sugar industry the previous July and August. Of 643,000 
acres dedicate to sugarcane, the JMA converted forty-six percent to cotton.1458 
Already, however, the forced conversion of farmland to cotton production had 
contributed to a severe and growing rice shortage accelerated by a monsoon in 
November 1943. In Manila, the cost of a sack of rice skyrocketed from 30 to 200 
pesos. Only the Japanese, with their ability to print money at will, could afford bulk 
purchases of rice, and their purchases cut available supplies and drove up prices 
further. Meanwhile, hunger had driven people to Manila, nearly doubling its prewar 
population. The discontent resulting from such hardships increased popular 
support for the guerrilla movement.  
Meanwhile, the Imperial Army renewed attacks across northern Luzon. 
February began with the Japanese raiding Ablan’s headquarters deep in the 
mountains and although they failed to capture him, he was never seen again.  Other 
patrols scattered Thorp’s First District under Parker Calvert. He appointed Arthur 
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Murphy as his adjutant and moved his headquarters to Kapangan in Benguet to 




On 5 February, Fertig received more questions from KFS seeking to confirm 
his identity.  His frustration mounted the next day when Bell informed him that 
Peralta had gotten an Army radio working and was in contact with Australia. “He 
had radioed MacArthur’s headquarters, Fertig noted, “that certain officers, including 
one Wendell Fertig, were trying to usurp his command.”1459  Peralta had asked 
SWPA to recognize him as the commander of all guerrilla forces in the Philippines. 
Peralta had a robust guerrilla command in Fourth Philippine Corps and a free 
government partner in Confesor centrally located in the archipelago. He 
demonstrated the vitality of his command on 14 February when Fourteenth Army 
Commander Lieutenant General Shizuichi Tanaka narrowly avoided one of Peralta’s 
ambushes near Iloilo.  To Fertig, developing his own large organization on the 
second largest island and the one closest to Australia, Peralta was simply an 
ambitious rival trying to take his place.   
Peralta sent staff officers to aid Fertig, which Fertig somehow interpreted as 
Peralta placing his Fourth Philippine Corps under Fertig’s command. Villamor heard 
this and wrote: “They were behaving like kids in a dispute for the leadership of a 
neighborhood gang. And all through the officer ranks there spread the fever of 
                                                        
1459 Keats, 193.  
 
410 
competition. Brevet promotions were being handed out right and left, to too many 
people without even the approval of Fertig or Peralta. It is getting to be a farce, I 
thought.” 1460 
On 10 February MacArthur sent orders to “All Guerrilla Leaders”: to limit 
hostile contact with the enemy to minimum; to concentrate on developing 
intelligence nets; and to report “promptly names of superior officers, and other 
items of military intelligence.” 1461  MacArthur sent Peralta and Fertig three 
directives: one banning the printing of money, the second keeping guerillas under 
their current commanders, and the third designating Peralta as “military guerrilla 
chief of temporarily occupied enemy territory.”1462 Confused and irate, Fertig fired 
off a capitalized message addressed to KFS with instruction to relay to the War 
Department: “As senior American officer in the Philippine Islands I have assumed 
command of Mindanao and Visayas with rank of brigadier general xxx As the leader 
of the guerrillas forces we have reactivated the USFIP and established civil 
government in the hands of duly elected commonwealth officials xxx Money is being 
printed by them and loaned to USFIP xxx Fertig.”1463  
 The message spurred MacArthur to get his arms around Fertig. On 11 
February KFS in San Francisco informed Fertig his call sign was no longer MSF but 
now WYZB. Three days later KFS officially passed WYZB off to KAZ, the call sign for 
MacArthur’s SWPA headquarters in Brisbane. Irritated, Fertig resent his long 
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message to KAZ. MacArthur’s headquarters responded: “KEEP YOUR SHIRT ON YOU 
ARE NOT FORGOTTEN.”1464 
The AIB realized it had to weigh in on the establishment of a chain of 
command in the Islands. As SWPA’s staff noted, “The problem of finding commander 
suitable for the overall situation was a difficult one and would take time and trouble. 
Recognition of individual local commanders appeared to be the most satisfactory 
solution and G-2 unhesitatingly recommended the establishment of island 
commands on the basis of pre-war Military Districts.”1465 MacArthur decided that no 
one other than himself would command all forces in the Philippines.  
He reactivated the pre-war military districts with the intention of assigning a 
guerrilla commander to command each one. On 13 February, SWPA broadcast to the 
guerrilla commands: “Command areas will be progressively established based on 
existing military districts.”1466  They also prepared a letter to this effect for future 
agents to carry to Mindanao. MacArthur approved Fertig as commander of the 10th 
Military District that included Mindanao and, for the time being, Sulu. He ordered 
Fertig to perfect an intelligence net in the 9th Military District of Samar and Leyte 
until a qualified officer was found there to take command. MacArthur named Peralta 
as commander of the 6th Military District of Panay with the responsibility for 
establishing  
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intelligence in the 7th and 8th Districts.  The order effectively recognized Fertig’s 
existing organization while terminating Peralta’s pan-Philippine Fourth Philippine 
Corps. SWPA specifically identified both guerrillas as lieutenant colonels and 
reminded them that no guerrillas were to assume the rank of general officer.  
The order made Fertig suspicious of more senior officers in his region. One 
was Colonel Alejandro Suarez, a 47-year-old Spanish Moro mestizo who had served 
in the Constabulary in Cotabato and the Sulus since 1914. Educated in the States, he 
had rose to command the constabulary in Cagayan Province before the war, 
transferred to Sulu and became governor there in 1941. He suffered wounds in 
battle fighting General Sakaguchi's Jolo Force when it landed at Taglibi, Jolo. He 
escaped to Mindanao, joined General Fort’s troops, and surrendered with Fort. The 
Japanese took him to Cotabato to command the Bureau of Constabulary forces in 
that province. In January, he escaped to Tawi Tawi before reaching Bato Bato on 
Sulu. U.S. Army intelligence reported: “He is reliable, capable, knows the Moros well, 
is respected and has many friends among them.”1467 
At Bato Bato, First Lieutenant Trespeces commanded thirty constabulary 
men. Suarez began integrating these men as guerrillas with those on Tawi Tawi to 
form one unit. About thirty miles to the south, Morgan had sent a Jolo Moro, 
Lieutenant Imao, with about twenty men to Siasi island. These "Fighting 21" 
attacked the Japanese garrison there on Christmas, captured thirty rifles, and 
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withstood counterattacks in early 1943.1468 Suarez incorporated Imao’s units.  
Recruitment brought the First Battalion at Siasi to 200 men, the Second Battalion at 
Jolo to 250, and the Third Battalion on Tawi Tawi to 350 men. After contacting 
Fertig, Suarez’s men became the 125th Regiment of the Mindanao Command with 
headquarters on the Malum River near Bato Bato.  A separate guerrilla unit on Tawi 
Tawi under “Colonel” Tome Bitend eluded Suarez and seemed dedicated to 
profiteering by shipping rice to North Borneo. 1469  Eventually, SWPA would 
reestablish Sulu as a separate military district from Fertig, with Suarez as 
commander.  
When Abcede was appointed 7th Military District commander, Ausejo 
accepted it without complaint and became Abcede’s G-3.  Viloria became Ausejo’s 
executive officer and Bell served as his senior civil administrator.  Dr. Jose Garcia 




The AIB delivered radios raised a problem of purpose. The AIB intended them for 
intelligence communications but the guerrillas needed them for control of their 
operations. The SWPA staff clearly saw the first function as a G-2 responsibility and the 
second as a function of the G-3.  Yet the AIB wished to remain invisible to the other 
staff, reporting only to MacArthur. Ind set to work to also get “an exclusive channel” for 
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communications to his agents in the Islands, denied to everyone including guerrilla 
leaders with radio receivers.1470 If they read his mail, he reasoned, they might attempt to 
influence his agents’ reports. Ind wanted unbiased communication with his agents, 
immune from guerrilla observation and influence. He also wanted to be free from the 
“undesirable security angle” of the RAAF station KAZ in Darwin that received and 
transmitted all Philippine traffic. The AIB could not be certain that the KAZ portal was 
not open to other eyes seeking to utilize the guerrilla forces. Ind drafted a memorandum 
for the G-2 explaining, “This is understood by me to be a temporary situation which will 
obtain only so long as no major military effort toward the Philippines is in effect.”1471  
While Villamor provided the AIB with visibility and control in the central 
Visayan Islands, the situation on Luzon remained murky. On 6 February, Moses and 
Noble arrived at Praeger’s headquarters and spent the next two weeks using his 
radio to communicate with SWPA.1472 They confirmed that they had directed all U.S. 
forces in the Philippines to “limit hostilities” in favor of collecting intelligence in 
accordance with MacArthur’s wishes.1473 Yet they seemed to contradict themselves, 
often in one message, in regards to popular morale, guerrilla status, and their 
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intended operations.1474 They appeared to be in less than complete control. Then, by 
the end of the month, over 1,000 Japanese troops began converging on Kabugao 
towards Praeger’ radio.  
Not everyone was avoiding combat. Cabalhin of Marking’s guerrillas set an 
ambush on the Koyambay-Tanay trail augmented with an air-cooled .30 caliber 
machine gun recovered from an airplane.1475 His roughly seventy men encountered 
a patrol of 150 closely packed Japanese and killed 93, later discovered to be 
engineers headed for the Angelo mine. 
 Meanwhile the Huks had increased to a point that required reorganization. 
They divided central Luzon into five districts: First in Pampanga under Banal 
(Poblete); Second in Baliwag, Apalit, San Ildefonso, San Simon, San Luis, Candaba, 
Santa Ana, and part of Arayat under Dayang-Dayang; Third north of Mount Arayat 
under Aquino; Fourth in Nueva Ecija under de Leon; and Fifth from Mexico to 
Bacolor to Lubao and Floridablanca under Abelardo Dabu.1476 They bought or stole 
arms and ammunition.  
The Huks invited USAFEE guerrillas to meetings. “In February 1943 my 
executive officer, Harry McKenzie, received such an invitation to try to negotiate 
some kind of working agreement with the hosts. En route to the appointed meeting 
place he was ambushed and shot in the chest.”1477 Harry’s men fled but his wife 
Mary and his adjutant, Manuel Bahia, stayed by his side as the Huks took them 
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prisoner. When a Japanese patrol raided the Huk camp, Mary and Manuel pulled 
Harry into the jungle and escaped to a doctor and then back to the LGAF. 
 
Mindanao, D438/R-611 
Based on Villamor’s and Hamner’s reports, SWPA decided to send their next 
submarine to contact Fertig.1478  Chick Parsons arrived in Brisbane on 18 January 
and went to the AIB with his plan for a mission to the Philippines that was quickly 
approved by MacArthur. Taking over coordination with the Navy and Army for the 
mission, Parsons delivered lists of supply priorities for signal equipment, medical 
supplies, arms and ammunition, food, clothing, and “morale builders’ like cigarettes, 
chocolate, gum and magazines, and a fifty pound can of wheat flour “for Communion 
wafers” in the Catholic land.1479 He prioritized medical supplies second only to radio 
equipment, “especially a quantity of atabrine for use against malaria.”1480 He also 
brought cathartic pills to combat dysentery and sulfathiozole to treat pneumonia 
and staphylococcal infections.1481  
SWPA G-2 noted: “Prior to this time, the C-in-C [MacArthur] had ruled that no 
American personnel would be permitted on penetration missions, but Parsons 
secured special permission at the last moment and was allowed to go on the first 
supply run to Mindanao and to remain on Mindanao as an observer of the guerrilla 
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organization there.”1482Parsons recruited newly promoted Army Major Charles 
Smith, fresh from his arduous trek on the Or Else, and two Moros for their 
knowledge of Mindanao and its people. When Fertig received the message from 
SWPA that Charlie Smith had arrived safely, he wrote, “That is wonderful for it gives 
me a friend at court. He can explain the reason for many things that have been 
done.”1483 
On 18 February, the submarine SS-198 Tambor under Lieutenant 
Commander S.H. Armbruster departed Fremantle, Australia, on its sixth war patrol 
carrying Parson’s FIFTY team.1484  On midnight 5 March they went ashore at 
Laganan near Tukuran in Zamboanga, Mindanao. Parsons sent a message to Fertig: 
“Urgent have four tons supplies for you from down under signed Lt. Comdr. Parsons 
and Smith.”1485 Parsons had gone ashore without either a disguise or a weapon. 
Incredibly, among the natives who met him was his former washerwoman. A local 
guerrilla leader provided him a sixty-foot diesel-powered open lighter captured 
from the Japanese. Parsons used the boat, daringly flying an American flag, to shuttle 
the tons of supplies from the submarine. As Japanese patrols responded to 
exaggerated reports of six submarines unloading hundreds of men, guerrillas 
carried Parsons and his cargo into the jungle north of Oroquieta.  
Fertig thought the four tons of supplies incredible.1486 He calculated that it 
came to 1.3 pounds per guerrilla but found it did not break down that easily. 
                                                        
1482 Intelligence Activities, 54. 
1483 Fertig Diary, 21 February 1943. 
1484 See “Tambor” at uboat.net at http://uboat.net/index.html accessed 25 July 2016. 
1485 Fertig Diary, 5 March 1943. 
1486 Keats, 200-202. 
 
419 
Assuming an adequate distribution, four tons could be carried by 160 men or 25 
carabao carts. As they managed the shipment, Parsons explained to Fertig that only 
MacArthur’s personal interest produced any of these supplies. Fertig owed 
MacArthur his loyalty. Parson also presented instructions from SWPA for Fertig on 
how he should develop a radio net, establish coast watchers, and the construct 
secret airfields. Fertig was now firmly wrapped in the  chain of command.  
Fertig shared his fears that his organization could dissolve at any time. 
Indeed, while Parsons was still at sea, Major Angeles Limena’s 109th Regiment 
attacked the headquarters of Major Manuel Jaldon. “Finally,” Fertig wrote, “mutiny 
has broken out and threatens this whole crazy structure.”1487 Limena’s attack lasted 
four months. Fertig found it hard to fight the Japanese when his units were fighting 
each other. 
Parsons reminded Fertig that MacArthur wanted intelligence, not action. 
“Those radios we brought you are for information,” he said, “You are to establish a 
flash line [immediate priority communication] of watcher stations along the coasts, 
and pass the word to us of Jap ship movements.”1488 Fertig disagreed. His priority 
was fighting. He told Parsons: “Now as far as the Japanese are concerned, the over-
all strategic objective is very simple. It is, Kill the bastards.”1489 No go, said Parsons. 
If he wanted SWPA support, Fertig would have to comply. 
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Map 12: AIB missions to the Philippines, December 1942-July 1943. 
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Morgan began the month with a ten-day attack supported by McClish’s 110th 
Division against the Japanese at Butua. The attack failed and created a loss of face 
for Morgan – fortunately for Fertig. McClish moved to the Clacveria-Malitbog area 
and convinced independent guerrillas to join the USFIP under James E. McIntire and 
U.S. Army Air Corps’ Lieutenant Alfred Fernandez. He contacted other guerrillas 
under the leadership of Rosaurio Dongallo in the vicinity of Gingoog Bay. These 
units became the 110th Regiment of McClish’s 110th Division.  MacArthur’s 
recognition – manifested by the delivery of supplies – improved Fertig’s position 
and made recruiting much easier. ‘The Aid’ proved his authority.1490  
Fertig now refined his command. He arrested Sam Goode and replaced him 
as commander of the guerrillas in the Tago area with Second Lieutenant Joe 
McCarthy, then commanding a detachment in Tandag.  He sent Lieutenant Alarcon 
from Zamboanga to Basilan Island to organize remnants of the Philippine 
Constabulary into an effective guerrilla force.  Alarcon found former USAFFE staffer 
First Lieutenant Benjamin Santilan had already turned the guerrillas into an 
effective unit and recruited them whole into the Zamboanga City area command. 
Fertig also placed Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bowler in command of the newly 
organized 109th Division although, for the time being, its area remained unsettled 
until Fertig settled a dispute with Pendatun.  
On 23 February, Fertig learned of his assignment as the 10th Military District 
commander.1491 He apparently felt secure enough to reveal to Parsons a strategy he 
used to coerce support from local populations. Except for one specific area on the 
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east coast, the Japanese had treated the people of Mindanao so roughly that they 
drove most of them to the side of the guerrillas. Fertig worked to get the Japanese to 
drive the rest of the population to him. His guerrillas deliberately harassed the 
Japanese in ways designed to bring about retaliations against or hostile neutral 
population centers.  Fertig explained to Parsons: “we practice sabotage and 
assassinate Japanese in that area, to provoke the Japanese into making the kind of 
reprisals that will put the people on our side.”1492  It was a cruel but effective policy. 
Parsons and Smith were further surprised when Fertig told them that former 
Philippine Brigadier General Manuel Roxas was a key source of his intelligence.1493  
“Briefly reports from Manila indicate that the politicians are trying to play the 
game,” Fertig wrote, “Except for Aguino [Aquino] the others are still with us. Even 
Laurel is at heart OK. The common people are definitely pro-Americans with the 
cocheros extremely so. Morale his high and they are just waiting.”1494 AIB had 
wondered where Roxas’ loyalties had settled. After all, when Quezon invited him to 
go with him to Australia, Roxas had demurred saying his duty was to remain in the 
Islands. As William Manchester noted, “Whether or not he stayed on MacArthur’s 
instructions is unclear. The General later said so, but contemporary documents are 
confusing.”1495 The Japanese had since released Roxas from prison in accord with 
Laurel’s wishes. MacArthur gladly received the revelation from Fertig.  
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Fertig also shared interesting insights on the running of a successful guerrilla 
organization. To raise much needed funds, his men gathered up all the hair curlers 
in Misamis Occidental and established a monopoly on styling women’s hair.1496 
President Quezon greatly alleviated Fertig’s money problems early 1943 by 
approving the creation of the guerrilla-staffed Mindanao Currency Board and 
authorizing it to print emergency currency.  
Guerrilla operations took many forms. Fertig learned Japanese soldiers 
confiscated sweet potato like camotes from a tribe of Negritoes, only to find the 
tubers were actually camoteng cahoy. Though similar in appearance, if not peeled, 
diced and soaked for three days in a fast running stream the camoteng cahoy ripens 
with cyanide. The feasting confiscators quickly turned blue and died. Fertig then 
made it a rule for his guerrillas to obtain as much camoteng cahoy as they could find 
and mix into baskets of camotes the Japanese purchased in local markets. The 
surviving Japanese soldiers remained extremely wary of local merchants.1497  
With his new connection to the AIB, Fertig seemed a promising choice to 
serves as a central base for intelligence and sabotage operations across the 
Philippines as part of MacArthur’s return.  Options elsewhere were clearly less 
appealing.  In northern Luzon, Noble and Moses were trying but lacked control. On 
February 15, Merrill’s executive officer Cayler sent a message reminding them that 
Merrill was the senior American on Luzon and “therefore commander of all USAFFE 
guerrillas there.”1498 No one was listening to Merrill. Bicol saw a tug-of-war between 
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several leaders. In the Vasayas, Peralta played for power. On Negros, new 7th MD 
commander Abcede was under pressure from the Japanese around Kabakalan-
Binalbagan. Peralta supported Abcede on Negros and Cudilla on Marindduque. On 
Romblon he removed Captain Constantine Raval for incompetence and replaced him 
with Major Enrique Jurado.  
 
Panay, D440/R-609 
Apparently Peralta sent Raval to spy in Manila but he was shot at the 
Malacañang Palace in mid-1944. Jurado’s executive officer was Captain Mario 
Guarinia, a former attorney from Guimbal. SWPA concluded, “The organization is 
reported to have been weak and inefficient: the officers were lazy, there was 
considerable commandeering of goods from civilians, and loose control of officers 
and men from the top. Guarnia is reported to be a politician closely aligned with LTC 
Garcia in northern Panay and concerned mostly with his own personal power and 
profit; he did not work together well with Jurado.”1499  
On Panay, the uneasy alliance between Peralta’s guerrilla organization and 
Governor Confesor’s free government continued to frustrate the Japanese. Failing to 
defeat Peralta, the Japanese targeted Confesor. The puppet provincial governor of Iliolo 
Fermin Caram wrote a letter to Confesor pleading with him to surrender to local 
commander Colonel Furukawa and bring “peace and tranquility to the suffering people 
of Panay.”1500  Confesor was a thoughtful man, with degrees from the University of 
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California and the University of Chicago. He recognized Caram’s plea as a totem for 
larger questions on war and resistance. Why risk lives to resist the Japanese? Was the 
effort worth it? What were they fighting for? Confesor’s reply of 20 February became a 
rare historical document, an explanation of large motives and an inspiration to a nation. 
 Confesor began by declining to surrender, saying peace and tranquility were 
beyond the power of Filipinos as long as Japan and America were at war. “This is a total 
war in which the issues between the warring parties are less concerned with the territorial 
questions but more with forms of government, ways of life, and those that affect even the 
very thoughts, feeling, and sentiments of every man,” he wrote, “In other words, the 
questions at stake with respect to the Philippines is not whether Japan or the United 
States should possess it; but more fundamentally it is: what system of government should 
stand here and what ways of life, systems of social organizations and code of morals 
should govern our existence.” 1501 He recognized that through the act of resistance, the 
islands of the Philippines had the chance to become one nation. 
If Japan truly had the Filipinos best interests at heart, Confesor argued, they 
would withdraw and proclaim the Islands as neutral territory. If not, then the conditions 
set for independence were false and unachievable. “I agree with you when you say that 
our people are ‘experiencing unspeakable hardships and sufferings because of these 
hostilities,’ but you should realize that our people are bearing these burdens cheerfully 
because they know that they are doing it for a good and noble cause,” he wrote.1502 Japan 
forced an unacceptable way of life and system of government upon Filipinos. Fighting 





them was an opportunity for Filipinos to prove themselves worthy of choosing a better 
way of life and system of government. Confesor wrote: 
 “In other words, this war placed us in the crucible to assay the 
metal in our being. For as a people, we have been living during the 
last forty years under a regime of justice and liberty regulated only 
by universally accepted principles of constitutional government. 
We have come to enjoy personal privileges and civil liberties 
without much struggle, without undergoing any pain to attain 
them. They were practically a gift from a generous and 
magnanimous people – the people of the United States of America. 
Now, that Japan is attempting to destroy these liberties, should we 
not exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be willing to 
suffer for their defense? If our people are undergoing hardship 
now, and are doing it gladly, it is because we are willing to pay the 
price for these constitutional liberties and privileges.” 1503 
Confesor believed America represented democracy and freedom and was 
fighting for the Philippines not to keep them, but to protect them and would honor 
the promise to grant them independence. He noted that Japanese authorities, on the 
other hand, routinely condemned democracy and the principles of liberty. Filipinos 
like Caram had to make a choice between the two, a choice that would decide 
‘national principles.’ To surrender for peace and tranquility was to forfeit the 
worthwhile ideals and principles upon which to build a new nation. As an exemplar, 




Confesor pointed to Lincoln and his determination to suffer civil war as the price for 
higher principles. He closed with a quote: “suffering afford for the practice of many 
virtues – virtues which develop greatness and nobility of soul.”1504 The letter spread 
across the Islands, reprinted countless times and posted everywhere. The Japanese 
attempt to win over Confesor instead provided an opportunity to rally Filipinos to 
support the resistance and America’s return. 
 Villamor was becoming convinced of a need for one overall commander for 
guerrillas in the Islands. Peralta seemed a likely candidate. On 20 February, 
however, SWPA reminded Villamor: “As you know Peralta named commander of 
Panay district only. He has been specifically ordered December seventeenth to carry 
on no offensive activity unless by order [of] this headquarters and on February 
twelfth [to] cancel proposed armed demonstrations [on] Negros. – MacArthur.”1505 
The next day SWPA sent a reminder to Peralta: “Command areas will be 
progressively established based on existing military districts. Commander of 
districts will operate under control [of] this headquarters and assignments will be 
subject to review on basis of performance. LT. COL. W.W. Fertig (CE) INF. is 
designated to command the Tenth MIL District (Islands of Mindanao and Sulu). He 
will perfect intelligence net covering Ninth MIL District (Samar-Leyte). No officer of 
rank of general will be designated at present. LT. COL. Peralta will command Sixth 
MIL District (Panay) and is responsible for organization of intelligence net covering 
Seventh and Eighth MIL Districts. – MacArthur”1506 On 19 May, Fertig would enter 
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into his diary: “KAZ has named Villamor as C.O. 7th Mil. Dist. To try and bring into 
line the groups that are fighting. God help him. I would not like the job.” 1507 
On 2 March, propaganda platoon leader Lieutenant Hitomi reported from 
Panay: “the enemy has gained the upper hand in applying pressure on the citizenry 
… propaganda speeches without a show of force are of no value at all.”1508 He asked 
for troops to assist him. Lieutenant Colonel Ryoichi Totsuka, the commander of the 
107th Independent Infantry Battalion, also known as the Panay Defense Force, 
developed a “collective barrio operation” plan to forcibly relocate rural islanders 
into heavily populated urban areas so as to separate them from the guerrillas.1509 He 
tasked Hitomi to persuade the peasants to cooperate in the move.  After reporting 
this to the Propaganda Corps headquarters in May, however, a plane from Manila 
arrived to pick up Hitomi and deliver him to Fourteenth Army Vice Chief of Staff 
Colonel Naokata Utsunomiya, who also served as the Chief of General Affairs of the 
Japanese Military Administration.  
“Collective barrios have already failed on the China mainland,” Utsunomiya 
scolded Hitomi, “The only effect that they have is evoking the wrath of the 
people.”1510 He added: “I can’t believe that there is some fool now trying to 
implement the same plan out on Panay.”1511 Utsunomiya relieved Hitomi of his 
platoon and reassigned him to a desk in the Department of Information (Hodobu) in 
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Manila.1512 Hitomi believed that Governor Caram, had pressed the JMA to end the 
relocation plan.1513 With Hitomi gone, propaganda tailored to the people ended. 
The Japanese also renewed efforts to leverage the Catholic Church. On 6 
March, the Philippine Executive Committee, through Laurel’s Interior Department, 
ordered the Church to: “inculcate in the minds of their faithful or flock, loyalty to the 
constituted authorities and the absolute necessity on the part of all Filipinos to 
cooperate whole heartedly with the present administration in the establishment of 
peace and order in every nook and corner of the Philippines.”1514 Laurel issued a 
circular that stated: “Far from being political, the collaboration of all Churches is, in 
the ultimate analysis, a religious enterprise demanded by conscience.” 1515 
 
Southern Luzon, D450/R-599 
In Bohol, Turko had built a new VTG a camp in Caramoan in the third week of 
February. “Soon reports of rapes and other crimes against civilians in Caramoan 
surfaced,” Barrameda wrote, “Pitched battles ensued between the VTG and Camp 
Tinagawan men, some of whose relatives were said to have been violated and 
maltreated by Turko’s men.”1516 Reportedly, some of Dianela’s family were VTG 
victims but Turko’s men emerged as victors. Dianela took refuge in with Padua’s 
camp. When Turko followed, only the intervention of Lieutenant Adolfo Caro, 
Padua’s executive officer, saved Dianela from execution.1517  
                                                        
1512 Ibid., 8.  
1513 Ibid., 9.  
1514 Villamor, 189. 
1515 Ibid. 
1516 Barrameda, 153. 
1517 Ibid., 141-142. 
 
430 
Still on the run, TVGU commander Miranda limped on crutches with twelve 
men from Tangcong to Siruma and to Bahi (no Japanese there) arriving on 2 March. 
Former Bahi resident Jose Benvenuto (Benut) commanded a group of Turko’s VTG 
in the town. Six days later Miranda married recently promoted Lieutenant Estrada. 
The townspeople complained to Miranda of abuses by Benvenuto’s men, including 
extortion and rape. He ordered the VTG men to stop; they ignored him. Resident 
Ramon Piano went to Turko who sent Sergeant Floresta to investigate. “Apparently 
the sergeant saw Miranda’s young wife and liked what he saw,” noted 
Barrameda.1518  Floresta left town to report to Turko. On 14 March men from the 
VTG, apparently with Turko’s approval, plotted to poison both Miranda and Elias 
Madrid at a dance, but the targets failed to attend.  Floresta returned to Bahi a few 
days later as part of a large force led by Turko and Dianela and announced that he 
claimed Miranda’s wife as balato – something of a gratuity due for service – 
apparently with the intention of giving her to Turko. Cooler heads prevailed, 
assisted by the arrival of Judge Bajandi, and Turko departed. 
Madrid then discovered that Turko and Dianela planned to arrest Miranda 
for banditry and usurpation.1519  The plotters ordered to Miranda to report to Camp 
Tinawagan, but he fled Bahi. By now acting TVGU commander Aureus had been out 
of contact with Miranda for more than three months.  After a shootout with Turko’s 
men in Bahi, Miranda and his wife left on 21 March with eleven men for the remote 
town of Viga, far from Turko’s influence. There he spent three more months 
recuperating.  
                                                        




Although Turko’s VTG and Padua’s Camp Isarog guerrillas were partners, of 
the forty-six actions logged by the Padua’s forces between 27 January 1943 and 26 
December 1944, the VTG fought in only four. 1520   Yet, Turko carried 
disproportionate influence. In May, he met Dianelo in Padua’s camp in Goa, forced 
his capitulation, and absorbed the Camp Tinawagan guerrillas into the VTG. Turko 
immediately ordered the combined force to find and kill Miranda. He also married 
Caramoan Emilia Teoxon, expanding his kinship network with her powerful family, 
and made her brother his adjutant. 
 The tale grew more complicated. Lapus had recognized Miranda as the 
commander of the TVGU, but Zabat recognized Aureus in hopes of assuming his unit. 
Meanwhile the tug of war between Governor Escudero and Lapus took a turn in 
March when Escudero fell ill and went to Samar to recuperate. Lapus exploited his 
absence by convincing Merritt to drive Escudero off Samar.  In May, both Lapus and 
Escudero sent delegations to Panay searching for Peralta’s support.  The next month 
Lapus and Zabat met on Ticao Island, Masbate. 
 
Negros, D464/R-585 
 Villamor had to learn through the jungle telegraph that a SWPA team under 
‘Commander X’ (Parsons) with Captain Charles Smith and three others had landed 
on Mindanao in early March. “This mysterious commander was working to bring the 
independent groups on the huge island into line under Fertig,” he recalled, “There 
was no exchange of traffic between the Commander and me, and since Fertig were 
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getting along well – he had brought a set of silver eagles from Australia and had 
personally pinned them on Fertig – I decided to stay away from any involvement in 
Mindanao and turn my full attention to the other islands in the Visayas group.”1521 
Mellnik would add, “Though outwardly frank, Chick [Parsons] was most mysterious 
about his origin and mission.”1522 There was also a mysterious dynamic within the 
FIFTY team. Fertig noted on 16 March that Smith “encoded a telegram for the South. 
He would not let Parsons read it so he left in huff… Parsons considers himself as C.O. 
of the party while I consider them both as independent intelligence agents.” 1523 
Villamor had sent YuHico to Panay to Peralta, Jorge to Inginiero on Bohol, 
and Lieutenant Bartolome to Cabangban on Mindanao to reach Fertig. Villamor 
himself intended to go to Leyte. Finally, he sent Bell to Cebu in late March to meet 
Fenton. Villamor had considered going himself, but Bell convinced him that it would 
be better to send an American to see the erratic Fenton. Parsons discussed Fenton 
with Fertig and reported to SWPA: “In guerrilla areas today feelings are tense, 
pressure is great at times, and life does not have the high value of peacetimes.”1524 
Villamor’s position abruptly became precarious on 28 March when the 
Japanese sent troops into south Negros. Quinto reported to SWPA: “Japanese land, 
sea and air activities started very suddenly. Locations menaced. Expecting word 
from leader. All’s well my side presently.”1525 Fighting lasted four days and 
dispersed the PLANET team.   
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From Panay YuHico reported a positive impression of Peralta: “He has ten 
thousand men, half of them armed, with sub-machine guns and assorted firearms. 
He rules with an iron hand, under martial law, threatening to execute spies by drum 
head courts martial. His agents are everywhere. He fills the airwaves with messages 
to MacArthur.” 1526  Peralta despised Vargas and wanted Quezon to publicly 
denounce him.  YuHico told Villamor, “He doesn’t have much faith in you. He says 
your identity and mission are all over Negros and other islands. He claims your face 
has given you away. The people have deduced your mission.”1527 Peralta clearly 
thought Villamor not a suitable choice to lead the Philippine guerrilla movement.  
Villamor went against Peralta and radioed MacArthur recommending Quezon 
refrain from denouncing Vargas or any other apparent collaborators. “A 
denouncement by Quezon even or Vargas alone will include in the minds of the 
people all others,” he argued, “and it will undoubtedly encourage the shoot on sight 
policy of our soldiers which has already caused so many unjustified killings and 
which has actually boomeranged against us in that it has forced loyal people to seek 
Japanese protection.”1528 It may have been that Villamor’s family attachments to the 
Philippine elite made him more understanding of their relations with the occupation 
forces. 
Collaboration was indeed colored in shades of gray. Lapham, like most 
guerrilla leaders, sensed that, “Probably 90 percent of ordinary Filipinos, both 
farmers and local officials, in their hearts preferred Americans and American ideas 
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to their Japanese counterparts.”1529 Yet as months went by without any sign of 
America’s return, many acclimated themselves to Japanese suzerainty. According to 
Adalai Marquez: “By this time, after more than eighteen months of occupation, some 
of the men and women residents of Manila had begun to ‘play ball’ with the 
enemy.”1530 Asunción A “Lola” Pérez explained, “It is not nationality. It is human 
nature. It could happen in America. It was happening in Europe before the war came 
here. It will happen wherever there is tyranny, oppression, and a price for betrayal.” 
1531 
Some collaboration resulted from an earnest attempt to gain respect from the 
occupiers. Isabela Yumol won second prize in a contest among Filipino students 
reciting Japanese, with several Japanese generals applauding, and a neighbor 
commented: “you know, our little personal triumphs, like this, permitted and 
appreciated, make us feel less oppressed and subjugated.”1532 
Others were clearly coerced into cooperation. As Villamor explained, “To 
some extent the whole country was a prison camp.”1533  “No civilian, even though 
loyal and sympathetic to the cause, could be expected to render support if he were 
sure to be reported to the Japs and shortly thereafter to lose his head to a Samurai 
sword,” wrote Volckmann, “It was obvious that the spies, informers, and 
collaborators had to be eliminated; the ‘eyes and ears of the Japanese’ had to be 
destroyed.”1534  
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In one example of the pressure felt by Filipinos, a Mr. Gongong from Kiangan, 
who had been raised by American missionaries and graduated and taught at 
Silliman University, applied to Volckmann as a volunteer spy. After being given a 
week to reconsider, he took the oath of service from Volckmann and went on his 
first assignment which he performed well. On his third mission, however, the 
Japanese stopped him and found his Army pass. They sent Gongong, who had a 
family, to a reeducation school in Manila, and after a few months he emerged as a 
constabulary officer working for the Japanese. “Our agents next reported that he 
was making public speeches denouncing the United States and asking the people to 
cooperate with the Japanese,” Volckmann wrote.1535 He then moved to Lubuagan in 
Kalinga province to command a constabulary company. The guerrillas found and 
killed Mr. Gongong. Volckmann wondered how the Japanese could have turned him. 
“Perhaps,” he concluded, “with certain individuals too much education is as bad as 
too little.”1536 
Still other collaborators were simply duped. One day Miss Magdalona Leones 
walked into the 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry Regiment, USFIP-NL, in La Union and 
reported that a Filipino agent from SWPA had arrived in Manila and sent her to fetch 
the rosters of all guerrilla units in the local area. She said the SWPA agent had 
shown her official looking orders and U.S. Treasury checks proving his identity. In 
accordance with counter-espionage procedures, the guerrillas detained Miss Leones 
and sent her to Volckmann.  A background check verified that she had been raised in 
the church by American missionaries and was a deaconess. She had been an friend 
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of Volckmann’s close associates Miss Metzger and Miss Spessard in Ifugao. 
Volckmann decided to hold Miss Leones until he could check out the agent in Manila. 
Two weeks later he received a report: he was a Japanese agent named Reyes. 
Volkmann’s investigation, however, triggered the Japanese to round up American 
missionaries used by Reyes in Manila. “I explained to Maggie, as we now called her, 
what had been uncovered,” Volckmann wrote, “She was very distressed to learn of 
the fate of her missionary friends.”1537 He invited Leones to work with the guerrillas 
and she readily accepted. She moved fearlessly about Manila, collecting information 
through her church contacts, and despite being arrested three times with 
incriminating evidence, she managed to escape back to the guerrillas each time to 
carry on her work. “Maggie was eventually formally enlisted into the Philippine 
Army and inducted in to USAFIP, NL,” Volckmann noted, “After the war she was 
awarded the Silver Star, the only woman in USAFIP, NL to receive such a high 
award.”1538 
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9.  Networks 
15 March – 31 May 1943 
 
 With the arrival of more agents and supplies, MacArthur began to construct an 
intelligence network parallel to the guerrilla organization. Meanwhile a new wave of 
local guerrilla leaders, assisted by submarine delivered aid, replaced those who had 
fallen and continued to organize and expand their operations. As the war turned, 
however, Japan became more desperate to control the Filipinos. 
 
Mindanao to Leyte, D463/R-586 
On Mindanao, Fertig gave Chick Parsons another boat, the sixty-foot diesel 
Mitsui launch called the Nara Maru. Parsons started along the coast northward to 
establish a radio station watching over the strategic Surigao Strait between the 
northwestern tip of Mindanao and the southeastern edge of Leyte. Almost anything 
transiting east and west through the Philippines got funneled through this easily 
observable and heavily trafficked waterway. Parsons wanted a team on 
northeastern Mindanao under Fertig’s control and support. A second team on 
southeast Davao would ensure coverage of the waterway.1539  
Parsons went ashore at Medina in McClish’s area of operations. He was 
surprised to find McClish’s ‘service company’ replenishing the Nara Maru with fuel 
distilled from coconuts – oil that provided fewer BTUs than diesel fuel but still 
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burned clean and true.1540 McClish also provided Parsons with personnel for a coast-
watching station and a .50-caliber machine gun for his boat. When Parsons neared 
the tip of Surigao City, the most desirable site for a coast watcher team, he found the 
Japanese were already there and searching for him. He headed north across the 
strait for Panaon Island that extended like a finger to the south off Leyte.  
When they arrived the next morning, a team of yellow covered guerrillas 
greeted the Nara Maru.  The guerrillas had opened a wayward sea mine in hopes of 
using its picric acid to treat jungle sores and got coated with its dust. On the 
southeast edge of Panaon Island, Parsons emplaced Lieutenant Truman Hemingway 
and a team from McClish’s command with a radio to report ship traffic in the strait. 
He then turned north to Leyte. 
Soon the Davo coast watching station reported seeing a ship sink off shore. 
That one report turned the U.S. Navy into an enthusiastic supporter of the Philippine 
guerrillas.1541 Until that moment, the battle damage from many Navy attacks had 
remained unconfirmed with no credit given for ships they sunk. Coast watchers 
could now confirm the ships sunk and provide the credit. The Navy was ready to 
provide submarines, coast watchers and net control stations to support spotters in 
flashing traffic to Naval Intelligence in Perth. SWPA G-2 reported: “It was eventually 
decided (20 August 1943) to establish a large radio station in Mindanao through 
which all special Navy traffic would be passed directly to the Navy control station in 
Australia.”1542 
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Map 13: Coast Watcher Stations and Destruction of Japanese Shipping
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Getting guerrilla commanders to be enthusiastic about coast watchers was another 
matter. Parsons explained to Fertig: “One torpedo in half a second can blow up more 
ammunition than the Japs can shoot at you in a year. Another can kill more Japs on a 
troop transport than all the guerrillas in the Islands could ever kill.”1543 Leaders like 
Fertig reluctantly diverted their resources to support the coast watcher network, 
and big results followed. In April 1944, coast watchers’ observations would give the 
U.S Navy the initiative in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.1544 Their observations led to more 
rapid cycles for attacks.  Some 214 ship sightings reported in June 1944 grew to 405 
in October, despite fewer Japanese vessels.1545 
Before passing through the hundred-foot wide Panaon Straits, Parsons tried 
to coordinate with the guerrillas under Lieutenant Jose Nazareno defending the 
channel. He sent word ahead  
by relay runners but still took friendly fire with damage to external fuel tanks. 
Instead of being warned not to fire on the Nara Maru, the guerrillas had only 
received a warning: “Look out for a launch arriving this afternoon.”1546 Parsons 
entered into his journal: “I have been fired upon by friends many more times than 
by the enemy.”1547 
Before the end of March, Parsons reached Maasin in southwest Leyte. He 
learned that two guerrilla groups there were at war with each other and had just 
fought a battle leaving forty-five dead. “Captain” Gordon Lang, a former yeoman in 
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the Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite led one band of guerrillas.1548  American 
mining engineer “Major X” Chester Peters and his wife Filipina Julia Manapasi, also 
known as ‘Joan of Arc,’ led a group near Inopacan after being driven out of Ormoc.  
Parsons visited both and thought them incompatible and unreliable.  
Parsons then went to see old friends Miguel and Mariano Jesus Cuenco of a 
powerful Cebu family who lived on Leyte. They advised him that the only person 
with enough status to unite all the Leyte guerrillas was Colonel Ruperto K. of San 
Roque at the southern tip of the island. A former constabulary commander on Cebu 
and Bohol, he had commanded the 81st Infantry Division and was captured while 
fighting near Davao. He claimed McClish’s men freed him from his imprisonment at 
Butuan.1549  Indeed, after apparently losing Ausejo’s unit on Negros, Fertig had sent 
McClish to make contact with Kangleon on Samar and Leyte. SPWA would later 
report, “Kangleon acted forcibly under GHQ-Fertig instructions and encountered 
Peralta’s men on Leyte, Samar, etc.”1550 
The fifty-one year-old senior Philippine officer on Leyte told Parsons he was 
too old and too tired to play another role in the war. Convinced by Parsons’ promise 
of recognition and support from MacArthur, and the faith of the Cuenco brothers, 
Kangleon finally said, “Apparently it is not the time for a soldier to rest. You have 
made my duty clear, Commander Parsons. I have no choice. You may tell General 
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MacArthur that I am at his disposition.”1551 Satisfied, Parsons headed to Malitbog in 
southern Leyte on his way back to Mindanao.  
Parsons seemingly failed to consider other guerrillas in Leyte.  Alejandro 
Balderian, Cirisco and Isabelo Centrino, Antonio Cinco, Blas Miranda, Felimon 
Pabilona, and Felix Pamanian, among others, operated separate successful guerrilla 
units across center and north of the island. Willoughby would later especially note, 
“Miranda may have had possibilities not evident at the time but was frozen out by 
Kangleon-Fertig-Parsons.”1552 “Rumors circulated among them that Kangleon was 
compromised, that he had somehow collaborated to win release from 
imprisonment.  Balderian, for one, would never accept the colonel as his 
commander.  
In his study of the Leyte guerrillas, however, Elmer Lear suggested another 
reason for Parson’s appointment of Kangleon: he was the most palatable choice for 
command to MacArthur and the Philippines elites. Some accused Blas Miranda and 
his WLGWF of economic policies indicating “radical tendencies hostile to property 
interests.” 1553  Peralta’s endorsement could be dismissed given the lack of 
alternatives at the time. The hacienderos of western Leyte, including the Mejia and 
Tan families, long feared tenant revolt and saw ill intent behind Miranda’s practical 
decisions to divert harvests from markets, to protect delinquent tenants, and to 
confiscate lands for communal farming. Whatever his motivation, Miranda and men 
like him created expectations that threatened to alter post-war social power 
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dynamics. “To be sure,” Lear argued, “one might argue that from such beginnings 
collective farms in the Marxist sense might emerge. Hypothetically, this eventuality 
cannot be dismissed. Nonetheless, when one reminds himself that Leyte had no past 
history of agrarian radicalism and that neither Miranda nor any of his staff were 
socialists (much less Communists), it seems rather remote to think of the WLGWF as 
an instrument of deliberate left-wing social change.” 1554 Even so, the wishes of the 
hacienderos had to carry weight with those eyeing post war politics in the 
Philippines. 
The mayor of Malitbog led the town’s entire population in greeting Parsons 
with all the pomp and enthusiasm they would have mustered for MacArthur himself. 
Under the crush of the reception committee, the mayor fell through the dilapidated 
dock. Even that could not break the town’s fervor for Parsons who stayed only a 
couple of hours before heading to Mindanao.  
 
Northern Luzon, D456/R-593 
To avoid capture as Japanese patrols pushed into Apayo Province, on 8 
March, Praeger disassembled his homemade radio and had his men laboriously 
move it one mile from Kabugao to Bulu.1555 The set included heavy diesel engines 
and equipment, with parts weighing as much as 200 pounds. Foiled, the Japanese 
threatened and bribed natives to find the guerrillas’ new headquarters.1556 With the 
radio reassembled at Camp X, thirty-minutes outside of Dampalan, Captain John 
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Simmons fought through recurrent bouts of malaria to keep faulty engines working 
and maintain Praeger’s communication with the outside world.1557 
Praeger’s decision to move his radio merits examination. While pacifying the 
Philippines forty-years earlier, the U.S. Army pursued a “wearing-out policy” to 
make the people weary of guerrilla “impotent military efforts” and thus “withdraw 
their material and moral support for them.”1558 In this new war, guerrilla leaders 
learned once again the link between action and popular support. As Fertig said, “I 
am trying to make clear that any guerrilla has to keep the pressure on, everywhere 
and all the time, killing Japs. Otherwise, no public support.”1559 If Praeger left 
Kabugao without a fight, the locals might perceive his force as impotent. Bernard 
Norling explained, “the people in and around Apayao would never feel the same 
pride about the radio message they would have felt had a couple of CAF patrols 
knocked off a Japanese company in their immediate locality.”1560 Yet with its 
batteries, generators, fuel, spare parts, etc., Praeger’s radio set took forty porters to 
move, demanding an early decision whether to fight or flee. If he stayed too long to 
fight, he risked losing the cumbersome radio. If he left in time to move the radio, he 
could look weak. Philosophical debates about ‘winning the people’ came down in 
practice to command decisions such as when to move a radio. Praeger chose to 
move quickly. 
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Running from the enemy meant Praeger went off the air.  Moses and Noble, 
who by now claimed 6,000 guerrillas drawn from the remnants of the 14th, 121st and 
43rd Infantry, sent out a message by runners on 20 March to “All Guerrilla Leaders”:  
“Send your men out to all barrios in your territory and search for a 
‘ham’ or amateur radio operator who is capable of constructing a 
transmitter that will carry 300 + 400 miles. Try to get him all the 
spare parts you can to construct the transmitter as well as the 
power unit and generator. Induct him into the U.S. Army. Place set 
on highest mountain in your vicinity. You are authorized to sign 
vouchers for all materials necessary to build this set. Also procure 
on regular commercial battery radio set in order to receive short 
wave messages. Make every effort to get this in operation by May 
1st. A special secret messenger will arrive at your Headquarters 
prior to May 1st giving you the proper call letters, frequency and 
hours of daily contact.” 1561  
The AIB instructed Villamor to smuggle a radio into Manila.  He had a Panay 
radioman, Jose Casteñada, memorize the construction of a radio, disassemble it, and pack 
the parts in a load of fruit. With two other PLANET members, Casteñada sailed a small 
boat to Luzon and brazenly walked through Japanese checkpoints all the way to Manila, 
telling any soldiers who stopped them that the fruit was meant for a Japanese officers’ 
mess table.1562 Casteñada arrived at the house of AIB agent Frank Jones, reassembled the 
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radio, and brought the Manila guerrillas onto the Villamor net. Villmor then sent Rodolfo 
Ignacio to smuggle the forwarding radio to Major Ricardo L. Benedicto on Mindoro.1563 
 Without radios, guerrilla leaders had to travel to make important 
communications. In March, Ramsey took a long, dangerous journey north through 
the area occupied by 10,000 Japanese troops near Fort Stotsenberg. At Tarlac he 
met with Captain Manuel Reyes who guided him through Nueva Ecija and 
Pangasinan provinces. Ramsey organized guerrillas in Bayambong, Claro Camacho’s 
home village. Anderson, who now ran his own guerrillas in Bulacan and Tayabas, 
went with Ramsey to organize east central Luzon. While they travelled, a ‘pro-
Japanese Filipino agent’ obtained Anderson’s organization roster and sparked a 
purge that hurt the ECLGF. “Andy had good men,” noted Yay Panlilio, “for the good 
are magnets for those of the same metal.” 1564 
On 17 March, the Philippine Executive Committee again endorsed the 
Japanese Military Administration practice from Manila the previous August and 
issued Executive Order 137 ordering the formation of Neighborhood Associations 
“as a tool to keep them informed on the presence of guerrillas, especially wanted 
one.”1565 They hoped to separate the people from the guerrillas. Association 
members were known as rondas (not to be confused with a similiarly named group 
of collaborationist bandits in Sipocot). Males from eleven acted as sentries with 
bamboo drums to warn of a stranger’s appearance in towns. By April there were 
reportedly 13,192 neighborhood associations with over 900,000 members in and 
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around Manila alone.1566 More and more, the guerrillas had to rely on a thin reed of 
trusted civilian support. This environment especially hampered their acquisition of 
medical support. 
The JMA was by now very concerned about Filipino reaction to the hardships of 
occupation, especially hunger.  The commander of the forces occupying Leyte since 
October, 36th Independent Infantry Garrison Battalion Colonel Yoshitsugu Omuri, issued 
a proclamation:  
“With respect to the food problem, I say that all of us have to 
make some personal sacrifices. This is the consequence of war. 
It is not only you who suffer from want of food. Everybody 
including America, England, Japan, China and all other nations 
engaged in war suffers from food shortage. Germany lost in the 
last war because of food shortage. Germany is winning today 
because she has learned a lesson about making herself a self-
sufficient nation. Let us not depend upon Gandara [a rice-
producing municipality in Samar] for rice. Even when the 
Japanese go there, they are not sure whether or not there is 
rice. Nobody knows when this war will end. Let us plant our 
own rice. This constitutes one of our moral disciplines. Sky-
high price [sic] of commodities is an American philosophy. 
Price [sic] should be controlled by the government. But the 
government cannot do this work alone. All of us have to work 
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together. As long as the war lasts, there will be problem of 
food.” 1567 
The Neighborhood Association failed to alleviate such problems. Any success 
in controlling local populations with identification cards, checkpoints on travel, or 
the allocation of food and medicine, faced counterbalancing moral opposition. Brian 
Hardesty believed this was the cost of not deploying more local garrisons to live 
among the people so as to convince the population that the occupiers were “there to 
stay.”1568 Yet, without sufficient numbers of troops and operating within cultural 
attitudes dictating superiority over subjugated people, the Japanese fell back on 
customs practiced in Japan and its earlier conquests.  
News suddenly rocked the northern Luzon guerrillas: Charles Cushing had 
surrendered. “Charles was a nervous man and, unlike his brothers Walter and 
James, had never seemed to me to be cut out for guerrilla life,” Lapham 
rationalized.1569 The Japanese had captured and imprisoned Cushing’s wife in Santo 
Tomas. After interrogation, they released her under the promise that if she would 
convince her husband to surrender to see his wife and children and know that they 
would be well treated. Cushing’s guerrillas, under Telesforo Palaruan and Feliciano 
Nobres, joined Lapham’s LGAF. 
Cushing’s capture was apart of a broader campaign in the region. In the 
Markings area, Panlilio recalled, “The Japs patrolled oftener and oftener, in groups 
ranging from 30 to 150. We moved back. We moved forward. We side-stepped. We 
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sat tight.”1570 From August through April Markings Guerrillas dodged the Japanese 
patrols in and around Kalinawan, Rawang, Makantog, Sulok, Mayton and Kanumay. 
“Those who failed to move got run over,” said Panlilio.1571  
The Japanese captured Governor Marcelo Adduru on 1 April, dealing a severe 
blow to the Cagayan-Apayao Guerrilla Force.1572 Shortly thereafter, the hundred 
men of Alban’s Guerrillas went inactive in the hills near Carazi, Ilocos Norte. Then on 
13 April, Captain Manuel Enriquez surrendered. Volckmann reported, “The Japs had 
taken Enriquez’s wife and children into custody as hostages, and at his wife’s 
pleading Enriquez surrendered. After his surrender he attempted to keep in contact 
and work with the guerillas.”1573 The Japanese imprisoned Enriquez in Fort 
Santiago. The remaining 1,000 armed men of 14th infantry passed to Major Romulo 
Manriquez.1574 The Japanese tactics of capturing guerrilla family members was 
paying dividends. Still, when one guerrilla surrendered, it seemed two more 
volunteers arrived to take their place. 
 
Negros, D486/R-563 
On 7 April, SWPA sent a message to Villamor: “Information that serious 
friction exists between allied military groups in Negros is profoundly disturbing 
particularly in present dangerous circumstances. I am directing all leaders faithfully 
to cooperate against the common enemy.”1575  MacArthur promised to designate a 
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new 7th Military District commander soon, but until then he would hold all 
commanders responsible for their units. Villamor issued a call for local guerrillas to 
cooperate. Gador refused and reminded Villamor that he was the one true 
commander by virtue of his higher rank. In doing so, Gador further irritated his 
fellow guerrillas and several of his own officers who desired to be part of the SWPA. 
Meanwhile Peralta continued to support Mata as commander in Negros while Fertig 
endorsed Ausejo. Villamor had come to the conclusion that Abcede was the best 
choice for Negros commander.  
The next day Villamor radioed SWPA a report on Peralta: “He is very strong 
against released prisoners and has verbally established the policy of having all 
released prisoners arrested and placed in confinement. His desire to have absolute 
control over other units is confirmed by his remark to [YuHico] that he had planned 
to furnish these with transmitters purposely constructed to be incapable of 
transmitting to you…”1576 Still, Villamor admired the commander on Panay. He 
explained, “Peralta was a good soldier. But he was fuming with exasperation. His 
bitterness was a maddening waste. He was not conveying to MacArthur the real 
situation; he made no mention of his arguments with Fertig or Fenton, nor of 
Ausejo’s refusal to recognize him. And he said nothing about the rivalries existing in 
Negros. Nor had he made mention of the many other organizational problems.”1577 
On 12 April, Fertig reported, “Radio from Peralta or rather Abcede suggests that 
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they might be considering an armistice which will make it that much tougher on 
us.”1578 
 Villamor began to feel that he could not bring unity to the Philippine 
guerrillas. He sent word to MacArthur: “There are many problems now whose 
solutions can only come from you or Quezon. Example questions re taxes, courts and 
their jurisdictions, money, status of men taken into the services since the fall, etc. I 
feel that unless policies are established soon there is a danger that the Army will 
eventually lose the full backing of the civilians without which the Army will not long 
exist.”1579 SWPA understood. G-2 noted: “The commanders have always been 
somewhat distrustful of one another. Cushing has complained that Ingeniero’s 
agents were operating in Cebu. Fertig allows no traffic to and from Negros, etc.”1580 
The guerrilla leaders even known to shut down each other’s radios in their areas for 




Near Manila, Lapham collected more guerrillas. One was Captain Charles 
Putnam, an American mining engineer commissioned into the Army during the 
fighting on Bataan. He was a hard drinking, loud man who organized his own 
guerrillas in the Lingayen Gulf region. “He had lived among the Filipinos, obviously 
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liked them, and understood them well,” Lapham noted, “He behaved toward them 
like an amiable despot and was extremely popular with his ‘subjects.’”1581 
Lapham received money and information from the Escoda Group, prominent 
Manila citizens organized in part by New York Herald Tribune reporter Tony Escoda 
and his wife Josefa. The Escoda Group consisted of primarily young female 
socialites. Many members of the group, including the Escodas, were eventually 
caught, imprisoned and beheaded in Manila’s old Chinese cemetery.1582  One 
member, Ramona ‘Mona’ Snyder, was with relatives in the country, one of who was a 
Lapham lieutenant, when she learned that the guerrilla leader was nearby and 
severely ill. “Though she had never seen me before,” recalled Lapham, “she showed 
up one day well supplied with money, medicine, and provisions and began to try to 
nurse me back to health.”1583  Later introduced to Ramsey, Mona fell in love. 
According to Lapham, “In rapid succession she became his girlfriend, then an 
intermediary between him and Manuel Roxas.”1584 
The time of occupation was especially dangerous for women. They lived 
under constant threat of sexual assault and rape by the Japanese or armed bands. 
President Quezon noted, “Many of the girls died from this brutal treatment and 
nothing could have been more certain to leave a permanent scar of deep hatred 
among the Filipinos against the conquerors than these awful crimes.”1585 Describing 
attacks by indigenous bandits, Barrameda wrote, “It was horrible enough to be 
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molested and violated by the armed ghouls of San Jose and Rey. But the sons of 
Nippon were infinitely worse. They not only raped women; they soiled Filipino 
womanhood by carting off their victims to army-run brothels to serve the libidinous 
drive of their soldiers.” 1586  
This sense of insult to ‘Filipino womanhood’ motivated fierce resistance. 
Early on Quezon sent General Francisco and General De Jesus to inspect the troops 
fighting on Bataan. They reported on the desperate conditions facing the men. “They 
also told me,” recalled Quezon, “of the increasingly grim determination on the part 
of our men to fight as they learned of the abuses and atrocities committed by the 
Japanese soldiers, especially the raping of Filipino women.”1587 Previous divisions of 
class and clan fell away; the victims were Filipina. 
Many women had to make hard choices against such dangers.  Almost every 
town saw morally good women and girls turn to prostitution to feed their families. 
Others turned to acts of collaboration. Adalia Marquez recalled, “I knew one such 
woman well. She was truly beautiful. I shall refer to her only as Linda. Her friend 
was Colonel Nagahama, Chief of the Japanese Military Police [Kempeitai] in the 
Philippines. She really had him ‘wrapped around her finger.’”1588 Beauty was an 
exceptionally vulnerable condition. Collaborators such as Linda served a vital social 
function however. On many occasions, they acted as gateways for Filipinos to access 
Japanese authorities while seeking justice for some wrong. Adalia used Linda to 
reach her husband Tony in prison. 
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A legion of other women joined the resistance and provided support for 
many guerrillas. Larger organizations frequently included Women’s Auxiliary 
Service (WAS) units making clothes, acting as nurses, or providing entertainment. 
Women served as vital intelligence assets and couriers. The Escoda Group socialites 
raised money and supplies and suffered for it.1589 In Bicol, the Daughters of Tandang 
Sora and the Daughters of Liberty provided intelligence, field first aid, and acted as 
camp orderlies. Young female couriers tucked messages into their braided hair.1590 
The Daughters selected Paz Caguia as their president and their officers included 
Ezperanza Dañgalan, Modesta Pancho, Rosario Sicad Peña, Maria Lareza Uy Abitria 
and Soledad Uy-Boco. They organized a food sales cooperative to raise money for 
local guerrillas. To deliver the monies, the women braved not only Japanese lines 
but also the infighting between the Bicol guerrilla groups.1591 
 Other women made their marks as individuals. Claire Phillips gathered 
intelligence while working as a hostess in a cabaret for Japanese officers and earned 
the nickname ‘High Pockets’ for carrying valuable information in her bra.1592 
American Dorothy de la Fuente posed as a Filipina and ran the Tsubahi, a bar 
reserved by the Japanese military where she collected intelligence and cash for the 
guerrillas. She was arrested and disappeared into Fort Santiago prison.1593 Five-
foot-tall nurse Lieutenant Estella Remito in Bucanasi amazed Don Willis with her 
ability to lead marches across jungle mountains at a pace of twenty miles per 
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day.1594  Miss Trinidad Díaz, a cashier in the Binangonan cement factory, “a tomboy, 
but so gracious of heart she gave no offense nowhere,” served as a lieutenant in 
Marking’s Guerrillas, “policing the district with her own men, liquidating a spy, 
laying an intelligence network to catch more.” 1595 She led ambushes and killed 
Japanese soldiers. The Japanese finally captured her and tortured her for thirty-two 
days before she died.  
Then, of course, there was Yay Panlilio. A well-known newspaper reporter 
and radio broadcaster before the war, she left her children to join Marking’s 
guerrillas. She quickly became his lover and co-commander, explaining “War was 
our marriage, the guerrillas our sons.”1596 She faced resentment from the men 
around Marking and eventually had to confront his bodyguard, Cabalhin. “He said 
something, I said something,” Panlilio remembered, “he placed his hand on his 
sidearm, I challenged him to pull it and reached for my own.”1597 Marking 
intervened with gun drawn on his bodyguard who left in tears. Panlilio’s 
relationship with Marking was not easy. “A week before, in a jealous fit,” she wrote, 
“he had thrown me on the ground, leaped over me to grab me up by my shirt front, 
slung me up over his shoulder after a couple of slaps, and carried me to the creek to 
hold me under water, thrashing and kicking and helpless in his big paws. …Before 
that he had fired his .45 twice past my left ear at two feet, trying to put the fear of 
the Lord in me, and it did, it did.”1598 Panlilio described Marking’s attitude towards 
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her: “’Don’t forget you belong to me. I catch you making eyes, I’ll black them both.’ 
And my unspoken retort, ‘If I weighed 135 and you weighed 90, it’d be the other 
way around, buddy boy.’”1599 
Some guerrilla leaders tried to avoid romantic entanglements. Ramsey said 
he and Barker agreed to remain celibate. “We had heard reports of guerrilla officers 
compromised by their relations with local women,” Ramsey explained, “either 
directly through treachery or because of a jealous boyfriend or husband.”1600 
Lapham concurred, “Romantic attachments sometimes caused trouble: leaders and 
whole units were betrayed to rival units or to the Japanese by ‘other women,’ 
outraged wives, vengeful husbands, or disgruntled boyfriends.”1601 Units routinely 
established codes of conduct to prevent liaisons between male and female guerrillas 
that bred corrosive jealousies and undermined discipline. “Code violators were 
summarily dismissed to prevent bad blood and demoralization in the 
organization.”1602 Intentions aside, human nature inevitably came into play. Ramsey 
became involved with his agent Ramona Snyder and guerrilla Doyle Decker even 
reported that the Huks wanted Ramsey apprehended “for making improper 
advances to Filipino women.”1603 
 Guerrilla memoirs are chocked full of their observations of Filipinas: “rich 
wavy black hair, a nice figure, and a really great personality,” “good female 
companionship,” and “beautifully proportioned, fully developed figure.”1604 The men 
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participated in customs of courtship that ranged from politicking with parents, to 
accepting betel nut bags or rolled cigarettes, to meeting under the trees outside 
dance halls, to ritual abductions of young women from their homes.1605 Willis once 
turned down a concubine sent to him as a gift from a wealthy benefactor but noted, 
“Actually the practice wasn’t that unusual in the Philippines, as many businessmen 
had girlfriends living in apartments or houses conveniently located to their places of 
business.”1606 On Samar “almost all of the Americans had their own huts, equipped 
with native housekeepers of the female variety.”1607 Fertig’s men were happy to be 
stationed in Lanao where, as John Keats explained, “It was not that the Moro girls 
were immodest; they were merely helpful. They sincerely believed that men sicken 
if they do not enjoy regular sexual intercourse, and it seemed that none of them 
wished the Americans to become ill.”1608 
 Thorp went into the jungle with his secretary and mistress Herminia Dizon. A 
woman named Maria nursed a desperately ill Villamor back to health in June 1943; 
he married her, and then divorced her when the war ended.1609 Henry Clay 
O’Connor married a Negrito daughter of a chief, had children with her, and left her 
when MacArthur returned.1610 Bob Stahl wistfully recalled a platonic relationship 
with a beautiful young daughter of Mayor Jesus Medenilla of San Narciso. He 
accepted a silver ring from her, not knowing that by this local custom a girl gave her 
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intended the ring to slip on her finger at their wedding. After he returned to the 
states, he received a letter from one of the disheartened girl’s cousins asking for the 
ring back.1611  
 For the Japanese, relations with Philippine women were problematic. In 
Korea, the Japanese encouraged miscegenation as a method of colonial 
incorporation, but this had a double edge.  “While this policy celebrated the 
essential sameness of Korean and Japanese and made it possible to praise mixed 
couples as conjugal models for the empire, such gestures of inclusion preserved the 
possibility of extreme violence against those judged incapable of living up to 
expectations of cultural Japaneseness,” T. Fujitani explained, “In other words, it was 
precisely the assumption that Koreans and Japanese had the opportunity to be 
equals that legitimated abuse against those deemed (in)different.”1612 Filipinas 
suffered doubly in that they did not share an “essential sameness” with the 
Japanese, and in that they were women. 
 A British observer wrote in 1912: “It has been conclusively shown that at 
present the social structure of Japan rests upon loose foundations; that woman, 
though not subjected to physical ill-treatment, is precluded from exercising a will of 
her own; and that the prince no less than the peasant is not slow to take advantage 
of a system that gives rein to the passions.”1613 Lawrence Lawton, future member of 
the House of Commons, also noted, “It is not realized that in the midst of a country 
which perhaps more than any other part of the world has been endowed with the 
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glorious beauties of nature, thousands of women, and even little girls, are enslaved 
in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings 
of Christianity are accepted.”1614 The Japanese carried these attitudes with them to 
the Philippines.  
The JMA’s Philippine Research Commission (Hito Chosa Iinkai) recommended 
that Filipino women confine themselves to the affairs of the home and be re-
educated to accept that they “are not in themselves… needed in passing judgment 
upon questions of public policy or taking proper measures regarding them.”1615 
Filipino women needed to accept female Japanese values and “work quietly and 
unobtrusively in the family and for the neighborhood associations, enabling their 
husbands to work outside, completely freed from the cares of their families, thus 
drawing to themselves the unbound gratitude and respect of their men.”1616 To 
instill these values, the commission recommended separate schools and curriculum 
for girls.  
 
Central Luzon, D487/R-562 
Meanwhile, Marking’s Guerrillas conducted a string of assassination of 
Japanese Military Police in Manila.1617  On 8 April, the Chief of the Central Luzon 
Military Police, Captain Ikeda, sent a letter to Augustin (Marking) and Panlilio by 
name offering them a chance to surrender within ten days or face attack. “I hope you 
will understand this present situation, and be a historic man for the establishment 
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of the New Philippines so that you will be consider [sic] second to Rizal,” Ikeda 
wrote.1618  The letter continued: “I am sure that the day may come that you will 
repaint [sic] if you continue the nothing dispute against the New Government or the 
Japanese Imperial Force. I am going to serve you as a man of real Philippines if you 
come to me and surrender, I will do the most possible was for your security and 
protection, as I, Chief of Central Luzon Military Police.” 1619 At Panlilio’s urging, 
Marking reluctantly dispersed his men and ordered them to lay low. At the deadline, 
the Japanese launched a massive three-week campaign and detained, tortured and 
executed civilians.   
During a full moon on 18 April, Japanese patrols arrived at Marking’s base on 
Mount Kanumay. For a full day, they drove off the guerrillas, killed those they 
encountered, burned the local crops, and left. Then they surprisingly returned, 
found proof that guerrillas were still in the area, and began hunting again in earnest.  
For four days Marking and forty-nine of his followers evaded the Japanese, always 
staying just one step ahead of their pursuers.1620 Finally, they slipped through the 
enemy net to safety.  
 Many guerrilla leaders lived in paranoid fear of betrayal, and Marking was no 
exception. He realized that peasant men like him, even more than Americans, 
threatened elites like Villamor and Peralta. Across the Islands former members of 
the lower classes had gained power from conditions caused by the Japanese 
invasion. As Brian Fegan observed: “The Pacific War opened new opportunities for 
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political strong men drawn from classes below the old landed elite.”1621 Marking 
was one such man. 
Ricardo ‘Kardeng’ de Guzman, from a family of rice cultivators in Barrio Buga 
near San Miguel, was another. His older brothers, Amando and Bienvenido left home 
to manage estates for the wealthy and well-connected Doña Narcisa Buencamino-de 
Leon, “Doña Sisang,” who represented the absentee landlord de Leon family. 
Kardeng took over the family farm and in 1928 became a leader of the village 
peasant union Kapatirang Magsasaka (KM), where he protected villagers from 
rustlers sent by landlords to intimidate tenants by stealing their water buffalo and 
threatening their property. Kardeng gained a good reputation that he then used to 
deliver votes from Buga-Pinambaran to patron landowners who in turn provided 
political protection for him as a union leader.1622 
The war brought Kardeng power. With hundreds of rifles and stores of 
ammunition from a nearby abandoned army camp, he formed an armed band of 
followers loosely affiliated with the USAFFE. Kardeng’s son Rubing joined Bernard 
Anderson’s guerrillas as a scout. The Japanese installed one of his cousins as town 
mayor. Amando used Kardeng’s band to enrich himself in estate management and 
politics but Bienvendio died at the hands of bandits in 1943. Of his younger 
brothers, Andron joined the KMPM and the Huks while Doña Sisang hired Graciano 
(Grasing) to manage her estates. All these connections increased opportunities for 
more power. “The war justified robbing ‘collaborator’ merchants moving valuable 
cargoes along the highway,” Fegan wrote, “Kardeng distributed part of the proceeds 
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to the USAFFE and Huk guerrillas, in a style that was at once supportive of the 
patriots fighting a national enemy and payment of a kind of tribute by an 
independent political entrepreneur in recognition of superior force.” 1623  
Old enemies in the Ganaps and Sakdals, including an in-law, betrayed 
Kardeng. Japanese soldiers and Constabulary troops raided his house, arrested 
Kardeng, threw him into Fort Santiago and tortured him. Rubing took over his group 
and allied them with Anderson. When the Americans arrived and Kardeng returned 
from prison, the family and their men ‘obtained’ U.S. army vehicles “for a few bottles 
of rum, some fresh food, or a few minutes with a woman,” and hauled lumber and 
supplies into rebuilding Manila. 1624 Andron returned to farming, Grasing and 
Kardeng grew rich in the service of Doña Sisang.  Kardeng, and men like him, 
became important members of a new social order. 
 
Northern Luzon, D495/R-554 
By mid-March Blackburn was finally well enough to leave Volckmann’s camp 
in Ifugao and search for any guerrillas remaining in Benguet. “We just didn’t have 
any information. We had been cut off from everything,” he said, “My objective was to 
find out who was still around after the intense Jap patrol activity, and what the 
attitude of the native population was after such an ordeal.”1625  After two weeks, he 
returned with an American, Mr. Fish, who reported that the Japanese had been 
campaigning since the October attacks ordered by Moses. “I learned that large 
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quantities of weapons had been captured when the Japs moved out,” Blackburn 
reported, “and that a lot of guerrillas had been captured. People had been scattered 
to the four winds.”1626  
The Japanese captured Herb Swick in Uding, and shot Dr. Biason’s wife Daisy. 
Fish agreed to go back to Benguet and find guerrillas.  After he left, Blackburn and 
Volckmann found that the Japanese knew they were in Antipolo and were heading 
their way. The two Americans escaped by night to Haliap. Volckmann continued to 
try to reorganize his guerrilla force and extend his intelligence network. “To 
supplement our fixed agents, we employed special agents who traveled widely 
under various guises as merchants or peddlers,” he recalled.1627  Not until 16 April 
would a search party sent by Volckmann into Benguet find a radio receiver for his 
headquarters. “This was the start of the beginning,” said Blackburn.1628 
 
Visayas, D497/R-552 
On 18 April, Vargas visited Negros and Panay with Jose Tulo as part of a 
pacification tour. The Japanese apparently felt satisfied with the military situation in 
the Philippines that by month’s end they would transfer the 2nd Infantry Division to 
the South-Eastern Area. Recruiting enough manpower to support industry, however, 
remained a problem and led an increasingly reliance on Filipinos.  
In April, the Southern General Army issued “Details in Implementing Military 
Auxiliary Regulations” which authorized the formation of a military auxiliary (Heiho 
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Kitei) defined as “locally recruited non-Japanese soldiers attached to the Japanese 
military in order to supplement military action.” 1629  Auxiliary units in the 
Philippines included “the Navy Free Unit” (Kaigun Jiyutai) in Zamboanga, the Pro-
Japanese Unit (Shin’nichi Tai) in Nueva Ecija, the Standing Army in Negros 
Occidental, and the National Unity of the Children of Rizal (Pambansang Pagkakaisa 
ng mga Anak ni Rizal – PAMPAR) in Laguna and Rizal provinces.  
Several weeks earlier the JMA Department of Industries had inspected the 
Antique copper mine in Panay and reported operations there had not yet reached 
the ore extraction phase.1630  In April the Fourteenth Army fired mine manager 
Mineo Mori and would replace him with Hideo Yamazaki in July. Not for another 
twelve months would Antique reach its target of 19,000 tons of copper ore, but 
increasing guerrilla activity and a lack of transportation would close the mine in 
November 1944.  
Vargas saw the turmoil Peralta’s men caused on Panay. He reported to the 
JMA, “Capiz [on Panay] is totally hopeless. Not a single official was in office. 
Provincial and municipal officials have been taken by guerrillas.”1631 Asked about 
Tomas Confesor, Vargas answered, “He is hopeless. Nobody can make him give up. 
We will go get him!”1632 Vargas suggested to Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff, General 
Takaji Wachi, that the Japanese arm the Iloilo constabulary so they could get 
Confessor and ‘clean up’ the province. 
                                                        
1629 Motoe, 73. “It is said that this was practiced only in Malaya, Sumatra, Burma, Java, and Borneo, but the 
United Nippon (UN) soldiers in the Philippines were definitely heiho or military auxiliaries.”  
1630 Setsuho, 148. 




Meanwhile Bell returned to Villamor on Negros seven weeks after leaving for 
Cebu. He reported that he had landed in southern Cebu and was ‘escorted’ to 
Fenton’s headquarters in Balanbar.  In a fit of rage Fenton told Bell: “Tell Villamor 
we don’t want him or anyone else to butt into our affairs.” 1633 Bell found two 
delegations he had sent earlier to Cebu held in Fenton’s prison. He also saw that 
Fenton and Cushing had a well-organized, well-armed force and had killed more 
Japanese than any other group in the Visayas. They had ‘finished’ most of the 
mayors and surrounded the Japanese in Toledo, Carcar, and Cebu City leading to 
recent Japanese reinforcement.  
When Bell offered recognition and aid from SWPA, Fenton replied, “To hell 
with that stuff. We don’t want ‘recognition’ or anything like that from MacArthur or 
anybody else until the American flag is flying over here again.”1634 Fenton had Bell 
and his men escorted from the island with a warning: “Tell Villamor next time not to 
expect the return of anyone he decides to send – if he is crazy enough to do so.”1635 
Cushing took Bell to his boat and said he hoped his report would not be all bad, then 
added, “But I cannot go on like this much longer.”1636 
Blackburn had learned that the power enjoyed by guerrillas “represented a 
beautiful way for the people to get even with their enemies.”1637 Indeed, there was a 
political side to Fenton’s campaign of executions. Studies show that among the more 
than sixty executions Fenton ordered between July and December 1942, his Filipino 
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aides had selected a number of politically prominent Cebuanos.1638  The most 
prominent aide was Ramon Durano, later known the “Caesar of Cebu,” who before 
the war had lost the First District Congressional seat to Osmeña ally Celestino 
Rodriguez. Durano joined Fenton as a captain and worked as a supply and 
intelligence officer. In these roles he provided the guerrilla leader with money, 
supplies and “young women.”1639 “Under Fenton’s authority,” Michael Cullinane 
explained, “Durano is said to have used his position in the guerrillas to arrest, try, 
and summarily execute prewar political figures in the First District suspected of 
collaborating with the Japanese. After the war, it was alleged that many of these 
executions were part of a systematic elimination of the political allies of Celestino 
Rodriguez.” 1640  To prevent similar malfeasance, Blackburn explained that in 
Volckmann’s area, “We felt that we should make the judgment [on executions], even 
though it sounds dictatorial, because we didn’t have any axe to grind other than the 
accomplishment of our mission, whereas, many of these people had a hell of a lot of 
axes to grind.”1641  
On his own Fenton, the former radio announcer, had managed to broadcast 
on a radio station identified as WJE. According to MacArthur’s G-2, “The Cebu radio 
station was one of the more unfortunate incidents in the history of radio contacts in 
the Philippines.”1642 On 14 February 1943 the War Department notified SWPA that 
this station broadcasting “in the clear, information of value to the enemy and would 
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not cease despite War Department orders.”1643 SWPA futilely tried through Villamor 
and Peralta to get Fenton to stop. After about thirty days the station went silent and 
soon thereafter fell into Japanese hands. The Cebu guerrillas would remain without 
a radio until Villamor provided them with on in late 1943. 
On Marinduque, Peralta’s hand-picked commander, 1934 graduate of the U.S. 
Naval Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, brought back his predecessor, 
American Charles Hickok, from assignment on Tablas Island. Peralta had tasked 
Jurado to plan and execute penetration into Luzon. With this in mind, Jurado 
ordered Hickok to organize a guerrilla team to secure stopovers for agents moving 
between Panay and Luzon.   
 
Mindanao, D504/R-545 
Fertig’s agents on Mindanao made contact with a band of three hundred 
Chinese guerrillas under Albert I.N. Kwok east of Jesselton in North Borneo. 
Through Lieutenant Jose Valera, the 10th MD raised money and arms from anti-
Japanese civilians on the Borneo coast. Kwok claimed to have been a Chinese Army 
doctor assigned to intelligence in Malaya and Sarawak in 1937.1644  When Moro 
traders informed him of guerrillas under Colonel Suarez in Tawi Tawi, Kwok 
persuaded them to take him there in May. He made a second trip to Tawi Tawi in 
June and brought money and medical supplies for the guerrillas. As a reward, Fertig 
commissioned Kwok as Third Lieutenant. 
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Fertig decided to send the disgruntled Morgan on another round of travels, 
this time to other islands. Morgan went first from Surigao to Leyte hoping to unite 
the contested 9th MD an (Leyte and Samar) under Colonel Kangleon who, after 
contact by Parsons, had reached out to Fertig for support. Unsuccessful, Morgan 
moved on to Siquijor and recruited guerrilla leader Major Benito Cunanan to 
command Cebu. Cunanan believed Morgan was an agent of SWPA, but the guerrillas 
on Cebu were unconvinced. The resulting contest among Cebu guerrillas led to hard 
feelings between Cunanan and the 10th MD.  Morgan went on to Negros where he 
tried to recruit Lieutenant Colonel Gador to lead the 7th MD. 
On Negros, Morgan met Villamor and brought him arms, ammunition, and 
other supplies 
He told Villamor how he had made Fertig a general by “taking a lesson from Mein 
Kampf that a lie will be believed if it is big enough.”1645 Morgan claimed it was his 
plan that had brought men out of hiding and turned them into a guerrilla 
organization across Mindanao. Villamor saw Morgan as a “proud and brave man,” a 
“restless man, frustrated by orders that came later to only ‘annoy’ the enemy,” who 
fought many battles and shared credit.1646 Villamor later recalled, “I wondered if 
Morgan was aware that Fertig not only had pushed him up [promoting him from 
Captain to Lieutenant Colonel] but had in effect thrown him out of the command. I 
had intelligence reports to this effect. Fertig wanted Morgan out of the way.”1647  
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Villamor thought that Morgan seemed unaware that he had been sent on a 
fruitless recruitment mission. Villamor recalled, “He seemed not to understand the 
reason for his failure. What he couldn’t grasp was that as a mestizo he was part 
American and part Filipino loyal to the Americans, but in another way his dual 
nationality worked against him. To many Filipinos he was not a Filipino… He had 
been spreading Fertig’s name everywhere, throughout the Islands, without really 
realizing that the Filipinos felt this was their cause, and they weren’t about to step in 
line behind some unknown American.”1648  Villamor had come to see Fertig as 
something of a remnant of colonial exploitation and Morgan as his victim.  “It’s best 
that you stop your tour,” Villamor told Morgan, “You’re just adding to the 
confusion.”1649 
According to Villamor: “Fertig was playing favorites with Americans. He was 
giving them the best accommodations and arms, the best clothing and best 
assignments. Fertig was a nobody when he came to Morgan’s district for protection. 
Morgan had helped him, had made him a general. It had been his movement, and 
now he lost control.” 1650 How much Morgan may have influenced Villamor in 
forming these opinions is a matter for speculation. 
The AIB continued to reach into the Islands. On 25 April the SS-211 Gudgeon 
under Lieutenant Commander W.S. Post, Jr. was ten days into its eighth war patrol 
out of Fremantle, Australia, when it attacked an enemy ship and escaped a 
counterattack. After three more days, Gudgeon torpedoed and sank the Japanese 
                                                        





fleet tanker the Toho Maru, the troop transport Kamakura Maru, and damaged 
tanker the Kyoel Maru in the Makassar Strait. Finally, on 30 April, Post executed his 
primary mission, delivering six men (including three Filipino enlisted men) of team 
PLEVEN under Second Lieutenant Toribio Crespo with three tons of equipment 
including two 3BZs and one ATR4 radios near Pucio Point, Panay.1651 Gudgeon then 
moved to Tawi Tawi and Mindanao to deliver four more tons of supplies before 
spending eight days sinking Japanese light vessels with its deck guns and heading 
for Pearl Harbor. 
On Mindanao, Parsons had arrived in Bukidnon to settle the dispute between 
Fertig and Salipada Pendatun. He met “General” Pendatun in the Del Monte section 
in the southern Cagayan Valley.  With his well-situated and large Moro force, 
Pendantun saw no reason for him to work under Fertig’s command. He had a large 
and effective staff with many Americans like Major Frank Magee, a former chief of 
staff to the commander of the Philippine Air Corps.1652 His organization was self-
sufficient with livestock and farms and maintained their own powerful radio station.  
Not until Pendatun staged a demonstration of his power in an attack against 
Japanese troops barricaded in a school building in Malaybay did Parsons gain 
leverage in his recruitment effort.  
After failing to dislodge the enemy with machine guns and homemade 
bombs, Pendatun sent in a carabao buffalo strapped with aerial bombs modified 
with dynamite fuses to finish the job.  Parsons casually mentioned that with the kind 
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of mortars and bazookas he would send to Fertig, Pendatun’s force would be more 
powerful.  Mention of ‘the Aid’ proved effective. “He persuaded Pendatun to return 
to Cotabato with the Moro guerrillas who had come into Bukidnon by this time in 
great numbers,” SWPA noted.1653 Pendatun contacted Fertig by radio and accepted a 
standing offer to join Fertig’s 10th MD as the 117th Regiment with a rank of 
major.1654  
Bowler and a priest named Father Haggerty also joined Fertig’s organization 
but friction rose between them and Pendatun. On 3 May, Bowler informed Fertig 
that Andrews, “is violently anti-American, is largely responsible for Pendatun’s 
attitude.” 1655 Fertig called two of Pendatun’s officers, Andrews and former Lanao 
assemblyman Tomas Cabili, to his headquarters. He asked them to explain 
Pendatun’s issues. Fertig then sent Andrews to Villamor in Negros and kept Cabili 
with the guerrillas at Lanao.1656   
In February, Fertig had recruited James Grinstead, a retired Army officer in 
his early fifties with many years of service among the Moros, to organize guerrillas. 
He later appointed Grinstead to command the 109th Regiment and later still as chief 
of staff of the 109th Division and he proved to be “a stable and careful commander in 
a difficult area.”1657 With help from Parsons and Dr. Kuder, new bands sprang up in 
Nasipit, Buenavista, Cabadbaran and the lower Agusan River and united to become 
the 113th Regiment under the command of a Syrian mining engineer named Khalil 
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Khodr who was described as “a highly intelligent, brave, forceful leader.”1658 
Somehow Khodr obtained 900 arms for the men of his new outfit. 
Fertig’s embrace of the Moros irritated Morgan who detested the tribal 
Muslims. The arrival of Americans on submarines had already strained his uneasy 
relationship with Fertig. Already supported in his suspicions by Villamor, Morgan’s 
constant female companion, the guerrilla Sinang, convinced him that Fertig and his 
countrymen were out to get him.1659 The promotion of Pendatun to major, and as 
such superior to Morgan, further divided the two men.1660 
Upon returning to Fertig’s headquarters, Parsons went out on an ambush to 
observe guerrilla tactics. Outposts reported that the Japanese moved troops in big 
trucks reinforced with boilerplate on a routine schedule.1661 The guerrillas chose a 
narrow stretch of road in a mountain forest and set up an L-shaped ambush. At one 
end, a few men with tommy guns were told to shoot the windshields, tires and 
engines. A lieutenant told Parsons the Japanese would come to a stop about fifty feet 
from where the guerrillas opened fire – because they always came to a stop at that 
distance. At that exact point the guerrillas dug and camouflaged a trench on the side 
opposite of the firing line to catch the Japanese as they exited the trucks – because 
they always exited the trucks under fire and ran to that side of the road. Once set, 
the guerrillas waited. The trucks arrived on schedule; came to a stop fifty feet from 
the initial engagement; the troops ran out and fell into the pit; and were executed by 
the guerrillas. Parsons left the ambush convinced of the potential of the guerrillas. 
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He wrote, “I am definitely a guerrilla. I see no sense in risking annihilation in open 
combat when you can fight, kill, run – and, later, fight again.” 1662 
Fertig’s 110th and 113th Regiments attacked Butuan, Agusan, from all sides 
under the Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Childress, Lieutenant Willard Money, Lieutenant 
Thomas Baxter, Captain Rosaurio Dongallo, Captain William Knortz and Major Khalil 
Khodr. The Japanese took refuge in a concrete schoolhouse and waited out a nine-
day siege until Japanese aircraft and reinforcements. The intensity of the attack 
created a shortage of rifle ammunition for the guerrillas, but they noticed that the 
people saw the action as proof of their power.1663  
 Organization and reorganization was a way of life. Fertig placed his 3rd 
Battalion, 115th Regiment, under Major Manuel D. Jaldon who reorganized them into 
the 121st Regiment. The next month Fertig learned that Jaldon’s brothers persuaded 
him to meet with the Japanese in Zamboanga and sign a peace agreement. The 10th 
MD commander immediately suspended Jaldon and his regiment. No supplies would 
reach the unit until December when Major Felipe Fetalvero arrived from Lanao to 
take charge. He disbanded the 121st Regiment and declared a new 1st Separate 
Battalion with former American enlisted man Lieutenant Donald Lecouvre in 
command. Lecouvre began establishing valuable intelligence agents in Zamboanga 
City. As the battalion established detachments at Sirawai and Siocon on the west 
coast, it once again became the 121st Regiment but now directly under “A” Corps 
and not the 105th Division.  
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A month earlier Parsons had used guerrilla contacts to reach out to 
Philippine Senator Jose Ozámiz in “in connection with the establishment of an 
Intelligence Net in Manila.”1664  On 25 May, Ozámiz arrived from Manila by boat with 
Jose Maria and Pelong Campos to meet with Parsons and Fertig.1665 He had 
pretended to travel on business only to be “caught and held under arrest by the 
guerrillas” until he was released to return to Manila.1666 The senator was the son of 
prominent Spanish copra planters in a Mindanao province that bore their name in 
Misamis Occidental. He had earned a law degree at Columbia University in New York 
in 1929.1667 During the occupation he served in the government with the approval of 
the guerrillas and provided them valuable intelligence.  
The senator was one of a number of prominent agents in contact with 
Parsons. Juan Elizalde was a wealthy polo playing from a Manila family invested in 
sugar, shipping and insurance companies. With his brother Manuel, another 
Parsons’ contact, he organized the underground well-placed “28 Men of Fort 
Santiago” who gathered information from Japanese business and political 
contacts.1668 He communicated with industrialist and statesman Salvador Araneta, 
Women’s Society of Christian Service Manila District President Mrs. Asuncion Perez, 
Mabini Academy founder Dr. Jose Katigbak, Hans Mensi [sic] and Company founder 
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and CEO Hans Menzi. President of the Sanitary Division in Lanao, and reserve 
Captain in the Philippine Army, Dr. Antonio Montalva visited Parsons in Mindanao. 
Others SWPA G-2 listed as contacts with Parsons included A.F. Gonzales, Antonio 
Pertierra, Enrique Priovano, Prasedes Verona, Mary B Stagg and his mother-in-law 
Blanche Jurika.1669 Primitivo San Agustin and Mario Rama of President Quezon’s 
Own Guerrilllas would also travel to Fertig’s headquarters to establish liaison. 
Ozámiz reported that some people in Luzon supported the Japanese and 
were well rewarded.1670 Most of the common people, however, simply endured in 
increasing poverty and fear. To get access to food and other rationed necessities, 
they had to belong to the Neighborhood Associations that he believed were tools of 
the Japanese controlled KALIBAPI party. Ozámiz reported, “It is difficult to persuade 
those, who otherwise would be helpful, that they have a higher duty to their country 
than to the families.”1671 Membership in the Neighborhood Associations brought rice 
allocations but also required spying and reporting on friends and neighbors. 
Parsons commissioned Ozámiz as a lieutenant colonel on active duty in the 
Philippine Army.1672 He also agreed to send Dr. Montalvan from Misamis to live with 
members of his kinship network in Tayabas to and  develop intelligence contacts in 
Manila.1673 
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On 5 May, KZRH radio broadcasted news of Tojo’s visit across the Islands. 
The Prime Minister returned to the Philippines to cheering crowds orchestrated by 
Vargas as instructed by Consul Kihara. Twenty-four hours later at a “day of 
gratitude” ceremony in Manila’s Luneta Park, Tojo announced: “you Filipinos today 
are going to wipe away your mistaken Americanism… and return to your true 
character as a nation of great East Asian origin… we urge you all to cooperate in 
winning the Greater East Asian War more actively … and be invested with the crown 
of national independence as quickly as possible.”1674  On 9 May, the first anniversary 
of Corregidor’s surrender, Vargas publicly called on “misguided remnants of 
USAFFE” to surrender.1675 Fertig reported, “KGEI commented ‘Tozyo [Tojo] visit to 
the Islands will be restricted by the activities of the Filipino-American troops.’ This 
is one of the first official admissions of our activities.” 1676 
 
Negros,  D523/R-526 
On 14 May, under pressure from SWPA to end the divisions on Negros, 
Villamor suggested that he be made commander of 7th Military District. SWPA 
responded the same day: “You will exercise your authority under direct command of 
General MacArthur. You will require all leaders of allied groups in your district 
faithfully to cooperate against the common enemy under your direction. Any failure 
on the part of allied group leaders to carry out these instructions will be reported to 
this headquarters for appropriate disciplinary action when circumstances permit. 
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You will report to these headquarters when designation of permanent commander 
Seventh Military District seems to you expedient and recommend designee.” 1677  
Villamor put Abcede in charge of the field troops and named Colonel Gabriel 
Gador as Chief of Staff. He appointed Lieutenant Abenir Bornales as G-1 Adjutant, 
Lieutenant Roberto Benedicto as G-2 Intelligence officer, Major Placido Ausejo as G-
3 planning and Training officer, and Lieutenant Benjamin Hollero as his G-4 
Quartermaster. He named Major Romeo Intengan as his Finance Service officer and 
Lieutenant Modesto Castañeda as a Signal Officer. Villamor commissioned Bell as a 
major and appointed him as Negros Civil Administrator and as Chairman of a new 
7th MD Research Board. Villamor also established a free civil government under 
Negros Occidental pre-war governor Alfredo Montelibano, a thirty-six-year-old 
wealthy planter in north Negros who had gathered money and food with Mata for 
local guerrillas. “Montelibano is reported to be aggressive, a tireless worker,” SWPA 
noted, “and exacting in his demands for work done. He apparently has the popular 
support of the populace on Negros and is a program socialist fighting for the welfare 
of the poorer class.”1678 The organization intended to unite all the competing groups 
on Negros into one ‘kinship network.’  
 On 28 May, Villamor held a conference to sell his plan. Abcede, Ausejo, 
Montelibano, Bell, Intengan and dozens of others came to the meeting with their 
deputies Rito Dominado, Uldarico Baclagon, Lorenzo Teves and Roberto S. 
Benedicto. Gador arrived late. All the attendees wanted recognition, medicine, 
money, radios, arms and ammunition. Villamor demanded cooperation from all the 
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guerrillas and threatened, “I will shoot any son of bitch who doesn’t get the 
message.”1679 He announced the staff assignments and added, “My command is 
temporary, and when I see fit, when one of you shows me that you can command the 
respect and cooperation from all others, I’ll make him the permanent District 
Commander.”1680 That seemed to get the men aboard. Villamor told them they 
would all wear their prewar rank, to which Gador violently objected. Villamor 
radioed SWPA that Gador was “a better politician than soldier” and “he does not 
believe in uniting Negros.” 1681 
Villamor called another conference of all guerrilla leaders on Negros for the 
third week of June. Mata, Abcede and Ausejo came to the conference and offered him 
their suppor. Gador arrived with much fanfare at the head of a large delegation of 
staff officers and armed guards. Coincidentally, the Japanese landed a patrol nearby 
in search of the guerrillas. One patrol managed to find and burn Bell’s camp.  “Gador 
and most of his men fled without assisting in the local defenses though he had a 
position assigned,” Villamor reported to SWPA, “At the conference Gador accepted 
the post of Executive Officer in the 6th MD headquarters but resigned when he fled, 
and resumed his opposition activities.”1682 Although a number of Gador’s officers 
joined Villamor’s command, and despite the pledges of loyalty from the conference 
attendees, Villamor received little support to remain as 7th MD commander. 
 
Luzon D532/R-517 
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 On Luzon, the Japanese campaign of early 1943 began to ease. Remnants of 
Thorp’s organization reformed to create the United States Philippine Island Force in 
the Botolan-Olangapo area. Colonel Gyles Merrill announced the reformation of the 
original Western Luzon Guerrilla Force in the mountains northeast of San Marcelino 
in Zambales. Another 1,000 men rallied under Antonio Francisco around Castillejos 
and San Marcelino.  
Recently promoted to major by Moses, Ramsey and Lapham traveled 
together to see Putnam in the Lingayen Gulf.  Ramsey would later claim Lapham had 
agreed to serve under him as deputy of the ECLGF and place his guerrilla force 
within Ramsey’s organization, something Lapham denied.1683 Everywhere they went 
Filipinos seemed to ask the guerrillas one question: when would MacArthur return? 
“His name was like an invocation to them, a holy word that had special power and 
meaning,” Ramsey remembered, “None of them doubted his promise to return, but 
they were anxious to learn when the invasion would come.”1684  
Putnam agreed to command the Pangasinan province for Ramsey as part of 
Lapham’s force.  Waving an arm over the land, Putnam told Ramsey, “We control 
these people. We hold their lives in our hands. Being a guerrilla leader is like being a 
king, Ramsey, you have absolute power over people.”1685 He told him the Igorots and 
Ilongots were headhunters and, sometimes, cannibals who invited Japanese raids as 
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an opportunity for spoil. “That’s guerilla warfare, and as far as they’re concerned I’m 
no captain, I’m the king.”1686 
Volckmann had become well established in Ifugao with lines of 
communication to nearby guerrillas. Moses and Noble sent him word that the 
Japanese were becoming more active in Apayao and he expected Praeger’s radio 
soon to be forced off air again. A week later a large Japanese force pressured 
Manalo. Then the Japanese captured Captain Rufino Baldwin, commanding 2nd 
Battalion under Parker Calvert, south of Baguio. Baldwin had been, in Volckmann’s 
words “terrorizing the Japanese in the area south of Baguio for many months.”1687 
One night he had received a message from his fiancé asking him to come to her 
house. When he arrived, Japanese troops took him prisoner. Calvert commissioned 
Private Grafton Spencer to First Lieutenant and gave him the 2nd Battalion. Spencer 
took the battalion to Dalupiripin in the Itogon mining district southeast of Baguio.  
Towards the end of the month Volckmann learned that a Japanese force was 
bearing down on him at Haliap. He asked chief Kamayong for help in evacuating his 
headquarters but Kamayong only sent four native holy men to hold a ceremony 
called a bacci.  As Volckmann and Blackburn watched in agitation, the four men 
spread out tobacco, rice and other items on a blanket, chanted, and slaughtered four 
small chickens to examine their entrails. They concluded that the signs indicated the 
Americans were safe where they were for they would bury the chicken legs on the 
approaching trails to stop the Japanese patrols. Volckmann protested to no avail. 
“The Jap patrol did come to the very foot of the hill upon which our camp was 
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located,” he recalled, “but upon arriving at the spot where the chicken legs were 
buried they changed their direction and went on down the river valley!”1688  
 
Manila, D537/R-512 
On 28 May fifty-five year-old Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda arrived as 
the new military government to replace Homma. His thirty-three years with the 
army included tours as military attaché in England and India. He made it a priority 
to socialize, especially in playing golf, with the leading Filipinos. Kuroda’s 
philosophy was “in politics there should be no room for excessiveness or 
bullying.”1689 Barrameda wrote, “In Manila, Kuroda spent much of his time on golf, 
geishas and goofing off – and because discipline became lax, he was soon on bad 
terms with many of his senior officers.” 1690 Kuroda made few preparations to 
defend the Philippines against MacArthur’s return as he considered the Islands 
“obviously indefensible.”1691 However, to rally the Filipinos, he appeared to be the 
right man for a new approach in the Islands.  
 A week earlier the year-old Greater East Asia Establishment Council issued a 
report calling for cultural programs to unite the occupied lands into a war alliance 
with Japan. The report stated: “The principal emphasis in education and all cultural-
education policies should be on having those people discard all the remnants of 
Anglo-American ideas and having them achieve a full appreciation of being peoples 
of East Asia so that they will recognize and understand that the Greater East Asia 
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War is a holy war for the liberation of East Asia and also for the noble idea of the 
establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”1692   
A priority program in the new approach was the Special Overseas Students 
from the Southern Regions (Nanpō Tokubetsu Ryūgakusei, abbreviated as Nantoku) 
to bring students identified as future leaders to Japan for education and 
culturalization. In the fall of 1943, one hundred and sixteen students from across the 
occupied territories were sent to Japan – twenty-seven from the Philippines. 
Another twenty-four young Filipinos went the next year making one out of every 
four students in the program a Filipino. In part, the program taught them to reject 
the ‘lazy’ Western humanist attitudes and adopt rigorous, disciplined Japanese 
methods. Among all the students, only those from the Philippines registered 
complaints about this effort.1693 
In holding out a carrot, the Japanese were not forgetting the stick. The day 
after Kuroda’s arrival, sixty-three Japanese transports arrived in Manila with 
150,000 troops, of which 50,000 – many “Indo-Chinese and Burmese recruits” – 
would take up stations in and around Manila.1694  The Japanese military also 
scheduled construction of munition storage sites for Manila, Corregidor, Lamao, 
Kalaklan, Tabaco, Cebu, Iloilo, Davao and Cagyan to begin in October.1695 
 Villamor passed these details to SWPA. “My agents spread out and they fed 
me with a constant stream of information,” he said, “By mid-June 1943 I had full 
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knowledge of all enemy movements in the Visayas and Luzon, and I was sending 
daily reconnaissance reports to Australia…”1696 Then Villamor fell sick in early June. 
A local woman named Maria nursed him back to health. He proposed and she 
accepted. 
 
                                                        





10. The Regional Section 
1 June - 20 October 1943 
 
 MacArthur set up the more robust Philippine Regional Section to coordinate an 
increased delivery of agents and supplies into the Islands. Their judicious allocations 
secured guerrilla cooperation and limited the power of those deemed to be outside 
MacArthur’s network. Only northern Luzon remained beyond their reach. Meanwhile 




At SWPA headquarters in Brisbane, first thing each morning MacArthur would 
turn to the reports from the AIB radio operators in the Philippines.1697 By now, they had 
liaisons and radios on Mindanao, Negros, Tawi Tawi, Cebu, and Panay – and agents in 
Manila. As the submarine insertion teams confirmed the capabilities of the guerrilla 
leaders and their men, MacArthur became more determined to provide “direction and to 
weld the scattered groups into unified and responsible forces through the designation and 
support of responsible local commanders.”1698  As the SWPA G-2 noted, it was “the 
approximate end of the preliminary or pathfinding phase of intelligence 
development.”1699 It was time to move from the exploration of the guerrilla movement by 
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the AIB to the development of the guerrillas by another, more robust, staff in preparation 
for MacArthur’s future return to the islands. 
SWPA drafted a plan to transform the isolated AIB Philippine sub-section staff 
into a larger Philippine Regional Section (PRS) under G-2 that would be more 
interconnected with the rest of the staff. With greater access to more supplies, submarines 
and personnel, PRS priorities were to 1) establish bases in Mindoro and Samar, 2) 
conduct intelligence penetration of Luzon, and 3) close gaps in the existing intelligence 
nets south from Luzon. MacArthur approved the PRS and recalled from Washington old 
Philippine hand Colonel Courtney Whitney, Jr. to lead it. “He was ideal for such an 
assignment,” wrote MacArthur, “A prominent Manila lawyer, his thirteen years there had 
made him thoroughly familiar with Philippine conditions and personnel. Rugged and 
aggressive, fearless and experienced in military affairs, his driving force found full play 
in charge of a guerrilla army.”1700   
Notified of his new assignment, even before departing the States, Whitney looked 
for radios better suited to guerrilla operations but decided to stay with the Australian 
portable transmitters already in use.1701 He arranged to have the Signal Corps organize 
the 978th Signal Service Company to support infiltration missions and cooperate with the 
guerrillas.1702 Despite AIB plans for 100 volunteer soldiers from the 1st and 2nd Filipino 
Regiments training in the U.S. to be “sent in increments over a two year period,” on his 
way to Australia, Whitney inspected the regiments and chose 400 men for PRS 
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missions. 1703  The PRS got the volunteers approved and organized into the 3217 
Reconnaissance Battalion.  
On 23 May, Whitney arrived at SWPA.1704  Six days later at 1345 hours he 
attended a conference in Sutherland’s office to clarify “the relationship of G-2 to the AIB 
and, more particularly, the Philippine Regional Section, AIB, as well as the 
responsibilities for both.”1705 As MacArthur explained Whitney’s mission in the PRS: 
“His objectives were the formation of a battle detachment in every 
important Filipino area, alerted to strike against the enemy’s rear as our 
battle-lines advanced; to secure fields adjacent to military objectives 
into which our airmen might drop with assurances of immediate rescue 
and protection; to arouse the militant loyalty of a whole people by 
forming resolute armed centers of resistance around which they could 
rally; to establish a vast network of agents numbering into the 
thousands to provide precise, accurate, and detailed information on 
major enemy moves and installations; to create a vast network of radio 
positions extending into every center of enemy activity and 
concentration through the islands; to build on every major island of the 
Philippines a completely equipped and staffed weather observatory to 
flash to my headquarters full weather data morning, afternoon, and 
night of every day; to implement an air-warning system affording 
visual observation of the air over every square foot of Philippine soil to  
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give immediate warning of enemy aircraft or naval movement to our 
submarines on patrol in Philippine waters; to apply close interior 
vigilance so as to secure for our military use enemy documents of 
value; and to exploit any other aids to our military operations that 
might arise.”1706    
 Despite the carryover of AIB personnel, like Major Allison Ind, the transition to 
the PRS and Whitney help open a gap between ongoing guerrilla intelligence collection 
and new SWPA missions.  The PRS sidestepped the predominantly Filipino guerrillas for 
U.S. Army mission that were predominantly white Americans. Five years later 
MacArthur’s G-2 concluded: “In this project, however, several previously established 
channels were ignored or not fully exploited, especially the Villamor net. These channels 
were Filipino manned and guided. The new channels developed were all under American 
leadership and were based mainly on personnel from Australian bases.”1707 The result 
contributed to a sense of racial discrimination among the Filipinos involved. 
The PRS continued to use AIB facilities at Camp Tabragalbra and Frazer Island 
near Brisbane to prepare agents for the penetration missions. “All persons were given 
basic training and then groups were segregated for general areas in the P.I.  On about a 
two-week notice, parties were organized for specific areas.” 1708  Army Signal Corps 
Lieutenant Louis Brown trained American and Hawaiian born Filipino volunteers as 
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guerrillas, coast watchers, aircraft spotters, or weather observers. As of August, the 
camps held 125 officers and men, but planned to increase to about 800.1709   
At any one time five groups of 25 volunteers entered Phase I of training without 
being told “the reason for this training or their possible destinations.”1710 The groups 
rotated through classes: 3.5 hours on judging distances; 8.5 hours each on map and 
compass reading; 10 hours on first aid; 21 hours weapons training; 29.5 hours ship and 
aircraft recognition; 30.75 hours on signals and Morse code; and 47.25 hours on physical 
training, unarmed combat, “Ranger type training and School of the Soldier.”1711 The AIB 
would interview qualified graduates for selection for fifty-six days of Advanced Training 
that included additional instruction on guerrilla operations, Japanese and local habits, and 
cryptography.  
Navy commander Parsons ran a PRS supply dump in Darwin. Parsons and 
Whitney coordinated for submarines with the 7th Fleet Staff. Whitney oversaw all liaison 
with guerrillas including radio messages, guerrilla mail, and interrogation of returning 
personnel.  
The PRS accelerated submarine missions into the Philippines. On 27 May, the 
submarine SS-202 Trout under skipper Lieutenant Commander Albert H. Clark, left 
Fremantle, Australia, on its ninth war patrol.1712 On 12 June, the Tambor class sub landed 
the five-man TENWEST team under CPT Jordan Hamner with two tons of supplies, 
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including 6,000 rounds of .30-cal and 2,000 rounds of .45-cal ammunition, for Fertig near 
Labangan, Mindanao.1713  Though impressive, the amounts fell well short of 50,000,000 
.30-cal rounds and 20,000,000 .45-cal rounds Fertig had requested in March.1714 
Hamner brought with him Lieutenant Franklyn Young, Jr, returning to the Islands 
after his escape with Albert Klestadt. Together they established a radio station near 
Zamboanga City -- then “after a short review with Col. Fertig,” were off to Tawi Tawi to 
provide radio to Colonel Suarez.1715  
On 1 July in the Makassar Straits off the northwest coast of Celebes, the SS-200 
Thresher under Lieutenant Commander Harry Hull was on its ninth war patrol when it 
torpedoed the Japanese destroyer Hokaze, leaving it damaged and run aground in Subaya 
harbor, and sank the troop transport Yoneyama Maru about forty nautical miles from 
Balikpapan.1716 The boat then stopped in Tawi Tawi where Captain Jordan Hamner and 
his team of agents set up a radio station to tie in intelligence on the Sibitu Passage in the 
Sulu Archipelago to SWPA.1717 On 9 July, the sub delivered 500 pounds of supplies, 
40,000 rounds of ammunition, and Hamner with the remaining five members of his team 
near Catmon Point, Negros, before heading to Pearl Harbor for an overhaul.1718 
Interestingly, SWPA G-2 reported that in November the AIB sent a British team 
of agents to North Borneo with supplies for Hamner. SWPA instructed both teams to 
establish radio contact with each other. The teams failed to comply. G-2 remarked: 
“Neither party had much interest in inter-communications and their failure to take any 
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such action in this connection was received with a certain amount of prejudice against 
Hamner.”1719  SWPA suddenly noted his problems with malaria, his teeth and an ear 
growth. When Hamner returned to Australia on 15 March 1944, SWPA’s Philippine 
Regional Section (PRS) wrote to Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Richard K. 
Sutherland:  “Recommend that no action be taken toward the recognition of Maj. Jordan 
A. Hamner’s services as was done in the case of Comdr. Parsons and Maj, Smith upon 
their return from the Philippines, without consideration of the prior comment of PRS.”1720 
 Agents reported that despite support from SWPA, the guerrillas found their 
toughest foes continued to be malnutrition and illness. As Blackburn stated, “About the 
time you’d think you got over with an illness, bam! You were hit with something 
else.”1721  Just moving through jungles caused casualties. Arthur Noble lost an eye from 
walking into a tree branch.1722  Lapham fell into a hole one night, broke his shoulder, and 
suffered from poorly constructed cast from an ill-trained medic. “His replacement,” 
recalled Lapham, “seeing at once that the cast was unsuitable, cut it off and discovered 
that what had originally been a simple break had been made a good deal worse by the 
misplaced efforts of his predecessor: muscle pressure and the cast had pulled the break 
apart.”1723 Lapham underwent rudimentary surgery and a new cumbersome, larger cast.  
Illness and poor nutrition eroded willpower. Volckmann noted how the relentless 
pace of events, hardships and constant tension amplified any moral defects in a guerrilla’s 
character. He wrote, “Each day they became more depressed and listless, and with few 
exceptions these men readily gave up when forced into a tight spot. If overtaken by fever 
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or some other tropical illness, they often displayed no determination to fight back and as 
a result usually died within a few days.”1724  Volckmann and the other guerrilla leaders 
countered these dangers through sound organization, coherent operational direction, and 
firm military discipline. The bands of guerrillas that failed to do so, did not survive. 
In June, famine and shortages threatened guerrilla and civilian alike. “Locusts had 
stripped the coconut palms of their leaves, making branches stick out like the ribs of 
umbrellas. A bar of soap was like a precious jewel,” Villamor recalled, “People moved 
about in clothing they had worn for months, men and women walked barefoot or in shoes 
with soles made from bits of old automobile tires. Cases of malaria were treated not with 
quinine but with the bark of the cinchona trees. And everywhere there was the nagging, 
persistent question: When would aid come?”1725 The malnourished population proved 
increasingly susceptible to tuberculosis, pneumonia and other respiratory diseases – often 
spread by released POWs and furloughed guerrillas returning to their homes.1726  
As indicated by his ‘lay low’ order, MacArthur worried about the effect of 
guerrilla actions on the general population. “We guerrillas considered that we had a right 
to civilian support,” Lapham added, “since we were risking our lives against common 
enemies and of course could not operate without food and equipment. Yet civilians only 
had so much to give anyone; if pressed too hard they might starve.”1727   Guerrillas 
developed several methods of obtaining supplies from the people. Some ‘taxed’ the locals 
either through a free local government or by direct requisition. Most guerrillas tried to 
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limit the demands they placed on the population closest to them for fear of losing both 
popular support and the loyalty of guerrillas with family ties in their area.1728  
In Volckmann’s organization, Blackburn recalled, “We got control of the towns, 
and the mayors were directed to appoint Food Administrators who would work with my 
Food Administrator. We would tax the mayor for so much rice and other food stuffs, and 
his Food Administrator would gather it up. Then, we would sign receipts for so many 
bundles of rice, so many pigs, so many chickens, and so many eggs, or what have you, 
the logistics people, would pick it up and distribute it to the camps in that geographic 
area.”1729 Local chiefs allied with the USAFIP-NL arranged support, issuing U.S. army 
receipts to their people in Volckmann’s name. 
Some villages paid taxes in money, but most through food or other goods. 
Guerrillas purchased the goods with money, script they printed, or IOUs. Most tried to 
keep records of payments. Balance sheets however failed to reflect the tense debates 
among guerrillas over how to best allocate their scarce financial resources. “How many 
quarrels we had had over finances!” recalled Panlilio of her dealings with Marking.1730 
Some guerrillas were lucky enough to receive deliveries of cash from SWPA, but 
strict rules of accountability governed expenditures. 1731  Issues over the collection, 
expenditure and safe keeping of money could rip apart organizations. Lapham actually 
declined $50,000 in genuine Philippine pesos when Chick Parsons told him he would 
have to account for it.1732  In September 1944 Anderson took that money, but later could 
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not account for $20,000 he gave to Alejo Santos.  “I did not keep formal records of such 
‘sales,’ or of contributions either,” confessed Lapham, “because I thought it dangerous to 
write of benefactors in record books that might be seized by the enemy.”1733 
 Guerrillas obtained supplies from a variety of local sources. Medicine came from 
large cities like Manila, often through the black market. They gathered weapons from 
raids and ambushes, old battlefields, or black markets. The LGAF gathered between 
1,500 and 3,000 rifles for their 13,000 guerrillas from the fields of Bataan.1734 Fuel for 
generators and engines came from the triple distillation of coconut oil.1735  For other 
items, as Willis noted, “I was beginning to realize that if you ever want anything and 
can’t find it, all you have to do is go to a Chinese merchant in town, and he probably will 
have it or can locate it.”1736  
Finding food became the predominant logistical problem for the guerrillas. 
Lapham recalled, “The production, acquisition, and distribution of food and supplies was 
always more complex than might appear on the surface.”1737 Even the most loyal of 
citizens were struggling to feed themselves could only give little to guerrillas. As one 
said of Ernesto Felix, a volunteer Home Guard battalion commander in Cardona, 
Morong, Binangonan, and Taay: “He fed his children with one finger; and devoted the 
other nine to the fighters.” 1738 The Japanese captured Felix and tortured him to death. 
 American guerrillas lost on average about forty percent of their body. They 
survived on concoctions like ginamoose, which Stahl described as “a slurry of boiled 
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baby shrimp, small enough to qualify as maggots. I’ve never eaten maggots, but they 
couldn’t have tasted worse than ginamoose.”1739 They ate carabao blood: “We would set 
the cup by the fire and let the blood congeal. Then we dumped out the lump of blood, 
sliced it, and put it on our rice or fried it and ate it with our rice.”1740  
 Some foodstuffs served multi-purposes. One of the most useful was the tree fruit 
tuba. Gatherers scaled palm trees daily, cut a slice from tuba buds, and hung a little 
bamboo bucket under it to collect the dripping juice.1741 A day later they collected the 
juice into a larger bucket, and then repeated the process. After one day, the juice tasted 
like beer; each day thereafter its became more potent. After five days, it served as the 
base for a kind of pepper vinegar. After ten days, it could be triple distilled and used as 
gasoline. Stahl noticed a problem: “It was not unusual for [drivers] to siphon the fuel 
from the tank along the way to mix a few highballs. Then an SOS would be sent to the 
nearest distillery for more fuel.”1742 
Another remarkably versatile food was the coconut. The tree palms became 
thatched roofs, baskets, hats; the husks used for firewood and the ashes made lye. A 
guerrilla recalled, “The un-matured meat inside is a jelly-like consistency but very 
pleasant to eat.” 1743   A ripe coconut would have one-quarter to one-half inch thick 
coconut meat that was high in oil (sixty-eight percent). Mixed with water it made milk to 
pour on toasted rice with sugar for cereal. Willis remembered native women shaving 
coconut meat and boiling the slivers in a fifty-five-gallon drum of water until the oil 
settled on top. “Then they had a nice clear oil for cooking, for lamps, or for anything else 
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which oil could be used for,” he wrote, “The meal from the coconut meat after the oil is 
extracted is around 8 or 9 percent protein and was fed to carabao or cows.”1744 Guerrillas 
learned to strip the husk off a mature coconut, punch holes through the points were the 
shell connected to the tree, blow air into the holes and pour in a tablespoonful of sugar, 
plug the holes and bury the coconut six inches below warm sands. “Wait at least a week 
before removing it from its ‘oven.’ Remove the plugs and pour,” recalled Stahl, “Or, if 
you are in a hurry, drink directly from the container. Voila! You have a cupful of sweet-
tasting alcohol not unlike Southern Comfort (if you have enough imagination).”1745  
Though usually starving, guerrillas often demonstrated a remarkable ability to 
regain health under favorable conditions. When Willis escaped from a prison ship and 
was fed by natives on Mindanao, he reported, “I stayed in Siokon for three weeks, and 
during that time I gained fifteen pounds. I would have gained more because the food was 
certainly very good after prison fare, but I had two attacks of malaria and the quinine I 
was taking killed my appetite somewhat.”1746 
 
Northern Luzon, D543/R-506 
Increased Japanese patrols pushed the famished guerrillas to the breaking point. 
After the campaign in the first half of 1943, Blackburn recalled, “Things were tough all 
over. The people were afraid to support guerrilla units… And, there was no protection 
from all the spies and informers who were beginning to spring up. The morale of 
personnel and the units hit a new low, if you could call them ‘units.’”1747  Operations 
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suffered accordingly. Once while trying to impress the hostile Huks, Ramsey collapsed 
with what he later believed was a “mild stroke” that brought on “fits of paralysis and 
unconsciousness.” 1748  By October, Blackburn would have to abort plans while he 
“detoured to go to Uding to receive another series of shots for his fever.”1749 Operational 
considerations had to be sacrificed in the interests of situating bases above the mosquito 
plains. Volckmann moved his forces into the Zambalese Mountains and reported: “The 
clean pine odor and the cool refreshing air of this beautiful country made me feel like a 
different person. Already I felt that by the grace of God I would again get a strong and 
well. I was sure that in this country we had a least half a chance.”1750  He traded access to 
the enemy for healthy living conditions. 
Captain John Boone, a former corporal of the 31st Infantry, had five regiments of 
men in the Japanese occupied Bataan-Zambales province. He kept them dispersed, living 
in their homes, to be reassembled in secret. They were loosely connected with Merrill and 
spent a good deal of time combating the Hukbalahaps.   
Volckmann’s efforts to expand area of his authority irritated his neighbors. He 
made contact, recalled Lapham, “Then he tried to absorb my command into his by 
invoking what he called the ‘understanding’ I had reached with Moses and Noble. I 
simply ignored his blandishments as I had those of his predecessors. Nothing 
happened.”1751  Blackburn remembered Volckmann’s frustration. He said, “You could 
never get a handle on what Lapham had done.”1752 Blackburn added, “We never heard 
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from him, but Volckmann wasn’t pushing anything on it since that wasn’t going to 
accomplish anything.”1753 
  Building his organization seemed to invigorate Volckmann. Failure to do so had 
an opposite effect. At a low moment Volckmann complained to Blackburn, “Any chance 
of continuing resistance in the area can practically cease to be considered anymore.”1754 
Blackburn replied, “You remember, we always agreed, you and I, that the first one who 
took on a negative attitude, then the other was going to kick him right in the ass. Turn 
around.” Volckmann admitted, “I remember, so let’s stop that.”1755  
For Filipinos civilians, efforts to organize resistance presented dangers of a 
different kind. In Manila late on 3 June, lawyer Antonio Bautista, a founding member of 
the Free Philippines, sent his children and household staff to the movies. While they were 
gone he and his wife Adalia held a private dinner for five guests in their new house at 
Number 9 Third Street.  In attendance were U.S. Army Colonel Narcio Manzano, Dr. 
Jose B.L. Reyes, Rafael R. ‘Liling’ Roces, Jr., and Lorenzo Tanada. From 1600 to 2100 
hours, they discussed their plans for opposing the Japanese. “That was the beginning of 
the end of peaceful period I may have hoped for,” recalled Adalia.1756 Having spoken 
openly in the meeting, each attendee was now hostage to the loyalty of the others. At any 
moment something could happen that might result in the arrest and interrogation of one 
that could easily lead to the capture and execution of the others.  For the several attendees 
close to PEC Commissioner of the Interior Jose Laurel, one such event came quickly. 
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Two days later at 0600 hours, Laurel was playing a round at the Wack Wack Golf 
and Country Club in Mandaluyong with Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, Dr. Leoncio B. Monzon, 
Dr. Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and ‘Liling’ Roces. On the seventh tee, a 
gunman shot Laurel twice in the back with a .45 caliber handgun. His doctor golf partners 
hurried Laurel to the Philippine General Hospital where the best available medical 
personnel, joined by Chief Surgeon of the Japanese Military Administration Colonel 
Ishii, saved his life. The Kempeitai immediately launched a massive search for the 
gunman, rumored at first to be a member of the Markings guerrillas known as “Little 
Joe.” Laurel, however, reportedly urged compassion for his attacker. He later wrote, “I 
condemn cowardice and treachery but I must respect the political ideology of people 
plunged into desperation in a situation in which I played an important role.” 1757 
According to Agoncillo, the Kempeitai apprehended and executed Captain Palma Martin, 
a member of Colonel Enrique Arce’s unit in the Hunters Guerrillas, but Laurel later 
identified his attacker as former boxer Feliciano Lizardo. 1758 
On 9 June, Volckmann received bad news. Hiding in cave near Lubuagan, 
Kalinga, Moses and Noble had sent a runner to a nearby town for supplies. “According to 
the story that we heard,” said Blackburn, “they had native boys they’d send out in front of 
them, supposedly to scout the trail, but the scouts carelessly let it be known that ‘the 
colonels are coming, the colonels are coming.’”1759 The Japanese caught the runner and, 
under torture, he revealed the location of the two American officers. “The captured 
colonels were rushed to Bontoc, the capital of the Mountain province, where the Japanese 
commander forged an order by the colonels directing all guerrillas to surrender,” 
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Volckmann recalled, “We wouldn’t have paid any attention to such an order if it had 
really been signed by the colonels, but the order published by the Japs was obviously a 
fake.”1760 The capture was a hard blow. Volckmann explained, “Morale in general, both 
troop and civilian, was at a new low.”1761 Blackburn added: “The morale of personnel and 
the units hit a new low, if you could call them ‘units.’ The men suffered from the lack of 
food and medical supplies. We just didn’t have anything.” 1762   
Volckmann was now the senior American officer with the fragmented guerrillas 
in Luzon. With Praeger’s radio offline, he had no means for communicating with SWPA. 
“Anti-resistance feeling mounted so high in some areas that it was impossible to send 
even a native runner through those areas without having him apprehended, tied on a pole 
like a pig, and carried to the Japs,” Volckmann note, “Arms and ammunition were 
becoming scarce; medical supplies ceased to exist. The guerrilla forces in North Luzon 
had been reduced to less than two thousand men dispersed in small bands. All this added 
up to a very gloomy picture.”1763  On 20 June, Japanese troops arrived near his camp in 
Haliap. That night Volckmann wrote: “Hid our surplus things and went to our hide out.  
Made the last part of the trip in the dark, very hard walking.”1764 For the next few weeks, 
local residents reported Japanese soldiers asking about Volckmann and Blackburn by 
name. The two guerrillas left Ifugao. 
 
Mindanao, D552/R-497 
                                                        
1760 Volckmann, 119. 
1761 Ibid., 120. 
1762 Blackburn Interview, 128. 
1763 Ibid. 
1764 Guardia, 100. 
 
501 
On 12 June, the submarine Trout landed the TENWEST team under Jordan 
Hamner with two tons of radios and supplies for Fertig near Labangan, Mindanao.  
Farther south in Liangan, bed ridden with intestinal illness, Fertig wrote, “The casa is the 
one place in the whole world in which it is almost a pleasure to be sick. The war seems so 
far away and yet it is just across the bay… Unless the offensive starts very soon, we are 
lost, for we can’t meet the full force of the enemy.” 1765  Meanwhile, Villamor had 
dissuaded Morgan from interfering with the Negros guerrillas and sent him back to 
Lanae.  From Villamor’s reports, SWPA suspected that Morgan’s visit had been a ploy 
by Fertig to keep Villamor out of Mindanao.1766  
A Japanese force landed in nearby Misamis but Morgan did nothing to resist 
them, later claiming he was following MacArthur’s order not to provoke retaliation. 
When Morgan finally sent guerrillas into Misamis, contrary to Fertig’s orders, it was only 
to seize arms from those guerrillas who had fled before the Japanese.1767 Coincidentally, 
Fertig received word that “Andrews is continuing his anti-American conversations. He 
had a long talk with Morgan and after a few drinks, the latter admitted that he was 
responsible for all this; I simply acted as his front man. Andrews desires to go to 
Villamor. Well and good.” 1768  
 At his headquarters in Liangan, Lanao, Fertig named Lieutenant Colonel Robert 
V Bowler as 10th MD Chief of Staff and to succeed him if he was captured or killed. This 
was a severe rebuke to Morgan, nominally Fertig’s second in command. Fertig converted 
the Cotabato-Bukindon guerrillas into the 106th Division under Lieutenant Colonel Frank 
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McGee. The guerrillas south and southwest of Cotabato became the 116th Regiment 
under Major Herbert Page, a retired officer with many years in the Philippines. Planter 
Fred Johnson assisted Page. Villamor, Captain Macario Guballa, and Major Matas also 
lent support to Johnson.    
Second only to the many Americans added to Fertig’s organization was the 
increase in the number of Moros. Pendatun’s 118th Regiment included commanders 
Lieutenant Colonel Soriano, Major Gabutina, Datu Aliman and Datu Udtog. “Utog’s 
leadership and influence and Pendatun’s education have forged a powerful unit in this 
area,” SWPA reported, “The regiment kept the Kigos-Kabacan Road closed to enemy 
traffic until early 1944 when shortages of equipment and supplies forced the guerrillas to 
yield control.”1769 In June, however, Fertig faced an apparent Moro spy ring from Bohol 
centered around an agent named Quizon. “Looks most suspicious,” he wrote, “as tho [sic] 
he were reporting my movements and indicating the possibility of an early attack.”1770  
Fertig set out to ‘consolidate or eliminate’ dissenting guerrillas on Mindanao. He 
sent Captain William Knortz to Surigao, Major Garcia into central Surigao, and Captain 
Tomanning to Lianga.  Knortz, a former U.S. Air Corps corporal, had hid in the hills after 
the invasion. As the 10th MD liaison officer, Knortz proved trustworthy, efficient and 
daring. According to Fertig: “He was a fearless fighter when meeting the Japanese and 
square, firm dealer in organizing recalcitrant guerrilla groups.”1771  Knortz organized the 
guerrillas in the 114th Regiment and promoted former Private First Class Paul H. 
Marshall to Captain to command the regiment. Sergeant and now Lieutenant Robert 
Spielman, a fellow escapee from the Davao Penal Colony in April, assisted Knortz. 
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Tragically, while carrying supplies from Lanao to Agusan in September, the boat 
carrying Knortz would capsize and he drowned. This followed Bill Lowry’s suicide in 
June. “He was living and working too hard,” Fertig concluded, “and 18 months of war 
took their toll.” 1772 
As June came to a close, Parsons stayed with the Ozámiz family in Jiminez on 
Mindanao’s Iligan Bay. He was drafting a report when guards on the beach sounded an 
alarm. While the Ozámiz family hastily departed to hiding sites in the jungle, Parsons 
decided he had time for a nap. He awoke suddenly to find Japanese soldiers breaking 
down his front door. Parsons barely escaped out the back with his papers.1773 In the hills 
he linked up with a group of locals led by Father Calanan heading to the Jimenez church 
to recover a can of wheat flour for communion wafers before it fell to the enemy. 
Realizing the size of the Japanese force, Parsons began a long roundabout journey to 
rejoin Fertig.  
 
Manila, D556/R-493 
 News from Tokyo on 16 June reported Prime Minister Tojo’s announcement that 
Japan would grant the “honor of national independence” to the Philippines within a year. 
The PEC in Manila declared the creation of the Preparatory Committee for Philippine 
Independence (PCPI). On 19 June, a KALIBAPI convention selected members for the 
PCPI: Aguinaldo, Aquino, Osias, Paredes, Recto, Vargas, Yulo, and Roxas (who declined 
and recommended Aquino, then Laurel). The next day Kuroda approved the names and 
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appointed Jose Laurel as chairman. The delegation headed to Tokyo to coordinate the 
steps towards independence.1774 
Ironically, the announcement of pending independence slowed down JMA efforts 
to improve economic conditions in the Philippines. There was less incentive for Filipinos 
to work with the Japanese, and less incentive for the Japanese administrators to pursue 
long-range plans. As one arrival in the JMA Department of Industries reported, there was 
now little to do and little need for new men.1775 
The announcement fit with Japanese adjustments to unexpected difficulties 
resulting from their initial war objectives.1776  Isolating Asia from the West had caused a 
loss of vital imports, jobs and investments. Japanese control led to a weakening of self-
policing and a rise of nationalism and resistance. Having occupation forces ‘live off the 
land’ increased competition for food and goods giving rise to shortages, inflation, and 
starvation. Economically exploiting the occupied countries for their natural resources 
exacerbated shortages and led to forced labor that in turn bred resistance. Occupation had 
politically, socially, and economically destabilized the occupied territories. 
 The selection of Laurel to chair the PCPI indicated a change of fortune for 
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee Vargas. Fourteenth Army Chief of 
Staff Lieutenant General Wachi observed: “No one had been so much taken advantage of 
and so abruptly rejected by Japan as Jorge B. Vargas, administrative chief under Japanese 
rule… he had been treated as a puppet not only by the Japanese, but also by the 
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prominent Filipinos.”1777 Since January 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army had controlled 
the PEC and used Vargas as it saw fit. At first the Japanese hoped he would entice 
Quezon to join the occupation government. Now with Quezon in Washington, Vargas 
was no longer needed. On 15 July, the JMA ordered Alejandro Roces’ TVT newspapers 
to “play down Vargas” and “play up Laurel.”1778 The papers quickly printed a statement 
from Laurel: “Vargas cannot handle the situation: If I were given the chance to head the 
government, I would place all who opposed me under the machine gun.”1779  
 The Japanese put Fourteenth Army Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Naonori 
Utsunomiya in position to oversee the drafting of the Philippine constitution. When 
Roxas begged off claiming to be ill, occupation authorities sent him to see Tojo who 
convinced him to join the constitutional assembly. Roxas later received credit for 
changing the document so as to avoid any declaration of joining the Great East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.1780 Roxas’s position remained precarious: “He was living on Lepanto 
Street, in a house always guarded by the Japanese and whenever he left he was 
accompanied by a personal Japanese guard.”1781 
Lieutenant Colonel Narciso Manzano ran an intelligence cell in Manila for the 
Free Philippines, with his deputy (and Villamor agent) Lieutenant Osmundo Mondoñedo.  
Among his network was Juan Elizalde who ran an underground team, “28 Men of Fort 
Santiago,” who circulated among social circles and business communities gathering 
intelligence. 1782  He also coordinate intelligence gathering activities for Parsons by 
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politically prominent men such as Senator Jose Ozámiz, Rafael ‘Liling’ Roces, Jr., 
Enrique Pirovano. The Japanese kept a number of Manzano’s spies under watch: Hans 
Menzi, Manuel Elizalde, and Mrs. Asuncion Perez. 1783  Villamor said of his agents: 
“Many belonged to the best families in Negros and our roster of officers began to read 
like the Social Register: Montelbano, Alvarez, Torres, Benedicto, Locsin, Yulo, and 
others.”1784  The intelligence net continued to spread across the Islands. 
Villamor now had a fairly robust radio network.1785 In Colipapa, Negros, Andrews 
operated station YAF with a 3BZ set in contact with SWPA in Australia with NEI as a 
reserve. With a Signal Corps set, he also oversaw the guerrilla contact station WPI. 
Benedicto operated the separate AIB intelligence net with another 3BZ transmitter and 
receiver. Villamor was providing an ATR-4 to Ingeniero in Bohol. He sent a handmade 
set to Arthur Zayco for the guerrillas in Albay or Sorgoson but heard nothing from them. 
Cebu station PNM was in contact with Andrews. Villamor however asked SWPA for 
ATR-4s for his agents in Panay, Leyte, and Cebu, saying, “I do not want to depend on 
guerrillas.”1786 
With networks of couriers, the radios connected Bicol, Laguna, the Cagayan 
Valley and Manila in Luzon, along with Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Mindoro. Through them 
men like Captain Buenaventura Villanueva (Benny Newcastle) in Nagcarlan, Laguna, 
coordinated networks of spies that included Manila former Speaker of the National 
Assembly Jose Yulo, newsman Arsenio Lacson, University of Santo Tomas professor 
Manuel Colayco, Lieutenants Felizardo Tanabe and Emilio Zerudo, Lawyer Emilio 
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Severino, and Manila Policeman Ramon Bagatsing. Catholic priest Father Francisco 
Avendaño of Manila used a radio transmitter in his church to send information through 
Laguna to Negros to Australia.1787   Villamor counted as agents the Free Philippines 
members Lorenzo Tanada, Antonio Bautista, Anselmo Claudio, Jose Barrera, Roberto 
Concepcion, Jose Reyes, and Rafael Roces, Jr.1788 Manuel Roxas passed information 
from the heart of the government. One of Jorge Vargas’ press relations officers in 
Malacañang Palace, Vincente Alvarez, broadcast on KZRH containing coded information 
for the guerrillas that was passed from Villamor to SWPA.1789 
 
Southern Luzon, D557/R-492 
In Bicol, Turko sent his VTG guerrillas to hunt the TVGU leader Miranda.1790 In 
the second week of June, 24 to 39 of his men under Lieutenant Rafael Quiñones and 
Lieutenant Jesus del Valle arrived in Viga.1791 They looted the local church, Our Lady of 
the Assumption, and used the convent as their headquarters to harass citizens. Turko 
arrived on 17 June met with Miranda in the nearby barrio Rizal.  In a heated exchange, 
Miranda called the VTG deserters. “At this point Quiñones went for his gun, not knowing 
that Miranda was a fast draw and a dead shot,” Barrameda wrote, “Quiñones was dead, a 
.45 caliber bullet in his forehead, before he even hit the ground.”1792 Another VTG man 
went to shoot, Miranda killed him too.  Miranda’s party relieved Turko and his men of all 
their bullets and then split up and escaped.  
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Turko returned to his base to Caramoan to gather a larger posse to chase after 
Miranda. In Bato, they caught and killed TVGU Sergeant Manuel San Juan. They then 
spent July fruitlessly searching Catanduanes. On 2 July, Miranda and a small group had 
left Virac in Catanduanes for Batan Island, Albay, where he rendezvoused with Faustino 
Flor. The two leaders decided to join with Lapus in Bicol.  Miranda continued on to 
Masbate then reached Panay in mid-August. Over the next month he conferenced at least 
twice with Peralta’s chief of staff Relunia – a fellow Bicoloan – seeking recognition and 
support. He also learned of his promotion to major, on Lapus’ recommendation. In mid-
September, he left Panay for Iloilo. 
Meanwhile, Leon Aureus broke his portion of the TVGU from Miranda’s to join 
Zabat.  In July Aureus and Padua came to a new understanding. They divided Camarines 
Sur into five districts, Padua in charge of districts two and five, Aureus’s TVGU in 
charge of the rest.1793 This agreement upended the Miranda-Padua accord that placed 
Padua under Miranda. Zabat used the new agreement as an opportunity. In August, he 
mediated remaining differences he had with Aureus and Padua and brought them into his 
organization as the 53rd Regiment with Padua in command. He then convinced Turko to 
also join him with promise of regimental command, the 54th Regiment (not to be 
confused with Lapus’ similarly named regiment).  
 
Negros, D562/R-487 
Despite his intelligence network success, criticism of Villamor found its way back 
to SWPA. On 22 June, Fertig wrote, “Unification of Negros is doubtful as Villamor is 
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young, He is using unlimited promotion as a club to buy opposing leaders.”1794 Four days 
later Villamor received word that he would be withdrawn from the Philippines by 
submarine. It was time to pick a successor as 7th Military District commander. “Although 
the youngest and most junior of all possible commanders,” he decided, “Abcede was, in 
my opinion, the most active and aggressive, the best suited for the task.”1795 Then, at 
month’s end, 400 Japanese landed at Tolong on Negros. A reported fifty ships 
bombarded on Dumagete on their way into the Mindanao Sea. About the same time, 
SWPA instructed Villamor rendezvous with a submarine bringing an agent from Quezon 
around 8 July at the place he had arrived on Negros, near Catmon Point. 
Villamor delayed his departure while trying to leave his house in order. He asked 
SWPA to appoint Abcede commander, allow Ausejo to go work for Fertig, and to place 
Gador on inactive status “for the sake of unity in Negros.”1796 “Gador had a history of 
antagonizing guerrilla leaders,” Villamor reported, “He had interfered with and 
obstructed the operations of other organizations. He took advantage of disagreements in 
other organizations by offering their officers appointments in his own organization. 
Sometimes, because of his meddling, open conflicts between rival organizations erupted 
into open fighting.”1797 SWPA left Gador alone. 
 
Visayas, D571/R-478 
On Panay, Peralta continued to build a formidable organization. His G-2, 26-year 
old Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran (a former 1st Lieutenant in the Intelligence Section 
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of the 61st Division) created and ran a robust intelligence network. SWPA observed: 
“There is good indication that his reports are reliable but that his sources are loosely 
organized and developed, and that little effort is being made to keep the financial 
accounts of the intelligence sector.”1798  Finances were indeed a problem for Peralta. He 
was spending a half-a-million pesos each month on his intelligence network. On 27 May 
he wired SWPA: “Problem of money this district acute. Released on million pesos 
printed last month and all gone. To combat Jap attraction policy, we have been paying 
partial salaries of soldiers and buying food. Otherwise soldiers’ families starve. Civil 
government in same hole.” 1799 
At the PRS, Whitney received Peralta’s urgent request for money and 
commented: “Soon such a requirement may be expected to be doubled or trebled. How 
much of these funds are actually distributed for legitimate purposes and how much are 
dedicated to the creation of an overlordship that may later prove a harassing thorn in our 
side, is a matter for pure conjecture but, as Peralta himself points out in this radio, 
‘money talks.’ I know of no place in which it talks louder than in the Philippines.”1800 
SWPA also noted that Peralta’s forces were both known for their frequent combat and 
their adoption of a Fabian strategy to avoid decisive battles: “This has not helped 
relations with the civilians but has retained the army almost intact.”1801 SWPA believed 
the guerrillas’ habitual confiscation of local supplies irritated these relations. 
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Peralta divided his 6th Military District Headquarters into two echelons. He 
remained with the East Central Antique Headquarters (First Echelon) with his executive 
officer, chief of staff, adjutant, intelligence officer, and signal officer. The Second 
Echelon, Eastern Panay Headquarters under Relunia included his executive officer, 
assistant executive officer and district quartermaster. SWPA agents reported, “From the 
beginning Peralta has exhibited a strong desire to bring a larger area under his command, 
to extend his influence as widely as possible, and to set up an intelligence system that 
would give him complete detailed coverage.”1802 Peralta sent agents to Luzon in two 
sections: one under Captain Alejandro P. Hontiveros southeast with 2nd Combat Team 
through Masbate; and, another under Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurado (former Chief of 
the Offshore Patrol, Philippine Army) southwest with 1st Combat Team through Mindoro. 
Hontiveros, a 25-year old graduate of Ateneo de Manila College, edited agents’ reports 
and forwarded them through Peralta’s 6th Military District headquarters to SWPA. 
By July 1943 Peralta had extended his radio net into Luzon “to establish contacts 
‘among friends’ for collection of intelligence on ‘harbor defenses, troop arrivals, etc.; 
airfields; troop dispositions’ in the area extending from Batangas to Pangasinan.”1803 
Captain Teodorico Haresco reported from Batangas; Lieutenant Porfirio Bretana from 
Fort Wint on Manila Harbor;  Lieutenant Ludovico Pablico from Manila and its suburbs;  
Lieutenant Maximo Basco from Tarlac and Pampanga; Sergeant Elesco Pugne from 
Bataan and Corregidor; Sergeant B. Martinez from Lingayen and Pangasinan; and 
Sergeants Aurelio Parrenas and Enrique Magalona from Cavite. According to SWPA, 
however, “Reports were infrequent and often considerably delayed…. Reports from 
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central Luzon and Manila were exaggerated and sometimes were treated with reserve 
unless verified from other sources. Contacts were mainly mechanics, bar-tenders, small 
businessmen, and government clerks.” 1804 
SWPA’s decision to reinstate the pre-war military districts had upended Peralta’s 
plans for expansion as the Fourth Corps, but he maintained his contacts he had built with 
guerrilla leaders in Negros, Leyte and Samar. He met no resistance in expanding his 
influence in Masbate, Marinuque, Mindoro or Palawn. Peralta continued to support 
Abcede on Negros in the 7th Military District and Blas Miranda on Leyte in the 9th 
Military District, often causing conflict with other regional commanders and SWPA. He 
flooded other areas with agents who infiltrated the puppet government, Japanese 
installations, and city street corners.1805 Only Fenton on Cebu and Fertig on Mindanao 
defied Peralta.  
SWPA had trouble assessing the leaders in the Visayas. PRS agents reported: 
“Shifting support, failure to thoroughly examine the facts in disputes and the resultant 
hasty decisions, often cited by junior and inexperienced officers, have aggravated the 
local political situation on those islands.”1806 The native kinship network system often 
compromised shipments of supplies by submarine meant to bolster guerrillas. Agents 
reported: “Supplies sent from SWPA are reported to have appeared in quantity on the 
black market and seldom reach the needy or those for whom the supplies were 
intended.”1807 The assessment continued: “Besides graft and sometimes strained relations 
with the civilians, the compadre [extended kinship network] system by increasing 
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overhead personnel and depleting supplies seriously has further reduced the effectiveness 
of the organization, destroyed discipline almost entirely and at times immobilized the 
army.”1808 Even so, the PRS succeeded in arming the resistance: in early 1943 about sixty 
percent of guerrillas were armed; by mid-1944 that number rose to nearly one hundred 
percent.1809 
 On Palawan, the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary at Puerto 
Princesa, Major Guillermo Maramba, had led his family and others into the hills when the 
Japanese invaded. He refused, however, to associate with any of the island’s emerging 
guerrilla groups. In June, one of the Cobb brothers met with Maramba in Danlig. The two 
men got into a heated argument and Cobb shot and killed Maramba.  (A family history, 
however, states that Maramba “was ambushed, shot and killed by an American 
collaborator with the Japanese.” It further claimed that went on to claim that his adopted 
daughter Lola Luz, an active guerrilla, chased down and killed the gunman with her 
pistol.1810)  The Cobbs tried to recruit the seventy-five armed Philippine Constabulary 
members assigned to Maramba’s executive officer, Captain Pedro Manigque. U.S. Army 
intelligence reported: “Manigque is reported to be a weak character, congenial but not 
intelligent, and not respected by his men; he printed money in an effort to hold the loyalty 
of his men, but was not able to check their abuse of civilian rights and commandeering of 
civilian goods.”1811  Manigque resisted incorporation by the Cobbs brothers.  
Second Lieutenant Baldmero R. Garcia, a cousin of Lieutenant Colonel Garcia of 
Peralta’s command, had hid on the west coast of Palawan until February 1943 when he 
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went to Caramay and joined Manigque as his executive officer. When Peralta officially 
recognized Manigque as commander in Palawan in early June, the more aspiring Garcia 
assembled their men and won their vote to take command. Garcia then charged Manigque 
with misuse of funds. In July he promoted himself to First Lieutenant in command of 
Palawan and went to Panay to seek Peralta’s blessing. Manigque held on to his command 
until Peralta formed the Special Battalion in October with Garcia as its executive officer. 
Manigque refused to work with Garcia or acknowledge the legitimacy of the new 
battalion and fought against it. Garcia’s assumed command, captured Manigque in 
January 1944, and imprisoned him until the end of the war.   
 Peralta’s interference extended to southern Luzon. Governor Escudero, who had 
built the most powerful guerrilla force in Sorsogon province after separating from Lapus, 
had considered joining Straughn’s FAIT as a colonel but fell ill in March and moved to 
Samar to recover. Lapus then got Merritt to drive Escudero off Samar. In June, Escudero 
sent his son Antonio with three hundred armed men to Panay to see Peralta. They asked 
for permission to organize all of Bicol. Here was an opportunity sought by Peralta. He 
offered to recognize anyone who could unite the 5th Military District of southern Luzon. 
Failing to get immediate recognition from Peralta, Escudero played his own hand. In 
July, he announced his promotion to colonel and appointment as commander in Bicol by 
authority of Straughn and warned all others – i.e. Peralta – that he would not tolerate 
interference in his area of operations.  
On Negros Siquijor, Major Benito Cunanan with his two battalions of guerrillas 
confronted the last of several attempted Japanese landings in June. The transports tried to 
land at Larena, but a captured mine placed in the channel by Cunanan sank one of the 
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vessels, drowning a number of enemy soldiers. Other troops, however, finally got ashore 
and dispersed the guerrillas. That was when Captain Luis Morgan arrived from Mindanao 
to upset Cunanan’s status as commander of the 4th Provisional Battalion under Ausejo’s 
75th Regiment. Unaware that Morgan lacked authority, Cunanan accepted his offer to 
take command of the 8th Military District of Cebu and Bohol.1812  Cunanan left Second 
Lieutenant Eduardo Cornella in command of what became M Company, 75th Regiment, 
73rd Division, and went to Cebu to assume command. After much confusion, Cunanan 
left Cebu in July to assume duties as the headquarters commandant for SWPA’s newly 
established the 7th Military District under Abcede. 
 The situation on Cebu had been confusing enough without Cunanan. Harry 
Fenton and James Cushing had built a well-organized force of about 9,000 men, half of 
them armed, with plentiful supplies supported by another 3,000 civilian volunteers. 
Citizens even produced ammunition in local towns. The guerrillas had access to ship full 
of food meant for Corregidor that had been kept at Cebu to avoid the Japanese blockade. 
Yet 1943 had been rough for the Cebu guerrillas.  
Cushing was suffering severe malaria when the Japanese launched a campaign in 
Cebu in March. Fenton, exhausted by nervous strain, suspended all guerrilla operations. 
The local population became uneasy with Fenton’s decisions and his growing reputation 
for executions. When other guerrilla leaders visited, Fenton refused to meet with them 
and broke off further contact. Moreover, he absolutely refused to print money and pay his 
men. By June, food had become scarce throughout Cebu, aggravated by currency 
shortages.  Guerrillas left the field to head back to their homes. While Cushing left for 
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Negros to recuperate, Fenton chased off Roy Bell. Cushing opposed Fenton’s monetary 
policy, his enforced isolation from other guerrillas, and his overt distrust of popular 
Governor Hilario Abellana who escaped Japanese imprisonment in July to carry on free 
government against puppet governor Jose Delgado. A SWPA study later noted: “Fenton 
was becoming more eccentric, his killings became more wanton, the lack of pay for his 
men and the constant Japanese raids caused further disaffection, and many men began to 
leave for other islands..”1813 Fenton and Cushing were on a collision course. 
On Jolo, the Japanese suddenly reinforced their small Japanese garrison that had 
been confined to Jolo Town by the island’s guerrillas. The larger force charged out to 
attack the guerrillas with air and seas support and “literally destroyed organized guerrillas 
activity on Jolo.”1814 
 
Luzon, D572/R-477 
After mopping up Luzon Island with the 16th Division, the 65th Brigade and the 
Nagano Detachment, the Japanese Fourteenth Army continued pacification operations 
against guerrillas with combat support units.1815 Peace and security remained elusive. At 
the end of July, the Japanese high command issued a new directive: “The Outline of the 
Plan for Subjugative [sic] Operations in the Philippines.” Maneuvers to end the resistance 
would begin in the Visayan Area, termed by the high command as “the worst in the 
maintenance of peace and order.”1816  The plan aimed to secure all political centers, 
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resources areas, and areas of strategic and tactical importance by the end of 1943.1817  It 
identified the means as: “1) Direct subjugative operations by the Army; 2) Advance in 
stability through the spreading of policies of the military administrative organs; 3) 
Pacification work through propaganda and information; 4) Work through the Philippine 
government organs.”1818 The order called for “The breaking up of guerrillas bases, the 
destruction of enemy radio apparatus and extermination of enemy submarine bases will 
be carried out in the subjective operation.” 1819 Finally, the order noted, “Special attention 
will be given to win the heart and mind of the people.”1820 The timing seemed ripe. 
With no signs of MacArthur’s return, anti-Japanese spirit began to weaken.  
Through the summer Ramsey toured the northern edge of his area and noticed, “a waning 
in the popular will to resist.” 1821  He thought people were beginning to believe the 
Japanese occupation was becoming “irrevocable” and were demoralized by the damages 
wreaked on the economy. Ramsey and Lapham agreed something had to be done. “Our 
Maoist model of organization was proving inadequate,” Ramsey observed, “The Huks 
reinforced theirs with deceit, intimidation, and terror, thus keeping it vital through fear, 
but to us such tactics were alien and abhorrent.”1822  
 Fourteenth Army’s “The Outline of the Plan for Subjugative Operations in the 
Philippines” identified specific reasons for Filipino resistance: “The population gradually 
turned against the Army, because of the shortage of goods, the inflation of money, and 
above all, the stringency of food, clothing and housing facilities. Hence, the hold on 
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public opinion, which had been most carefully guided by the Army, was not easy to 
maintain.”1823 This assessment was true as far as it went, but it did not go far enough. It 
failed to recognize Japanese policies and actions that caused these problems and the 
tactics of occupation that exacerbated resentment.  The report ranked the worst places in 
the Islands in terms of peace and order: Panay, Cebu, Bohol, and Negros. “There were 
enemy radios in several localities,” it noted, “but the radio on Samar Island was the most 
active of all.” 1824  More damaging to law and order than the radios and submarine 
activities on Mindanao, it said, were the “constant rampancy” of the Moros. 
 No matter the causes of resistance, guerrilla action proved most damaging to 
Japanese interests. By 2 July, the Taiheiyo Kogyo Company was producing 6,000 tons of 
high-grade manganese at the mines in Bani, Camarines Sur in southern Luzon, but 
guerrilla intimidation prevented the recruitment of enough longshoreman to move the 
ore. 1825  Elsewhere, the Japanese army still held about 40,000 Filipino POWs. The 
solution seemed obvious. The head of Taiheiyo in the Philippines, Namikawa Eijiro, 
petitioned the JMA for the use of the Filipino POWs captured at Bataan. The next day the 
JMA decreed that Filipino POWs could request work at a mine in Bohol managed by 
Nihon Kogyo. The JMA also allowed Taiheiyo engineer Ikeda Yoichiro to take one 
hundred and fifty POWs from the camp at Cabanatuan in Neuva Ecija. The POWs would 
finish loading the ore in Bani on 29 August and would then be released to their homes in 
Samar, Leyte, Bohol and Manila. The JMA asked the military to grant a P4,000 payment 
to the POWs who satisfactorily completed their work at the Bohol mine.   
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In Northern Luzon in the Benguet province, the Mitsui Mining Company had 
managed to increase production of copper ore at the Mankayan Copper Mine from 
roughly 800 tons per day in January to a peak of 1,500 tons per day in June.1826 By 
August the mine would have between 4,600 and 5,500 workers and a company town 
population of 10,000. 1827  The successful recruitment reflected management’s use of 
financial and material incentives, the dedicated support of military and Kempeitai 
security forces, and a coercive retention policy. By September however, a growing 
shortage of transportation – only 52 of the mine’s 402 vehicles were operating – created a 
backlog of 3,400 tons. The JMA ordered fifty vehicles from their motor pool and fifty 
from the military sent to transport the stockpile. It also directed spare parts from the 
military and Toyota Motor Industries sent there, authorized the use of lower grade 
lubricating oil, and directed that “Filipino employees will be trained in the use of the 
vehicles more carefully and efficiently.”1828 However, Lieutenant Bado Dangwa led a 
more intense and active guerrilla campaign to counter operations at the mine. 
The Japanese still hoped religion could pacify the Filipinos. Sometime between 
May and October the JMA finalized “Policy Towards Philippine Roman Catholicism,” a 
forty-six-page policy statement. It set out a six-point strategy: (1) replace Archbishop 
O’Doherty with either Bishop Guerrero of Manila or Archbishop Reyes of Cebu; (2) 
replace all Caucasian priests with Filipinos; (3) obtain sales or leases of Church property 
for government interests of tenant farmers; (4) gain government control of all private 
school curriculum; (5) use an ongoing tenant uprising at the Church-owned Buena Vista 
estate as leverage to obtain goals; and (6), take all clergy and missionaries from enemy 
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foreign countries to Japan for incarceration as quickly as possible.1829  Bishop Taguchi 
opposed any government interference with religious education, and the JMA prepared to 
compromise on this one issue if the Vatican would approve the removal of O’Doherty 
and the Caucasian priests. Still, it took until 6 January 1944 for the JMA to finalize a 
communiqué to send to the Vatican concerning O’Doherty. Two days later Laurel sent a 
letter to Pope Pius XII requesting the appointment of Filipinos to the hierarchy of the 
Church in the Philippines. The subsequent sensitive negotiations proved too time 
consuming to aid the Japanese pacification program, but they would have real and lasting 
results on reforming the Church in the Philippines after the war. 
 A plan for reorganizing the Philippine textile industry formed another promising 
but futile JMA project.1830  The Japanese put forth a proposal to import 120,000 spindles 
and 4,800 looms to add to the 20,000 spindles already in use in the National 
Development Corporation Textile Mills. As their name suggested, the textile mills were 
the product of a number of state agencies led by the Central Bank of the Philippines – and 
they were deeply entangled in corruption and favoritism.1831 The JMA had some 50,000 
spindles and 1,800 looms sent from Japan and installed as part of a planned venture with 
Daiwa Boseki Company. Yet the Filipino elites in government resisted any interference 
in their businesses and used shortages in fuel, transformers, available space, and building 
materials to preclude any further expansion of the mills. When the JMA ended in 
October, so did the mills expansion enterprise.  
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 By this time rises in commodities prices threatened to undermine all other JMA 
efforts to win support from the Filipinos. On 15 July, it responded by issuing Military 
Ordinance No. 15 to control prices of prime commodities including cotton and cloth, 
matches, salt, tobacco, lard, soap, and paper.1832 The JMA followed with Administrative 
Ordinance No. 10 that created the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control 
Association (PRIMCO), which rationed commodities to prevent hoarding and sales on 
the black market. Each person registered with a neighborhood association received a 
yearly ration ticket with points for prime commodities. The Japanese military received 
half the total amount of textile commodities allocated to the private sector and 
corporations, even though there were twenty-five Filipinos for each Japanese solider in 
the Islands (16 million Filipinos to 630,000 Japanese troops).1833 
Even after nineteen months of occupation, the Japanese government still hoped 
that appeals to Asian identity could overcome resentment caused by hardships associated 
with the war. In July, it sponsored the Greater East Asian War Inquiry Commission filled 
by diplomats, businessmen, politicians and academics. The Commission issued a report 
(in English) “to expose the outrageous words and actions of the enemy nations, words 
and actions which violate all the principles of justice and humanity.”1834 The report cast 
the war as a “counteroffensive of the Oriental races against Occidental aggression” 
marked the nefarious plans of the United Kingdom and the United States to deny 
Japanese power. The JMA disseminated the report across the Philippines.  
 The Fourteenth Army also renewed anti-guerrilla campaigns across the Islands, 
but believed it lacked the numbers required to do the job successfully. Army planners 
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later determined that the “subjugative operations” from July onward failed to offset the 
impact of constantly falling standard of living that turned public sentiment against them. 
“Therefore,” they reported, “due to the lack of military strength, suppressive activities 
were unsuccessful.”1835  
Meanwhile, the guerrillas continued to operate. As Volckmann and Blackburn 
began to pick up the pieces of their scattered command, they traveled at night on foot, in 
shorts, straw hat, and shoes, to contact the guerrilla units across north Luzon. “After a 
few minutes on the trail one became soaking wet, either from the rain or perspiration. The 
bloodsucking leaches in the Ifugao area were very thick, and at every rest stop we shaved 
them from our legs with our bolos. On arriving at our destination, we bathed in cold 
water, being careful to remove all the leaches we had picked up, and then put on dry 
clothes,” Volckmann recalled, “From sad experience in the past, we were now always 
careful to suspend our shoes from a rafter to dry, Once I forgot to do this, but 
remembered them just as I was about to drop off to sleep. I startled everyone in the camp 
by jumping up and yelling, “My shoes!” I was too late; the rats had already eaten holes in 
the leather, leaving me a half-day repair job!”1836 
 To their south the leaders of Marking’s Guerrillas suffered as Japanese troops 
pursued them through Rizal, to Laguna, and to Mount Banashaw.  Panlilio endured chest 
and stomach pains. “There was so much pain in me that I no longer felt hunger pains. …I 
was ready to die.”1837 Finally she collapsed and had to be carried on a sling between 
bamboo poles as their band marched on, one step ahead of their pursuers.  
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Major Ralph Praeger, who was among the first to fight the Japanese with his 
Troop C of the 26th Cavalry, continued to fight at the head of his guerrilla unit in the in 
Ilocos Sur area. His close compatriot was former Cagayan Province governor Marcello 
Adduru. In June 1943 Adduru turned himself over to the Japanese as part of a spy plot. 
Appearing to turn collaborator, Adduru obtained a position with the Japanese in Manila 
from which he sent intelligence back to the guerrillas. Lieutenant Bonito Bulan took over 
Adduru’s guerrilla band and moved it to Isabela.  
Luzon continued to tempt Peralta. He identified Masbate as the key to get to the 
big island.  In July, he sent Major Vincente A. Tansiongo to take command in Masbate. 
Two months later Peralta sent a composite company of one hundred and thirty men under 
Captain Leon Gamboa to southwest Masbate. Through November, Tansiongo would 
reorganize the native Masbate guerrillas and used them to grow Gamboa’s unit into a 
battalion of three companies. 
In Manila in August an incident occurred that reminded the Japanese of work to 
do. Movie director Abe Yutaka was shooting a bi-budget picture, The Dawn of Freedom, 
using the ‘liberation’ of the Philippines to rally support for the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. General Kuroda, who was having an affair with an actress in the 
movie, supported the production and arranged for “thousands of American POWs to be 
trucked into Manila so they could suffer the humiliation of reenacting for the cameras 
their defeat of 18 months earlier.”1838  Even more thousands of Manileños staged an 
impromptu celebration at the sight of the Americans, screaming and rushing to touch the 
POWs, leading to many arrests and beatings. 
 
                                                        




In July, the Japanese reoccupied Misamis Occidental and the Zamboanga north 
coast and put Fertig and his headquarters on the run. “My soldiers run off with the 
greatest of ease,” he wrote, “May they resist when necessary.”1839 Captain Jose Naranjo 
heroically made a rearguard stand and helped to keep the scattered force from 
disintegrating. Fertig reestablished his base at Lanao. Thinking the Japanese were 
concentrating against him he complained of “brutal headaches”  and rationalized, “It is 
only natural, I suppose, to place yourself in the position that you are No. 1 in the eyes of 
the enemy, and that their sole interest is to trap the leader.”1840   
Chick Parsons had arrived at Fertig’s headquarters on 30 May with three officers 
who had survived the Bataan Death March and escaped the Davao Penal Colony: Navy 
Lieutenant Commander Melvin McCoy, Army intelligence officer Major Stephen 
Mellnik, and former MacArthur staffer Army Lieutenant Colonel William.1841 “They are 
a bit stir crazy,” observed the 10th MD commander, “and apparently determined to 
continue on south.”1842 Fertig then surprised Parsons by presenting Chick’s brother-in-
law, Captain Tommy Jurika who had escaped a Japanese prison.  
The Davao escapees informed Fertig of the fate of his friend Roy Gilbert. He had 
failed in an attempt to escape from Cabanatuan. “He was tied up to post at the entrance to 
camp and brutally beaten for three days then shot,” Fertig recalled, “The Japanese 
treatment is designed to eliminate all prisoners. Food is kept scarce and prisoners are 
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beaten if they steal of try to smuggle it into camp. At Cabanatuan diphtheria broke out in 
camp. There was ample antitoxins in the hospital but an American could not get 
permission to go to hospital.”1843 On top of exhaustion, sickness, and malnutrition, the 
weight of such events had to take a toll on the guerrillas. 
Mellnik and McCoy met with Fertig and asked for transportation for ten to 
Australia. Fertig tepidly said he would ask to SWPA and await instructions. McCoy 
remembered, “I didn’t expect him to fall over us, but he was downright hostile! Is he 
afraid we’ll debunk his phony rank? Why the brush-off on our request to wire 
MacArthur? Fear that GHQ might learn about people like McClish and Bowler? Maybe 
the poor guy has more than he can handle! He didn’t sound convincing when he said he’ll 
tell GHQ about us; We’d be wise to check on him.”1844 Joined by Ed Dyess, ten days 
later the three again confronted Fertig who told them his transmitter had been down. On 
18 June, they got SWPA’s reply: a submarine scheduled to arrive between 15 and 25 July 
to pick up Parsons would also take McCoy, Mellnik and Dyess. G-2 noted: “They were 
brought out at the specific direction of General MacArthur to obtain information on the 
treatment of American prisoners of war in Japanese hands.”1845 After a harrowing hike, 
the haggard men barely dodged a pursuing Japanese patrol before linking up with the SS-
202 Trout southeast of Olutanga Island for the trip to Brisbane. 
 
Negros, D578/R-471 
On 8 July, SWPA relieved Villamor of his temporary command in Negros and 
appointed Abcede as commander of 7th Military District. He called a conference for 
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September to get agreement on organization, operations, and command. Gador not only 
refused to attend but also threatened to disrupt Ausejo’s organization, intelligence 
collection and communications with Cebu. Gador eventually left for Bohol and reported 
to a guerrilla unit commanded by his former subordinate, Major Isamael P. Inginiero. In 
October, he received a letter from SWPA directing him to relay reports through 
Abecede’s 7th Military District radio. This implied subordination. Gador chose instead to 
send his reports directly to SPWA and explained that “he had come to Bohol after 
receiving a SWPA letter on Negros and that he was awaiting further instructions.”1846 
SWPA sent no reply. Gador would virtually disappear after a powerful Japanese landing 
on Bohol in June 1944. 
On Negros, the Japanese stepped up raids on the south coast from Dumaguete to 
Sipalay, attacked food production areas of central Negros Occidental and Oriental, and 
conducted a terror campaign in the north. The combination nearly collapsed the 
guerrillas. SWPA noted: “[Abcede] has been well aware of the limitations of his own 
organization, and has admitted realistically that the Japanese can do anything they want 
to on Negros. He has therefore conserved his forces and has sought to maintain the proper 
balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up morale of officers, men and 
loyal civilians, and over-aggressiveness which might invite strong retaliatory 
measures.” 1847  Abcede dispersed his men and supplies, established early warning 
systems, and practiced higher levels of secrecy. He developed highly productive 
intelligence networks and managed to recover a number of downed pilots. An evacuation 
of American civilians left Negros with an entirely Philippine guerrilla organization. 
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Reports from Negros indicated: “Politics are rife and many of the officers are not above 
appropriation of army supplies for their own purchase and aggrandizement of their 
positions for after the war.”1848 
The attacks on Negros were part of larger Japanese campaign across the 
Vasayans.  The Japanese also suddenly advanced into central Panay from southern Iloilo. 
This drive reached the guerrilla district headquarters Sara in the northwest by September, 
capturing and destroying significant vital stocks of guerrilla supplies.  
On its ninth war patrol, SS-202 Thresher under Lieutenant Commander Harry Hull sank a tanker 
and scored hits on a transport in the Makassar Strait on the night of 30 June, and then engaged another 
tanker of Celebes five days later. On the night of 9 July Thresher delivered 500 pounds of supplies and 
50,000 rounds of .30 and .45 caliber ammunition at Catamon Point on Negros, before departing for Pearl 
Harbor. Hull also delivered the promised representative from Quezon, Agent “Gatbiala” wearing a uniform 
and major’s rank. Villamor recognized him as surgeon Dr. Emigdio Cruz, the President’s personal 
physician. The good doctor had accepted the incredible mission of going to Manila and somehow meet with 
Roxas, Rafael Alunan, Jose Yulo, Sr and any others he could find. Quezon had told him, “Cruz, this is a 
very tough job. Personally, I believe you have no chance to get through. With your connection to President 
Quezon, you have become very well known.”1849 The AIB had nothing to do with planning this mission, 
but Whitney and MacArthur approved it. Cruz assumed a new alias, Major Suylan. Though Villamor 
strenuously objected to the mission, Quezon insisted. Villamor dutifully arranged agents to get Cruz to his 
destination.  
“Once in Manila he would try to determine if Vargas and his associates had really 
been won over [by] the Japanese,” Villamor recalled, “Had they lost hope that America 
would ever redeem them? Did they believe that Japan would win? Had the people 
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become pro-Japanese?” 1850  Cruz would also try to explain to his targets Quezon’s 
departure and the delay in America’s return. “Tell Vargas,” Quezon had told him in 
Washington, “and tell all those whom you can safely see and talk to, that I give them my 
word Japan will lose this war. I know it. I have seen the almost infinite resources of 
America, and its enormous war production. The whole thing staggers the imagination. It 
is only a matter of time. Tell them to keep faith with America. Tell them that General 
MacArthur has sworn to return to Manila in triumph.”1851 
On 12 July, the Japanese launched another large attack across southern Negros 
behind a bombardment that lasted for five days. Fertig tried to find out what was 
happening on the island and complained: “Villamor gave WSK orders to send us no 
information except naval movements, and to relay our stuff south. Result we know 
nothing about changes in enemy status in Negros.”1852  
 
Manila, D580/R-469 
From 30 June to 12 July, Tojo made a second tour of Japan’s southeast conquests. 
On 10 July, he returned to Manila with the chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs Satō 
Kenryō, the vice minister in the Ministry of Greater East Asian Affairs, and chief of the 
Bureau of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yamamoto Kumaichi. The 
orchestrated throngs that greeted him a year earlier failed to materialize. “What is this?” 
he asked his official reception committee, “This is quite a change from the last time I was 
here.” 1853  Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff General Wachi answered: “Perhaps it is 
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because it is too warm.” 1854  The Japanese Prime Minister met with Laurel and the 
Philippine Independence Preparatory Committee in the Manila Hotel. After expressing 
his hopes for Philippine independence and cooperation, Tojo suggested that the 
Philippines enter a military alliance with Japan to wage war against the United States. 
The Filipinos appeared cool to the suggestion. 
 
Visayas, D597/R-452 
In late July, the SS-209 Grayling under Lieutenant Commander Robert M. 
Brinker, began its eighth war patrol.1855 On the last day of the month the boat delivered a 
team of agents under Lieutenant Ireneo Ames with equipment and supplies for Peralta at 
Pucio Point, Panay. SWPA G-2 explained, “This shipment was intended mainly as a 
token of material support for the Panay guerrillas.”1856 On 23 August, under Skipper 
Lieutenant Commander E. Olsen, Grayling would deliver two more tons of supplies to 
guerrillas at Pandan Bay, Panay. Four days later, the submarine would torpedo and sink a 
Japanese transport, Meizan Maru, west of Mindoro.  Grayling, however, would never 
return from this mission.1857 
 The situation between Fertig and Morgan was getting worse. On 27 July, Fertig 
wrote: “Morgan apparently thought that I would be going to Australia and had left 
Bowler in command. He would then take over. His latent anti-American jealousy came to 
the surface in his drunken speeches. I think it is a bluff as long as I am here but you never 
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know.”1858 The next day he intercepted a telegram from Morgan to Captain Sanguila 
reading: “I sent my resignation as chief today, advise Maj Busran – Morgan,” leading 
Fertig to comment, “I did not consider him that dumb.” 1859  The next day Morgan 
officially resigned from Fertig’s command. Morgan began issuing orders signed “General 
of the Fighting Guerrilla,” “C.O. of the Guerrillas,” and as Fertig’s Chief of Staff.1860 
Fertig sent a letter accepting Morgan’s resignation on 30 July. Finally, on 4 August, 
Fertig received a courier from Misamis Occidental announcing that Morgan was going to 
assume command of Mindanao and Sulu. Fertig wrote, “Personal opinion is that it is a 
trial ballon [sic] to test my reaction.”1861 
On 3 August, Villamor sent a situation report to MacArthur: “Morale effectively 
undermined by threats, force propaganda, misunderstanding between friendly units and 
between army and civilians, sickness, activities of some puppets and the supposed 
kindness of Nips to ‘misguided element.’ If not immediately and effectively counteracted 
all semblance of resistance here will soon disappear.”1862   
As he neared departure, Villamor more openly expressed his frustrations. Feeling 
ignored by MacArthur, he dreamt of liberating his homeland. He sent SWPA a proposal 
to gather six of his old Filipino pilots, return to Australia, and lead a bombing raid on 
Tokyo.1863 The request went nowhere. On 15 August Villamor wrote Quezon: 
“Now, more than ever, the people are in dire need of your guidance and 
counsel. I assure you that they have not forgotten you. Nor have they 
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lost faith in you or our General MacArthur. Neither have they lost faith 
in America or that victory shall ultimately be ours. However during 
these most trying times when as you say we are before the bar of public 
opinion to test our capacity as a race for self-government and the issue 
definitely rests in the mind and heart and soul of each individual among 
us, we find ourselves so besieged by the enemy that even this very air 
we breathe carries with it along with the enemy’s perfidious lies the 
stench of bodies torn and mutilated for their unflinching belief in the 
cause so many others have already died for. If you only see us now you 
will see that our hearts are broken, our souls torn between love of 
liberty and love of dear ones who are dying for lack of medicines, food 
and shelter, and our minds confused by enemy propaganda and the 
enormous uncertainties of our daily lives. But with all that we aim to 
carry on till no human can do any more. Please tell America that over 
here we do not pray for victory, for victory is sure to come. Rather we 
pray that God may speed the day of their coming which shall also be 




Two days later the Manila Tribune printed Laurel’s first interview as Chairman of 
the Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence. He told Japanese and Filipino 
newsmen of his plans to deal with the guerrillas: “The constabulary will be reorganized 
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and strengthened to compel obedience of unruly elements. The force will be increased as 
needed to maintain order. If necessary, the Nippon forces will be requested to extend 
assistance during the transition period.”1865 The Japanese spent August conducting zoning 
operations in and around Manila.  
In central Luzon, Colonel Hugh Straughn had built his Fil-American Irregular 
Troops (FAIT) into a robust if loose guerrilla command. He had four brigades under 
Colonels Marcos Agustin (Marking), Emilio Acosta, Manuel T. Dikit, and Dionisio 
Banting, Jr. in the Bulacan-Rizal-Manila area, Batangas, Tayabas and Bicol respectively. 
Near Christmas of 1942, Marking left the organization. On 5 August, the jungle telegraph 
reported that the Japanese captured Straughn. Villamor saw Straughn’s picture in the 
Rabuang Arudela and heard him on the radio denouncing the guerrillas as “trouble-
makers and racketeers.”1866 Fertig reported: “Tokyo radio is playing up the capture as that 
of the guerrilla leader of the Philippines. Jap like he was quoted ‘I wish I could advise all 
my followers now hiding in the mountains to surrender.’”1867 
 One month later the Visayan newspaper Shimbung printed an article, 
“Guerrilla Activities in P.I Futile,” that quoted Straughn: “I organized a guerrilla band 
known as the Filipino American Irregular Troops which was nothing but a make believe 
organization and materially composed of bandits, outlaws and other dissatisfied elements 
without effective arms or weapons.”1868 Straughn continued: “The ‘Marking Guerrilla’ 
was either annihilated by the Japanese punitive expeditions or dissolved through 
voluntary desertions. The group became so small since March 1943 that it had to be 
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formally disbanded on May 1943.”1869  It is possible Straughn chose his words in hopes 
of saving his former guerrillas from attack. 
Rumors circulated that Straughn was a victim of betrayal by Marking’s Guerrillas. 
Yay Panlilio countered that when Marking heard of Straughn’s capture he wept openly 
and said, “I told him that peninsula was a pocket! I told him to come with us. I told him 
to get farther back. I told all of them. Why didn’t they listen?”1870 Panlilio admitted that 
she did not like Straughn. 
Most of Straughn’s units went their own way under their leaders.  About four 
hundred poorly armed FAIT men in the mountains near Antipolo, Rizal, remained under 
“Col. Elliot P. Ellsworth” (reportedly General Vincente Lim) in Manila, until the 
Japanese captured Lim.  The Japanese later executed both `Straughn and Lim. Nearby the 
Hunters in Cavite ignored the orders to concentrate on intelligence and instead continued 
to fight within itself and with rivals like Marking’s guerrillas, “but especially against the 
Japanese.”1871 The President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG) became an independent 
group in Batangas. By May 1944, Hunters and Marking’s absorbed the remaining FAIT 
who had been under Ellsworth. 
The Japanese success against the guerrillas caused Filipino political leaders to 
recalculate their positions. On 11 August, Laurel told a group of women from the 
KALIBAPI: “It will take two more years to put down Germany; it will take another three 
years to beat Japan, that is five years. In the meantime, we must keep peace and order to 
forestall pestilence and famine. We must liquidate all guerillas.”1872 Whether he truly 
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believed this or was telling the pro-Japanese audience what it wanted to hear remains an 
open question. 
Worried about Mindanao, the JMA organized intense media coverage of a tour of 
Manila by twenty-six Lanao Moros led by Domocao Alonto.  On a stop at JMA 
headquarters, newsmen reported that the group agreed to cooperate with the Japanese.1873 
After the tour, the administration in Manila sent Alonto to replace Rival as governor of 
Lanao Province. 
For the administration, food was becoming a critical concern. Japanese policies 
across the their occupied territories had deleterious effects on agricultural supplies. 
“Burma, Malaya, and indo-China together represented the world’s largest rice-exporting 
area, but mismanagement of the rice trade led to a dramatic decline in production which 
combined with ruthless requisitioning of supplies to create a widespread hunger and, in 
Burma and Indo-China, famine,” Lizzie Collingham wrote, “As the Malayan 
schoolteacher Chin Kee Onn commented, ‘the much-publicized and rosily-painted ‘New 
Order’ turned out to be the ‘New Disorder’ and what was proclaimed to be the ‘Co-
Prosperity Sphere’ was actually the ‘Co-poverty Fear.’” 1874  With Filipinos making 
similar derogatory observations, food shortages endangered Japanese control. 
By August, NARIC held only enough rice to feed Manila for one month.1875  With 
a new planting season at hand, Japanese plans for the agricultural economy were clearly 
in trouble.1876  Unfavorable weather, poor soil conditions and pests combined to devastate 
Hortai rice and cotton cultivation. Price controls on foodstuffs failed; market prices rose 
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despite government enforcement efforts. The cost of rice remained somewhat stable only 
around Manila and the price of meat spiked everywhere. Attempts to compensate for 
shortages by increasing the slaughter of animals reduced the number available for 
agricultural work.  
The Japanese military’s tight control of transportation and fuel hampered all other 
sectors of the economy. The wider war exacerbated the Japan’s problems in the 
Philippines.  Fourteenth Army lost the 122nd Regiment (two battalions of the former 65th 
Brigade) to the Central Pacific.  It still maintained 22 to 23 infantry battalions throughout 
1943 only by creating garrison units from second and third tier troops.1877 Late in the year 
Independent Garrisons reorganized to create three Independent Mixed Brigades, 
including the 30th Mixed Brigade in Mindanao and the 31st in the Visayas, built around a 
nucleus of six infantry battalions. Reinforcements from levies brought the total number of 
Independent Mixed Brigades to four in early 1944.1878  
In August, Mona Snyder met with Manuel Roxas in his Manila home. Learning of 
her guerrilla contacts, he asked her to serve as a liaison between him and Ramsey.1879 She 
passed a report from Roxas indicating that Luzon had become the main reserve area for 
Japan’s Southwest Pacific Army and contained 50,000 soldiers. The next month Mona 
informed Ramsey that the new Republic would declare war on the United States. Ramsey 
dispatched runners south to both Peralta and Fertig to get this important news to 
MacArthur.  
Ramsey met with Lapham and transferred to him Captain Al Hendrickson, a 
tough Montanan and prewar private in the Signal Corps. “He was brusque, short-
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tempered, and not one to refuse a drink or three,” noted Lapham. 1880  Hendrickson 
inherited Captain Criscenzio Hipolito as his intelligence officer, Captain Ramos in 
command of Squadron 401 in western Tarlac, and Captain Diosdado Aganon commanded 
the Squadron 403. Hendrickson’s new commander sent him to the Tarlac Military Area 
as district commander. Tarlac was Huk territory.  
 Meanwhile Bernard Anderson sent two envoys, an American named Schaffer and 
Bim Manzano, to Marking to arrange a meeting. Panlilio described the pairing of 
Marking and Anderson as “gunpowder and matchstick.” 1881  Anderson wanted 
cooperation. Marking suspected that now that he claimed 200,000 organized men and 
women, the American army officer wanted to take his command. Anderson offered 
recognition. “Bullshit, recognition!” Marking told him, “I don’t need to be authorized to 
fight for my country, I guess! Are my fighters paid heroes that they can’t fight just for 
nothing? I guess even MacArthur won’t tell me I’m doing the wrong thing! I guess even a 
bus driver can fight for his country – get the idea? And I was the best driver on the line 
too. I guess I can run my outfit right! Nobody has to give me permission to fight. I’d like 
to see anybody stop me!” 1882  Anderson answered, “Recognition means bullets.” 1883 
Influenced by Panlilio, Marking finally agreed to take orders from MacArthur, but only 
MacArthur. Anderson taught Panlilio Army procedures for accounting, communication, 
policies, etc.  
 Anderson wanted to rally all the USAFFE soldiers in hiding. Panlilio recalled, 
“Marking and I agreed that it would take an American to pull the local Americans out of 
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the rut – one who knew his own people, and one from whom they could take orders 
without loss of pride. Andy was it, we said.” 1884  Anderson and his officers began 
canvassing Marking’s area.  Very quickly many Americans secreted in kaingin hideouts 
across the countryside started working as couriers for Anderson. “They were Americans 
again, doing important work,” Panlilio wrote, “where in humiliation they had been mean, 
surly, ugly, all of a sudden in restored importance there was humility and friendliness – 
and gratitude. The only difference between them and Andy his men was that they were 
restored, and his men had to be.”1885 Anderson sent Lieutenant Russell Barros to deliver a 
message to Lapus in Bicol. 
 
Southern Luzon, D606, R-443 
In southern Luzon near Sorgoson, Major Licerio Lapus had survived combat with 
the Japanese, conflict with Escudero, and defections among subordinates. With backing 
from Peralta, he yielded to pressure and united his 54th Regiment with Sandico’s 
guerrillas to form the 56th Regiment. Sandico reported to SWPA that he had been offered 
the military governorship but refused because Escudero was still governor. Escudero 
charged Lapus with the unlawful declaration of martial law. This ongoing conflict turned 
Lapus even more to the 6th MD for help. Peralta, seeking influence on Luzon, alternately 
encouraged Lapus, Zabat and Escudero to lead unification effort in Bicol’s 5th MD.  
When any of the three Bicol guerrilla leaders appealed to the 6th MD, said Willoughby, 
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Peralta would respond with “attendant double talk (and) would aver it had no right to 
meddle in the internal affairs of the 5th MD.”1886 
Before the end of August, however, each of the three guerrilla leaders possessed a 
letter from Peralta acknowledging the bearer as 5th Military District commander. In this 
way Peralta increased the volume of intelligence flowing through his 6th MD 
headquarters, but he also escalated the bloody competition among guerrillas. Finally, 
Anderson intervened by sending Barros to Lapus in mid-August. He found Lapus 
“anxious for a settlement of the causes for the conflict” but Ecudero still refused all 
suggestions of settlement.1887 
The competition for Bicol undermined unity. “True, Bicol-based rivals had 
themselves to blame as well, for letting the siren song of Panay drive them to the rocks of 
disunity as their quickened personal ambition obfuscated the paramount military goal of 
consolidating forces,” wrote Barrameda, “But individually, Escudero, Lapus, Zabat and 
Sandico were no less patriotic Filipinos, no less America-loving Filipinos, no less 
Nippon-hating Filipinos than any Filipino in the 6th Military District. Had circumstances 
allowed those men a local-based radio early on like Peralta, to transmit directly to GHQ, 
SWPA, in Brisbane, their reports would not have been exposed to the temptation of 
filtering and editing by a third party with an agenda of its own.”1888 
 
Mindanoa, D607/R-442 
On 6 August, Fertig received a proposal from Morgan, now self-proclaimed 
commander of Mindanao-Sulu Force, to meet at Kolambugan. Fertig thought him “nuts” 
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and sent word that any “conference would be held at my order.”1889 Three days later 
Fertig received another letter, this one “setting forth [Morgan’s} grievances which are 
those of a spoiled child. He was not given the same treatment as others, etc.”1890 “Morgan 
aired his grievances to the assembled Provincial officials in Kolambugan and apparently 
consist largely of anti-Americanism and petty personal insults,” Fertig noted, “It boils 
down to his regret that he named me to command instead of assuming it himself. The 
conversation with Villamor and Andrews did not help the situation for they are both 
against me.”1891  
The two men met on 11 August in Liangan. Morgan proposed to leave Fertig in 
charge of the 10th MD if Fertig acknowledged him as commander of the field forces. “I 
did tell him exactly what I thot [sic] of his actions,” Fertig wrote, “He has authorized the 
burning of all houses occupied by the Japs (of course after the Japs have departed). A 
tragi-comedy opera war.”1892 Morgan left the next morning without waiting for Fertig’s 
response to his proposal. 
Fertig approved the appointment of former U.S. Army 31st Infantry Sergeant 
William MacLaughlin as captain and commander of the 112th Regiment based near 
Sumilao. He similarly promoted a former 102nd Division quartermaster to captain in 
command of 111th Regiment centered near Mambuaya.  Both units fell under the 109th 
Division. He dispersed the third battalion of the 125th Regiment on Jolo and sent many of 
its men to the second battalion on Siasi. A heavy Japanese assault on Siasi drove the 
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guerrillas to the first battalion on Tawi Tawi.  Before the year’s end, more Japanese 
attacks pressed the first battalion near the breaking point.  
On 22 August, an exhausted Fertig wrote in his diary: “Queer this war. Monday 
morning 8:30 P.I. time in my nip shack on a Lanao hillside looking toward Mt. 
Melindong across the smooth blue bay. The American program from Chungking with 
Diana Shore [sic] singing ‘The One I Left Behind.’ Love and happiness seem far away so 
does War with the pleasant air of the hillside.”1893  The troublesome Morgan had quit 
Fertig’s 10th Military District and set up his own command in Misamis Occidental, hence 
Villamor’s account that Morgan resigned his place with Fertig and took thirty loyal men 
into the jungle to fight on as loyal independent guerrillas. 1894   To Fertig, “Morgan 
violated his agreement by notifying men on the other side to follow his orders until 
friction with me was settled. The man is crazy ‘insane’ and will make trouble eventually I 
fear.”1895 SWPA noted: “The situation threatened to become serious due to Morgan’s 
violent attempt at mutiny.”1896  
 
Visayas, D620/R-420 
On Mindoro, Captain Esteban P. Beloncio merged his two hundred and fifty 
guerrillas around Lake Naujan with Ruffys Bolo Battalion and agreed to serve as Ruffy’s 
executive officer. As SWPA evaluated Beloncio it noted: “Some sources report that he 
was not well liked.”1897 Peralta, however, had no influence with Ruffy. Working through 
Jurado, Peralta would convince Beloncio to break loose from Ruffy at the end of March 
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1944. The following November, Beloncio died in a fight with local guerrillas on 
Mindoro. 
Elsewhere on the island, Alfonso Sotelo organized about 300 men on Mindoro 
into the Sotelo Group. The first time SWPA heard of the group was when they learned of 
their surrender in September 1943.  In Mercado on Negros, Major Hermenegildo 
Mercada, an Infantry School classmate of Peralta who had joined and broken from 
Gador, joined the 7th Military District as commander of the 72nd Regiment (East Negros 
sector), 72 Division. 
On Cebu, Harry Fenton faced a difficult decision. In July the Japanese had 
captured his wife and children and tried to use them to coerce his and Cushing’s 
surrender. Fenton and Cushing refused. By now, however, the two men agreed on little 
else. Fenton obstinately refused to pay his men, to work with other guerrillas, or to 
reconsider his determination to execute anyone he deemed guilty of crimes against the 
guerrilla cause. Cushing went to Negros in August to meet Villamor, leaving orders with 
his executive officer, Lieutenant Richard Estrella, to arrest Fenton.  
On 19 August, Estrella convened a conference of his commanders to convince 
them of the need to arrest Fenton along with his loyal officers. The conference attendees 
agreed Fenton had crossed a line when he arrested and executed a missionary priest, 
Father Patrick Drumm.  
James Cushing met with Villamor on Negros on 2 September. Cushing brought 
with him his regimental commanders: Lieutenant Colonel Olegario Baura, Captain Abel 
Trazo, and Captain Rogaciano Espiritu. Villamor found Cushing to be a “sacerdotal 
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figure” and a “mild figure of a man.”1898 He notified MacArthur: “Cushing just arrived. 
States that their present situation requires immediate solution else total collapse Cebu 
forces inevitable. Claims that majority of forces will no longer obey Fenton whose life is 
in danger. Believes that immediate financial aid will be of incalculable value in 
maintaining unity and is even more vital than command questions.” 1899  Villamor 
explained to Cushing SWPA’s policies but Cushing wanted authority to issue money and 
impose civil government. 
Back in Australia, Parsons had convinced SWPA that Fenton and Cushing were 
out of control and refusing MacArthur’s authority Villamor sent another request to 
MacArthur on 17 September. “In this connection,” he explained, “it is felt that the 
situation is such that the SWPA cannot afford to recognize the district under the 
leadership of Fenton and Cushing nor give recognition to the guerrilla units until a new 
leadership can be arranged.”1900  
Matters came to a head on 15 September when Estrella arrested Harry Feton. 
While Cushing would later claim he only expected Estrella to detain Fenton, Estella 
immediately held a court martial that found Fenton guilty of all charges against him. He 
then had Fenton and several of his aides executed.  Estrella then reorganized Fenton’s 
remaining 3,500 men.  
 
Luzon, D622/R-427 
 Others also thought in terms of coups. In September, Major General Sosaku 
Suzuki arrived as the new commander of the Army Shipping Headquarters in Manila. He 
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became convinced that the JMA needed to be more aggressive in purging pro-American 
officials from the Philippine government and advocated greater use of anti-American 
Moros and Ganaps. Suzuki went to the 31st Garrison Unit, commanded by the Great 
Asian Society board member Colonel Koreshige Inuzuka, to propose a coup. Inuzuka 
chafed under the Fourteenth Army policies and hired a writer named Hayase to research 
and advertise the Ganaps. Together they would produce a pamphlet in April 1944 lauding 
the Ganaps and Ramos.1901 Shortly thereafter, the Japanese high command sent Suzuki 
out of the country.   
During this time Volckmann felt he had enough control over Thorp’s old 
USAFIP-NL guerrillas to begin reorganization in northern Luzon. He communicated with 
Romulo Enriquez in Nueva Vizacaya province, Robert Lapham in Pangasinan, Dennis 
Molintas northeast of Baguio, Parker Calvert northeast of Baguio, and George Barnett on 
the Ilocos coast. “We were still having trouble,” he wrote, “contacting any unit north of 
us, and contact with Praeger had been completely lost.”1902 Volckmann issued what he 
termed his “Lay Low Order,” directing the units to emphasize intelligence collection 
efforts and avoid confrontations with the Japanese. “By ordering that any member of his 
command who surrendered or permitted himself to be captured would be shot on sight,” 
Villamor noted, “Volckmann held his command intact.”1903 
Volckmann drew up a “Reorganization Plan of 1943” establishing seven 
geographical districts in North Luzon, one for each major subordinate commander in the 
USAFIP-NL.  “Each district commander,” he wrote, “was directed to organize a combat 
regiment generally along the lines of a Philippine Army regiment, except that the three 
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rifle battalions consisted of four rifle companies instead of the usual three.”1904 He then 
tasked Blackburn to find and establish contact with any guerrilla units from Praeger’s 
outfit remaining in Benguet.  
“Well, every time I would send someone north,” Blackburn commented, "the 
collaborators would cause their capture. They would take our man out and put him on a 
bamboo pole, tie his hands and feet like a pig, and take him to the town where he was 
ultimately executed.” 1905 In September, Blackburn sent former Philippine Scout Quiocho 
and Greg Swick with a company of armed men to open the line of communication to 
Apayao and Cagayan. They hid while traveling during the nights until, in a surprise 
attack, they seized “every public official, every policeman, and all of the public files” in 
both Kabugao and Ripang.1906 They found letters from the Mayor of Ripang to Mountain 
Province Governor Hillary P. Clapp describing how they captured guerrillas including 
Praeger and with lists of local individuals “instrumental in this capture.” 1907  The 
guerrillas allowed those named to confess to Father David, a Belgian Priest, and then 
executed them in the city square. Later, Blackburn asked Father David if they had made 
any mistakes among those executed.  He answered, “I won’t say that you made any 
mistakes, but, my son, I don’t approve of your method.” “Good enough,” replied 
Blackburn.1908 
Volckmann assigned his new command areas. First District commander Parker 
organized his guerrillas into the 66th Infantry Regiment in Benguet. Second District went 
to Barnett with the 121st Infantry Regiment in the southern half of Ilocos Sur, La Union, 
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and northwest Pangasinan. Arnold took command of the 3rd District with the 15th Infantry 
Regiment in the northern half of Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, and Abra. The Fourth District 
and its 11th Infantry Regiment went to Blackburn in Cagayan and the sub-provinces of 
Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga and Apayao. The Fifth District with Nakar’s old 14th Infantry 
Regiment went to Major Romulo Manriquez in Neuva Vizcaya, Isbela, and northeastern 
Pangasinan.  
“The new objectives were to get the guerrillas into camps,” recalled Blackburn, 
“and get them organized with the ultimate objective being to be in a position to render the 
maximum effectiveness in support of the Americans when they returned to the 
islands.”1909 Companies in the regiments included special weapons platoons to handle 
machine guns, mortars and any other available special weapons. Volckmann ordered all 
units into camps, no larger than company-sized, far from civilian populations. “This 
policy improved morale of both civilians and the military units, and also improved the 
discipline of the troops,” Volckmann observed.1910 Each district in turn was subdivided 
into areas required to provide guerrillas with material support like clothing, 
administrative supplies and money.1911  
Tired of part-time guerrillas, Volckmann wanted a full-time outfit. Blackburn 
noted, “His philosophy was to stop being guerrillas by night and farmers by day. All that 
did was stir up the Japanese.”1912  The USFIP-NL guerrillas required town leaders to raise 
food contributions from local families. Volckmann also required his regiments to 
establish field hospitals of six doctors with six to fourteen nurses, a dentist, and seventy 
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enlisted personnel, augmented with civilians as necessary. 1913  They had to purchase 
nearly all their medical supplies from Manila. 
 Volckmann set up his General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL with general and 
special staff sections along Army doctrinal lines with special emphasis on the G-5, 
Civilian Affairs section, with sections in every district, regiment and battalion. He 
required each district to gain and maintain popular support in their area. “The greatest 
menace to this program was not the Japanese but rather the spies, informers, and 
collaborators operating for them,” he wrote. 1914  Eventually he began to issue two 
newsletters with any good news gleaned from KGEI radio out of San Francisco.1915 They 
tailored one newsletter to the needs of the guerrillas, the other to boost the morale and 
support of the people. Eventually Blackburn put in about 100 miles of telephone lines, 
powered by old hand-cranked commercial receivers retrieved from municipal buildings, 
solidifying Volckmann’s area command. 1916 
Once organized, Volckmann set out on a four-step campaign: “One, take stern 
measures against spies and informers i.e., their elimination; two, control the puppet 
officials; three, destroy the Japanese Bureau of Constabulary that was being put into the 
area; and four, gain the confidence of the people and restore their morale.”1917  
 
Manila, D628/R-420 
During the summer, Vargas carried P7,000,000 in Philippine occupation currency 
around the Islands to exchange for the emergency script authorized by Quezon and 
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printed by guerrillas. He explained to Tanaka, “The possession of these [guerrilla] notes 
has a very great psychological effect on their holders and induces them to wish that the 
Government that authorized their issue should come back.”1918 Vargas also requested that 
the JMA revoke the prohibition against displays of the Filipino flag. “The restoration of 
this flag would enhance the faith of the Filipino people in Japan and the Imperial 
Japanese forces and will no doubt make them eternally grateful,” said Vargas, “The very 
sight of this flag alone would inspire them with greater determination, not only to co-
operate in the maintenance of peace and order in this country, but also to fight side by 
side with the Imperial Japanese Forces in the sacred mission of eradicating all Western 
influences from the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, including those in India 
and Australia.”1919 Vargas also asked the JMA to outlaw the Sakdal or Ganap party as 
part of the Japanese ban on political groups other than the KALIBAPI. Laurel however 
challenged Vargas on this point. He sought to continue using the Sakdal, as an informer 
militia.1920  
On 6 September, the KALIBAPI assembly completed and approved a draft 
Constitution for an ‘independent’ Philippines. The Japanese government General Affairs 
Bureau (Sōmukyoku) worried that following Philippine independence, all territories 
including India and Korea would push for independence.1921 The grant of independence 
had to be managed carefully to protect Japan’s interests.  Japan had compelled Burma’s 
leaders to declare war against the United States and Britain as a price for their 
independence. They sought a similar pact with the new independent Philippines. The new 
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constitution, however, included no such pact. “To that,” explained Tarling, “the activities 
of the guerrillas contributed, the Huks, the left-wing Chinese Hua Zhi, and above all 
those affiliated to the USAFFE.”1922  
As for an alliance against the Americans, Laurel argued, “It is not that we would 
refuse to sign the treaty if the Japanese forces insist on their phrases, but such a wording 
would hamper our policy to lead the people toward entry into the war, to which they are 
opposed, and it might hurt the position of the new government, and there would be 
danger of a split in the nation.”1923 Instead he asked for a declaration of war “if feasible, 
as soon as possible.”1924  When pressed by Tojo, Laurel explained “that Quezon, Osmeña 
and Roxas were the popular leaders in the Philippines, and not himself; that he could not 
carry the people, or even maintain a following, with such an unpopular measure; and it 
would not be ‘decent’ for the Filipinos to declare war against a benefactor.” 1925 
By now the Japanese administration had run the Philippines for more than a year 
and a half. Filipinos who had once tried to ignore or coexist with the administration found 
their patience tried in countless ways. Most kinship networks suffered the imprisonment 
of at least one family member or friend. Uncertainty and fear, aggravated by the 
obnoxious behavior of the Japanese bureaucracy, made Filipinos angry with the occupiers 
and sympathetic with the resistance. The case of Adaia Marquez was one of thousands in 
Manila.1926    
 On 27 August, the Japanese had arrested her husband, Philippine Civil Liberties 
Union leader Antonio Bautista at his law office. He had been a principal organizer of the 
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underground intelligence network of young urban professional Filipinos known as “the 
Free Philippines.” The Japanese had strong suspicions about Bautista’s activities, but no 
certain proof.  
Adalia Marquez tried every avenue available to her to get to see her husband 
including pleading to a Filipina acquaintance named Linda who was living with a 
Kempeitai colonel as his mistress. On the evening of 3 September, Adalia unexpectedly 
received instructions to report to the Fort Santiago prison at 0700 hours the next morning. 
She did not realize that the Japanese hoped to use her to break her husband’s will. Adalia 
made arrangements with a neighbor to watch her children and arrived early to the prison. 
She was left waiting outside until 0800 when guards escorted her to a room with one 
table and one chair. They left her standing in the room.  
After an indeterminate amount of time two men entered and identified themselves 
as Lieutenant Namiki and interpreter Fujiwara. They did not bring Bautista. Namiki sat in 
the chair at the desk and began questioning Adalia about her husband’s rank and role in 
the guerrillas. She claimed to no nothing, and in fact her husband had made certain that 
she knew very little of these things. Around noon the two interrogators left Adalia 
standing alone in the room.  
At about 1300 hours (Adalai could not be certain for there was no clock in the 
room), the two men returned. They presented her with a poorly written letter supposedly 
composed by her highly educated husband. The letter read: “If you love our children, you 
must tell the truth, as I have already CONFESSIONED. Please, for the sake of our 
HOUSE, you must tell the truth because the Japanese Military POLISE is very 
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magnanimous and they will let you go home after you are telling the truth.”1927  Adalia 
recognized the letter as a forgery and assumed her husband had not confessed and that the 
interrogators were desperately fishing for information.  
When Adalia continued to plead ignorance of any guerrilla activities, Namiki 
began beating her with a heavy ruler. Panlilio described such beatings: “It began in the 
application of a ruler edgewise to the face and hands, aimed at the bone protrusions such 
as eyebrows, bridge of the nose, knuckles. It ended in simply pounding the victim to a 
jelly with a baseball bat or rifle butts.”1928 Namiki screamed at Adalia, “This is the kind 
of treatment you deserve! You want to be like American girl – you want to wear pants, 
eh? Why do you wear pants!”1929 The questioning and harsh treatment continued with 
few breaks well into the night. Finally, the two men left and Adalia curled up on the floor 
to sleep. Around 0400 hours on 5 September, she awoke to the call of a rooster in the 
distance. She was alone.  
Not until 2100 hours on 6 September did another person enter the room. Adalia 
recalled, “Then a white clad figure appeared at my door. A bowl of thin rice gruel was 
thrust towards me. ‘Lugau, eat it quickly,’ Fujiwara whispered.”1930 Now worried about 
her husband, her children and herself, Adalia came up with a new plan of action.   
In the afternoon of 7 September, Namiki and Fujiwara re-entered the room and 
renewed the interrogation. A clearly exhausted Adalia answered their questions with lies 
laced with exaggerated gossip in hopes of pacifying them. They asked about her brother 
in the United States, indicating that they had done some homework on her family. They 
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seemed especially receptive to any gossip relating to Japanese officers and their 
interactions with Filipinos, particularly with women. After a while Adalia was left alone 
again.  
Sometime on 8 September a Filipino boy brought Adalia a bowl of lugao. That 
night Fujiwara brought her a few rice cakes to share as she told him about Linda and the 
Japanese Kempeitai officer. After her days of forced solitary contemplation, Adalia had 
become convinced that it was Linda who had betrayed her husband. 
Before sunrise, Namiki and Fujiwara returned carrying flashlights to wake her and 
hear more about Linda. “I adlibbed enough material to fill a Sunday supplement scandal 
sheet,” recalled Adalia, “I began to suspect what I later found out to be actually the case. 
There were two cliques among the Japanese Military Police and they were terribly 
jealous of each other, one clique would do anything to discredit the other.”1931 
Finally, on 9 September at 0200 in the morning, Namiki released Adalia with 
orders to return at 0730 with a written report of all she knew about the guerrillas. She 
returned at the appointed time and was left waiting and until 1200 when she was taken to 
a cell.  Late that day she was released with orders to return the next day at 0900 hours. 
When she returned to Fort Santiago she was shown photos of suspected guerrillas to 
identify. She was released at noon. Four hours later she received a call telling her to 
expect a visit from Fujiwara at 1900 hours. 
At the appointed hour, the interpreter arrived at Adalia’s home and demanded 
P10,000. He was almost crying as he explained that he had a wife and three children in 
Japan and they desperately needed money. Fujiwara told Adalia, “You understand, of 
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course, why Lieutenant Namiki admires you so much – why he treats you the way he 
does? It is because of the way I interpret for you.”1932 The implication was clear. 
On 11 September at 0700 hours, Adalia met Fujiwara on a bridge and handed him 
P5,000 – all she could beg and borrow. An hour before midnight on 12 September, she 
received another phone call telling her to meet Fujiwara in a hotel bar at 0300. At that 
meeting Fujiwara informed Adalia that she would begin work as an informer for the 
Japanese Military Police. She never got to see her husband who was later reported to 
have escaped and disappeared. 
 
Northern Luzon, D631/R-418 
Praeger continued to lead guerrillas in the Ilocos Sur area while Adduru imbedded 
himself with the Japanese as an apparent collaborator in order to access intelligence.1933 
Adduru’s Cagayan and Apayao Force (CAF) had already placed Apayao Company’s 
Captain Silvino P. Garcia and headquarters commandant Lieutenant Joaquin B. Flores in 
similar missions after apparent surrenders.1934 Lieutenant Bonito Bulan took over the 
CAF and moved it to Isabela.  
Meanwhile, the Japanese in Cagayan threatened and bribed locals in an effort to 
find Praeger’s new headquarters.1935 Finally on 30 August, they captured Praeger along 
with Furagganan and Brazelton.1936 The details of Praeger’s capture remain clouded. The 
Japanese had been intercepting Praeger’s radio messages for several weeks, deciphered 
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with a broken code.1937 Some guerrillas thought he had been betrayed. Others suggest that 
the physically fatigued officer was ready to surrender. Blackburn heard from a priest: 
“Praeger had captured these Japanese. He was treating them according to the rules of land 
warfare. But, he was running out of food and medicine, so he decided that he couldn’t 
adhere to those rules. So, he asked Father David to take the Japanese back to the 
commander in the town of Tuguegarao, down in the Cagayan Valley, which he did. The 
Japanese turned around and captured Praeger.”1938 Later Ramsey noted: “Praeger had 
been seen by one of our guerillas in Japanese custody at Cabanatuan, and there were 
reports that he was being tortured and put on display. This was becoming more common: 
Guerilla leaders were being paraded before the public after having been tortured beyond 
endurance and forced to make speeches denouncing the resistance and urging Filipinos to 
betray us.”1939 The Japanese executed Praeger in November. 
 
Australia, D633/R-416 
Since June, the PRS had been working on plans “envisaging intelligence 
penetration separate from guerrilla consideration or support.”1940 Through the summer, 
however, they began to appreciate the intelligence sources made and maintained by the 
guerrillas. Before the end of August, the PRS proposed a finalized plan “to develop 
intelligence procurement through guerrilla sources south of 12°00’ N” – the line dividing 
Mindoro and Luzon from the rest of the Philippines.1941  
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Back in Australia, Parsons reported to MacArthur and Whitney. The former 
lawyer eagerly took up Parsons’ case for establishing SPYRON - an amalgamation of 
‘Spy Squadron’ - to shuttle supplies, communications, and agents into the Islands.1942 
Parsons hired his brother-in-law, Captain Tommy Jurika. Captain George Kinsler took 
charge of procuring equipment for the guerrillas from civilian sources. Navy Ensign 
William Hagans – born and raised in the Philippines – arranged forward bases for 
submarine resupply. Navy Lieutenant Lee Strickland did the same for semi-forward 
bases. The Navy’s Seventh Fleet assigned Captain A.H. McCollum to coordinate support. 
Commodore Jack Haines of Task Force 72 also worked closely with Parsons.  “It was a 
novel arrangement to have Army officers working at Navy bases and vice-versa, and we 
were looked upon as mystery men,” recalled Parsons, “The hush-hush nature of our 
business, prior to invasion, made it necessary to order supplies without indicating purpose 
or destination.” 1943 
With MacArthur’s support, Whitney also sought new and better equipment for 
radio communication and fuel extraction from coconuts and other organic sources, along 
with lightweight carbines for jungle fighters. He prioritized and quantified orders for 
desperately needed supplies ranging from atabrine to shotgun shells. Finally, he sorted 
through requests from particular guerrilla leaders for special items. What might seem 
unimportant to a general supply officer might be critical to a particular guerrilla; Parsons 
understood why Fertig needed soap, Pendantun needed polish, and Kangleon needed 
dentures.1944  
Meanwhile the AIB kept up the submarine insertions. On its last run in August, 
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the SS-209 Grayling delivered to Panay supplies that included prized PRS radios. 
Villamor’s station HT-9 on Negros was now relaying traffic from numerous short-range 
B3Z and ATR-4 radios from central Luzon, southern Negros, western Panay and eastern 
Sorsogon, including traffic from Anderson, Merrill and Ramsey.1945 Each night, when 
solar radiation abated, the bases sent their updates directly through to SWPA. 
About this time, Wolfgang Kleinecke of the Nazi Transocean news organization 
broadcast from Berlin a message that would take time to reach Parsons: 
“The headquarters of a North American espionage ring in the 
Philippines, led by a 63-year old Catholic American woman 
missionary, were eliminated in January of this year by the arrest 
of the ringleaders, it became known only now from Manila. The 
ring numbered more than 100 North American, British, Chinese 
and Indian agents. Investigations have revealed that one Col. 
Evans before the outbreak of the G.E.A [Greater East Asia] War 
was head of the U.S. Secret Service in the Philippines, and had 
sent a man by the name of Charles Parson [sic] as his secret 
envoy to the Philippines to establish connections with 63-year 
old Blanche Jurika, who ostensibly was a Catholic missionary in 
Manila, but who in fact led a corps of guerrillas. By the way, 
Jurika is the mother-in-law of Parson. Parson, himself, was 
charged with rigging up a far-flung espionage apparatus and with 
organizing guerrillas. Parson collected anti-Japanese elements 
and on Mindoro Island overlooking Manila Bay established a 




secret wireless station which kept in constant touch with 
Australia and America. Blanche Jurika was the ring leader of the 
organization. She was already before the war an active member 
of the U.S. spy service in the Philippines, while her elder son, 
Stephan Jurika, prior to the outbreak of the war was military 
attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. It is reported that Stephan 
Jurika was directly in the lead of the air raid on Tokyo in 1942, 
and was aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier commanded by Doolittle. 
Also, Blanche Jurika’s second son, Thomas, was discovered to 
be a spy.”1946 
Of course there were much inaccuracy in this report: there was no international 
ring of 100 spies in Manila; Blanche Jurika was not spy; and Stephan Jurika was a naval 
intelligence officer aboard the USS Hornet who briefed Doolittle’s pilots but was not one 
of the fliers. Yet the report also indicated two interesting things: the Japanese knew of 
Chick Parsons and they were concerned about him. 
 
Mindanao, D645/R-404 
Despite the complaints of officers like Major General Sosaku Suzuki and Colonel 
Koreshige Inuzuka, the Fourteenth Army leaders believed they were adopting a more 
aggressive approach, at least towards the Moros in Mindanao and Sulu.1947 They sent a 
covert operations specialist, First Lieutenant Baba Masataka of the Defense Intelligence 
Section, to Mindanao.  
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On 13 September, Fertig wrote: “Morgan is whipped… Tate pulled away and left 
him out on a limb. The mutiny is done…Things are clicking so well that I almost 
expectant [sic] for trouble.” 1948 He noted, “Tate is Oc. Misamis doing some harassing 
and trying to clear up the mess made under Morgan’s orders.”1949 Fertig sent Cabili to 
Morgan in Misamis Occidental “with a proposal that will solve everything if accepted.” 
1950  
 “Fertig got on badly with two of his other lieutenants as well, Captains Ernest 
McClish and Clyde Childress,” wrote Lapham, “They thought him paranoid and 
consumed with personal ambition, not to speak of ungrateful and discourteous to them 
after they had made it possible for him to move his headquarters to a safe location on the 
eastern part of the island.”1951 Believing Morgan dreamed of “a general amnesty,” Fertig 
cooked up a plan to convince Morgan that MacArthur needed to see him in Australia for 
vital coordination.1952 
A month earlier SS-287 Bowfin had begun its first war patrol from Brisbane, 
Australia, into the South China Sea. 1953  The new Balao-class submarine had been 
commissioned in May and placed under veteran skipper Lieutenant Commander Joseph 
H. Willingham. Before dawn on 29 September, the boat delivered seven tons of supplies 
to Binui Point, Mindanao.  Fertig sailed out to meet the sub aboard the Rubin IV. 
“Beautiful deadly sight, silhouetted against the driving rain squalls that slithered down 
Malindang. Comdr. Wallingham [sic] met me on the bridge and we went below to clean 
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linen, drip-o-later coffee, sandwiches and cookies. We got everything possible off the 
ship, some few items, but they were on the edge for rations.”1954 A separate launch came 
alongside with evacuees: Tucker, Minter, Napolilio, Glover, Owens, Offret, Graschio, 
Mr. Kuder – and Morgan. According to Lapham, Fertig used Davao prison camp escapee 
and American pilot Lieutenant Samuel Grashio to get Morgan on the submarine.1955  
On his way to the sub, Fertig received a radio message from SWPA “saying that 
Morgan, Tucker and Minter were to be held here. It was too late for the easiest solution 
of Morgan was to send him out.”1956 The 10th MD guerrillas delivered more than a ton of 
fresh fruit to the sub. “At  
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8:30 we cast off and there in that thin steel shell are some of my biggest problems,” 
commented Fertig, “some friends, and my letters to my loved ones. For another few 
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weeks we shall be tied to the rest of the world. Only by the thin song of the radio 
transmitter bon voyage.”1957  
On his way home, on 25 September, Willingham came across and sank the 
Japanese tanker Kirishima Maru in the South China Sea.  Five days later Bowfin 
delivered more supplies and evacuated nine people from Siquitor Island. Departing the 
area Willingham engaged with gunfire and sank a small Japanese cargo ship, the Mitake 
Maru, in the Sulu Sea and a Japanese sampan in the Makassar Strait before returning to 
Fremantle on 10 October.  
In Misamis Oriental, Fertig organized the guerrillas north of Agusan and Surigoa 
into the 110th, 113th, and 114th Regiments.  Battle tested guerrillas who a year earlier 
drove the Japanese out of Balingasag under the leadership of Clyde Abbott and Pedro 
Collado formed the 110th Regiment. Later, Fertig had Collado arrested for conspiracy of 
mutiny and replaced by Captain Luz. 1958  The three regiments faced light Japanese 
garrisons in Cagayan and Bugo with an outpost in Libertad. The Japanese launched 




On 20 September, Captain Sofio Bayron sent intelligence to Villamor which he 
then passed to SWPA: “My man in Bohol reports Santander in Cebu now occupied with 
indications whole island will be overrun. Governor Abelana of Cebu now in Bohol with 
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eight officers. Fenton reportedly held by own men.”1960  At Villamor’s side, Cushing 
remained highly agitated, threw up at least once, and appeared ready to use his .45-
caliber pistol. The PRS informed Villamor that the 8th Military District would go to Fertig 
who was to deputize Cushing to organize Cebu. SWPA denied Cushing the authority to 
print money. Fertig or Gador, or perhaps both, were to provide funds to Cushing. 
Villamor recalled the impact of this message: “Cushing was crushed. He began to tremble 
with anger.”1961 Villamor again sent to SWPA a request to allow Cushing to print money, 
and SWPA instructed Cushing to visit Fertig for a solution.  
About this time Villamor experienced a distraction. Mauricio Guidote arrived in 
his camp claiming to be an agent sent by Roxas. His interest in the guerrillas’ radio, his 
praise of the Japanese, a sudden appearance of Japanese planes, and his demands that 
they contact Governor Montelibano raised suspicions as to whether or not Guidote was a 
spy. Unable to contact Roxas to verify the man’s bona fides, Villamor convened a board 
of senior officers to interrogate Guidote. After several hours, they believed the man’s 
story “appeared more and more phony.” 1962 The board unanimously ordered Guidote 
shot.  A firing squad carried out the sentence. 
 
Manila, D667, R-382 
On 5 October, Fourteenth Army Commander General Tanaka visited the 
presidential palace in Malacañang. Vargas told him there were considerable USAFFE 
remnants still refusing to accept JMA offers of amnesty and causing problems. “This 
problem can be solved by the military authorities in two ways,” he said, “either by 
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sending sufficient troops to control the situation in the troubled provinces, or by 
authorizing the Executive Commission to organize, fully equip, and utilize the 
Constabulary for this purpose.” 1963  He recommended Commissioner of the Interior 
Benigno Aquino to command an armed constabulary against the guerrillas.  
A much different exchange between the two men occurred at 0933 hours on 14 
October. Vargas repeated the words of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army 
and declared: “Effective October 14th, 18th year of Syowa, Military Administration 
throughout the occupied territory of the Philippines is terminated.”1964 With those words 
Jose P. Laurel became President of the Second Philippine Republic as elected by the 
National Assembly.  Chief Justice Jose Yulo administered the presidential oath of office 
while national heroes of forty years earlier, General Emilio Aguinaldo and General 
Artemio Ricarte, raised the Philippine flag as the Philippine National Anthem played in 
public for the first time since the invasion. At 1730 hours, the new president signed an 
alliance between the Philippines and Japan promising close “political, economic, and 
military” cooperation. 
The Japanese Military Administration officially disbanded. Colonel Utsunomiya, 
the Fourteenth Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff and the JMA’s Director of the General 
Affairs Department, became the consular attaché to the new Philippine government. 
Chairman of the Philippines Cotton Growers Association Shozo Murata, the highest-
ranking civilian and supreme advisor to JMA, became Ambassador Plenipotentiary. 
Harvard educated former General Motors executive in Japan, Hamamoto Masakatsu, 
became special advisor to Laurel. Hamamoto worriedly reported that there was not “even 
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one pro-Japanese” in the highest levels of the new Philippine government.1965 The JMA 
reassigned liaisons in the provinces. Lieutenant Goto in Dansalan, Mindanao, for 
example, transferred to Manila. 
In his inaugural address Laurel stated his belief that “every living Filipino, 
including those in the mountains who still had some doubts,’ would ‘come down to help 
us.”1966 That evening Laurel departed for Tokyo with Vargas and Benigno S. Aquino. 
President Roosevelt broadcast his denouncement of the “puppet government” established 
under Laurel as born in “fraud and deceit” and added, “I wish to make it clear that neither 
the former collaborationist ‘Philippine Executive Commission’ nor the present 
‘Philippine Republic’ has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United 
States. No act of either body is now or ever will be considered lawful or binding by this 
government.”1967 
Four days into independence, Laurel called a special session of the Assembly to 
address the country’s economic crisis. As a major in the JMA noted: “…whereas the 
Americans brought to the Philippines more than they took away, the Japanese, instead of 
bringing in goods needed here, have been taking away iron, ore, copper, and other 
resources of the archipelago. As a result, Filipino living standards have been continuously 
depressed since the Japanese arrival.” 1968  Under the new constitution, Japanese 
companies retained their exploitation rights. The Japanese also kept control of fuel, 
transportation, media and the issue of money. Only the guerrillas interfered with their 
control. In Luzon, for example, the Hukbalahap and other guerrillas viewed the new 
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government as Japanese puppets and deliberately attacked rice production and 
distribution.1969  
Laurel took the opportunity to offer a new amnesty to people “who may be 
responsible for crimes and offenses of sedition, illicit association, engaging in guerillas 
activities or aiding and abetting those so engaged or spreading false rumors and for all 
crimes and offenses political in nature committed heretofore against the laws of the 
Philippines.” 1970  The Assembly unanimously approved the amnesty and ratified the 
alliance with Japan.  
The new Philippine government had little choice but to comply with policies 
dictated by the Japanese. This was especially true in the area of law and order. “At the 
time the Philippines declare their independence,” the Japanese military stated, “guerrillas 
will be looked on as traitors who continue to disturb the peace in the Philippines, but the 
ones who repent their misdeeds and renew their allegiance to the Japanese Forces will not 
be punished.”1971 The guerrillas did not comply with the amnesty. “The reason, that the 
state of order could not be improved easily was due mainly to the industrial policies of 
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11.  Foundations 
21 October 1943 – 6 January 1944 
 
 The Japanese grant of nominal independence to the Philippines failed to create 
the fruitful alliance they desired. The active and growing guerrilla resistance empowered 
the Filipinos in government to defy Japanese demands for more active partnership 
against the United States for fear of causing a civil war in the Islands. In some areas, 
however, the privations of occupation strained popular morale to the breaking point. 
 
Mindanao, D682/R-367 
As Saburo Ienaga wrote, “Granting independence to the puppet administration in 
1943 did not reduce anti-Japanese feeling… Many Filipino men joined organized 
guerrilla units, but the whole populace – old and young, men and women – cooperated 
with the resistance. Japan had ‘liberated’ the islands from Yankee imperialism and given 
the Filipinos their ‘independence.’ Nevertheless, ‘The whole island chain became hostile 
territory.’”1973  Only slowly, however, were guerrilla leaders able to connect regional 
resistance into a nation wide effort. 
On Mindanao that October, Fertig formed the 106th Division under Lieutenant 
Colonel Frank McGee from the 116th, 118th and 119th Regiments plus the 116th Separate 
Battalion. Formerly retired American officer of the Philippine Constabulary, Major 
Herbert Page commanded the 116th in south and southwest Cabatao. The 119th was under 
Gumbay Piang, who had only joined Fertig in September. The Japanese had captured 
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Piang but released him to house arrest in Cotabatos to appease the Moros. He lost no time 
in rejoining the guerrillas. When Japanese inspectors arrived to check on him, he pointed 
to the “Gumbay Piang, Prisoner of War” sign posted over his door and insisted he was 
out of the war.  Once the Japanese revealed they had evidence he was still a guerrilla, 
Piang fled to the jungle to join his men full time. 
Pendatun commanded the 118th assisted by Lieutenant Soriano, Major Gabutina, 
Datu Aliman and Udtog and kept the road from Kigos to Kabacan closed to the Japanese 
until early 1944. 1974  The suspicious Fertig still had issues with his 118th Regiment 
commander and wrote: “Pendatun continued to make trouble by underhand tactics. The 
Bukidnon civilians finally petitioned Bowler to get Pendatun out of the province. This 
justifies my previous contention.”1975 
U.S. Army Air Corps Lieutenant Owen P. Wilson wandered out of the jungle near 
Caraga, Davao.  Fertig sent him to take charge of a year-old battalion on the west coast of 
Davao Province. First Sergeant Javito Pedraya had killed the battalion’s former 
commander, Captain Asis, in June for attempting to surrender the unit. Pedraya then held 
the command together while waiting for Fertig to name a new commander. When Wilson 
arrived, Pedraya became battalion executive officer. Fertig supplied Wilson with a radio 
and sent the battalion to Caraga to collect intelligence on the southeast coast as the 111th 
Provisional Battalion of the 106th Division. 
 Lieutenant Villarin raised the 10th Military District’s 112th Provisional Battalion 
in the Augusan Valley and southern Surigao at Cateel and Lingig. Then Fertig sent 
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American Lieutenant Anton Haratik to assume command of the unit. The battalion saw 
very little action.  
Also in October, Kwok’s guerrillas attacked the Japanese in Borneo, drove them 
out of Jesselton, and held the town for 48 hours. A large Japanese counterattack dispersed 
the guerrillas into the hills. Guerrilla Lim King Fatt was able to later reestablish contact 
with the 10th MD but the Japanese reportedly killed 3LT Kwok in January 1944.1976 
 
Negros, D682/R-367 
On 20 October, the submarine SS-288 Cabrilla on its first war patrol was hunting 
Japanese ships when its skipper, Commander Douglas T. Hammond, received a change in 
mission order.1977 In thirty-eight days at sea the boat had only engaged one ship, but it 
was memorable. One 24 September, Cabrilla had torpedoed and damaged the Japanese 
escort carrier Talyo northwest of Chichi Jima. Now they changed course to pick up four 
people from Doog Point, Negros – Major Jesus Villamor and three others. Thirty-six 
year-old British submarine liaison officer Commander Anthony Miers reported to 
Britain’s chief of submarines, Rear Admiral Claude Barry, that Hammond was too 
cautious and had refused to engage a schooner and two unarmed trawlers in the San 
Bernardino Strait.1978 Hammond did not bother to explain his overriding need to preserve 
secrecy while executing his special mission to recover Villamor. 
Villamor left on Negros thirty-nine year-old Edwin Andrews, a target of Fertig’s 
ire, as SWPA’s forward agent for 7th Military District intelligence. A former student with 
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the FBI in Washington in 1929, he had studied U.S. Treasury Department’s investigative 
techniques. He later worked in the Intelligence Section of the Philippine Constabulary. 
Later he earned his wings and commanded the Zablan airfield at Bukidnon but took to the 
hills when USAFFE surrendered. With Morgan, he became the Chief of Staff of the 
Bukidnon-Cotabato Force. Fertig sent him to Misamis and then to Negros to join 
Villamor as a camp commandant. “Andrews has been well trained and has had 
experience,” SWPA noted, “He has been close to American influence and is appreciative 
of the treatment he received while in the United States. He is sensitive to his mixed blood 
and when things are not going to his personal tastes, often jumps to the conclusion that he 
is being discriminated against of this.”1979  
G-2 acknowledged the handicaps under which Andrews operated. “The 7th MD 
had little enough supplies, and the net had to subsist on a small allowance of Negros 
Emergency Currency and contributions from friends in various parts of the Philippines. 
Agents were withdrawn from the Visayan Islands but radio contact was maintained with 
Bohol, Cebu, and 7th MD headquarters for use of net agents coming from Luzon.”1980 
 
Leyte, D683/R-366 
On 21 October, SWPA approved Parsons’ designate Colonel Rupert K. Kangleon 
– the “strongest guerrilla leader on Leyte” – to command that island’s guerrillas. Fertig 
sent him Navy Lieutenant, Junior Grade, I.D. Richardson as a liaison officer along with 
Lieutenant St. John and Lieutenant Truman Hemingway to establish radio 
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communication to bring Kangleon into the 10th Military District net. Kangleon then set 
out to consolidate the guerrillas in his district. 
Using supplies stored at a camp in Jaro, former Second Lieutenant Alejandro 
Balderian, had organized a guerrilla division in Northern Leyte. They fought well as an 
independent force and Balderian assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He joined 
Kangleon’s organization in mid-1943 to form 95th Regiment of the Leyte guerrillas. 
Civilians Circiaco Centino and his son Isabelo Centino had become guerrillas 
under Philippine Army sergeants Terraza and Antonio Juan until both soldiers died in 
combat.  The Circiacos each assumed the rank of major and the elder took charge. Isabelo 
fought under Balderian until given his own sector to command and helped bring the 
Centino groups in the northeast Leyte’s towns of Jaro, Pastrana and Palo in to join 
Balderian. 
Colonel Antonio C. Cinco, leader of a guerrilla group that spanned Tanauan, 
Dagami, Tolosa, Burauen, Dulag, and La Paz, had an interesting past. After Corregidor’s 
surrender, he reportedly served as a Japanese informer until they discovered that he had 
been a USAFFE solider. The Japanese threatened him with execution but he escaped to 
rally his guerrillas. He joined Kangleon and became his 1st Battalion, 85th Regiment. 
American Navy Yeoman Gordon A. Lang assumed the rank of lieutenant and 
organized guerrillas in southern Leyte. He merged with another group formed by 
Philippine Army officers, Major Porfirio E. Jain and Lieutenant Jose Nazareno, on 
Panaon Island. The senior ranking Jain took over what became known as the Lang-Jain 
group and joined Kangleon as the 94th Regiment. 
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One of USAFFE Colonel Cornell’s pre-war Leyte Provisional Regiment’s First 
Sergeants, Filemon Pabilona, also served with the guerrillas under Terraza and Juan. 
Rising to command his own section under Centino, Pabilona grew his group until it 
eventually separated into its own command centered around San Miguel, Babatngon, 
Alangalang and unoccupied Tacloban. Eventually, Pabilona joined Kangleon as a 
Lieutenant Colonel in command of the Second Battalion, 95th Regiment.  
Technical Sergeant Felic Pamanian refused to surrender with the Leyte 
Provisional Regiment and instead organized guerrillas near Mount Capoocan in northern 
Leyte.  His growing band subsumed a guerrilla formation under USAFFE Captain C. 
Corpin from Biliran. Kangleon recruited the Pamanian Group as the 3rd Battalion, 95th 
Regiment with its leader promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and Corpin as Kangleon’s 
Assistant G-3. 
Not all the guerrillas on Leyte were willing to fall in with Kangleon, however.  
Brigadier General Blas Miranda remained bitterly opposed to collaborators, and that 
included anyone like Kangleon who had once surrendered. A U.S. Army history stated: 
“He killed many former prisoners, whom the Japanese had released, on the pretext that 
they were spies.”1981 Miranda formed the formidable Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare 
Force (WLGWF) that ranged from Palompon to Baybay on northwestern Leyte and 
became known to Peralta who sent emissaries offering Miranda recognition as the 
commander of Leyte and Samar. Peralta was at the time unaware that Parsons (and 
Fertig) had tapped Kangleon for that role.  
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Miranda absolutely refused to place his WLGWF under Kangleon, whom he 
believed had collaborated with the Japanese to earn his release from prison. Some 
reported that Miranda’s “inconsistent response to the Japanese” enraged Kangleon.1982 
Now with SWPA’s authority as commander of the Leyte-Samar district, Kangleon 
ordered Miranda to subordinate his command in the name of MacArthur. If Miranda 
failed to do so, Kangleon promised that his 92nd Division “would force… Miranda to join 
us.”1983 Miranda would not budge and in August, Kangleon launched attacks into western 
Leyte against the WLGWF. In November, Kangleon would order all WGLWF officers to 
report to his 92nd Division headquarters, but none came. 
In December, during a typhoon, reinforced Japanese forces attacked the WLGWF 
main headquarters with great precision along with the headquarters of Miranda's 
regiments in Albuera, Palompa, Merida and Baybay. Miranda dispersed his remaining 
forces and ordered them to lay low. His chief of staff, Marcos Soliman, appealed to 
Peralta for help. Pedro Merritt on Samar had already pledged loyalty to Peralta who now 
considered appointing Soliman, as commander of a unified Leyte-Samar.1984 Before then, 
Kangleon’s attacks proved too much for the remaining WLGFW. The 92nd Division 
welcomed the surviving members of Miranda’s guerrillas as the new 96th Regiment. By 
the time of MacArthur’s return to Leyte, Kangleon would report 209 officers and 3,190 
men organized as the 92nd Division, Philippine Army. 
 
Northern Luzon, D685/R-364 
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There was, however, no unity in the resistance. As Blackburn recalled, 
“Throughout the north there were independent bands which were going to do their own 
thing, including out-and-out banditry. If we were going to do the things that Volckmann 
wanted to do, we had to ‘command’ and keep these scalawags from stirring things 
up.”1985 They began sending emissaries to round up the stray groups. During October, 
Dennis Molintas and Bando Dagwa rejoined the USAFIP- NL under Volckmann. Then, 
Parker formed the 66th Infantry Regiment by combining the 1st Battalion of 43rd Infantry 
Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 12th 
Infantry Regiment (43+11+12=66).  
Volckmann collected all available radios and related parts and searched for 
someone who could turn them into a working transmitter and receiver. They collected the 
parts at his headquarters where a 300-foot waterfall provided power for a captured 220-
volt generator. Unfortunately, Volckmann remarked, “A search through North Luzon 
failed to turn up a single individual with the required skill.”1986 Finally agents in Manila 
located Timoteo Sinay and Crespo Hernandez, technicians who reportedly could build a 
working radio. On 23 October, the USAFIP-NL commander celebrated his 32nd birthday 
in Halaip, Ifugao, with a team working on his radio to support his existing intelligence 
network. “We cultivated a system of SS agents, secret service agents,” Blackburn added, 
“who were planted in the barrios and towns. They were kept undercover. They would 
surreptitiously get word out to us about what was going on.”1987 
Frustration in dealing with informers led to some unorthodox strategies. 
Blackburn found that every detail of guerrilla activities in Tuao quickly found its way to 
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the Japanese. He responded by arresting the leaders of the three most prominent families, 
Sanchez, Casabang and Rodriguez. The families had been feuding and at least one was 
likely bargaining for Japanese support. Blackburn promised his detainees he would kill 




Between April 1943 and January 1945, MacArthur’s command conducted forty-one submarine 
missions and more than fifty landings in the Philippines that delivered over 12,080 tons of supplies to the 
guerrillas.1989 In the first twelve months of its operations, the PRS oversaw thirteen submarine missions and 
twenty-seven insertions into the Philippines to extend SWPA control in the islands. These included nine 
missions to Mindanao, five to Luzon, two each to Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Tawi Tawi and Palawan, and 
one each to Samar, Bohol, Leyte and Bicol. By 27 October 1944 the AIB and PRS would have 134 radio 
stations: 46 on Mindanao, 23 in Panay, 21 in Luzon, 13 on Negros, 11 on Leyte, 6 on Mindoro, 5 on 
Palawan, 3 each on Cebu and Samar, and one each on Bohol, Masbate, and Tawi Tawi. 1990  This 
infrastructure enabled MacArthur to use the guerrillas in support of his preparations for invasion. 
With MacArthur’s personal support, the PRS obtained from the Navy one of its 
new large submarines. After fifteen days in Brisbane and a refit by Submarine Division 
Eighty-One the submarine SS-167 Narwhal under Commander F.D. Latta departed on 23 
October for the Philippines on its seventh war patrol.1991 She carried ninety-two tons of 
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supplies stored in both torpedo rooms and eleven Filipino-American graduates of the 
Tabragalba school organized into two teams.1992 Parsons led one team of four officers and 
six enlisted men of the 978th Signal Services Company.1993 By now submarine deliveries 
of medical materials had changed the guerrillas’ supply priorities. For example, F.D. 
McGee in northern Luzon sent a request in October indicating a reduced need for 
antimalarial medication: “The principle medicine needed is for amoebic dysentery. Next 
is local anaesthetic [sic], calcium, sulfa drugs etc.”1994 On its first run, Narwahl carried 
1.2 million atabrine tablets and 800,000 quinine pills to Mindanao.1995  
Lieutenant Garcia returned from Panay to Palawan in October with Major Pablo 
Muyco of Peralta’s G-3 section.  The two men had traveled the island and obtained 
agreement from all the local guerrilla leaders, except Manigque, to merge their forces 
into the Palawan Special Battalion of the 6th Military District. Muyco would command 
the unit with Garcia as his executive officer. They organized the battalion into four 
companies: A Company under Captain Higino Mendoza at Malcampo, B Company under 
Third Lieutenant Felipe Batul at Danlig, C Company under Captain Carlos Amores at 
Taytay, and D Company under Captain Narizidad Mayor at Brooke’s Point.  Within a 
few months the battalion had 57 officers and 954 men with about 300 arms. It covered all 
of Palawan and some areas on the smaller nearby islands of Balabac, Cuyo and Agutaya, 
Cagayancillo, Busuango, Culion and Coron. They also managed to cover Dumaran Island 
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with at two or more agents in every town. Within a year the Palawan guerrillas were well 
integrated into SWPA’s coast watcher network and provided valuable intelligence on 
ships passing through the narrow straights through the Islands.  
Later in the month, Cushing returned to Cebu after having received no help from 
Villamor or SWPA on his trip to Negros.1996  He found Estrella commanding after the 
hasty execution of Fenton. Some P150,000 from Fenton’s treasury had disappeared. 
Furthermore, officers gave evidence that Estrella had accepted P60,000 from the 
Japanese to deliver Cushing over to them. Alarmed, Cushing declined an invitation from 
Fertig to go to Mindanao to discuss the Cebu. He instead he sent Abellana to Fertig with 
hopes of bringing back some money. 
On 2 November, the submarine SS- Rey delivered 2 tons of supplies to Rowe on 
Mindoro along with one intelligence officer and two weathermen.1997 
 
Manila, D696/R-353 
 Just after sunset on 3 November the SS-225 Cero successfully rendezvoused with 
Bernard Anderson north of Manila on Luzon. The boat unloaded 20 tons of supplies, 2 
intelligence officers, 6 radio operators, a two-man weather team, and two officers and 4 
enlisted men of a demolition team.1998   
 As president, Laurel secretly established a radio in the Malacañang Palace to 
monitor foreign broadcasts.1999  He had Chief of the Constabulary General Guillermo B. 
Francisco bring in radio expert Captain Angelo P.B. Frago from the Japanese controlled 
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PIAM station (the pre-war KZRH) to set up and monitor a listening post. Frago listened 
every night to the international broadcasts and used Lieutenant Circiaco Quinto as a 
stenographer to prepare synopsizes for delivery to Laurel each morning. The radio was 
kept a closely held secret to prevent the Japanese from knowing what Laurel knew. The 
Kempeitai, tracing a lead from captured guerrillas, would arrest Frago but fail to break 
him in Santiago Prison before Laurel secured his release.  
On 5 and 6 November, Tokyo hosted leaders across Southeast Asia in a Greater 
East Asia Conference. Chang Ching-hui from Manchukuo, Prince Wanwaithayakon from 
Thailand, Wang Ching-wei from China, Ba Maw from Burma, and Jose Laurel from the 
Philippines attended. The conference was to be “an inspiring symbol of Pan-Asian 
idealism and the demise of white colonial rule in Asia,” and to stoke both pan-Asian 
dreams and Western worries about racial politics.2000 Before the conference, Laurel met 
with Tojo and confessed that he believed freedom in the Philippines – and all Asia – 
depended on Japan’s success in the war. He added, “if the Asian people become aware of 
this fact, they will naturally cooperate with Japan in her task of liberating her East Asian 
brothers. They must be informed that Japan’s victory is absolutely necessary for their 
own sake.”2001 The Japanese hoped their conference would produce an Absolute Defense 
Sphere (zettai kokubō) uniting all the countries against the United States. 
Laurel, like the other delegates, agreed to make a speech. He alone declined to 
submit his speech in advance for review. In his speech he said, “one billion Asians will 
never again become victims of Western exploitation… Although the Philippines is a 
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newly born, small, and feeble country, we are prepared to devote all the spiritual and 
material elements of the country to victory in the Greater East Asia War.”2002  
After the conference, the Japanese suggested they might send two hundred and 
twenty ‘advisors’ to assist Laurel and his new government. The new President rebuffed 
the offer reasoning that “if such a large group of Japanese are to stay in our country, we 
are afraid it would give the impression that the Philippine government is a puppet 
regime.”2003 Tojo decided not send the advisors.  Japan assessed Laurel as ‘useful’ but not 
‘cooperative.’2004 
Across Luzon, poor management and bad environmental conditions led to a failed 
rice harvest that brought the people close to starvation. This famine affected guerrillas in 
a number of ways. The Japanese and their collaborationist allies were often able to recruit 
spies and turncoats “for twelve pesos and six liters of rice.” 2005  For guerrillas with 
starving families the inducements were especially hard to resist. Magsaysay recalled, 
“My men did not surrender as a result f the rice offers. But I knew that the offers had a 
demoralizing effect among them.”2006  
Groups like the TVGU in Bicol had to send “guerrilla reservists” to live at home, 
though ready to mobilize when needed, because they could not feed them. Mobilization 
meant “that both regulars and reservists underwent combined drills and lectures on 
military matters for a full day or more.”2007 Offensive action was left to small, specially 
trained units like the Bagong Sirang Society assassination squad.2008 The guerrillas had to 
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employ greater numbers of women to split rattan, made bakya wooden sandals, soap and 
other products, for sale in local markets to raise money for food.2009 Some organizations, 




On 6 November, Villamor arrived back in Freemantle to debrief a panel of six 
officers headed by headed by Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers. Villamor reported: 
“The morale of the troops and the people appears on the surface to be high. Actually, it is 
built on a very shaky foundation which crumbles every time the Japs start a campaign in 
a particular area. ...they are fairly well informed [of the U.S. advance across the Pacific] 
and they regard all of this understandingly, but this understanding often gives way to 
disappointment, then impatience, and finally despair whenever they are hard pressed by 
the enemy.”2011 
The panel wanted to know if the order to refrain from attacks against the Japanese 
to concentrate on intelligence hurt the guerrillas. “Tell me this,” asked Major C.A. 
‘Archie’ McVittie, “do these ambushes help the morale of the guerrilla forces? In other 
words, if they were not permitted to pull these ambushes, do you believe that they would 
be able to hold them together as a unit?”2012 Villamor said he thought the units could hold 
together and that a strong order from MacArthur could stop the aggressive actions that 
only brought retaliation. 
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Reports from Negros indicated that for the first time since June, Japanese patrols 
burned Bell’s camps. The professor and his family barely escaped capture. This time he 
had enough. Bell called SWPA and asked for a submarine to remove a number of 
civilians from Negros, including his family and him.  
Restless, Villamor asked to return to Negros and resume command of his net. He 
had left Andrews as the nominal head of his station while Benedicto secretly operated the 
PLANET net.2013 The net remained invisible to the guerrillas, free from their influences, 
to provide a direct connection with SWPA. Whitney, however, received reports that 
caused him to second guess the selection of Andrews.2014  On 6 December, he weighed in 
on Villamor’s request to return with a message to MacArthur: “There is convincing 
evidence before us (Parsons – Meider) to the effect that Villamor, upon his return to 
Negros, became politically ambitious – Meider says that he now envisions himself as 
Quezon’s successor as President of the Philippines – and under such circumstances it 
would be difficult for him to confine employment of such a net to military rather than 
political purposes.”2015  Whitney wanted to turn the Negros net over to Abcede.  
 
Visayas, D706/R-343 
The Japanese resumed attacks along the east coast of Panay in November and 
December. In late November, their campaign from Panay reached Tablas Island. A week 
later, patrols appeared on Sibuyan Island. They attacked into the Romblon Islands in 
December and the Aklan area in the northwest Panay into January and February 1944. 
“This was the most thorough-going and ruthlessly destructive campaign of all,” 
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MacArthur’s headquarters noted, “Loss of life and civilian property was exceptionally 
heavy but this only further embittered the people against the Japanese.” 2016  Many 
guerrillas in the Romblon Islands surrendered. At first Guarinia remained to reassemble 
the guerrillas as part of Lieutenant Garcia’s 1st Combat Team but then reportedly he 
surrendered to the puppet government officials on Sibuyan. The Japanese moved 
Guarinia to Manila, creating a vacuum in Romblons that Untalan tried to fill.  Jurado 
managed to escape ahead of the Japanese to Mindoro, taking his intelligence center with 
him, and would be made commander there in March 1944. Later, captured documents 
clearly showed how the Japanese had “carefully observed guerrilla activity and radio 
traffic, even breaking some coded and ciphered messages.”2017 
In the wake of this campaign Relunia, Peralta’s chief of staff, decided to 
streamline his organization. By spring, he had seven Combat Teams in semi-autonomous 
areas that relied on his division headquarters only for supply and administration. He 
attached special units to the combat teams but placed the Combat Commands’ 
intelligence under S-2 liaisons that reported directly to the district command. SWPA 
noticed the result: “The products of Peralta’s intelligence network has been vastly 
detailed and exceptionally voluminous.”2018 The network’s runners delivered reports on 
schedule to feed a monthly district report that included “enemy strengths and movement 
of even individual Japanese soldiers, enemy installations, supply areas, communications, 
etc.,” leading SWPA to conclude, “The ability of the agents to secure information is 
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unlimited and their patience in preparing reports on these details seems bottomless.”2019  
Unfortunately, the agents did not understand what intelligence SWPA needed.  
On 13 November, twenty-four hours after spending two days attacking Japanese 
ships and evading destroyers, the submarine Narwhal slid silently on her electric motors 
through the moonlit night to within 1,600 yards of the western beach of Butuan Bay on 
Mindoro.2020  At its closest point Mindoro lay eight miles from Luzon across the Verde 
Island Passage. It was this passage that Parsons wanted under observation. He went 
ashore in a rubber raft escorted by a Filipino soldier. Spotting a batel anchored off shore, 
Parsons made a snap decision to board it and requisition the craft to ferry supplies from 
the sub. He climbed aboard only to awaken Japanese army sentries on deck. Parsons took 
a bayonet to the chin while making a narrow escape as gunfire erupted behind him.2021 
Once ashore, he linked up with local guerrillas and got his chin bandaged until he could 
get it stitched properly back aboard the Narwhal  
The next day the Japanese batel left the area. At 1815 hours, Lieutenant 
Commander Latta moored on the starboard side of the guerrilla schooner Dona Juana 
Maru and unloaded forty-six tons of supplies. Parson’s sent ashore a coast watcher team 
under Major Lawrence H. Phillips with a radio. The team members were Captain Ricardo 
C. Galang, First Lieutenant R.F. Songco, Warrant Officer Braynard L. Wise, Master 
Sergeat Alfredo A. Alberto, Technical Sergeant Arcangel Baniares, and Sergeants 
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Vincente Pinuela, Benjamin Harder, Ramon Vitorio and Lino Banares.2022 Their mission: 
to “a) watch Verde island Passage and Apo East Pass and b) correlate the development of 
information from Manila and Central Luzon.” 2023  Parsons was supposed to put the 
Phillips party ashore on an isolated section of coast, but he chose to deliver them to 
Paluan where he had an associate.2024 After they finished unloading, Narwhal departed. 
Latta made a short dive for trim, and on 15 November rendezvoused with a 
launch flying a prearranged signal to pick up Colonel Fertig and ferry him to Naspit 
Harbor, Mindanao. “The expected sight brought us relief – the largest sub in the world,” 
wrote Fertig, “Enroute to the pier, we grounded but by blowing down the aft we floated 
clear and tied up at the pier. The only case in our history where one of the naval craft 
moored at a pier in enemy occupied area…. The job was done but the mental strain had 
been terrific.”2025  A local band playing Anchors Aweigh greeted Latta and his boat.  
Fertig recalled, “Sandwiches and coffee in the ward room. Letter from home with 
pictures of Mary and the girls. Gee, I was homesick.”2026  
The guerrillas off loaded 46 more tons of supplies along with Parsons and five 
agents from the PRS. At midnight Latta departed with thirty-two evacuees, including 
members of Buckley’s famous PT boat crew, eight women, two children and two-year-
old Steven Cryster.2027 “In the forward torpedo room, Steven solemnly bit into his first 
pieces of bread. ‘Cake mommy,’ he said.”2028  Observing were two visiting guerrilla 
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leaders: “Kangleon and Ingeniero were much impressed by their visit to sub,” Fertig 
wrote, “Now to send them home with some supplies will complete their trip and cement 
their loyalty.”2029  Narwhal departed for Darwin, arriving on 22 November.2030 
The Narhwal’s return posed a problem: what to do with the civilian evacuees? 
Whitney conferred with representatives of the American Red Cross. Together, they 
decided to take control of the Stathalan hotel in Caloundra, about 70 miles north of 
Brisbane on the coast. As G-2 reported: “This housed 30 to 60 people at various times 
and was seldom empty for more than a few days at a time from early November 1943 
until it was closed in August 1944. During this time Miss Alice Thompson, ARC, kept a 
hospitable recuperation center for evacuees, and the excellence of the food added many 
pounds to the hungry civilian in the month they stayed there before their return to the 
United States.”2031 The remote location helped preserve secrecy. Officers from SPWA G-
2 interviewed the evacuees at the hotel before clearing them for return to their homes. 
“Approximately 250 persons were processed at Caloundra, and much valuable 
information was accumulated for use of occupation forces and for dealing with post-
occupation problems such as guerrilla recognition (Luzon), emergency currency, 
recovered personnel, and claims.”2032 
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McKay with his wife Harriet and daughter Mary, Mrs. Evelyn Birchfield and her son James, Mrs. Glenda 
Cryster and her son Steven, Mrs. Helen H. Welbon, Mrs. Nellie Varney (whose husband remained with 
Fertig), Mrs. Thelma M. Briggs, Mrs. G.E. C. Mears (British), two Norwegian sailors rescued from a 
torpedoed ship, Mr. Fred Warner. Ind, 199. See also Campbell, 302-303. 




After three days of refit and reloading, Narwhal had returned to sea. At dusk on 2 
December, Latta began unloading ninety tons of supplies, three Army officers and ten 
enlisted men in Butuan Bay on northeast coast of Mindanao at Cabadaran. 2033  One 
member of the team under Charlie Smith, radioman Bob Stahl, recalled two hundred 
natives with a small band playing ‘Anchors Aweigh’ greeted them at the dock. Japanese 
forces sat ten miles away in garrisons at Nasipit and Cabadbaran. “They’re as scared of 
us as we are of them,” one of Fertig’s American guerrilla leaders told Stahl, “We 
whipped their asses lots of times, and they leave us alone.”2034 Chick Parsons and seven 
evacuees, along with ten tons of bananas, departed aboard the sub before dawn the next 
morning.2035 Parsons informed skipper Latta of their next destination.  
Three days later the sub picked up another nine evacuees “with great haste” from 
Alubijid Bay about 120 miles to the west a Misamis Oriental. 2036  A Navy history 
reported, “Latta stepped up he four engines to 17 knots as the submarine left this bay – 
the place had an unhealthy look.”2037 Over the next three days Narwhal picked up nine 
                                                        
2033 Although other sources say two officers and eleven enlisted (see Roscoe, 274 for example) the team 
was: Major Charles Smith, Captain James Evans (medical officer), Lieutenant Robert Ball, First Sergeant 
Restituto J. Besid, First Sergeant Aniceto C. Manzano, Staff Sergeant Gerardo A Sanchez, Technical 
Sergeant Third Class Robert Stahl, Technical Sergeant Fourth Class David D. Cardenas, Technical 
Sergeant Fourth Class Crispolo C. Robles, Technical Sergeant Fifth Class Daniel B Sabado, Technical 
Sergeant Fifth Class George R Herreria, Private First Class Querobin B Bargo, and Private First Class 
Andres S. Savellano. Intelligence Activities, 39-40. 
2034 Stahl, 31.  
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soldiers were Adriano S. Oliver, Jr., and Efron H. Rodillon. Both were Filipino soldiers who were captured 
by the Japanese and later escaped from Panay Island.” Campbell, 303. 
2036 The nine evacuees: Reverend Robert P.  Kohler, his wife Grace, their two daughters Lou-Anne and 
Joyce, missionary nurse Louise Gertrude Lynip, Dutch mining engineer T. Sikkes DeVries and his wife 
Mary with their two sons. Office of Naval Records and History, Ships’ Histories Section, Navy 
Department, “History of USS Narwhal (SS 167),” 8. Microfilm Reel Job No, H108, AR-229-76, Naval 
District Washington Microfilm Section, available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/176290597/SS-167-
Narwhal-Part1 accessed 29 July 2016. See also Campbell, 303-304. 
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more people from Negros and Mindanao and sank the Japanese merchant Himeno Maru 
with gunfire off Camiquin Island before returning to Darwin on 11 December. 
On 23 November, Phillips radioed SWPA from Mindoro about Japanese patrols in 
his area: “Increased activity against guerrillas in general. Expect meet with Majors 
Jurado, Ruffy, and Valencia to talk about guerrilla difficulties. Will then advise 
recognition status.”2038 Two days later Phillips held a conference of the Mindoro guerrilla 
leaders that quickly drew Peralta’s attention. The previous May, Peralta had sent 1934 
U.S. Naval Academy graduate Lieutenant Enrique L. Jurado of the Philippine Offshore 
Patrol to organize the guerrillas on Mindoro where former constabulary Major Ramon 
Ruffy and Captain Esteban Beloncio competed for leadership. According to MacArthur’s 
G-2: “Peralta had appointed Maj. Ruffy CO on Mindoro under the Panay Command.”2039 
On 26 November Phillips convened a meeting in Mamburao between the guerrilla leaders 
and came away with an understanding that Ruffy would command the Mindoro 
provisional guerrillas with Beloncio as his executive officer Without authority from 
SWPA, Phillips then encouraged Ruffy to assume the role of “4th MD commander, 
independent from Peralta.  
Not until 13 December did Phillips get a reply from SWPA: “Your mission is one 
of secret intelligence, and while it is desired that you extend friendly cooperation to local 
guerrillas and loyal residents, your participation in their affairs to any greater extent could 
tend to compromise the success of that mission and should be carefully avoided.”2040 The 
Panay commander sent Jurado back to Mindoro ostensibly to establish observation posts 
on the Verde Island passage and create a base for penetration of Luzon. Peralta also sent 
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a unit from 1st Combat Team to provide Jurado’s security and maintain presence on 
Mindoro. Relations between the guerrillas would deteriorate while the Japanese 
harassment of Phillips intensified. 
 
Bohol, D719/R-330 
Meanwhile between Cebu and southern Luzon, Ismael Ingeniero assumed the 
rank of major and claimed command of all guerrillas on the island of Bohol despite the 
presence of several senior officers. “This may have caused friction within the command,” 
noted SWPA agents, “and there are indications that Ingeniero maintained a close 
surveillance of these men lest they attempt to assume command.”2041 He named his united 
guerrillas ‘Boforce’ and established headquarters at Carmen near the center of Bohol. 
Reports indicated: “The organization was run in a military manner with some formality, 
and guards and sentry posts were frequently on highways. Discipline was reported as 
good.”2042 Yet SWPA noted, “Despite this outward show the military efficiency of the 
organization was questionable. And little action was taken against the enemy other than 
occasional ambushes and the gathering of intelligence.”2043 Ingenerio added a Women’s 
Auxiliary Service to sew clothing and make other equipment and raise money to sustain 
operations. Local attorney G. Lavilles volunteered to run a unit newspaper, Bolos and 
Bullets, that became popular on Bohol.  
Ingenerio claimed command of the prewar 8th Military District that included Cebu 
and extended his intelligence to include Cebu City, irritating Cushing. In December, 
SWPA recognized Ingeniero as the Bohol Area Commander – but not Cebu. The PRS 
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sent Ingeniero supplies in late 1943 including a radio, noting, “There have been 
difficulties in the distribution of supplies from SWPA through Bohol to Cebu, and fairly 
reliable indications that the Bohol regime is concerned less with fighting the enemy than 
with aggrandizement of their political power, renown and economic well-being, even at 
the expense of the civilian population.”2044 
On 26 November, Ed Andrews reported from Negros that Doctor had returned 
from Manila. Quezon’s physician had successfully worked his way to the capital and 
managed to meet met with Roxas, Rafael Alunan, Jose Yulo, Pandac, Justice Ramon 
Avanceña, Taba, Nonoy, Bulotong Elpidio, and Quirino. MacArthur’s G-2 later wrote, 
“His mission is easily the single outstanding feat of the entire year.”2045 He found all of 
them and all the generals loyal to Quezon and the constitution. General Lim even 
pretended to be chronically ill to avoid cooperation with the occupiers. Cruz reported Pio 
Duran, who had given his children Japanese names before the war, competed with 
Ricarte for Japanese favor but Quintin Parades “whose prewar business connections with 
the Japanese made him suspect” was still loyal.2046 He cautioned however, that Vargas 
was “entirely helpless and in a mist” and Peping was “in a very thick mist.”2047 Cruz 
added: “Independence is a joke. Ninety-eight percent of people and government 
employees are true and loyal. They are more interested in the return of American forces 
than anything else. Feeling of hatred against enemy is at a very high tension and a slight 
sign of American help will cause general uprising all over.”2048 
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Dr. Cruz felt the emotional sacrifice of war in Manila when he managed to drop in 
unannounced to see his wife. He recalled, “My wife was shocked, too, when she saw me, 
but after praying for a few minutes to the Image of our Holy Virgin, she became 
composed. She was speechless, keeping a tight hold on me and trying to convince herself 
that I was no a product of her imagination.”2049 
 On 20 December, Andrews sent a multi-part message to SWPA requesting 
recognition, promotion, and the authority to promote his people and to establish financial 
contacts across the Islands. Nine days later SWPA replied: “It is desired you report to 
commander Seventh Military District [Abcede] for duty.”2050  Learning of this, Villamor 
became very upset.  
More than a decade later Villamor searched archives to learn why PLANET was 
replaced. He concluded: “These channels were Filipino manned and guided. The new 
channels developed were all under American leadership.”2051 He believed that Whitney 
was a racist and commented, “Andrews was no ‘bobo,’ no undesirable, although Whitney 
would have treated him like one.”2052 Villamor confessed: “Once I had admired General 
MacArthur, held him in the highest esteem. But now I was disillusioned in him. This man 
capable of acts of rare courage, it seemed, was also capable of accepting bad advice from 
self-serving aides. It was a contradiction I found hard to comprehend.”2053 
In 1948, Willoughby oversaw a study of Philippine guerrilla intelligence 
operations that included this observation: “Regarding Maj. Villamor’s mission to Negros 
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to establish an intelligence net, it is now known that he assembled one of the most active 
and best connected of any intelligence group gathered in the Philippines. The potential 
was enormous but largely unrealized.”2054 G-2 had realized that Villamor’s extensive 
contacts, especially in Manila, were under the impression they were talking to SWPA. In 
practice, however, they were talking to Villamor and when he left, they were talking to 
no one. Except for those net members who found their own ways to pass information to 
other networks, SWPA had to start from scratch. This was the cost of the highly 
compartmentalized designs of the AIB. The G-2 study concluded: “This tendency to 
ignore experience and existing organizations is one of the less creditable characteristics 
or the otherwise brilliant intelligence enterprise in the Philippines. There was no need for 
a new broom; the Villamor net, properly supported, was chronologically a full year ahead 
of Maj. (then CPT) L.H. Phillips, Smith, and Lt Comdr. George Rowe.”2055 
 Villamor’s conclusions also seem to ignore some pertinent factors. While there is 
little doubt that Whitney and others were more comfortable with professional U.S. Army 
officers manning key command and control nodes in the islands, the case of the Negros 
net control station does not support claims of racism in MacArthur’s headquarters. 
Whitney recommended that a Filipino –  Abcede – take over the net. As previously noted, 
Abcede shared Villamor’s suspicion of American biases, having questioned Ausejo’s 
preference for working under Fertig saying: “Does he think that the Filipinos cannot fight 
or stay together unless they have an American leading them?”2056  Villamor’s frustration 
was not unique, however. Americans like Fertig, Volckmann and Lapham also felt 
persecuted by SWPA.  
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In December, in the U.S. capital, Villamor read in the Washington Post that 
2,000,000 items with “I shall return” were sent into Japanese occupied Philippines. He 
thought: “They needed medicine, arms, the full recognition of guerrilla leaders, some real 
sign that, indeed, was coming – like the sight of an American airplane, the sound from 
the guns of American ships. The thousands of Filipinos and Americans in Japanese 
internment camps, the hundreds in the dungeons of Fort Santiago, would never see these 
tokens, would never get the cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, candy bars, sewing kits 
and pencils now being sent by submarine in great quantities, each package bearing the 
crossed American and Philippine flags on one side and on the other the ‘I shall return’ 
pledge of MacArthur.”2057 
 
Southern Luzon, D742/R-325 
In November, Turko and Padua nominated Zabat for Lieutenant Colonel and 
command of all Bicol Free Forces. Weeks later Mayor Velasco of Libon communicated 
to Zabat an offer of amnesty from the Japanese if he would cease operations. Zabat 
conferenced with his commanders and used the offer to obtain loyalty pledges from 
lieutenants Sandico, Lelis, and Capayas. He then informed Peralta’s representative, 
Colonel Serran, of his new organization. Serran told Zabat that if he could get Miranda, 
Lapus, Escudero and Flor to join him, then the 6th Military District would support his 
claim as commander of the 5th Military District. Then Sandico renounced his ‘forced’ 
pledge but told Lelis and Capayas to stay with Zabat whose subsequent efforts in sending 
Turko to Lapus, Padua to Escudero, and Captain Garcia to Miranda failed to achieve 
unification. 
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During the first week of December, Miranda met with Lapus and agreed to bring 
the TVGU into Lapus’s 54th Regiment in January. On 9 December, Miranda left Panay to 
go home to Bicol. About that time a two-week long Japanese zonification campaign was 
underway in Tancong Vaca area. “A sidelight to this,” wrote Barrameda, “was the rumor 
at the TVGU headquarters that at the height of the Japanese ‘bandit-zone’ operation, 
some VTG men tried to betray the location of Miranda’s camp to the Japanese. …Such 
was the paranoia of the times.”2058 After being away from his TVGU guerrillas for more 
than a year, Miranda returned on Christmas Eve with fourteen soldiers and a shipment of 
weapons provided by Peralta.”2059 
 
Central Luzon, D743/R-306 
Ramsey had received an invitation in late November from Brigadier General 
Vincent Lim, living in virtual house arrest in Manila, to come and discuss the unification 
of all Luzon guerillas. The invite meant travelling into the capital where Kempeitai chief 
Nagahama had raised the bounty on Ramsey’s head to a half million pesos. Nevertheless, 
he felt meeting Lim was worth the risk. Ramsey made the daring trip through Japanese 
lines in a railroad boxcar secured by Claro Camacho.  
Swiss national Walter Roeder, technical director of the Manila Gas Company, 
posed as a collaborator with the Japanese while secretly supporting the guerrillas. 
Assisted by photographs taken by Major Jorge Joseph and logistics from eighteen-year 
old Pacifico Cabral, Roeder had false identification papers waiting for Ramsey when he 
arrived in Manila. Ramsey entered the city by sedan on 20 December, and spent the next 
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several days openly traveling and secretly coordinating with resistance leaders, usually 
with Ramona Snyder at his side.   
On Christmas Day, Ramsey met a Czechoslovakian consul named Schmelkis who 
informed him that a Filipino claiming to be agent CIO-12 had arrived in Manila by 
submarine and wanted to meet.2060 The man’s bona fides seemed valid, Shmelkis said, 
but ‘Agent CIO-12’ had oddly said that he knew Ramsey had come to Manila to 
assassinate General Lim. Perplexed, Ramsey instructed Schmelkis to go back and tell the 
visitor that the Huks and ambushed some of the ECLGA and Ramsey had left to deal 
with the situation. Meanwhile, Roxas sent word through Ramona Snyder that Nagahama 
knew Ramsey was in Manila and was closing in. He also stated that Baba had learned the 
Huks had recently killed some of Ramsey’s guerrillas and Ramsey was moving to deal 
with them. Clearly, CIO-12 was a counterintelligence agent for Baba. Ramona took 
Ramsey to Roeder who hid him in a gas company compound guarded by more than 100 
Japanese soldiers while the Kempeitai searched for him in Manila for nine days.  
In December, the Japanese announced: “The amnesty under which Americans 
have been guaranteed safety and internment by the Imperial Japanese Government is 
about to expire. After 25 January 1944 any American found in the islands, whether un-
surrendered soldier or civilian, will be executed without trial.”2061 Peralta reported to 
SWPA that on Panay the Japanese executed thirteen captured Americans, including 
women and children.  
Meanwhile Marking’s guerrilla had returned to their old Sulok Camp for 
Christmas where they received a holiday visit from prominent Manila social worker 
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Asunción A “Lola” Pérez. For more than twenty-five years she had led the Associated 
Charities in the Philippines and served as the Director of the Bureau of Public 
Welfare.2062 She had conveyed Marking’s offer of refuge to Manuel Roxas who tearfully 
replied, “Tell General Agustin that it is not time yet for me to escape. Tell him that for 
some of us the fight against the enemy is in close. Tell him that we all of us fight, but in 
different ways. I am old and sick. I cannot carry arms. I would be a burden. Here in 
another way, I fight. I did not know anybody knew it but myself.”2063  
It is worth noting that Pérez relayed a specific message from Roxas to Marking: 
“Do not shoot Laurel again.” 2064  Rather than deny involvement in the attempted 
assassination, Marking insisted on the appropriateness of such actions. Pérez explained 
that Roxas feared that killing Laurel or any other member of the government would just 
bring more radical collaborationists into office. She added reported, “Seriously, Laurel 
has changed. He was always a Filipino, a good Filipino. Before the war he was convinced 
that the political future of the Philippines lay in a Greater East Asia. Now he knows that 
will be just another Korea crushed by the same Japan. He may not love the Americans, 
but he does love his own people. History may show him a pitiable figure indeed, caught 
up by a culture of ideology, then forsaken by it. Right now, between Roxas and the 
Japanese, he is caught and crushed between two opposing forces.” 2065  Lola said 
succinctly, “The way it is, the Japs use Laurel, and so do Roxas and the loyal men behind 
Roxas.”2066 
Pérez provided perhaps the strongest defense of Laurel:  
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“Roxas could do no better than Laurel, who now delays, distracts, gives 
advice that Roxas gives to him to give. The Japanese will never 
understand the Philippine psychology. Roxas studies their plans very 
carefully and, with other loyal leaders, maps out a counter campaign 
against everything they plan to do. Then they advise Laurel. Laurel 
knows Philippine psychology, too; he knows the significance of Roxas’ 
advice; he knows that if he gives the advice cleverly or casually 
enough, the Japanese will swallow it and do exactly the thing that will 
warn the Filipino people that will make them balk, that will keep them 
alert. Take the Japanese plans to conscript Filipinos no longer as labor 
but as soldiers. Roxas advised Laurel to make a big speech openly 
stating that we Filipinos must fight the Americans. That jolted the 
Filipinos wide-awake. They knew then the real significance of being 
recruited and trained to keep peace and order. In the meantime, 
following Roxas’ advice, Laurel has been busy perfecting the plans for 
conscription. A headache delays him. He must go to the province on a 
tour of inspection. He is very ill. He recovers. He must consult with 
other officials. He must verify certain statistics. He is delayed by a 
storm. He is delayed with official matters.  He is delayed by family 
matters. It is a dangerous game that Laurel is playing. In front of the 
Japanese, he and Roxas disagree just enough to invite the Japanese to 
take Laurel’s advice instead of Roxas’s, and it is really Roxas’s advice 
they take through Laurel. Laurel cannot move around too much. He is 
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forever surrounded by the Japanese. But Roxas has connection that 
keep him informed of the real state of affairs, and so he puts into 
Laurel’s mouth the words that will not only annul the endeavors of the 
enemy but also inform the people of the real intentions of the 
Japanese.”2067 
Lolo reported that in Manila:  
 “There is tremendous greed and heartbreaking treachery everywhere. 
The enemy have a system of espionage that traps the patriots at every 
turn. They send out solicitors, and these catch the most victims. These 
solicitors speak words that the desperate heart aches to hear – that the 
Americans have landed in Mindanao, that aid is very near, that the 
guerrillas need only a little help to rid the country of the enemy. These 
solicitors claim direct contact with MacArthur. They claim to have 
transmitters, and to receive and send messages. Perhaps there are 
genuine contact men… But how do we know which is genuine and 
which is a Japanese agent? Home after home has been raided by the 
Japanese Military Police. From the supper table, with his children 
around him, a father has been taken. A son waves goodbye to his 
mother and is not heard from again until weeks later, when they return 
his clothes to her form Fort Santiago – if they return anything at all. In 
the markets, in the throngs on the street, in restaurants, in clubs, in 




offices, even in schools – waking and sleeping, there are informers 
everywhere.” 2068 
 
Visayas,  D746/R-303 
On 23 December, Charles Smith led a team from Mindanao north to place coast 
watchers between the Leyte Gulf and Manila Bay. With Smith were Americans, Medical 
officer Captain James ‘Doc’ Evans and Corporal Bob Stahl. He also picked up Lieutenant 
Robert Ball, a former Signal Corps private, from Fertig’s organization. The bulk of the 
team was nine Filipino soldiers chosen from the First and Second Filipino Infantry 
Regiments in California. Smith moved north with his team while peeling off detachments 
to set up separate stations: First Sergeant Anicento C. Manzano and Technician Fourth 
Class Crispolo C. Robles headed to Bondoc Peninsula in Southern Luzon; First Sergeant 
Restituto J. Besid with Privates First Class Querubin B. Bargo and Andres S. Savellano 
went to Masbate Island; Staff Sergeant Gerardo A. Sanchez went to Cebu City; Ball and 
Technician Fifth Class Daniel B. Sabado trekked to northwest Samar; and Technician 
Fourth Class David D. Cardenas and Technician Fifth Class George R. Herreria went 
with Ball before heading for central Luzon and Manila.2069 
As part of the trade for Ball’s services, Doc Evans replaced Captain Armato 
Arietta in Fertig’s headquarters to serve as 10th MD medical officer, and Pennsylvanian 
Lieutenant Elwood Royer -- who knew how to operate a .50-caliber machine gun – joined 
Smith’s band. “Also with us were five Filipinos who proved to be very important to our 
well-being,” wrote Stahl, “Each had his individual skills, which would be used repeatedly 
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in the days ahead.”2070  Sixteen-year old Rodriques had learned to cook from Major 
Smith’s wife, Kathryn, and served as a man Friday on Masbate Island. Smith’s 
bodyguard, Catalina, had been with him on the Or Else to Australia, returned as a coast 
watcher at Davao, fought the Japanese with Fertig, and rejoined Smith upon his return. 
Two other soldiers sent by Fertig, Ochigue and Madeja, were veteran guerillas known for 
their courage and loyalty. Teenager Frederico was a long-time aid-de-camp to Captain 
Ball and had become something of an adopted son to him.2071 
 Travelling together aboard the seventy-foot sailboat they called Malaria, Ball, 
Smith and Stahl arrived in Guiuan Bay on Samar on 27 December. Three days later Ball 
and Stahl set up radio station MACA at Guiuan. They chose their call sign for the 
abbreviated way MacArthur initialed papers and sent reports to Fertig’s station KUS for 
relay to station KAZ in Australia.  
On Samar, Charlie Smith found that a Major Manuel Vallie controlled the south 
while Captain Pedro Merritt still controlled the north. Neither would cooperate with the 
other. Smith shuttled between them hoping to work out an alliance, while placing 
Sergeant Cardenas as a coast watcher on the west coast. Ball, Royer and Stahl left 
Sergeant Herreria operating a small radio at Pambujan Sur and on 3 January, headed 
farther north.  
After Stahl got his radio working, Vallie arrived with several local politicians. 
“Success in the islands depended in large part on a good relationship with politicians,” 
Stahl recalled, “We tuned in a news broadcast from San Francisco – the first news they 
had heard since the islands had fallen, except for the constant Japanese propaganda 
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broadcasts. Seeing us – real, live Americans who had come from Australia – and hearing 
the news of the Allied offensive in New Guinea and other islands in the south brought 
tears of joy to their eyes! They had been waiting for General MacArthur to send THE 
AID, and it had finally arrived.”2072 The natives held a party, and Vallei shared a stash of 
Coca-Cola mixed with several fifths of stateside whiskey.  
The Americans’ heavy 50-watt radio required a 110-volt power source. They had 
several small, gasoline-powered generators to charge 6-volt batteries. They needed two of 
the small generators to produce 110-volts, but one had already broken down. At 
Borongan, Mrs. Emma McGuire, the Filipina wife of a recently deceased American 
mestizo mine operator, led the PRS team to a diesel engine and a ten-kilowatt, 110-volt 
generator.2073 The guerrillas disassembled the new generator as best they could but the 
largest piece still weighed over five hundred pounds and had to be carried by four 
cargadores suspended from two long poles. They recruited twenty native men each day to 
work in shifts to tote the generator, dubbed “McGuire’s Monster.”   For several days Mrs. 
McGuire fed the party while doctor Arturo Victoria tended to their ailments.  
 
Northern Luzon, D748/R-301 
In November and December, Volckmann reported, “nothing exciting” happened 
in his area of operations.2074  Calvert Parker managed to get a radio receiver working in 
the USAFIP-NL First District, and heard from San Francisco that the U.S. had invaded 
Bougainville and the Gilbert Islands. Runners reported that Japanese had executed Thorp, 
Straughn and Barker in Fort Santiago.  Volckmann went to Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya to 
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meet his 5th District Commander, Major Manriquez, and came away impressed with his 
organization. He returned with a decision to share with his deputy, Blackburn. “He was to 
remain in Ifugao for the time being as commander of the Seventh District and the 11th 
Infantry,” Volckmann recalled, “I planned to move west over into western Benguet or 
eastern La Union province to set up a new headquarters.”2075 It would be a couple months 
before Volckmann was healthy enough for the move and he maintained strict secrecy 
about it. He held forlorn hopes to find Praeger.  
Expansion meant friction. Robert Lapham, now wearing colonel’s rank, 
established guerrillas in north central Luzon across Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. In spots 
his jurisdiction conflicted with Volckmann’s claimed territory and resulted in increasing 
conflict between the two. In December, Ray Hunt, a former aircraft mechanic with the 
21st Pursuit Squadron who had served as an infantryman in Bataan, joined Lapham. Hunt 
had escaped from the Death March and the Fassoth camp.2076 Since then he had wandered 
Luzon, gathering a handful of guerrilla followers as he went. Lapham sent him to become 
Captain Al Hendrickson’s executive officer until the two irritated each other so much that 
Lapham separated them in mid-1944. Hendrickson remained in western Tarlac while Ray 
Hunt assumed command in San Quentin, Pangasian.   According to Lapham, having 
Americans to appoint to various positions alleviated a serious problem: jealousy among 
the Filipino officers.2077 Lapham later remarked, “By December there were people at 
SWPA headquarters who had heard enough. CPT Bartolomeo Cabangbang issued a 
memo to all unit commanders on Luzon to stop our petty squabbling.” 2078  To ease 
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suspicions between competing guerrilla commanders, SWPA decided to change the way 
it sent communications. “Thereafter, SWPA directives were addressed to Anderson, 
Volckmann, and me [Lapham] en masse, as if it made no difference whether we were 
together or separate or some subordinated to others.”2079 
By now, USAFIP-NL’s understanding with the former 11th Division members in 
the local Constabulary companies paid big dividends. Sergeant Pedro Dunuan had taken a 
job as a clerk for a Japanese garrison and passed to the guerrillas copies of enemy 
intelligence and plans. Captain Emiliano Dunuan arrested people targeted by the 
guerrillas. When they suspected someone worked for the Japanese, the guerrillas would 
provide ‘evidence’ that they really worked for the resistance, Dunuan arrested them and a 
sympathetic judge in Augarrine sent them to jail in Bontoc escorted by a Japanese patrol. 
“Now, if the guy was real bad,” explained Blackburn, “we’d ambush that patrol to 
Bontoc and get rid of him. If the Constabulary couldn’t handle it, we would do it quietly, 
and the Constabulary would cover it up.”2080  
By year’s end, Volckmann established Camp Seven on a mountainside 
overlooking the Taboy Valley. He noted cultural differences between the tribe he had just 
left, and the one he now lived among. “The Benguet beat is slow and the rhythm and 
movements of the dancers resemble graceful butterflies, while the Ifugao beat is much 
faster and the rhythm and movements mush sharper and more jerky, like a war dance,” 
Volckmann wrote, “The dances in general portray the differences in the characteristics of 
the two peoples. The Benguet in general is even-tempered, modest and peace loving, 
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while the Ifugao is more impatient and is hot-tempered and a fierce individual 
fighter.”2081  
Blackburn, who claimed to have cured an infected heel by walking on it until it 
got better, suffered another bout of malaria. 2082   In camp near Haliap, nurse Lottie 
Spessard brought him some blood medicine called salvisand she found in a burned out 
sawmill. “I felt that malaria was a blood weakener, at least that is my hypothesis,” said 
Blackurn, “and since we had the damn stuff, I said, ‘Why not try it?’ So, [Spessard] shot 
it everywhere but in the vein, and my damn arm swelled up and looked like a baseball 
bat. I never had so much pain. I couldn’t use that arm for two weeks.”2083  
Things were tough all over. Farther south near Manila, Ramsey believed Filipino 
morale had grown dangerously low. Lapham, however, disagreed and later wrote, 
“Maybe I fooled myself,” he recalled, “maybe I saw mostly what I wanted to see. But I 
don’t think so.”2084 After much consideration, Ramsey continued to jettison the Maoist 
cadre organization he had been using and restructure the ECLGF. He counted some 
30,000 guerrillas in five regimental military districts around Manila, Bataan, Bulacan, 
Pampanga and Pangasinan-Tarlac.2085   He renamed the East Central Luzon Guerrilla 
Force as the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Army (ECLGA). 
Eugenio Lopez, from the wealthy Lopez family on Panay, decided to wait out the 
war in his summer home in Baguio on Luzon. “Working through close friends among the 
guerrillas, Lopez supplied them with ‘medicine, shoes, bond papers, laundry soaps, 
clocks and liquor.’ Simultaneously, however, he cultivated a warm social relationship 
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with the local Japanese command, hosting frequent parties for the most senior 
officers.”2086 In December, a man named Franco Vera Reyes arrived in Baguio posing as 
Colonel Reyes, American intelligence officer sent by MacArthur. He had already used 
this con to gain money from the Manila underground and eventually delivered to the 
Kempeitai resistance agents Rafael R. “Liling” Roces, Jr., wealthy industrialist Juan 
Miguel Elizade, and Del la Rama Shipping manager Enrico Pirovano.2087  In Baguio, 
Reyes enticed Congressman Ramon Mitra and Colonel Manuel Enriquez to arrange a 
meeting with local resistance members at the Tropicana Restaurant. As he arrived that 
night Reyes recognized the waiting Eugenio Lopez, the restaurant’s owner, and instantly 
departed, heading for Manila. Lopez had also recognized Reyes as a con man he had 
dealt with before the war. Fearing imminent arrest, Colonel Enriquez accepted Laurel’s 
standing offer for amnesty and Congressman Mitra agreed to a Kempeitai request that he 
serve as mayor of Baguio. 2088 
 
Mindanao, D753/R-296 
In mid-December, Fertig wrote, “Radio contact has been made and maintained 
direct with Australia. Plenty of good dope to them.”2089   However, a new Japanese 
campaign soon threatened Fertig’s headquarters on the north coast of Lanao.  He moved 
his command to the Augsan Valley and by January set up a subcommand called “A” 
Corps under Bowler for communication and control. The corps consisted of the 105th, 
108th, 109th and 106th Divisions. Bowler’s second in command, his adjutant, was 
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Lieutenant Colonel CIriaco Mortera, a well-respected Philippine Constabulary officer 
who was relieved of command of the 105th Division.  Fertig replaced Bowler as 
commander of the 109th Division with Lieutenant Colonel James Grinstead, a retired 
officer who lived on his plantation in Cotabato with many years of service in the 
Philippines, especially among the Moros in Mindanao. 
On one hand the appointment of Grinstead fit with Fertig’s penchant for placing 
Americans in command positions. As American escapees appeared and joined the 10th 
MD, Fertig gladly commissioned them. Yet on another hand, the appointment was 
unusual. Fertig had gained a reputation for appointing young officers to command and 
staff positions. A daughter of one guerrilla, Virginia Hansen, recalled, “This infusion of 
young people into the organization clashed with the old-timers like my father and many 
other civilians who had operated businesses in the Philippines for years.”2090 Her father 
was fifty-three years-old Grinstead was also in his early fifties. When it came to 
accusations of bias among the Philippine guerrillas, there always seem to be exceptions.  
The Japanese stepped up their attacks. A proclamation went across the island 
announcing that any American, or anyone helping an American, faced immediate 
execution. “True to their word,” recalled Virginia Hansen Holmes, “particularly when 
they found a guerrilla, American or Filipino, the Japanese forces immediately executed 
him, usually by beheading. Afterward, they put the head of the dead person on a stake in 
the town plaza to demonstrate to the people the consequences of resisting Japanese 
occupation or aiding their enemies. Albert McCarthy, killed by the Japanese in an 
ambush, was treated exactly this way.”2091  
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Propaganda efforts sought to reinforce these acts to separate Filipinos 
from Americans. On 8 December, Jorge Vargas wrote for the Japanese News 
Agency in the Osaka Mainchi:  
“Responsible as I was for the safety of the lives and property of the 
citizens of Manila, I faced the impending entrance of the Japanese 
Imperial Forces with uneasiness and trepidation because American 
propaganda had led us to expect abuses and excesses from the army of 
occupation, and we felt that the USAFFE had abandoned us to a cruel 
and bitter fate. I believe that my high esteem for the Japanese, which I 
entertained long before the war, was completely justified by the 
irreproachable conduct of the Imperial Japanese Forces which entered 
the city of Manila during the first days of January. My belief in 
Japanese nobility and honor has been further strengthened by the 
beginning policies which have been followed subsequently. As I have 
said time and again, the Imperial Japanese Forces came to us, not as 
enemies, but as a liberating army of fellow Orientals.”2092   
Late in December, Parsons met again with Senator Jose Ozamiz who reported that 
the food situation in Manila was “very bad.”2093 The Japanese 16th Division also reported 
that the deteriorating food crisis undermined peace and order: “Lack of rice and corn 
makes the people worry too much about the food situation. It becomes the main topic of 
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the day among the residents here.”2094 The division cited NARIC’s failure in Leyte and 
called for the immediate improvement of provision and distribution of food for Filipinos. 
 According to Ozamiz, many of the Kempeitai had withdrawn from the occupied 
towns.2095 Without the police around, the Chinese retail stores owners who ran the black 
market kept rice at about P1,000 per bag to both make profits and to discredit the 
Japanese in the eyes of the Filipinos. The Japanese responded by bringing in food from 
outside the districts and distributing it through the neighborhood associations. They paid 
laborers with a bag of rice and five pesos per day in occupation script, a five-fold 
increase of pre-war wages. Ozamis reported this extra ‘Mickey Mouse money’ was 
worthless: “A man may buy a woman for a night, he may gamble, hoping to treble his 
stake and so purchase something on the black market. Otherwise there is nothing to buy. 
Inflation is advancing rapidly.” 2096 
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Table 1: Wartime Inflation in the Philippines2097 
 
By this time, prewar Philippine currency was out of circulation. The Japanese had 
floated two million pesos of occupation script and were printing more every day. There 
was already more money than the value of goods in circulation. In accordance with 
MacArthur’s plans to increase the rate of inflation, Parsons brought P500,000 of 
artificially aged counterfeit Japanese issued Philippine currency and slipped it into 
circulation on the Islands.2098 In unoccupied areas, President Quezon authorized guerrillas 
to print money in the name of the exiled government. Parsons also brought in real cash to 
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empower guerrilla leaders in their local communities. Guerrillas enforced harsh measure 
to control inflation in their areas. “Not only is there no inflation in the unoccupied 
sections,” Parsons reported, “but also there is no black market or profiteering. Ceiling 
prices are rigorously maintained and anyone endeavoring to profit by the situation is dealt 
with by the guerrilla chiefs.” 2099  
The AIB would send Peralta $500,000 in US $100 bills in July. The next month 
they sent another P1,000,000 into the Islands. When Parsons returned he provided 
samples of the latest Japanese issued Philippine Invasion Currency (APA) and 
recommended counterfeiting as much of it as possible.  By end of December 1943, some 
10,000,000 artificially aged pesos arrived from Washington: ten thousand P50 notes, five 
hundred thousand P10, six hundred thousand, P5 notes, one and a half million single peso 
notes. While these amounts provided critical funding to guerrilla operations. “However,” 
s post war study noted, “P10,000,000 was only a ‘drop in the bucket’ compared to the 
tremendous amount of currency printed by the Japanese themselves; it would have made 
no appreciable difference to the economic system in the Philippines.”2100 
Ozamis informed Parsons that the Japanese had put a $50,000 bounty on his head, 
dead or alive.2101 Parsons had one question: had he heard anything about his mother law, 
Blanche Jurika? Yes, he was told, she had been arrested and sentenced to thirty-five years 
in prison.2102  
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Parsons sailed from Mindanao at night on one of Fertig’s inter-island supply craft. 
The wind fell, stranding them eight miles from their destination when day came.2103 A 
Japanese patrol craft passed within a hundred yards as the Filipino crew pretended to 
mend a fishing net carefully placed to hide their radio and supplies while the well-tanned 
Parsons, in native costume, manned the tiller. Any attempt to move away from the enemy 
boat would have brought an instant fusillade. The Japanese apparently saw nothing of 
concern and continued on their way. 
Fertig itched to attack and continued to grow and organize the 10th MD. When the 
Japanese invaded in June 1942, Captain Claro B. Laureta had led thirty of his men from 
Camp Victor in Davao into the hills to the north as a guerrilla unit. There, Laureta found 
around 4,000 civilian refugees along the Lubugon River and used his small force to 
provide them law and order. They flocked to his command. The 110th Division recruited 
Laurenta’s outfit in early 1943 and he reported to Misamis Oriental in July as commander 
of the 130th Regiment of the 110th Division. By the beginning of 1944, Fertig found the 
110th Division large enough to break part off and stand it up as a separate 107th Division 
under Laurenta whom he promoted to major. When Lieutenant Colonel Clyde McClish, 
the commander of the 110th Division, fell ill, Fertig had him evacuated to Leyte and 
replaced by Captain Marshall on 21 January.2104 
In command of the 105th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Ciriaco Mortera gained a 
reputation as a capable but not particularly aggressive or strong leader. Fertig reassigned 
him to administrative duty as Adjutant General of A Corps in January and replaced him 
in command with Lieutenant Colonel Hipolito Garma, a fifty-four-year-old Chief of 
                                                        
2103 Ibid., 172. 
2104 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 97. 
 
609 
Constabulary under Genera Sharp. Unwilling to surrender, he hid in the hills until 
appointed as the Adjutant General of the 109th Division in Bukidnon in 1943. SWPA 
noted, “It has been reported by one source that he lacks initiative and ‘fight.’”2105  In late 
1944, Lieutenant Colonel Teano became Adjutant General of the 105th Division. 
 
Luzon, D754/R-295 
From 31 December to 3 January, Laurel reorganized his government. Claro Recto 
took over Foreign Affairs, Antonio de las Alas assumed the lead at Finance, Teofilo 
Sison moved to Justice, Rafael R. Alunan became the chief at Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, Quintin Paredes took charge at Public Works and Communications, Emiliano 
Tría Tirona received Health, Labor, and Public Welfare, and Laurel kept control of Home 
Affairs, Economic Affairs and Education.2106   Together they faced serious problems, 
notably the rise of hunger, and fall of morality.  
On New Year’s Day 1944, the Haliaps near Volckmann’s headquarters reported a 
stranger lurking about the local trails. The guerrillas picked him up and under 
Blackburn’s interrogation the man confessed to being a spy for the Japanese. He was 
summarily executed.2107   
 The next day, Laurel summoned all of Luzon’s absentee landowners to Malacana 
and told them, “We have to get rice. If necessary, we must compel planters to sell to 
[government agencies]. We will strengthen the constabulary to keep peace and order and 
if the constabulary can’t to it, I will ask the Japanese Army to help me.”2108 Four days 
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later Laurel told his advisors: “If necessary, we have to sacrifice one third of our people 
in order to save the other two thirds.”2109  
On 3 January, Laurel issued Proclamation Number 10, calling for all students, 
KALIBAPI, and religious groups to work for food production.2110 He established the 
Food Administration under Jose Sanvictores to deal with the crisis. To curb the black 
market, the administration asserted NARIC’s monopoly on rice and banned citizens from 
brining the staple into Manila.  NARIC however had become so poorly regarded that 
Laurel replaced it with the National Rice Granary (Bigasang Bayan) – BIBA – run by 
Filipinos under the Food Administration.2111  BIBA rationed rice at only one-quarter 
pound per person per day, and that ration would soon be cut in half.2112 Laurel set up an 
Economic Planning Board to address the crisis with long-range schemes for 
improvement. Short-term special enforcement courts, drafts of manpower for farms, and 
confiscation had little impact on the famine. The Philippine government needed someone 
to blame. After touring Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas, Recto announced, “The recent 
food shortage as well as the present hardships suffered by the people are due mainly to 
the activities of the guerrillas, who hinder food production.”2113 The next month Laurel 
would have the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources forcibly draft manpower 
to support his food production campaign. 2114 
The Japanese were growing anxious about the Filipinos.  They sent Ricarte back 
to Japan, after rumors indicated he was involved in a planned a coup against Laurel, but 
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they would bring him back in April.  The high command sent instructions to the 14th 
Army: “The attitude of the Filipinos must be watched closely to see whether any sign of 
enemy operation against the Philippines appears. The guerrilla bands will rise against our 
forces in full strength just before the enemy invades the Philippines, and attack railways, 
communication, bridges, airbases, harbors and munition camps. In this manner they will 
harass our rear positions and interfere, to their utmost with our operational activities.”2115 
                                                        




12.  Harvests 
7 January – 4 June 1944 
 
 As the Americans marched across the Pacific, Japanese military leaders began to 
evaluate the readiness of Philippines defenses. Two years of relatively small garrison 
force operations had permitted the development of robust and well-organized guerrilla 
forces influenced by MacArthur that provided him with vital intelligence, over-watch of 
sea-lanes, and influence with local populations.   
 
Visayas, D761/R-288 
In early January, Ramsey received another report that a SWPA agent wanted to 
meet northeast of Manila. This one was a PRS agent who had arrived in Luzon by 
submarine and was waiting for him with instructions from MacArthur and a radio for the 
ECLGA. The news appeared incredibly exciting. “There was little more I could 
accomplish in Manila,” Ramsey noted, “and, given the surveillance, a meeting with 
General Lim was out of the question.”2116 On 7 January, he and Roeder left the city on 
bicycles to rendezvous with their visitors. 
 ECLGA Manila District chief of staff Colonel Patricio Gonzalez (aka Pat Gatson) 
waited in a house with Sergeant Ben Harder of the PRS who had arrived from 
Mindoro.2117 Harder informed Ramsey that Major Phillips, who was still with Ruffy, had 
the radio and Ramsey had to go to Mindoro to get it. Disappointed, Ramsey decided to 
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make the long trek across Manila Bay, down southern Luzon, over the inter-island 
waterways, and on see to Ruffy at Naujan, Mindoro. 
With fifty-year-old Filipino Colonel Eduardo Manahan, commander of the 
ECLGA Mountain Corps Regiment, Ramsey scouted a new place for his headquarters in 
Balagbag before he headed off for Mindoro. ECLGA chief of staff Colonel Armado 
Bautista oversaw construction of the camp in the high mountain site. Then on 15 January, 
Ramsey left to find Phillips. Pat Gatson arranged his passage through the fractious 
guerrilla territories of southern Luzon. One particularly worrisome area was under a 
“General Ernie.” “Tishio Ernie had been a renegade for years,” Ramsey noted, “and 
neither the prewar government, nor the Japanese had been able to suppress him.”2118 The 
old bandit warred with the Japanese and rival guerrillas, but he accepted a truce long 
enough to let Ramsey pass (with Gaston and four bodyguards). General Ernie, “certainly 
not my idea of an officer” Ramsey later wrote, staged for the ECGLA chief the beating 
and summary execution of several suspected spies.2119  
The previous May, Peralta had sent 1934 U.S. Naval Academy graduate 
Lieutenant Enrique L. Jurado of the Philippine Offshore Patrol to organize guerrillas on 
Mindoro where Ruffy and Beloncio competed for leadership. Jurado was unsuccessful. In 
November, SWPA sent Phillips to Mindoro where the two guerrilla leaders asked him to 
settle their differences. Phillips convened a meeting in December between the two in 
Mamburao. After three days, the parties agreed that Ruffy would command the Mindoro 
provisional guerrillas and Beloncio would be his executive officer. Peralta then sent 
Jurado back to Mindoro to establish observation posts on the Verde Island passage and 
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create a base for penetration of Luzon. Peralta also sent a unit from 1st Combat Team to 
provide Jurado’s security.  
Meanwhile Sofronio Untalan suddenly reappeared on Marinduque. The lieutenant 
who had surrendered his command in July 1942, had recently jumped parole, returned to 
Peralta and received a captain’s commission with orders to go to Marinduque and assume 
command of Company M in Lieutenant Garcia’s 60th Infantry Regiment. American 
Sergeant Charles Hickok had been replaced by Peralta for Captain Cudilla and 
subsequently recalled to organize movement between Panay and Luzon. When Hickok 
learned of Untalan return, he was incredulous. Hickok found Untalan “not very intelligent 
and not reliable under pressure.”2120 The two clashed and Hickok left. Untalan met the 
Constabulary chief on Marinduque, Lieutenant Rudolpho Tescon, and they agreed not to 
attack each other.  
From Masbate, SWPA received reports that on 23 January Tansiongo, Gamboa 
and several other Masbate and Panay guerrilla leaders met with puppet government 
representatives and Japanese officials. A year earlier constabulary Captain Manuel 
Donato organized a guerrilla band opposed by the resistance group under Captain Juan 
Villaojada (Jesus Arazaga). The meeting attendees agreed that until Villaojada was 
captured or killed, the Japanese military and their Constabulary troops would have 
freedom of movement between their garrisons and in return the guerrillas would have 
freedom of movement in their areas. Once Villaojada was liquidated, they would meet 
again, and some reports even said Tansiongco promised he would then surrender to the 
Japanese.  “This is an interesting sidelight on the enemy pacification program,” 
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MacArthur’s staff noted, “It likewise shows the weakness of the Masbate guerrillas.”2121 
In February, the Japanese would pin down the small band of guerrillas under Villaojada 
and his brothers in the northern peninsula.  Juan fled to Luzon where the Japanese 
captured and killed him and his son Estaclito in Lucena, Tayabas. A little later the 
Japanese killed Villaojada’s brothers in Masbate. Tansiongco would drive the Villaojada 
group remnants the into the hills. 
On 17 January, Japanese forces swept Samar and captured Pedro Arteche and his 
brother Melecio. They imprisoned both at Tacloban. Later, a military escort took Pedro to 
his neighbors assembled in a church in Catbalogan and instructed him to beg them to 
cooperate with the Japanese. Instead he urged them never to surrender. He was dragged 
away and never seen again.2122 
 
Southern Luzon, D769/R-280 
In Camarines Sur, the recently returned Miranda resumed command of Aureus 
and his men. Lapus ended nearly three months of exile to persuade Miranda to drop his 
cooperation with Zabat and sign an agreement to join him in Peralta’s 6th Military 
District. The TVGU agreed and became the 3rd Battalion 54th Infantry Regiment under 
Lapus. 
Guerrillas under Captain Natividad Mata group resurfaced in Bagotayog, Ragay, 
which was TVGU country. Mata however still claimed to be with Marking’s Fil-
American Troops (MFAT).  Unaware of Miranda’s return, he wrote to Aureus, requesting 
a conference in Tatlong Parang, Ragay. Miranda sent a delegation under Lieutenant 
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Sibulo. At Bagotayog, this party was redirected to Basiad Bay, at the border of Tayabas 
and Camarines Norte, to meet Mata. A second patrol under Lieutenant Leonardo Golpe 
followed. Neither found Mata.  
 
Central Luzon, D780/R-269 
Outside Manila, the ROTC lads in the Hunters had destroyed their radio in June 
and linked up with Colonel Ramirez’s 34th Division. When the Japanese captured 
Ramirez, the Hunters tried to coordinate first with the Huks, then Thorp, Peralta, 
Straughn, and even Marking. They sent Captain Leonardo Aquino to Bataan and 
Zambales in late 1943 to develop intelligence contacts. He managed to organize four 
hundred poorly armed and trained men into a branch outfit called the Cavite Hunters. By 
January, a number of survivors of Straughn’s FAIT had joined the Hunters. “They lost 
thousands of members in counter guerrilla operations launched by the Japanese,” noted 
Panlilio, “yet throughout 1943 they continued to expand, at one time cooperating with 
Marking’s Guerillas, then with Colonel Ramsey’s East Central Luzon Sector guerrillas, 
and later with the 6th Military District force of Peralta on Panay.” 2123 When in early 1944 
they opened fighting with Marking’s guerrillas and the Huks, Anderson intervened.  
Marking’s guerrillas also developed branch organizations like the Texans in 
Cavite and Dunging’s Mountain Corps in Montalban, Rizal. By January, Marking 
claimed 200,000 organized men and women. He sent Serense to Manila to form the 
Guerrilla Intelligence Division (GID) from 600 handpicked men and women from 
Marking’s seventeen Manila regiments. 2124  The GID ran mail, collected food and 
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supplies, mapped enemy locations, moved people, and conducted surveillance and 




The latest PRS radio stations began coming on line. Sergeants Crispolo Robles 
and Anciento Manzano got station MAA operational on 28 January on Bondoc Peninsula 
on Luzon. Sergeant Restituto Besid and Privates Querubin Bargo and Andres Savellano 
put station MAB on Masbate on line on 29 January to relay their reports of traffic out on 
the Sibuyan Sea. Soon thereafter, Sergeants Gerardo Sanchez and Daniel Sabado had 
station MAD operating on Cebu. 
Meanwhile on 26 January, the submarine Narwhal departed Fremantle under 
Lieutenant Commander Latta on its ninth war patrol with 90 tons of ammunition and 
supplies – and Chick Parsons.2125  On 5 February, they unloaded 45 tons at Libertad, 
Panay. 2126  Parsons finally met with Peralta and was surprised to learn the colonel 
commanded approximately 12,000 men.2127 They seemed well organized and disciplined. 
Parsons also noted the influence of Governor Tomás Confessor. Peralta professed 
complete loyalty to MacArthur and SWPA and Parsons promised him recognition and 
aid. Narwhal picked up six evacuees and two days later sailed to unload 45 more tons at 
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Balatong Point, Negros, where Latta received another twenty-eight men, women and 
children to take to Australia.2128  
 
Central Luzon, D786/R-263 
In the Nacoco store in Baguio, the Japanese had earlier arrested Manuel Enriquez 
and sent him to a Manila concentration camp. He had gotten released in October as part 
of the general amnesty that came with Philippine independence. Enriquez reorganized 
guerrillas in the Mountain Province and obtained a transmitter from Manila. Captain Ali 
Al-Raschid, Chief of Police of Baguio and former Philippine Army officer, supervised 
communications from Baguio.  
In late 1943 an agent arrived at Enriquez headquarters and announced that 
Villamor had sent him to obtain a 14th Infantry roster. The agent got the roster but turned 
out to be the swindler Franco Vera Reyes – the same man who caused trouble for 
Eugenio Lopez – who now worked for the Japanese. Fearing security had been 
irreparably compromised Enriquez held a conference with his top lieutenants and got 
them to agree that some of them should surrender to the Japanese. Several others fled to 
other areas and islands to join or organize guerrillas.  A Japanese raid on the Nacoco 
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Store rounded up most of the remainder of Enriquez’s men. Enriquez was again captured 
in February.  
For guerrillas, the perils of famine surpassed even those of the capture. “Suddenly 
there was little left to eat in the land,” recalled Panlilio, “With hunger came another pale 
horseman, disease – with them both came he short tempers which almost undid us 
all.”2129 She added, “The guerrillas and civilians alike clawed for food, the starving from 
the starving.”2130 Marking’s agents reported the effort the Japanese took to look like they 
were addressing the problem: of twenty-one ships departing Manila loaded with rice, 
twenty went to Tokyo but one turned around at Olongapo and returned to Manila to 
appear as if it were delivering rice to the Islands.2131  The people, however, watched price 
tags. In the Philippines, the price of a 56-kilogram cavan of rice rose from about P7 in 
1941, to P30 in late 1942, to P70 in mid-1943, to P250 by mid-1944, to P3,000 to P5,000 
by December 1944, and to P12,000 in 1945.2132 At the same time, the average wages rose 
from P1.3 per day to about P4. “Until the harvest was reaped, the fighters would have to 
be kept quiet,” Panlilio wrote, “otherwise there would be more fighting in the foothills 
than harvesting. The Japs were demanding almost more than the harvest, and most of the 
seasonal crops had already been gathered in, but there was still palay [husked rice] in the 
fields and, left in peace, the people could sneak enough of their own on the side to live 
through a while longer.”2133 
 
Northern Luzon, D795/R-254 
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Volckmann toured guerrilla units in northern Luzon. Gualberto Sia had drawn 
remnants of McGuire’s troops near Olongapa and Botolan in Zambales into the USPIF-
NL and attached them to Anderson in Tayabas in early 1944. The combined force 
counted about 4,000 men. On 10 February, Volkmann left Ifugao for Benguet where 
Counselor Tammicapao waited.  Upon arriving at Camp Seven on the eastern side of the 
Taboy Valley, Volckmann learned of the U.S. invasion of the Marshall Islands. By 21 
February, he reached Parker’s First District camp in northwestern Benguet and  decided 
to make it his new USAFIP-NL headquarters. Captain Alipio Cubas’ 1st Battalion of the 
121st Infantry in the Second District most impressed him especially the camp hospital and 
dental office. All the company camps held reveille and taps each day with the American 
and Philippine flags. The Women’s Auxiliary Service organized plays, dances and social 
events. “No wonder the morale of this unit was so high,” he remarked, “soldiering in 
Ifugao had never been like this!” 2134 
The USAFIP-NL commander directed Barnett to move a unit of the 121st Infantry 
north through Abra into Ilocos Norte to discover if Ablan’s guerrillas were still around. 
The Japanese fiercely repelled earlier such attempts. Barnett sent John O’Day with K and 
M companies. And he made contact with a local guerrilla leader east of Laoag.  Days 
later they suffered a strong Japanese attack. “O’Day determined that he was not going to 
be run out of the area,” Volckmann noted, “and, suspicious of this local leader, detailed 
agents to watch him closely.”2135 O’Day called for a meeting with the local guerrilla 
leader and demanded he lay down his arms. When the local leader attempted to flee, 
O’Day shot him down along with several of his men.  “It turned out that the Japs, in order 
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to protect the Laoag area,” explained Volckmann, “which included the largest Japanese 
air base in the North Luzon, had cleverly organized and armed groups of natives who 
posed as guerrillas.”2136 O’Day broke the sham operation and opened the area to the 
USAFIP-NL. Robert Arnold went to Ilocos Norte to command the Third District.  
Barnett’s 121st Regiment also identified a collaborator living next to a Japanese 
garrison in his area. His guerrillas snuck in at night and executed the man. “I don’t know 
how they did this under the noses of the Japanese,” Blackburn reported, “but they put him 
up on the flagpole right in front of the Japanese garrison. The next morning the Japs 
found him hanging there. Well, that town cleared up in short order.” 2137  Blackburn 
considered the effectiveness of such a bold but foolhardy act: “If you could eliminate 




With the Americans marching west across the Pacific, Japanese military planners 
considered the Philippines as a future battlefield. Then the Dampier Straits in New 
Guinea fell on 12 February, bringing the Philippines into the front line. The Imperial 
Army headquarters declared, “The Philippine operation will be a decisive battle with the 
main American force.”2139 Geography dictated they prepare for many separate battles in 
the Islands.  
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With U.S. forces “advancing far faster than we had expected,” the Japanese in 
Manila “began intensive suppressive operations and enforced strict regulations in the 
important sectors so as to simplify defensive operations.”2140 Their plan: 1) blockade the 
main straights to prevent submarine transits; 2) build defenses of islands and harbors; 3) 
watch the coasts; 4) actions for “capturing enemy radios and the sectors in which the 
guerrillas are in operation”; and, 5) organize an anti-sub task force.2141 The army tasked 
the 2nd Signal Regiment with employing the Radio Direction Finding Unit as needed to 
locate enemy radios.2142 
 Senator Jose Ozámiz, recently commissioned by Parsons as a lieutenant colonel, 
served as Laurel’s chief of the Games Amusement Division. He suddenly resigned that 
position to become a fulltime guerrilla intelligence agent. On 11 February, Japanese 
police arrested him after discovering on him a letter addressed to Manuel Roxas from 
Parsons.2143 The Kempeitai rounded up twenty-nine other Filipinos in Manila believed to 
be associated with the guerrillas, all betrayed by a member of the Makapili.2144 According 
to a later G-2 report, the arrests were a result of information gleaned by the agent on 
Mindoro who had been observing Phillip’s contacts.2145 
Kempeitai chief Colonel Nagahama went with three truckloads of military police 
to see Laurel and demand Roxas’ arrest. Laurel’s son alerted the palace guards and tense 
situation developed. Laurel refused to allow Nagahama to arrest Roxas and said, “If you 
insist on arresting Roxas, you must get orders from the High Command. You are a mere 
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subordinate and I refuse to deal with you.”2146  Nagahama departed but promised he 
would get Roxas. Laurel called on Ambassador Murata and Hamamoto Masakatsu to get 
Kuroda to move against Nagahama.  
 
Mindanao, D800/R-249 
Lieutenant Adolph Sternberg, Jr. of the U.S. Army Air Corps joined Fertig’s 
guerrillas after spending more than a year bedridden with a tropical skin disease with 
Laureta’s force along the Libuganon River in Davao province. Fertig sent him back to 
Davao as a liaison officer between the 130th Regiment and the 110th Division.  Once there 
he was given eighty men to form a Special Intelligence Detachment near Matlivas, 
Davao. SWPA later reported, “LT Sternberg’s intelligence activities in the Davao area 
have been quite valuable.”2147   
On 15 February, the submarine Narwhal arrived at Darwin and transferred its 
thirty-four passengers from the Philippines to an Army tug before docking. After a day of 
resupply and refit, Narwhal departed Darwin for a return to the Philippines with 
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest McClish and Major Clyde Childress along with Lieutenants 
William H. Kimbrough, M. M. Wheeler, and S.R. Silva, four Filipino soldiers (Staff 
Sergeants A.T. Sarmtento, Conrado A. Gustilo, Louis Cotez and SGT Paterno A. Ortiz), 
and several enlisted U.S. Army soldiers. When guerrillas however failed to appear at a 
planned rendezvous at Mautabuan Island, Tawi-Tawi, to receive seven-man team under 
Lieutenant William H. Kimbrough and supplies, Skipper Latta sailed on to Mindanao. 
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On 2 March, the Narwhal entered the mouth of the Augusan River at Naspit ready 
to deliver McClish and Childress with 70 tons of supplies. Latta spotted a prearranged 
guerrilla signal on Cabadbaran Beach. At 1850 hours he sent forward a boat carrying 
Lieutenant Commander Wilson, McClish and Childress. They returned to inform the 
skipper that the river was too rough for the guerrillas’ barge, so Latta advanced in the 
moonless night into the channel to a point where he could conduct the transfer.2148 
Ashore Warrant Officer Walter Wallace stood with twenty-nine service men and eight 
civilians awaiting evacuation. Wallace wrote: “never in my life had I seen men go so wild 
with enthusiasm as we did then. Hats were thrown into the air, we kissed and hugged 
each other, we shouted and cheered, and cheered and shouted, until no one had any breath 
left to shout and cheer longer.”2149 By 0230 that night, despite the extremely difficult 
conditions, the 70 tons of supplies were in Fertig’s control. Twenty-eight evacuees (and 
Parsons) made it aboard the sub.2150 
The next day in the Sulu Sea, Latta engaged and damaged the 560-ton Karatsu, 
the river gunboat formerly known as the USS Luzon. On 5 March Narhwal returned to 
Tawi-Tawi, this time to Bohi Gansa, in difficult currents between the beach and reefs. 
Captain Hamner came out with two small boats to receive the remaining 20 tons of 
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supply. Latta inflated his four rubber boats and broke open all cases of carbines to assist 
in the transfer. Even with ten evacuees arriving aboard to assist, the delivery was 
incomplete when three Japanese destroyers arrived and forced Narwhal to escape. 
Departing with Hamner were British Army Captain Douglas Keith Broadhurst, Captain 
Paddy O’Keefe, Colonel John F. ‘Sugar’ Caine, Marine Corporal William Dewey Swift, 
airman John E. Spruill, and soldier Edward A. Chmielewski.2151  
As Latta exited the bay he passed several sailboats at no more than twenty-five 
yards, one of whose crew repeatedly bowed apparently assuming the submarine was 
Japanese before he broke into celebration at seeing the white face of the captain. The next 
day Narwhal attacked and sank a transport and suffered the most intense depth charge 
assault it would experience during the war. Latta reported, “Hatch wheels spun, lights 
went out, fuses blew, the port annunciator splintered in s symmetrical sunburst design as 
the escort crossed directly overhead between #2 and #3 charges. At 1855 Narwhal was at 
220 feet as two more depth charges came down and the crew was wishing for a 
soundproof blanket to pull over their heads.”2152 Forty minutes later the last two charges 
detonated. At 2135 hours the sub surfaced to an empty sea. Latta completed his last war 
patrol with the Narwhal on 11 March on return to Port Darwin and transferred the 
passengers to the Australian Navy tug Chinampa and then headed to Fremantle for short 
refit and a change of commanders. Narwhal finally arrived on 20 March at Freemantle. 
Latta finished his tour as one of the unsung heroes of the Philippine resistance. 
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 On the northeast corner Samar, Charles Smith found a new home for radio station 
MACA. Using the 50-watt radio with a hundred-foot antenna stretched between two trees 
on top of a 1,300-foot peak, Ball had them back on the air in the second week of February 
from a makeshift camp of huts in Palapag Mesa.  Smith’s team established alternate radio 
sites with stores of fuel, equipment and money in case the Japanese arrived and they had 
to ‘bug out.’ As their satellite stations came up on the net, Ball and Stahl set up shifts 
from 0600 to 2200 hours daily to monitor the weak signals through heavy earphones. 
With only inexperienced Morse code operator for assistance, the two Americans found 
themselves having to monitor calls personally.2153 Stahl recalled, “So many stations – 
Army, Navy, and civilian – communicated on our assigned frequencies that the 
interference was, at times, horrendous.” 2154 Only through experience did they learn how 
to wait until the interfering signal stopped, pick out the weaker MACA net 
communication, and vary the signal’s pitch to distinguish it from the other noise.  
With the station in operation, Smith took Stahl to settle with the contemptuous 
Captain Merritt in Catubig. The impression was, Stahl recalled, that “Merritt would go 
with the side that did the most for him, and he hadn’t yet heard the Japanese offer.”2155 
Merritt prepared a fiesta to greet his guests while Smith prepared for confrontation. Stahl 
said of Merritt, “He was much larger than any Filipino I had yet seen. His skin color and 
Negroid facial features belied any Filipino heritage. Filipinos are brown. He was black. In 
addition, he had the curly hair of an African Negro.”2156 During the evening party Stahl 
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observed from a distance that neither Merritt nor Smith drank any alcoholic beverages 
and their tense discussion grew increasingly bitter.  “Finally, Smith stood up and slid his 
hand down to his pistol,” Stahl reported, “I stood up and cocked my tommy gun. ‘Listen 
to me, you black bastard!’ Smith shouted, ‘I’m in control of this island. If you do 
anything to try to stop me, or help the Japs stop me, I’ll cut your balls off and ship them 
back to Africa!’ Not one of Merritt’s men moved in the face of the tommy gun and the 
BARs held at the ready by Ochigue and Catalina. From that day forward Merritt gave 
Smith very little help, but he gave no trouble either.2157  The confrontation said as much 
about the racial biases the actors carried as did about the nature of intra-guerrilla power 
politics. 
Charles Smith received a report from Lapus. He reported to SWPA that Lapus 
“had the foundation of a good intelligence net started and that he had given Lapus 
financial assistance.” 2158  That support undoubtedly undermined Turko’s efforts that 
month to get Lapus to join Zabat in a unified Bicol force. With it went Zabat’s chance to 
win Peralta’s recognition as 5th MD commander. Zabat ordered Captain Garcia to bring 
Miranda to heel, but Garcia never tried.2159 
 By now Peralta had developed an extensive intelligence network in Manila 
organized as the 43rd Division under Captain Ricardo Perez. The division’s four 
regiments supported sabotage missions conducted by a unit under I. B. Fernandez with a 
reported 1,000 members.2160 In early 1944, however, Japanese agents uncovered the unit 
and captured most of its agents.  
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Meanwhile Ramsey continued his three-hundred-mile journey across the Islands 
to Mindoro in search of the radio sent to him by SWPA. On 21 February, Anderson 
notified Lapham that he had not heard from Ramsey since November (when he headed 
for Mindoro). Two weeks later Anderson distributed an order to all Ramsey’s ECLGA 
guerrillas signed “Bernard L. Anderson, Capt, Infantry, U.S. Army Commanding.”2161 He 
bequeathed Ramsey’s northern Neuva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and northern Tayabas 
provinces to Lapham. (When Ramsey returned, Lapham recalled, “Ed raised no protest 
against this action; indeed he never made trouble of any kind for me.”2162 The transfer did 
bother Volckmann however.) 
On his trek, Ramsey hacked through dense jungle, sailed within fifty yards of a 
Japanese destroyer in an early morning mist, rode in horse carts escorted by unfamiliar 
guerrillas, and fought typhoon-whipped waves off the coast Mindoro.  “Whenever I 
would find myself outcast in some barrio, or buried deep in the jungle,” he wrote, “I 
would answer the inevitable question of what was I doing here, how I had gotten here, 
with the simple, sobering assurance that it was my job. But the guerrilla movement had 
grown far beyond a job, and its goals and ideals had surpassed duty’s ability to explain 
them.”2163 
 Ramsey’s deep reflection on guerrilla warfare, and his place in it, was something 
most guerrilla leaders experienced. He later explained: “Guerrilla struggle, I began to 
realize, had altered not only my understanding of tactics but also my whole concept of the 
nature of war, from that of a conflict fought by the rules with conventional weapons to 
one fought by instinct, with faith and devotion above all. And, inescapably, it was 
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altering my understanding of myself, not only as a soldier but also as a man.”2164 He 
became conscious of a truism of successful guerrillas few recognized. “I was no longer 
merely with the Filipino people, Ramsey realized, “I was of them… Their struggle had 
become my struggle, and their liberation, inevitably, would be mine as well.”2165  
 Traveling across the cultural landscape of the Islands, Ramsey began to appreciate 
the different values embraced by the different groups of native guerrillas. As Lapham 
explained, “Some such bands were led by Americans, but an overwhelming majority in 
all them were Filipinos whose motives were varied: hatred of the Japanese enemy, a 
desire to plunder, sheer fear, or some combination of these.”2166 The guerrilla leaders 
shared had one common interest with the people everywhere – MacArthur’s return. 
“MacArthur was reality,” Ramsey reported, “the long, unfailing cable that bound us to 
the outside world. He had promised to return and he would return, and when he did he 
would need our help.”2167   
In March, Ramsey finally made it to Ruffy’s headquarters near Bongabong. “I 
was impressed with Ruffy’s camp,” he recalled, “It was large and well organized, with a 
kind of permanence I didn’t usually associate with guerrilla forces. Rows of well-built 
thatch-and-nipa barracks stood on streets edged in stone.”2168 Ruffy had with him twenty-
three officers and 600 men with local governments and volunteer Home Guard 
formations established in the guerrilla-controlled areas. Phillips provided liaison to 
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SWPA and arranged support. Disappointingly, however, Ramsey learned that Phillips 
had already returned with his radio to his base on the opposite coast of Mindoro.  
An unexpected visitor to Ruffy’s camp was waiting for Ramsey: Peralta’s 
representative Jurado. The ECLGA commander was unaware that Phillips had tried to 
recruit Ruffy as an independent commander for the PRS, but Ruffy had previously 
submitted to Peralta. In fact, on 9 January, Phillips had informed SWPA that after 
meeting with Ruffy and his executive officer Beloncio, he recommended appointing 
Ruffy as 4th MD commander.2169 Ramsey had walked into a full-blown tug-of-war over 
Ruffy between Jurado and Phillip’s representative, his executive officer Captain R. 
Galang. Ramsey just wanted a radio.  
“We have heard rumors that Phillips’ camp was raided,” Ruffy told him, “and 
since then I have had no radio contact with him. No one knows if he escaped or is even 
alive.”2170 Narwhal tried to contact Phillips on 26 February spent two days looking for 
him with no success. Ramsey waited ten days.  Finally, a half-naked and clearly 
exhausted Warrant Officer B.L Wise of Phillips’ group stumbled into Ruffy’s camp to 
report that the Japanese had indeed raided his position near Naujan and killed or drove 
off their team and captured their radio and equipment. 2171  Phillips and Wise had 
wandered the jungle for week before they ran into a Japanese patrol that opened fire and 
killed Phillips. Wise had spent a month struggling to make it back to Ruffy.   
Years later the U.S. would learn that when Parsons had decided to land Phillips 
team in the town of Paluan, he inadvertently delivered them to the Japanese. Captured 
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documents would reveal Japanese intelligence reports for the period of 17 February to 7 
March 1944: “Maj. Phillips, WO Wise, and six Filipinos landed on Paluan, Mindoro with 
equipment. They brought small wireless sets to mountains north of Paluan Town on that 
island and reported details concerning ship movements to Maj Phillips until 15 February 
this year.”2172 After apparently monitoring Phillip’s contacts, they sent a patrol into the 
Mount Calavite area and caught the American team off guard near the end of February. 
Attacks like the one on Phillips hurt in many ways. A promising station was lost. 
Wise reported that Phillips had thrown some papers, codes and messages he carried into 
nearby bushes when the Japanese appeared. In March 1945 a Japanese prisoner at 
Hollandia testified that he knew Phillip’s code texts were recovered and decoded.2173 The 
team scattered. Galang joined Harder and Staff Sergeant V.A. Pinnela in Manila.  Wise, 
First Lieutenant R.P. Songo and Technician Fourth Grade A.A. Alberto escaped to join 
Jurado in his move to Panay. Wise and Songo would die before the war ended while 
Alberto disappeared. Staff Sergeant A. Banaires was believed captured and likely 
executed. Technician Fifth Class R.D. Vitorio was captured and “told what he knew to 
the Japanese. His diary confirmed information he reported.”2174 
As Ramsey prepared to return to Luzon, Peralta sent word that he had arranged 
for a submarine delivering supplies to the southern tip of Mindoro to take Ramsey back 
to Australia. “It was tempting, it was tantalizing,” Ramsey recalled, “But I knew I could 
not leave.”2175 Only after Ramsey declined the offer did Ruffy reluctantly show him a 
cable: “MacArthur to Ramsey: Request that you return to Luzon to command your 
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resistance forces. [signed MacArthur].”2176 Ramsey realized Peralta was aware of this 
order and still tried to get him to leave the Philippines. He gathered his entourage and left 
for Luzon immediately.  
After cheating death, Wise returned to Australia but insisted on returning to the 
Philippines to re-establish Phillips’ coast watching station. He was lost aboard the 
submarine SS-197 Seawolf when it was sunk while carrying him back to Mindoro. 
Beloncio and Ruffy fell out soon afterwards and their Bolo Battalion collapsed.  
Beloncio, supported by Peralta, broke from Ruffy and took with him the A, C, and D 
companies to the 6th MID.  Ruffy, left with B Company, fled to central Mindoro and soon 
rebuilt his force to about 300 to 400 men.  
 
Manila, D823/R-226 
On 9 March, Major General Shiyoku Kou (Hong Sa-ik) arrived in Manila from 
command of the 108th Infantry Brigade in China to assume command of all POW camps 
in the Islands. An ethnic Korean, he was a distinguished officer honored with promotion 
to lieutenant general in October. The atrocities committed in the camps under his name 
no doubt contributed to the creation of a well-known saying in the Philippines: “The 
Koreans committed more atrocities than the Japanese” (Mas malupit ang mga Koreano 
kaysa mga Hapon).2177 As Lydia N. Yu Jose has noted, however, unlike in China, the 
Japanese used few Korean troops in the Philippines; the old saying was not true.2178 
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That month the U.S. Navy began raids on the Japanese forces on Palau. Senior 
Japanese officers later admitted, “In 1944, the enemy’s attack became more violent and 
progressed beyond our expectations.”2179 The Imperial General Headquarters reassessed 
the strategic situation. They saw the next likely phase of the war would center in the area 
between the Palau Islands, New Guinea and Philippines. Efforts to defend this area began 
at once.  
The Japanese Imperial Headquarters sent an Expeditionary Group team under 
Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki to Formosa, the Philippines and Borneo to “improve 
Army equipment and head efforts being made to bring about cooperation in operations 
for the protection of the sea lanes.”2180 The allied advances had increased the strategic 
importance of the Philippines. As one general staff officer noted: “The geographical 
position of the Philippines in the Southern Area is equivalent to the pivot on a fan and 
thus is an important rear line communication and took active part during entire 
operation.”2181 
The Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters issued a report, “Recent 
Conditions in the Philippines,” which said in part: “in the Philippines, even after 
independence, pro-American ideas are still widespread and stubbornly upheld within 
every social strata and class, and cannot be extracted.”2182 This condition bred resistance 
and undermined Japanese endeavors to hold the Islands. “The attitude of the inhabitants,” 
the army planners noted, “who are displeased with our rule in the past, is a matter of 
prime concern. It is impossible to fight the enemy and at the same time suppress the 
                                                        
2179 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 48. 
2180 Ibid.,, 25. 
2181 Ibid. 
2182 Satoshi, 27. 
 
634 
activities of the guerrillas.”2183  The report went on to suggest that the persistent pro-
American sentiment throughout the government – save Laurel and a few others – 
indicated that the JMA had been too complacent with the Filipino elites.  Rumors of a 
coup against Laurel circulated in Manila, raising suspicions between Filipino and 
Japanese, especially the military among the 31st Garrison Unit’s Colonel Inuzuka, the 
Information Bureau’s Tomoji Kageyama, and their associates.2184 Kageyama in particular 
had long favored the Sakdalistas and objected to the Japanese army treatment of Benigno 
Ramos and his followers.2185  
The Imperial Army leaders feared that both the Filipinos and the Japanese army in 
the Philippines had become lax and “thus were apt to become careless in their work 
which attached importance to military administration.”2186 Preoccupation with guerrillas 
led to neglect of defense plans “which needed revision to meet the changes in the 
conditions.” 2187  Insufficient transportation, manpower and equipment had hampered 
efforts to improve the defenses since June. Additionally, the army reported, “Enemy 
attacks increased in violence day after day and heavy damages were imposed on our 
transports by enemy submarines.”2188 
The Japanese expected that any American return to the Philippines would begin in 
the southern-most island of Mindanao. In March, Major Yamajo Chotoku, Fourteenth 
Army Intelligence Section, Manila Branch, sent a request to the Imperial General Staff 
for agents – “preferably a Haji” – to coordinate ‘Moro operations’ against Americans in 
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the Philippines.2189 The General Staff forwarded the request to the Greater Japan Islam 
Association (Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai). The Association offered a three-man survey 
team consisting of former Great Asia Society chairman Okamoto Jingo, Association 
member and Japanese Muslim Owada Masato, and young linguist and Association 
researcher Furukawa Harukaze.  
The Imperial Army staff ordered the transfer of the Southern Army General 
Headquarters from Singapore to Manila. 2190  Further orders called for strengthening 
strategic points in the Islands by July. 2191  Revised plans foresaw a division in the 
Surigao-Cagayan, another in the Davao-Cotabato Area, and another for the Palawan and 
Sulu Islands. These plans announced “a minimum strength of approximately seven 
divisions will be required in the defense.”2192  
The Japanese planners also had to calculate the forces needed against the 
guerrillas. They categorized two required types anti-guerrilla missions while the army 
opposed MacArthur: first, the protection of installations including “railway, roads, 
bridges, communication, harbor installations, airbases, mines, factories, and munition 
dumps”; second, the maintenance of “order in the districts.”2193  From experience in 
Manchuria and China, they calculated “approximately 24 battalions is necessary for the 
said defense” and concluded, “the defense strength in the Philippines requires a minimum 
of seven field divisions and about 24 garrison battalions.”2194 By these numbers, the 
situation in the Philippines looked grim. The army planners in Manila noted: “The 
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strength on hand added up to only a field division (the 16th Division) and four 
independent mixed brigades (the 30th through 33rd Brigades, a total of 24 battalions). It 
was concluded that six divisions must be dispatched immediately.”2195 This request went 
to the Imperial Headquarters in March, and brought only plans for a gradual build up 
“due to the decrease of the transports.”2196 
 
Panay, D834/R-215 
The submarine SS-240 Angler under Lieutenant Commander Robert I. Olsen was 
about thirty days into its second war patrol in Philippine waters when suddenly Olsen 
received orders to head for northern Panay to evacuate ten Americans.2197  Before dawn 
on 20 March, the skipper reached a point eight miles south of the rendezvous point off 
Libertad and waited for dusk. “About 0900 a crowd of people was seen walking behind 
the tree line on the beach, and an hour later the prescribed signals were hoisted in the 
palms along the water’s edge,” Theodore Roscoe reported, “The submarine waited 
offshore, submerged. Then at sunset Angler surfaced, crew at battle stations, and with 
decks awash moved to within a 1,000 yards of the beach.”2198 A banca met the Angler 
and Lieutenant Colonel Cerilo Garcia, Peralta’s First Combat Team commander, stepped 
across to inform Olsen there were 58 people including 16 women and children awaiting 
evacuation – a number almost equal to the total crew on the submarine.   
On the twelve-day run back to Darwin, the boat’s entire crew berthed in a 
cramped after battery compartment, minus the torpedo watch-standers. “Concerning the 
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passengers,” Olsen noted, “Men and boys lived in after torpedo room, women and 
children in forward torpedo room. CPO quarters were inhabited by one woman with a 
two months old baby, one pregnant woman (8 months), one seriously ill girl (worms – 
temperature 104 degrees) and two elderly women. Ship was immediately infested with 
cockroaches, body lice, and hair lice. A large percentage of the passengers had tropical 
ulcers plus an odor that was unique in its intensity.”2199 The half-starved passengers bore 
lacerated feet that required medical attention. One male evacuee suffered a complete 
mental breakdown and Olsen placed him under 24-hour guard.  
The sailors noted how the passengers rapidly devoured all food passed their way. 
Without enough food for everyone on board, the captain put crew and passengers on 
rations of two meals per day with soup at midnight. Olsen added, “Habitability forward 
of the control room resembled the ‘Black Hole’ of Calcutta, a condition which resulted 
from children urinating and spitting on the deck, body odors, and 47 persons sleeping 
forward of the control room. In spite of the constant watch at the head it proved 
impossible to teach our passengers the proper use of this vehicle after two years in the 
hills…”2200 On 9 April, Angler arrived at Freemantle, Australia.  
 
Southern Luzon, D839/R-210 
After mote than 800 days, most Filipinos had learned to live with the war. “Like 
Manila and other population centers,” Barrameda wrote, “Naga had since settled into a 
somnolently placid and economically squeezed acceptance of the bored enemy, the 
underground movement only momentarily and not often breaking through the tranquil 
                                                        




surface of mixed disquiet and grey despair.” 2201 In late February, the Japanese in Naga 
had sent a team of Filipinos led by Governor Andres Hernandez and Judge Gabriel Petro 
to negotiate with the TVGU. 2202 Miranda, Aureus and others met them in San Gabriel, 
Pamplona. Miranda sensed low morale in his enemy.    
The negotiators presented Hitomi’s ‘sit-it-out’ argument: “The war was between 
Japan and America. There was no reason for the Filipinos and the Japanese to continue 
fighting each other. If the Americans came back to the Philippines, the Filipino people 
were free to renew their allegiance to the white men. But in the meantime, why should 
Filipinos make their lives miserable? The guerrillas could go home and they would not be 
bothered at all.”2203 Miranda asked the Japanese to demonstrate sincerity and disarm the 
rondas under Rey and San Jose within the next two weeks.  
Geronimo San Jose and Teodoro Rey led bands of anti-guerrilla ‘rondas’ 
(vigilantes) in Sipocot. “They professed no love for the guerrillas,” Barrameda wrote, 
“served the political interests of the Japanese invaders who tolerated their extralegal 
existence, robbed and abused civilians and claimed they were maintaining law and 
order.” 2204  When the Japanese failed to act, Miranda sent a detachment under Lieutenant 
Sibulo to Awayan to disarm Teodoro Rey’s smaller group. San Jose reacted violently, 
assaulting the towns of Sipocot and Malinao, wounding many civilians and sending many 
more to a detention pen in Tara.2205 Sibulo turned his patrols against San Jose.  
The Japanese responded by arresting Aureus’ sisters and other TVGU relatives 
and sending them to the Tara prison as hostages for the return of Rey’s weapons. They 
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also sent twenty Japanese soldiers and forty Constabulary troops to burn down the TVGU 
barracks in Tila, Cambalidio, and an ordnance post in Malinao.2206   On 25 March, 
Miranda ordered the sixteen rifles taken from Rey delivered to the Japanese in Quitang, 
Pasacao. When the authorities did not free Aureus’ sisters and the others as promised, 
Miranda went to the city hall, the Ateneo de Naga building, to meet with the Japanese. 
They released the sisters and arrested Miranda. With the assistance of Tom Kilates and 
other double agents, however, he escaped back to the TVGU just before the Japanese 
could complete his scheduled execution.  
In the first week of April, San Jose led his rondas with support from the Japanese 
on a two-week campaign of brutal raids in the Libmanan-Sipocot area. By this time the 
Goa agreement uniting Padua and the TVGU had fallen apart. Some of Padua’s Camp 
Isarog II force joined the Turko command and moved into TVGU Lieutenant Sibulo’s 
area by order of Colonel Zabat, now arch rival to Lupus and Miranda. “Zabat’s order in 
January 1944 to the Boayes [Turko] men,” Barrameda wrote, “was to whip Miranda into 
line and make him accept Zabat’s leadership.”2207 Warned about Turko and Padua, Sibulo 
kept his B Company intact and in an anxious coexistence through September. Then the 
Turko-Padua forces conducted ten attacks on the Japanese, apparently in an effort to win 
over the locals from the TVGU. The Japanese responded by torturing and beheading a 
number of area citizens through mid-October.  
 
Visayas, D846/R-203 
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In the meantime, the Japanese continued military actions to neutralize the 
guerrillas. Raids in Mindoro in March captured the radio first set up by Jurado on Tablas. 
When the Japanese forced its movement the previous December, Jurado had taken it to 
Mindoro, then Marinduque, then back to the northwest tip of Mindoro. To reestablish this 
broken link, Peralta would send Jurado back to Mindoro in mid-1944 with orders to 
rebuild the station under the 1st Combat Team.   
Following Fenton’s execution and a strong Japanese attack in January, James 
Cushing set on rebuilding the guerrillas on Cebu. Shortly afterward, SWPA recognized 
Cushing as the commander of the 8th MD in the Cebu area, sent him supplies, and 
established direct radio contact in March.  By April, Cushing had organized 5,687 men 
with 2,700 mixed arms into the 85th, 86th, 87th, and 88th Regiments. He established an 
intelligence net and sent information directly to Australia. Cushing then requested Bohol 
added to his district. Fertig also claimed Bohol and sent supplies there. Fertig, Peralta and 
Abcede would each maintain agents on Bohol. 
 
Cebu, D845/R-204 
On 31 March 1944 began what MacArthur termed “One of the most dramatic 
incidents of the war.”2208 Just after sunset, two four-engine Kawanishi HSK2 flying boats 
left besieged Palau for Davao, Mindanao.2209 Aboard one was Admiral Mineichi Koga, 
Yamamoto’s successor as commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet. His chief of staff, 
Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, flew separately with fourteen staff officers. Fukudome 
brought with him a leather case sealed in a box containing Koga’s plans for decisive 
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naval operations. The recently updated copies of Combined Fleet Secret Operations 
Order No. 73 and "A Study of the Main Features of Decisive Air Operations in the 
Central Pacific" were bound in a red cover marked with a ‘Z.’ Only a month earlier, the 
Imperial General Staff approved the ‘Z plan’ for defense against advancing U.S. forces.  
A violent storm brought down Koga's plane and all its passengers. Fukudome’s 
plane diverted to Manila, but running low on fuel tried for Cebu and crashed into the 
Bohol Strait about two hours after midnight. By dawn thirteen survivors of the twenty-
five passengers had swam the two and half miles to Cebu where James Cushing 
reportedly led 25,000 Filipino guerrillas.2210 Spotting Cebu City about six miles to the 
north, the survivors decided to swim up the coast to link up with the Japanese garrison. 
At about 1100 hours, however, fishermen from Magtalisay captured Fukudome and ten 
others. Two other survivors managed to take one canoe and continue to Cebu City. The 
natives decided to take their captives to guerrillas near Basak. Before they got there, 
Japanese airplanes began circling overhead looking for them. 
U.S. signals intelligence decoded an emergency message from the Japanese High 
Command in Tokyo alerting various commanders that Admiral Koga and important 
documents had gone missing. Cebu City garrison commander, Lieutenant Colonel Seiiti 
Ohnisi, sent out 2,000 soldiers on a ruthless search, leaving burnt villages and slaughtered 
inhabitants in their wake. They even released boxes at the crash site and found they 
floated to Magtalisay.2211  Nearby, early on 3 April, villagers Pedro Gantuangoko and 
Rufo “Opoy” Wamer had found a box containing documents in the surf and hid it from 
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Japanese patrols before passing it to Corporal Norberto “Berting” Varga of the local 
guerrillas just before the Japanese burned their homes.2212  
On 8 April, Cushing reported the crash and survivors to SWPA. Cushing also 
passed along his concern about the intense Japanese search. The natives had killed one of 
the Japanese who had tried to escape. Whitney offered to have the captives moved to 
another island but Cushing knew it would be hard to move them to a link up spot. Three 
prisoners were badly hurt; Fukudome was litter bound and running a fever of nearly 104  
degrees. His aide, Commander Yuji Yamamoto, spoke enough English to convince the 
guerrillas that Fukudome was General Twani Furomei, commander of forces in 
Macassar, Celebes. Cushing talked with the general, who spoke English well, and came 
away suspicious.  
On 9 April, with Japanese patrols closing in, Cushing urged SWPA to remove the prisoners but his 
message did not reach SWPA for three days.  Cushing evacuated his base and moved with twenty-five 
guerrillas and the captives towards Kamungayan where he learned that the Japanese had taken over 100 
Filipinos as hostages to exchange for the prisoners. A Japanese patrol, supported by aircraft, intercepted 
Cushing’s group and killed two guerrillas and a nurse. Knowing more enemy were on the way, Cushing 
decided to negotiate. 
Late that night, Cushing sent two guerrillas and two prisoners to Ohnisi with an 
offer to release his prisoners if the Japanese would end their violent campaign. 
Meanwhile he desperately sought guidance from SWPA. Ohnisi ended negotiations and 
demanded the immediate release of the prisoners. Near midnight Cushing radioed SWPA 
of his decision but two days would pass before SPWA got the message. At noon the next 
day, the two sides completed the exchange. Ohnisi told Cushing, “I expect to see you 
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again in the battle field some day.”2213 Too late, SWPA informed Cushing of a scheduled 
submarine rendezvous to pick up the prisoners. Fukodome was back in Tokyo by 29 
April. Ohnisi’s troops were back on the warpath by 13 April – with orders to avoid 
attacks on civilians.  
According to Villamor, Whitney had said: “Cushing is an unusual study in 
himself. Showing little strength in civil life, now badly crippled by arthritis and 
committed to the use of crutches most of the time, his fighting spirit has dominated Cebu 
resistance since the surrender and his leadership over a following badly harassed by 
consistently superior enemy forces is remarkable. I believe he and his followers merit all 
assistance reasonably possible.”2214 The decision to surrender the prisoners caused some 
of the senior SWPA officers to doubt Cushing’s nerve.  On 13 April, however, Cushing 
sent word that he had received some important looking Japanese documents.   
  According to Cushing, the haul brought in by Gantuangoko and Opoy Wamer 
included Japanese operations maps “showing airbases, naval bases, wireless stations, 
emergency landing fields, triangulation points, heights, and other control symbols in the 
legend” for Palau, the Philippines, French Indo-China, Hainan Island, and South 
China.2215 After consulting with Whitney, on 15 April Cushing put the documents into 
five empty cartons designed for 81mm mortar shells and sent them with Captain Celso C. 
Enriquez and escaped German prisoner Herbert Ritter on a two week trek to Andrews in 
Culipapa, Negros.2216 Over the next two weeks two more batches of documents arrived at 
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Cushing’s headquarters; the first he sent to Andrews and the second to Fertig in an 
attempt to catch a submarine.  
Reports that the Japanese on Cebu were offering P50,000 for documents lost in 
the crash raised eyebrows at SPWA. When on 4 May Andrews reported receiving the 
first documents, Chief of Staff Sutherland got the Navy to divert the SS-291 Crevalle 
under Lieutenant Commander Francis David Walker, Jr., from a patrol off Borneo late on 
May 7 to pick up twenty-five evacuees from Negros. Whitney coordinated with Abcede 
to oversee a secret transfer and pick up of the documents within thirty minutes. At dusk 
on 11 May, Crevalle arrived at Basay, Negros, and picked up forty American refugees. 
Abcede personally handed Walker a wood box to be delivered to MacArthur. Crevalle 
left after two hours, remaining surfaced as much as possible for faster travel to Australia. 
After two days, the commander of the U.S. Naval Base in Darwin, Commander X. M. 
Smith greeted the Crevalle to pick up the box. Six hours later the captured documents had 
travelled the 1,800 miles to SWPA at Brisbane. 
By 21 May, Whitney and Willoughby had passed the documents to Colonel 
Sidney F. Mashbir of the Allied Translation and Interpreter Section (ATIS). Forty-eight 
hours later Mashbir began distributing mimeographed copies of the 22-page Translation 
No. 4 "Z Operation Orders," with the first two copies going to General George C. 
Marshall and MacArthur. Within five days Mashbir also issued the 29-page translation of 
"A Study of the Main Features of Decisive Air Operations in the Central Pacific" and 
ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 5 of the remaining documents.2217  
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MacArthur tried to relay the information gained form the translation to Pacific 
Fleet Commander Admiral Chester Nimitz by radio with little success.2218 Seventh Fleet 
Director of Intelligence, Captain Arthur McCollum had the documents sent to Nimitz’s 
intelligence chief Captain Layton at the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area, at 
Pearl Harbor. His staff passed the intelligence quickly to Nimitz who ordered copies sent 
immediately to “all flag officers assembling in the Marshalls,” including Admirals 
Spruance and Mitscher as they prepared for operations in the Marianas. 2219  Thus 
informed, Spruance refused to chase a Japanese decoy fleet 600 miles west of Guam and 
remained in place for the ensuing Battle of the Philippines Sea west of the Marianas.2220  
Meanwhile, on 22 May, Cushing radioed SWPA to report that the Japanese naval 
commander in Cebu, Takeshi Watanabe, spread leaflets addressed to Cushing demanding 
that all documents and items from the crash site turned over by noon 30 May to the 
mayor of San Fernando. Cushing wrote to Wanatabe denying any knowledge of 
documents from the crash but added that local fisherman reported seeing a banca take a 
satchel out of the water and head off towards Bohol. The Japanese sent a 3,000-man 
detachment to search Bohol.2221 Without their demands met, at the deadline the Japanese 
stepped up attacks and took Cushing’s headquarters by surprise. Three days later Cushing 
radioed SWPA that Japanese patrols burning villages were chasing his battered band.  
Yet by that evening all remaining captured documents were in Andrews's hands and 
Whitney promised Sutherland a submarine would get them within of the 10 days. 
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The second batch of documents consisted of two volumes of typewritten and 
penciled radio messages that had been received and decoded. The messages were 
between various naval units from the end of 1943 to March 29, 1944, with code symbols 
on the messages. The messages were primarily about the change of codes of Japanese 
fleet units and radio broadcasts and appeared to be of primary value to the Central 
Bureau, the Allies' code-breaking unit in SWPA. 
By some accounts, MacArthur demoted Cushing to Private.2222 Whitney got him 
“reinstated” after the war and Cushing retired with his family within the Philippines.2223  
Luzon, D846/R-203 
Japanese units also attacked Marking’s Guerrillas in Rizal province. “For four 
hours, the Japs had bombed and strafed, shelled and mortared and sniped, combed the 
grass and bayoneted,” Panlilio reported, “Against four hundred of us plus a score of 
prisoners and the weaponless, they had pitted eighteen hundred troops, a cavalry 
detachment, six planes, three mountain guns and, near the highway, a tank. They had 
encircled an area two miles long and half a mile wide, and closed in while the planes 
bombed and strafed and the mortars burst within an area growing smaller and smaller as 
they drew the net tight. They were in condition and heavily equipped; we were not.”2224 
Marking’s troops escaped to Sampaloc, hungry, tired and fighting recurrent malaria. Still, 
the Japanese kept up the pressure. A Marking scout reported: “More and more Japs. The 
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people say that some of them are coming backwards – that they are not from Japan but 
from New Guinea. They are very cruel.”2225  
Farther north on 1 April, Volckmann completed his tour of Barnett’s Second 
District and returned to his new headquarters collocated with Parker’s headquarters. 
Seven days later American gold miner Captain ‘Herb’ Swick and Lieutenant Colonel 
Richard Green arrived, liberated by Parker from a prison at Camp Holmes near Baguio. 
Volckmann sent Swick to Blackburn and Green to Barnett.  
Volckmann ordered Blackburn to reclaim the Fourth District area where Praeger 
and his executive officer Captain Thomas Jones had been captured the previous July. He 
recalled, “The task of expanding from Ifugao north through Kalinga and Apayao 
subprovinces and into Cagayan province was a slow, difficult assignment and one that 
took several months to accomplish.”2226 Violent Japanese reprisals had turned much the 
population against the USAFIP-NL. “However,” explained Volckmann, “with the able 
help of Herb Swick and an outstanding Filipino officer, Major Joaquin Dunuan, and with 
great determination, Don gradually extended control north through Kalinga and 
Apayao.”2227  
A Blackburn raid on Apayao captured papers from the governor’s office that told 
of collaborators working with the puppet governor. “With this evidence,” Volckmann 
noted, “the 11th Infantry quickly rounded up the traitors, and when news of this spread the 
entire area opened up.”2228 “With the elimination of the spies and informers,” he added, 
“the ever-increasing support of the populace, and excellent intelligence, the resistance 
                                                        
2225 Ibid., 217. 
2226 Volckmann, 151. 
2227 Ibid. 
2228 Ibid., 152. 
 
648 
movement in North Luzon took on steadily growing strength.”2229 By the end of April, 
some 2,000 dispersed guerrillas he inherited from Thorp had turned into a force of 8,000 
organized guerrillas with 7,000 more in reserve. In addition, he could count on 5,000 in 
service support duties.  
Bad news from the 66th Infantry dampened the elation over the successful prison 
raid that freed Swick and Green. A fragmentary report from the field indicated that a 
Japanese raid on a Second Battalion camp had killed First Lieutenant Grafton Spencer 
who had survived serious illnesses, jungle hardships, and numerous encounters with the 
enemy to become a competent and popular guerrilla leader. The guerrillas learned that the 
Japanese had earlier captured two soldiers in Parker’s 2nd Battalion, 66th Infantry, who 
broke under torture and betrayed Spencer.2230  Although warned that an enemy patrol was 
approaching, Spencer overestimated the time it would take for them to reach his position 
and he remained with his cook to burn rosters and other documents. He was caught by 
surprise and sent several guerrillas scurrying with his papers while he and two others 
provided covering fire. Spencer was shot before he could flee and captured with two of 
his men.  “The Japs tried to extract information from their prisoners, and Spencer 
underwent severe torture; but to each question he merely answered with a broad grin,” 
reported his men, “The Japs finally could stand no more, bayonetted him to death, and 
moved off with the two Filipino prisoners.”2231  
 The Japanese also attacked and burned the Second District Field Hospital, though 
all personnel had left in advance with most of their equipment. They then detained and 
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starved 200 civilians in Kapangan for ten days, trying to gain more information on the 
local guerrillas.  
 On 6 April, Lapham acted Bernard Anderson’s earlier declaration made in 
Ramsey’s absence and announced that he was assuming command of the Second Military 
District and all organizations within it. Anderson took over the Kalayaan Command in 
Tabayas Province. “More than four months passed; and then a strange letter come from 
Volckmann,” Lapham recalled, “…the letter went on to complain that I was intruding on 
his territory, a matter he hoped would be straightened out after his report reached 
Australia.”2232 Volckmann claimed authority over the Second District per old orders from 
Moses and Noble. Lapham continued, “Three weeks later (now five months after my 
announcement that I had assumed command of the Second Military District), I received a 
letter saying that ‘this damn order has caused me too much trouble’ and charging that I 
had exceeded my authority because northern Nueva Vizcaya had never been in the 
Second Military District.”2233  
 Lapham enjoyed irking Volckmann over the Second District.  He explained, “…I 
had laid claim to it, tongue in cheek, only because Anderson had told me it was within 
my domain and because I knew that doing so would irritate Volckmann.”2234  Volckmann 
did not take this lightly. “He informed me,” Lapham remembered, “that though he 
disliked quarreling between units, if I continued to let my guerrillas kill his officers and 
men, he would have to move in a whole battalion and straighten things out.” 2235 
According to Lapham, “Volckmann then threatened to have me court-martialed, and 
                                                        






appealed to SWPA to have me placed under his command. Presumably he wanted formal 
authorization for having already listed Harry McKenzie and me among ‘officers under his 
command.’ He added that my pretensions had been hampering his intelligence work, 
delaying his reports, and producing armed conflicts between his followers and mine. 
SWPA ignored him, and so did I.”2236 
Ramsey finally returned to Luzon, coming ashore near a southern village he had 
passed through months earlier. Japanese troops chasing Ramsey had burnt the once 
cheerful collection of huts and interrogated and tortured their inhabitants. “What was 
more,” he wrote, “the raid had been led personally by General Baba.”2237  All along 
Ramsey’s route, Baba followed and laid waste. The population was now afraid to help 
Ramsey.   
 
Manila, D849/R-200 
In April the Japanese Supreme Southern Army headquarters began its move to 
Manila while drafting a new operation order and overseeing the development of airfields 
in the Philippines.2238  The Islands had changed from base depot to the front line of 
defense.  Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Supreme Southern Army chiefs-of-staff did 
not complete the transition until September, delaying “preparation for the operations.”2239 
The Imperial General Headquarters determined: “We must destroy the enemy before they 
gain a foot-hold on land, if possible at sea with the air force which has great 
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maneuverability and can begin operations on a large scale at anytime and anywhere.”2240 
To do this, they planned to transform the Islands into essentially a large airbase defended 
by the Fourteenth Army.   
The Supreme Army HQ arrived and in July stood up the 14th Area Army 
Command in Manila to command Luzon and the 35th Army Command in Cebu to 
command the Visayans and Mindanao. The 30th Division also went to Mindanao. More 
than 10,000 men came from other fronts. Even when reinforcements made it to the 
Philippines, however, getting them to the right place proved difficult. “At the end of May 
a great number of replacements for the southern area arrived in Manila, and the majority 
of them were compelled to remain there due to the shortage of sea transportation.”2241  
The Fourteenth Army was to build, defend and coordinate the air operations. They 
issued a new Operation Plan Number 11: “The Army must suppress the guerrillas with as 
small a group of men as possible and defend the Philippines with the greater part of its 
force.” 2242   The headquarters made available four brigades and parts of two active 
divisions for maintaining peace and order.2243  This limited provision of troops did not 
detract from counter-insurgent efforts. “The guerrillas,” the Fourteenth Army planners 
ordered, “must be suppressed to the utmost to maintain a state of order before the enemy 
invades.”2244  
The army had to devote itself to the preparation of air bases, munition dumps, and 
defenses. In May the Imperial Headquarters dispatched a planning section under Major 
General Tsuchio Yamaguchi to the Fourteenth Army To oversee the effort. Yamaguchi 
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planned to build seventy airfields, with top priority given to Manila, Clark, Lipa, 
Bacolod, Leyte, Davao and Malaybalay. An officer later recalled: “The reinforcement of 
the air bases was carried out according to the above mentioned plan, but fell short of our 
expectations because of difficulties encountered in employing coolies and getting 
bulldozers and trucks which were necessary to construct airfields. Furthermore, the 
progress of the works was impeded because of the rainy season.”2245 The U.S. Navy upset 
deliveries of needed fuel and equipment. Guerrillas disrupted everything else. 
Japanese field officers recalled: “The guerrillas became more and more active and 
not a single day passed without the Army having to take some action against them by 
dividing many units to protect arms, ammunition, fuel and other supplies, railway and 
communication centers.” 2246  Their actions surpassed the response capability of the 
Constabulary who had to pick and choose where to fight. A planner recalled: “The Army 
devoted itself to the preparation for the Philippines defense operations and determined to 
maintain a state of order only in the districts which were important to carry out the 
defense operations, namely main cities, air bases and their vicinity, important harbors, 
sectors along the railways and the main roads.” 2247 
 Field commanders saw resistance rise with rumors of MacArthur’s approach. 
“The guerrillas rose up against our forces everywhere,” an officer recalled, “and even 
attacked our garrisons due to the small number of men stationed there.”2248 Guerrillas 
continued to target vulnerable Japanese lines of supply and communications. Japanese 
officers reported: “The shortages of the supplies tended to worsen the state of order. The 
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situation went from bad to worse when more and more of the inhabitants began to 
disobey our orders.”2249 
 To counter fears of an insurgency in support of an American invasion, the 
Kempeitai stepped up operations. On 25 February, Antonio Bautista had been arrested 
again after his earlier release as part of the independence amnesty. About ten days later 
he smuggled a message to his wife: “Get rid of everything in our house. Take all my law 
books to my brother, Deogracias. Pay my insurance. Send the horses and carretela to 
Bocawe and get out of Manila.”2250 She stayed. On 4 April, Adalia received a call from 
Fujiwara instructing her to report once again to Major Nishimura at Fort Santiago. She 
went the next day as ordered. The interrogators tried to get her to convince her husband 
to sign a confession. He refused. An anonymous Japanese officer shouted at him: “You 
will not sign, ha? You would like to have your name go down in the annals of history as 
one who resisted the Japanese, one who refused to sign even at the point of death? Your 
name will be a great one. … All this you think, but it will never be so; no one will hear 
about this incident. No one will leave this room alive to tell about what happened. You 
will die the death of a common thief, a traitor to your countrymen whom you have tried 
to lead to slavery under the white man.”2251 They then beat Bautista in front of his wife. 
The treatment of her husband nearly broke Adalia. “I began to doubt the truth of history,” 
she wrote, “Were there really heroes? Or were heroes just political figures inflated in the 
eyes of the world by having something idealistic attributed to them? Were the ones who 
really suffered unheard and unsung, as Tony would be after the Japs were through with 
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him? Oh, nothing, nothing could be worth all this sacrifice.”2252  Many Filipinos must 
have had similar traumas. 
Agoncillo wrote, “For the Filipinos, the year was the most critical not only 
because of the thousands of arrests and executions perpetrated by the Japanese, but also 
because of the scarcity of food and medicine. There was a slackening in the buy and sell 
trade, and the law of supply and demand was taking its toll: hundreds of people were 
dying of hunger. Prices of commodities were shooting up daily and only a few could 
afford the black market.”2253 On 8 April, Manuel Roxas accepted the chairmanship of the 
new Economic Planning Board to curb the black market and reform the rationing system. 
Four days later he was playing golf with General Kuroda, Admiral Oka, and Ambassador 
Murata at Malacana Park.2254 
The Laurel administration also established the Labor Recruitment Agency and 
sent it traveling the country to recruit workers for the Japanese. In a radio address on 16 
April, Laurel offered the Japanese 40,000 Filipino laborers to build defenses against a 
U.S. invasion.2255  Almost no one volunteered. In Davao, the governor had to order the 
Neighborhood Associations to draft five workers per district. Terami-Wada Motoe 
observed, “This phenomenon was due to growing dissatisfaction among the people with 
the Japanese occupation, bad working conditions, fear of guerrilla reprisals, and effective 
guerrilla propaganda.”2256  
After Easter, 9 April, Bautista escaped from prison, never to be seen again. Five 
days later, the Japanese retaliated by detaining his wife Adalia and their children and 
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placing them in Fort Santiago as hostages. On 23 April, they were placed on house arrest 
as bait to attract Bautista.  Adalia made a study of her Japanese guards. Police Chief 
Kaihachu and his deputy Kawata both claimed descent from nobility in Osaka. Corporal 
Imanisi was quiet and kept to duties like cooking for his section. Her guard Hasiguchi 
had been born in America and graduated from an eastern university. He had a wife and 
child in Tokyo but confessed to another love: “Yes, I had a romance with a Japanese girl 
in the United States, but I could not marry her, she would have been too expensive to 
keep. What my wife spends in a year would have been spent in only half a month by the 
girl I left behind in the States!”2257 Shortly after the Emperor’s birthday on 29 April, 
Adalia and her children were taken back to Fort Santiago. 
On 17 April, a Philippine delegation went on a ‘gratitude mission’ to Tokyo. On 
the mission were Speaker Benigno Aquino, Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Minister of Finance 
Antonio de las Alas, Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources Rafael R. Alunan, 
Director-General of the KALIBAPI Camilo Osias, and Secretary Andres V. Castillo. 
Laurel charged Alas and Osias with a secret task of seeking out Japanese officials to help 
with the desperate economic situation in the Islands. 2258 The Emperor decorated Aquino 
with the First Order of Merit with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, his second award 
from the Japanese government.  
 A week into the visit, Aquino gave a speech in Tokyo in which he said: “Quezon 
is a puppet; final victory will be Japan’s.”2259  The next day the Manila Tribune quoted 
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him as describing the U.S. as suffering from “spiritual anemia,” as being “rotten to the 
core,” and said it would find recovering the Philippines “an impossible enterprise.”2260 
Even this late in the war, cultural blinders seemed to prevent most Japanese from 
understanding how Filipinos viewed them. In May, wounded Japanese soldier Horiguchi 
Itsurō was recuperating in a Manila hospital and tended to by a Filipina named Nina. Her 
kindness attracted him and when she spoke, he recalled, “My heart leapt with joy, and I 
responded to her.”2261 Then one day when they were alone their conversation turned to 
life under the occupation. “Freedom taken away, the lack of goods, the poverty of life, 
the brutality of military police, hatred towards Japanese soldiers,” Horiguchi recalled her 
saying, “She concluded by asserting strongly, ‘MacArthur will certainly return and save 
us.’ But I was one of those hated Japanese soldiers. My blood ran backward, my lips 
trembled, and I glared at her. If it hadn’t been firmly forbidden, I would most likely had 
knocked her down.”2262 
 
Visayas, D875/R-174 
 Since the start of the AIB intelligence collection, SWPA considered the need for 
weather observation posts in the Philippines.  On 31 March, the Allied Air Forces sent a 
request to establish three weather observation posts and a net control station on 
Mindanao.2263 G02 reported, “Plans were already on foot to establish weather posts near 
Balabac Island and within guerrilla nets when Lt. Col. Smith on Samar reported (3 April 
1944) that he had several pre-war Philippine weather observers and enough equipment to 
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furnish weather observations.”2264 Smith began sending the first weather reports on 14 
April. The next month the Allied Air Forces sent weather observation teams under 
Warrant Officer Lucien V. Campeau to Fertig for Lanao, the Agusan Valley, and 
Zamboanga City, and set up a special weather net control station in New Guinea.2265 
Weather teams to Mindoro in June and central Luzon in August would follow. 
Smith also reported to SWPA that in March, Escudero evicted Lapus from 
Sorsogon province in Bicol in southern Luzon despite Lapus’ claim of popular support. 
Since then Escudero had gained support of wealthier citizens and established contact with 
Smith. Lapus left behind small bands in Pilar and Bulan and in April requested Smith 
contact SWPA to request for him P500,000 in cash or the authority to print his own 
money. He had sent a similar request through Peralta who chose not pass it on to SWPA. 
Smith forwarded the request to Brisbane but SWPA replied with disapproval. Lapus then 
contacted Andrews on Negros with a promise to send his intelligence through him and 
not Smith. At the end of the month, Smith arranged a conference between Lapus and 
Escudero to iron out their differences, but the meeting failed to achieve unity. G-2 noted: 
“The situation between the two was so antagonistic and confused that Smith felt he could 
not rely on either completely. So in early 1944 he sent an independent net station to 
Sorsogon which any guerrilla could use for reporting intelligence.”2266 
In May, Anderson sent Captain Barros to Bicol to assess the situation. By July, 
Escudero rebuffed Barros. The Bicol guerrilla leaders continued fighting, killing, and 
mistreating each other and their civilians. Agents reported to SWPA: “Obstinate, and 
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under the influence of the embittered Sayoc, Governor Escudero has not shown himself 
an easy man to deal with.”2267 
Meanwhile the submarine SS-291 Crevalle under a new captain, Lieutenant 
Commander Francis D. Walker, had spent most of the month in the South China Sea on 
its third war patrol.2268 After torpedoing and sinking the Japanese fleet tanker Kashiwa 
Maru off Borneo and the Japanese army cargo ship Nisshin Maru west of Kalutan Island, 
Walker received orders to go to Negros. On 11 May, the Crevalle recovered twenty-eight 
women and children along with a number of sensitive documents from Tolong, Negros. 
Three days later the boat received damage from a depth charge attack north of Celebes. 
Walker changed course from Freemantle to Darwin and made port on 19 May to deliver 
his passengers and cargo and undergo repairs. 
On 15 May, new skipper Lieutenant Commander Jack C. Titus took the Narwhal 
out of Darwin for a return to the Philippines. Six days later the sub engaged a Japanese 
convoy and suffered damage to one engine.2269  On 24 May, Titus delivered 25 tons of 
supplies and 22 men to guerrillas at Alusan Bay, Samar.2270 After a failed attempt to link 
up with guerrillas near Sanco Point, on 1 June Narwhal delivered 8 men and another 7 
tons to Fertig at Tukuran, Mindanao and a second stop in central Mindanao to Bowler 
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with 8 more men and 45 tons.2271  On 9 June, the boat ended its patrol at Darwin. A day 
later, Narwhal left on its twelfth war patrol. After shelling oil tanks in the Netherlands 
East Indies, on 20 June the Narwhal would deliver four men and 92 tons of supplies near 
Tucuran, Mindanao. On the return to Freemantle, Titus engaged and damaged the 
Japanese oil tanker Itsukushima Maru in the Sulu Sea. 
 Among the men delivered to Samar were three U.S. Army Air Corps 
meteorologists: Sergeant William Richardson, Corporal William Becker III, and Private 
First Class Jerry Pascua.  Richardson and Pascua set up a weather station on the east 
coast of Samar. Becker set up another station with Sergeant Raymundo Agcaoili and 
Private Isaac Aguila at Sorsogon on Luzon. Stahl recalled, “They had to move frequently, 
for making weather observations required that they release hydrogen-filled balloons into 
the air daily to determine wind currents. Obviously, this activity drew attention to their 
location and aroused Japanese interest.”2272 Their data helped SWPA plan and execute 
current and future operations. 
Nearly a year earlier Peralta had sent Major Vincente Tansiongo and Captain 
Leon Gamboa to get control of Masbate Island where Captain Manuel Donato led one of 
several known guerrilla groups. By March 1944, Peralta had organized the 59 officers 
and 943 enlisted Masbate guerrillas as 2nd Battalion with Tansiongo in command and 
Donato his executive officer as part of Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran’s 2nd Combat 
Team on northeast Panay. Reports to SWPA indicated that the Villaojada group had 
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promised Donato supplies and recognition as commander of Masbate.2273  Donato was 
apparently irritated at being supplanted by Tansiongco and reached out to Zabat in 
Bicols. Now Gamboa returned to Panay with his original cohort of 130 guerrillas leaving 
Tansiongco commanding Masbate. Despite this intrigue, Tansiongco linked the weekly 
courier runs between Bicols, Samar, Leyte, Masbate and Panay. In mid-1944 he 
established strengthened this connection with radio links between the islands.  
Lapus fled Sorsogon west to Ticao Island between southern Luzon and Masbate. 
In April, a Japanese patrol arrived and Lapus relocated with a coast watcher party to 
Masbate. The Japanese followed and Lapus escaped back to Sorsogon.  Coastwatcher 
Armando Santiago was not so lucky. The team dispersed, losing some equipment to the 




The pace of events seemed to accelerate on Luzon. In May, Ball delivered a radio 
from Fertig to Lapham.  Ramsey reached Manila where the Japanese had arrested Gatson 
and dozens of other ECLGA agents in the previous months. “For the second time,” 
Ramsey lamented, “our Manila network had been stripped.” 2274  Colonel Sanchez, 
Hukbalahap 8th Regional Command, reported that Thorp, Noble, Moses, Praeger and 
Barker had all been forced to dig their own graves in the old Chinese cemetery and 
beheaded on a rainy day in the past December.  None of them had betrayed the guerrillas.  
Barker’s death struck Ramsey hard. “He was only one of over twenty-five hundred 
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guerrilla fighters who had so far lost their lives,” he observed, “and though he was closer 
to me than the others, and his face was clearer in my mind, I allowed him to take his 
place among them in my memory.”2275  
Ramsey oversaw the completion a new headquarters at Balabag while 
simultaneously constructing a series of outposts in the lowlands. Then he collapsed from 
malaria, malnutrition, exhaustion and various accumulated illnesses. He spent more than 
a week in the home of a Catholic priest in San Mateo when, in answer to his prayers, 
Modesto Castandeda (aka Captain Casey) arrived by truck with a radio from the PRS 
delivered by submarine.  Over the last four months Castandeda had travelled 1,000 miles 
from southern Negros with the radio. He cited Mao to Ramsey: “Communication is the 
lifeblood of guerrilla warfare. Every guerrilla unit must have radio equipment.” 2276  
Ramsey noted, “For us it was the beginning of a new phase of the war. There would be 
no more runners risking their lives on the long journey to Panay, no more endless delays 
to receive replies, no more isolation. We were back in the wider war, in touch with the 
world.”2277 To guerrilla leaders, radios were life. 
Staying alive required medicine. By summer, many of the guerrilla groups had 
developed medical support organizations. The USFIP-NL had two relatively well-staffed 
and supplied field hospitals. “As I recall,” Blackburn later said, “the table of organization 
called for six doctors and six nurses in each hospital company. Well, with the area being 
as large as it was, I had to take those hospitals and split them up. So I had four 
hospitals.”2278 The largest field hospital, at Manauan, was “a structure with a thatched 
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roof and floors, containing an emergency room, operating room, and several wards” with 
sixty beds.2279  Volckmann described his 2nd District hospital as “the best I had seen 
anywhere. They constructed patients’ beds that could serve as stretchers to carry the 
patients quickly. They added an extensive warning system to guard against surprise raids. 
The hospital even boasted a complete dental outfit, including a field chair and foot-
powered dental drills.” 2280  The warning system proved its worth when a Japanese 
attacked in June and destroyed every trace of the hospital, but the guerrillas had safely 
fled with the patients, staff and supplies.  
With adequate supply and supporting personnel, the guerrillas also provided 
critical medical assistance to local populations as a way to build their relationship. In the 
WLGWF, Blas Miranda’s Division Surgeon, Dr. Domingo C. Veloso, organized a 
hospital at San Jose open to guerillas and civilians alike that became “a health-giving 
oasis.”2281 As Blackburn explained, “This was one of our jobs, in addition to the military 
activities. You had to take care of the people. They saw that we were doing this 
thing.”2282 Modern U.S. doctrine has recognized the centrality of “civilian-military unity” 
in counter-insurgency operations.2283 Providing medical aid to the population generated 
such unity. Blackburn noted, “Later on, when the people recognized that we were 
consolidating our area, they began trying to move out of the Jap areas and into ours. We 
set up places for them to live, gave them seed, and a piece of land that was designated for 
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them by the mayor of the town. They were expected to grow their own crops and become 
productive. We had this civil affairs action going on as the organization progressed.”2284 
 Meanwhile, in Manila, Manuel Roxas sought better coordination of agents. In 
March he sent Colonel Narciso Manzano to Fertig with a request that SWPA appoint 
Manzano as “coordinator of intelligence of Luzon.”2285  In early 1942, Manzano had 
worked under Wainwright’s orders to “develop an internal intelligence net on Luzon after 
the surrender.” 2286  He then collected and disseminated intelligence for the Free 
Philippines out of Manila and develop contacts with Peralta and Villamor. In late 1943 
Roxas gave him P2,000  for operations and General Lim used him as an intelligence 
officer of his resistance group and he forwarded reports to Phillips on Mindoro and 
through Ozámiz to Mindanao.  
On 20 March, SWPA instructed Fertig to keep Manzano in Mindanao. On 14 
April they authorized Manzano to develop Luzon intelligence with Fertig’s support. At 
the end f May Fertig asked for a submarine to take Manzano back to Luzon. On 19 July 
SWPA instructed Manzano to return to Luzon and five days later arranged a submarine 
for transit. Two days later they cancelled the submarine.  SWPA arranged and cancelled 
second submarine mission on 1 August. Finally on 1 September, the PRS permanently 
assigned Manzano to Fertig’s headquarters. “The case of Manzano,” wrote MacArthur’s 
G-2, “is a baffling parallel to that of Rosenquist, Villamor, and Andrews: a promising 
potential, with extraordinary background, unexploited due to the refusal to grant 
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centralized operational control in intelligence matters and a total and irritating division of 
authority in the critical years, June 1943 to June 1944.”2287 
 
Visayas, D901/R-148 
 On Samar, Charlie Smith loaded two bancas with men and equipment delivered 
by the Narwhal on 24 May. He sent one team – Lieutenants Vincente Labrador and 
Carlos Ancheta, Staff Sergeant Cipriano Miguel, Sergeant Pete Luz, and Corporals 
Agrifino Duran and Rudolph Santos – with equipment to rendezvous with Ball on Baler 
Bay. A second group under Bob Stahl headed to the Bondoc Peninsula in southern Luzon 
to link up with Sergeant Crispolo Robles and establish a sub-net control station “to 
improve our operations in that area and to serve as an alternate NCS should MACA be 
lost to the enemy.” 2288  Stahl took along Staff Sergeant Gerado Nery, Sergeant Jack 
Montero, and Corporals Eddie Holgado and Julio Advincula, and two young civilians 
Ochigue and Madeja as bodyguards. To guide them through enemy patrolled seas to 
points on the rugged coastlines, the crews relied on a large scale 1933 United States 
Coast and Geodetic Chart of the Philippines Islands and a 1940 Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Company Road Map. 
On 30 May, by sheer luck, Stahl completed his danger-filled cruise to Luzon and 
landed very close to Robles’s base in Bondoc. The next day he established radio station 
S3L three miles northeast of Patabog on Luzon and radioed Smith: “Chased en route but 
arrived ok. Anderson’s man here so will dispatch money and codes immediately. Will 
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instruct him on rendezvous with other party.” Two hours later Smith replied: “Good 
going. Congrats. Send two radios to Andy. Nips are after us. Keep contact with Ball.”2289 
Smith was building a robust communications network. From his net control 
station in north central Samar, he connected with fours stations on that island, one in 
Cebu, one in Masbate, two in southern Luzon at Sorsogon and the Bondoc Peninsula, and 
two in central Luzon in Baler and Manila. 2290 
As fast as SWPA could emplace the radios, the Japanese responded. They 
virtually besieged Smith and the MACA station along with Fertig and KUS on Mindanao. 
Stahl recalled: “I had agents losing their radios – or worse, being captured. I had stations 
coming on the air, only to disappear and never be heard again. I had really important ship 
sightings that I could not get through to GHQ because the Japanese were jamming my 
signals. The Japanese were using direction-finding equipment to locate my station.”2291 
Shortly after Stahl got settled in Bontoc, he was summoned to meet with a native 
general in a nearby schoolhouse.2292 About twenty men clad in various ragged uniforms 
and armed with a mix of bolos and small arms provided a chilly reception. With a show 
of pomp, Colonel Figueras introduced ‘Lieutenant General’ Guadencio V. Vera, 
“Commander in Chief and Judge Advocate of the Tayabas Guerrilla Vera’s Party!”2293  
Stahl remembered: “He was about five feet, two inches tall, exceedingly thin, gaunt, 
sunken cheeked, hollow eyed.  His teeth were much too large for his mouth, giving him a 
constant snarl. His eyeballs were very large, adding to his proper appearance as the 
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madman he was.”2294  Stahl had no idea who this man was but he sensed danger from him 
and his men. Vera was the same man who had executed Lieutenant Vicente Villa from 
Miranda’s TVGU guerrillas for a perceived insult nearly two years earlier. 
Vera said, “Welcome to Bondoc Peninsula, Lieutenant Stahl. My guerilla forces 
have kept this entire peninsula free of the Japanese. The United States Army and the 
Philippine Army may have surrendered, but we did not surrender! Bondoc Peninsula has 
not surrendered to the Japanese! We are still a free country!... And when my supreme 
commander, General Douglas A. MacArthur, sends me enough guns, Tayabas Guerilla 
Vera’s Party will drive all of the Japanese from the Philippines forever!”” 2295 As proof of 
his power, Vera produced Americans George McGowan, Eldred Sattem and Chester 
Konka. The three had escaped from Japanese interment three months earlier, wondered 
into Vera’s ‘hospitality,’ and had not been allowed to leave. McGowan warned Stahl that 
Vera would kill them all if he didn’t do something.  
Stahl, like other Americans, formed a low opinion of Vera and his hundred or so 
followers. They were dirty, poorly armed nomads noticeably lacking sanitary latrine 
practices. Despite the pretensions titles, there was little evidence of military organization. 
Vera proudly displayed his two wives and his pretty mistress, who he beat and humiliated 
and later tried to send to Stahl for his enjoyment. The group seemed little more than 
bandits and a menace to Stahl. Vera would later explain how his people had fled to the 
hills when the Japanese came, and added, “We would be a guerrilla army. But with no 
money we soon became bandits in order to survive.”2296 
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“Imagine,” Stahl recalled, “more than one hundred men, women and children 
living in a jungle camp where every call of nature was handled as an animal would – drop 
it anywhere and don’t even cover it catlike! I now knew why they lived the nomadic life 
that Robles had described. The stench was unbearable.”2297 Yet, Stahl realized that he 
needed Vera’s cooperation if he was going to operate in the immediate area. Vera’s group 
could supply men and food, if they did not kill Stahl first. After hedging for time, Stahl 
forged a message from MacArthur to Vera, praising him as an important guerrilla leader 
and asking him to support Stahl and coast watchers and promising to send guns as soon 
as possible to the Tayabas Guerrillas. Stahl observed, “The scheme worked! Moral: 
When you’re dealing with a nut, think like a nut.” 2298,  
After failing to make scheduled contact with guerrillas at Sanco Point on eastern 
Mindanao, Narwhal completed a rendezvous in Pagadian Bay near Tukuran on the coast 
of southern Mindanao, to land 25 tons of supply and 16 men on 1 June. Leaving at 2200 
hours that evening, the boat ran aground but managed to get back to Darwin with no 
apparent damage.2299 
Meanwhile, on 5 June, the submarine SS-168 Nautilus, now under Commander 
George A. Sharp, Jr., delivered 92 tons of supplies to Tucuran, Mindanao.2300 Nine days 
later in the Banda Sea, Sharp engaged and sank a Japanese sampan with gunfire. On 22 
June, Nautilus delivered another 92 tons and four men to Balatong Point, Negros, and 
picked up seventeen evacuees. On 9 July, Sharp sailed into the Amsay River in Mindoro 
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and delivered twenty-two men and twelve tons of supplies. After a supply run to 
Canayoan, Bohol, was cancelled, Sharp delivered two men and 30 tons of supplies to 
Lagoma, Luzon. Finally, on 16 July, Nautilus recovered a sensitive document, a box, and 
two packages from Balatong Point, Negros.  
On 10 June, the Narwhal departed Darwin on her eleventh war patrol. Ten days 
later, after some secondary missions, skipper Titus rendezvoused with Peralta’s agents 
off Lipata Point, Panay, and delivered four men and 92 tons of supplies. 2301  With 
Japanese garrisons at Culasi three and a half miles to the south and Pandan thirteen miles 
north, the guerrillas came with enough boats to make unloading a quick chore but when 
they refused to load their boats to capacity, an irritated Titus put his men in the boats to 
take charge. After more conflict, Titus ordered the natives to swim fuel drums ashore, 
further infuriating the guerrilla officers and delaying unloading. At 0400 hours, Titus had 
had enough and jettisoned the last 15 tons of supplies and pushed overboard about 20 of 
Peralta’s men who had refused to leave the boat. With four men delivered ashore and 
fourteen evacuees on board, Narwhal departed the area.2302 On 28 June the submarine 
delivered its evacuees at Darwin before heading to Fremantle.  
Although the Supreme Southern Army forecast that the Americans would attack 
Luzon from the south or central Philippines, by June the Fourteenth Army Commander 
had come to believe the Americans would attack Luzon from the east.2303 He wanted to 
place at least two brigades and one active division to meet the American there, but higher 
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command overruled his plan. The dispositions remained: two composite brigades in 
Luzon (one brigade of six independent infantry battalions, and one labor and engineer 
brigade), one brigade in the Visaya Islands, one brigade in Mindanao, one division (16th) 
in Leyte, and one division (30th) in Siargao (northeast of Mindanao). Units reported sixty 
percent of the air bases completed. Fourteenth Army distributed its Four IMBs: the 30th 
IMB with the 100th Division in Davao, the 31st IMB with the 102nd Division in Visaya, 
the 32nd IMB with the 103rd Division in Northern Luzon, and the 33rd IMB with the 105th 
Division in Southern Luzon. 
The guerrillas still continued their attacks. A former collaborator on Mindanao, 
Ali Dimaporo, led a Moro attack on the Japanese garrison Malabang.  A Muslim from 
Lanao in Dansalan drafted on 29 October 1941, Dimaporo accepted a commission as a 
third lieutenant in the local 10th Battalion of the 10th Infantry Division. After serving as 
General Fort’s aide, he organized a bolo battalion. He surrendered in May 1943 under 
Fort’s orders and entered prison at Camp Keithley. In July, he accepted a pardon after 
agreeing to help fight the Moro guerrillas and bring in Captain Mamarinta Lao and Major 
Manaloa Mindalano. The Japanese provided him with thirty rifles and two launches. With 
a small band of men, Dimaporo travelled Misamis Oriental delivering pro-Japanese 
speeches, collecting arms from the natives, and protecting pro-Japanese traders. 
Meanwhile, he later claimed, he coordinated with guerrillas and provided them “food, 
money, shelter and ammunition.”2304  
Captain Ishima, the Japanese commander in Malabang, arrested and interrogated 
Dimaporo for suspicion of aiding the guerrillas, but released him again. On 24 June, 
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Dimaporo led several of his family members and twenty-six men on a detail protecting 
workers on the Malabang-Parang road, while Ishima and twelve Japanese soldiers kept 
watch nearby. During his lunch break, Dimaporo led his armed men in slaughtering 
Ishima and his soldiers. From then on Dimaporo fought as a guerrilla.  The attack, while 
not significant, represented a growing trend of collaborators turning sides and working 
against the Japanese as the war turned more decisively in U.S. favor.2305  The Japanese 
moved their battalion out of Dansalan to Iligan. Based on reports from Fertig, SPWA 
reported, “The guerrillas have only recently recovered from the pressure.” 2306  They 
added, “The Mindanao guerrilla force is the largest organized unit in the Philippines and 
is now the best equipped.”2307  
 
Balabac Island, 914/135 
On 8 June, skipper Lieutenant Commander Marshall H. Austin sailed the 
submarine SS-272 Redfin on its third war patrol to Ramos Island near Palawan in the 
Balabac Strait to deliver six guerrillas and 25 tons of gear.2308   The PRS had been 
planning this mission since February but had trouble scheduling a submarine until the 
Director of Intelligence for Allied Naval Forces Captain A.H. McCollum stepped in to 
provide the Redfin. An all-Filipino team of agents trained to conduct the mission: First 
Sergeant Amando S. Corpus, Sergeant Ramon F. Cortez, Sergeant Carlos S. Placido, 
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Sergeant James R. Renuos, Jr., Corporal Teodoro J. Rallojay, and Technician Fifth Class 
Richie D. Dacquel.2309 
On 23 June the team made its first radio contact with SWPA. At 2200 hours on 13 
August, the coast watchers spotted a vessel transiting the Balabac Straight explode and 
sink. 2310  Receiving their spot report, U.S. Navy Task Force 71 determined the vessel was 
the submarine SS-250 Flier.  Thirteen sailors made it off the quickly sinking boat, and 
eight made it ashore to Mantagule Island.2311 Six days later natives found the survivors 
and led them to Corpus’ team who notified SWPA. 
The Navy concluded that the Flier had hit a floating mine. Palawan guerrillas 
under Dr. Higinio Acosta Mendoza, Sr., had already passed a report from three sailors 
held by the Japanese in the Puerta Princessa Prison Camp of the sinking on 26 July of 
their boat SS-273 Robalo two miles west of Palawan by another mine.2312 This was too 
much. The Navy held Corpus’ team accountable and demanded better reporting on naval 
minefields. On 24 SWPA radio the agents: “Results thus far are disappointing and 
immediate improvement in your intelligence coverage and reports is desired and 
expected.”2313 Corpus took the reprimand hard. Two days later, Sergeant Placido notified 
SWPA that his team leader had shot himself through the heart. 
On 31 August, Redfin returned to Balibac Island to recover Flier’s surviving crew 
along with nine civilians. Before returning to Freemantle on 1 July, the boat sank the 
Japanese tanker Asanagi Maru and the Japanese army cargo ship Aso Maru. 
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13. Needed Signs 
5 June -19 October 1944 
 
 After nearly three years of brutal occupation, Filipinos needed some sign 
MacArthur’s return.  They did not know that MacArthur had to convince President 
Roosevelt to authorize him to liberate the Philippines – an argument the general won by 
citing the proof of Philippine resistance. The new government in Japan hoped to gain 
some measure of victory in the Philippines that would compel the Americans to negotiate 
an end to the war on favorable terms. As MacArthur began bombing the Islands, the 
guerrillas began work to deny the Japanese hopes. 
 
Australia, D911/R-138 
On 5 June, SWPA GHQ issued Staff Memorandum 18 that effectively ended the 
semi-independent status of the PRS.2314  At the end of February the G-2 had published a 
special staff study arguing for more involvement from other staff sections in Philippines 
operations. It had become apparent, for example, that “the requirements of the Guerrilla 
activities of PRS Section would soon become too large for the present AIB supply 
organization.”2315   SWPA produced a draft plan on 16 April for sharing operational 
responsibilities in the Islands, but only completed the necessary staff coordination in 
June. “The direction of guerrilla activities passed to G-3, with intelligence matters being  
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more closely supervised by G-2 and supply becoming a responsibility of G-4. PRS 
continued as a coordinating staff (under G-3), completing a curious administrative 
course, from G-2 – AIB – PRS – G-3, when its characteristic missions and functions 
behind enemy lines were predominantly G-2; which already successfully conducted 
clandestine operations in every territory, from the Solomons to Singapore.”2316 
 
Samar, D921/R-128 
On 15 June the United States began a month-long campaign to conquer the island 
of Saipan in a pivotal battle of the Pacific war. The Americans lost almost 3,500 killed 
and another 10,000 wounded; the Japanese lost 24,000 in battle and over 5,000 more 
committed suicide.  
Another 22,000 Japanese civilians on the island died, mostly from suicides to 
avoid falling into the hands of the Americans. Japanese government leaders used their 
example to inspire future sacrifice. “Newspapers across Japan, for instance, carried 
translations of a Time magazine article that described women and children committing 
suicide, and especially the extraordinary sight of young Japanese women choosing to 
plunge off cliffs rather than surrender to American soldiers,” noted Haruko Taya Cook 
and Theodore F. Cook, “Such awe-filled ‘enemy’ reports were presented by Tokyo as 
clear-evidence of the glory of civilian sacrifices, and portrayed as proof of the ‘pride of 
the Japanese woman.’” 2317  A Tokyo Imperial University professor told reporters in 
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Yomuri, “our courage will be buoyed up by this one hundred times, one thousand times” 
in an example of the required “sacrifice before our great victory.”2318 
Late in the afternoon of 15 June, Bob Stahl’s radio station S3L detected calls from 
Lieutenant Gerry Chapman on southern Luzon repeatedly trying to reach either Smith’s 
MACA station on Samar or Fertig’s KUS station on Mindanao – both known conduits to 
MacArthur in Australia.2319  Chapman had been a part of Fertig’s network reporting from 
Samar but in his new location he was part of Charles Smith’s net. Stahl knew that 
Chapman’s position in enemy territory near Santa Magdalena provided good observation 
of ships transiting the San Bernardino Strait. The persistence of Chapman’s efforts 
indicated something important about his message.  
Stahl recalled, “I had no idea of the content of his message, but I noticed the 
Japanese ‘jamming’ – sending out interfering noises to keep his message from being 
heard – was more intense than usual.”2320 Piecing together Chapman’s coded dispatch 
from the repeated broken fragmentary transmissions sent on his 4-watt AT4 radio, Stahl 
decided to relay the message with his more powerful 12-watt “Dutch Set.” No response 
came from either MACA or KUS.  Stahl took a chance in trying to contact KAZ in 
Australia directly but with no success.  
Somebody received Stahl.  “Suddenly, I heard someone calling my station. I 
couldn’t read the caller’s ident, but through the din I finally understood a request for me 
to change to another frequency. ‘QSY 10,800. QSY 10,800,” the caller said. Whoever 
was calling obviously knew something about my equipment, for he was asking me to 
switch to 10,800 kilocycles. Only a station that knew what frequency crystals I had would 
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request this, for it was a doubling of my 5,400-kilcycle crystal, a frequency I rarely used, 
but a good one for long-distance communication.”  The receiver turned out to be KFS. 
Once again, the Mackay Radio station in San Francisco had come to the guerrillas’ 
rescue. KFS offered to relay Stahl’s message to KAZ in Australia. After another relay by 
Fertig’s KUS, Chapman’s message travelled the 22,600 miles from the Philippines to 
California to Australia.  With the message sent, Stahl decoded it: “GOING EAST TWO 
SMALL PATROL BOATS, TEN CRUISERS, THREE BATTLESHIPS, ELEVEN 
DESTROYERS AND NINE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.”2321 
The Japanese Fleet was heading out to jump the Fifth U.S. Fleet under Admiral 
Raymond A. Spruance, at the moment distracted by its duties in assisting in the assault on 
Saipan in the Mariana Islands. It was a desperate gamble by the Japanese, but if 
successful, one that might stem the tide of war in the Pacific. Alerted by the guerrilla 
radio operators in the Philippine jungles, Spruance turned in time to surprise the Japanese 
in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.2322 From 19 to 20 June, three Japanese fleet carriers 
were sunk. Overhead, in what became known in the U.S. Navy as the “Great Marianas 
Turkey Shoot,’ vastly superior American aircraft shot down roughly 600 enemy 
airplanes, virtually destroying Japanese naval air power.  
 
Manila, D931/R-118 
On 25 June, a group of Japanese officers in dress uniforms came to Fort Santiago 
to inspect the prison cells. “Something somber dominated the atmosphere,” Adalia 
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recalled.2323  They pulled forty prisoners out of their cells and lined them up in two 
groups, chained together at the ankles and tied together at the wrists with ropes. The 
prisoners received picks and shovels and marched out of the Fort at 1430 hours in the 
afternoon. The first group contained Chinese prisoners. American aviator Captain George 
Harrison led the second group. Adalia recalled, “I had to look. Those noble men, with 
heads held high, marched on. It was no longer the chain I saw; I saw men whose kind 
make history. Never faltering, they marched out of the double gate – martyrs whose spirit 
will live forever in the hearts of the Filipino people.”2324 Four and a half hours later the 
detail guards under Lieutenant Yamada marched back into the camp alone.  Adalia asked 
Yamada if the stronger men had shot the weaker ones. “No,” he answered, “that is where 
I came in. You know, I am greatly honored by this. Those people who are gone were all 
first-class men. I had the honor to shoot them!”2325 Adalia passed the word to the other 
prisoners, “I said that none of us should be too trusting now. As for myself, I started 
suspecting that the kindness the Japs were showing me were nothing but a prelude to my 
own grave-digging.”2326 
 All Japanese, Formosan and Korean prison camp guards had to memorize 
regulations in the Imperial Code of Military Conduct (Gunjin Chokuron) issued in 1882 
and the Japanese Service Code (Senjinkun) of 1941.2327 Both drew upon the code of 
bushido that emphasized self-discipline and tolerance, compassion and justice towards 
others. The 1941 Service Code specifically forbade the kind of atrocities committed in 
China in 1937. Yet the code also demanded they obey all superior officers as 
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representatives of the Emperor with the blind obedience of the new military ideology. As 
Yuki Tanaka explained: “The brutal treatment of POWs by the Japanese can be seen as a 
way this ideology was put into practice. To despise men who had surrendered rather than 
fight to the death became a first step toward justifying reckless violence against 
them.”2328 The POWs keenly felt their guards’ condemnation.  
Guards used food as a weapon. In the Cabanatuan, Don Willis recalled, “Life in 
camp was a continual battle for survival. The men became walking skeletons on our food 
ration, about 10 ounces (a large sardine can scoop) of lugow, a watery rice, and 
kangkong, a plant which grew in the ditches around camp.”2329 Prisoners waited hours for 
a turn at a dripping water hose, often to be shooed away by guards at the last minute. 
When George Harrison arrived to Fort Santiago in April 1944, the guards starved him for 
ten days, beat, fed, then starved him again. They hauled him before an interrogator with 
Adalia Marquez interpreting. The interrogator placed food before Harrison as an 
inducement to get him to talk. Harrison ate greedily then pretended not to remember 
anything. “The interrogator jumped up and sat on Harrison’s stomach, bouncing up and 
down while raining blows on Harrison’s head until Harrison began to vomit blood. 
Harrison was then taken off to his cell to endure two months of torture before being taken 
from the fort.”2330 
 Harrison had suffered a version of a torture commonly used by prison guards: “tie 
up a man, force his mouth open under a faucet, fill him full of water, then kick him and 
                                                        
2328 Ibid., 208. 
2329 Willis and Myers, 27. 
2330 Marquez, 118-119.  
 
679 
beat him in the stomach!”2331 They also used the ‘Sun Cure”: “The victim was tied to a 
stake in the full heat of the sun with a sentinel to prod him with a bayonet to keep his face 
up and his eyes opened full in the sun’s direct rays.”2332 One day of the cure meant a day 
or two of blindness and possible permanent damage. Many guards liked to practice 
martial arts on the prisoners. Yay Panlilio reported, “The Japs, to amuse themselves, 
would tie the victim’s penis, scrotum, or both and lead him around like a dog on the 
leash, yanking it, laughing hilariously at the pain it provoked.”2333 Others reported from 
Fort Santiago: “Suspected guerrillas had lighted matches thrust under their fingernails 
and white-hot irons applied to their genitals. Women came in for especially cruel 
treatment, including rape and mutilation.”2334 
A few prisoners got to see the human side of their guards. Adalia noted random 
acts of kindness from several guards. One, Wada, she noted, “was not a strict guard. He 
swore at the prisoners like five drunkards all in one, but he was inclined to be kind, even 
allowing his charges to gossip and joke with him.”2335 At Cabanatuan, Willis recalled 
Lieutenant Okubo who was transferred with him to the Davao Penal Colony. “He would 
always ask, ‘How awe you?, Lieutenant Weeus,” recalled Willis who added, “I intended 
to use him if I could as he seem to take a liking to me. He even asked me to make a 
sketch of him, which I did.”2336 
SWPA considered plans for contacting and aiding the prisoners held by the 
Japanese. A month after departing Mindanao in July 1943, Davao Penal Colony escapee 
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Stephen Mellnik was on his way to Washington. There a secret organization dedicated to 
aiding U.S. prisoners in enemy hands, MIS-X, interrogated Mellnik for any information 
that might help future such operations in the Philippines.2337 Mellnik returned to SWPA 
and on 11 December submitted a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 on a 
plan to develop contacts with allied prisoners in Davao and possibly in Cabanatuan.  
Lieutenant Harold A. Rosenquist, an MIS-X officer trained in the latest escape 
and evasion techniques and serving with SWPA, agreed to go to Mindanao and attempt to 
contact the Davao prisoners. The Lieutenant had hoped to go in February, but Whitney 
stopped him. “Whitney’s influence was too strong,” Rosenquist recalled.2338 The SWPA 
Chief of Staff finally approved the mission on 26 March 1944, over the objections of the 
PRS who thought it trespassed on 10th MD’s authority. On 26 April the PRS notified 
Fertig that Rosenquist “has been placed on temporary duty with your command for the 
purpose of acting as your advisor in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in your 
military area.”2339  
Meanwhile on 1 March, Fertig sent Lieutenant Robert Spielman, another Davao 
escapee, back to make contact with the prisoners and gather whatever intelligence he 
could.2340 Sixteen days later Speilman made it to the camp and began his mission. After 
three more days he successfully linked up with prisoners in the lightly guarded, remote 
camp. In the process, Speilman passed some small supplies he carried to the prisoners. 
When on 27 March the Japanese discovered the newly arrived supplies, Captain Mark 
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Wohlfeldt led ten other prisoners in an escape. Patrols managed to recapture four of the 
escapes for severe punishment. 
On 1 June the SS-167 Nautilus, under Skipper Jack Titus, put Rosenquist ashore 
on the west coast of Turkuran, Zamboanga. The lieutenant made his way to Major Claro 
Laurenta’s guerrilla headquarters in Kampungagan.  Laurenta then got him to Fertig at 
10th MD’s base on 23 July. With a team of guerrillas, Rosenquist successfully reached the 
Davao Penal Colony in early August, and found it empty. 
 SWPA later learned that on 6 June the Japanese had gathered the 1,250 prisoners 
in camp and marched them blindfolded and tied together to Lasang Pier in Davao.2341 Six 
days later the prisoners crammed aboard the merchant freighter Eire Maru to 
Zamboanga, where 750 prisoners were transferred to the Shinyo Maru bound for Manila.  
U.S. submarines SS-256 Hake, SS-241 Bashaw, and SS-263 Paddle were waiting off 
Mindanao to intercept a reported Japanese fleet gathering near Tawi Tawi and expected 
to strike the U.S. fleet near the Marianas.2342 Notified by Allied Naval Forces command 
of a troop ship in her area, Paddle attacked on 7 September. Only 82 of the prisoners 
survived the sinking ship to make it ashore.2343 This was not an isolated incident: of the 
126,000 Allied prisoners transported on 134 unmarked Japanese vessels in 156 voyages 
during the war, 21,000 would die from attacks by American planes and submarines.2344 
Later studying the failed mission to Davao, MacArthur’s G-2 commented: “The 
removal of practically all PW from the Penal Colony during the five month’s delay in 
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Rosenquist’s arrival meant that help which might have been given arrived too late. It is 
now known also that the guerrillas with a little assistance might have removed most of 
the PW safely had the project been organized while the opportunity presented itself.”2345 
 
Bohol, D929/R-120 
The unexpected arrival of Senator Carlos P. Garcia, “the backbone of the civil 
government on Bohol,” disrupted a plot by junior officers in Boforce to kill and 
overthrow Ingeniero. 2346  The guerrilla leader reportedly fled to Panay. On 23 June, 
Japanese forces landed at several points on the island against little resistance. They seized 
the major cities and spread across the island in a few weeks. They killed, harassed, and 
destroyed all guerrillas they encountered. Agents reported to SWPA: “Secrecy discipline 
of the organization had been reported as bad, and it is known that the Japanese had 
obtained complete rosters of the Bohol guerrilla force before their invasion through 
Senior Inspector Muego of the puppet Constabulary. Shortly before their invasion many 
Japanese undercover agents from Cebu moved to Bohol, and at the same time BC’s 
(members of the puppet Bureau of Constabulary forces) surrendered and joined the 
guerrilla forces in Bohol.”2347 
The Japanese Army planners again reevaluated the guerrilla threat.  “American 
and Philippine guerrillas were prevalent on the many islands of the Philippines group, 
and they were in contact with the U.S. forces by means of radio and submarines,” high 
command officers recalled after the war, “These guerrillas were very powerful and active, 
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especially in the districts of Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon. Such being the case, each 
unit had to resort to punitive actions in order to maintain public peace and order.”2348 
 
Central Luzon, D933/R-116 
Ramsey arrived at his new headquarters camp in Balagbag. Six nipa huts housed 
the troops. Another larger hut served double duty as the mess hall and hospital. A small 
hut was Ramsey’s home. An escaped POW, Marine Corporal Jimmy Carrington, oversaw 
security with two .50 caliber machine guns salvaged from wrecked American fighter 
plane. On 27 June, Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Guillermo emplaced Ramsey’s new 
radio behind the camp on what he called ‘Signal Hill.’ With the new station, LRT, he 
contacted Major Andrews on Negros, net control station NAL. “During those first few 
heady weeks after our radio post went on the air,” Ramsey wrote, “I pieced together a 
brief history of the previous two years of the war, and I was both shocked and 
encouraged by what I learned.” 2349  Messages identified as coming directly from 
MacArthur requested Ramsey provide details on the numbers of his forces, their arms, 
their locations, and their training and readiness.  
The Constabulary, Kempeitai and Japanese military were cracking down on 
suspected guerrillas. The pressure led Ramona Snyder to leave her post in Manila and 
join Ramsey in the hills. She maintained her network of contacts through couriers. The 
ECLGA intelligence chief in Manila, twenty-nine-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Liberato 
“Obie” Bonoan, kept the information flowing out of the capital. Laurel’s administration 
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seemed to be gaining control and had supplied 250,000 laborers to the Japanese.2350 
Ramsey began publishing a counterpropaganda newsletter, The Voice of the Misguided 
Elements, and distributed copies to local towns. “They were in great demand as the only 
available source of outside information, and people read and reproduced them at the risk 
of their lives.” 2351 
Ramsey’s guerrillas did their best to keep pressure on the enemy. “Operatives 
would pour cane sugar into the gas tanks of planes and vehicles, set fire to depots, or 
attack military convoys in the countryside,” he reported, “Sabotage served a valuable 
morale-boosting purpose, but it had always remained subordinate to our main goals or 
organizing and intelligence gathering.”2352 He wanted more substantial operations. “The 
Filipino people needed a sign – something to sustain them through this third year of 
occupation,” Ramsey wrote.2353 Late that month Roeder delivered a prototype explosive 
device consisting of two six inch lead cylinders welded together, match heads and black 
powder in one end and the other to be filled with sulfuric acid, with a space between 
separated by thin copper sheathing.  “The sulfuric acid eats through the copper plate until 
it reaches the matches,” Roeder explained, “It ignites them, and they in turn explode the 
powder.”2354 With these time-delayed detonators, Ramsey ordered his commanders to 
initiate a campaign of sabotage in mid-July.  
 
Manila, D946/R-103 
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Japan had relied on an island line of absolute national defense that ran from the 
Aleutians through the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, and the 
Caroline Islands. That line was collapsing faster than anticipated. On 10 July the United 
States bombed Tokyo. “Troops began to be moved from Manchuria in earnest now – 
another turning point for the Imperial Army as a whole, reflecting a reluctant but 
inevitable shift in priorities to the defense of the home islands,” wrote Meirion and Susie 
Harries, “There were four possible centers for the defense effort, the ‘Sho Go, or Victory 
Operation,’ as it was defiantly called: Formosa, the Philippines, the Kurile islands, and 
the home island of Honshu itself. The Americans aimed to provoke the Japanese forces 
into advancing on Formosa, thus weakening their resistance in the Philippines.” 2355 
To defend the Philippines against return of American forces, the Fourteenth Army 
again reorganized. By July, the Japanese had transferred some 10,000 wounded and other 
troops from New Guinea and the Southern Area into Manila. Military planners intended 
to use the Islands as a point of transit for these men but a lack of transportation led to a 
chaotic buildup of troops. The Southern Army Command established a new 1st Field 
Replacement Hospital to educate, train, supply, and house the men with an eye to using 
them in the Philippines.2356  
Meanwhile reinforcements arrived as shipping allowed: the 26th Division in July 
and August, the 8th Division in August and September, the 2nd Tank Division and the 61st 
Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB) in September, and the 58th IMB in November. The 
army also formed several new divisions: the 103rd Division in North Luzon; 105th 
Division in Southern Luzon; the 102nd Division in Visayas; and the 100th Division in 
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Mindanao.2357  On paper, each division consisted of two brigades, each brigade four 
independent infantry battalions and associated artillery, mortar, engineers and 
transportation units. The newly organized independent mixed brigades had three infantry 
battalions with engineers and artillery.2358 The 54th IMB garrisoned the Sulu Archipelago 
in Zamboanga, the 55th IMB garrisoned central Luzon. The 58th IMB reached the 
Philippines in early July with three infantry battalions and artillery. 
The Fourteenth Army continued to refine plans. Following the lessons of Saipan, 
where Japanese positions on the beaches fell to U.S. naval gunnery, they planned an 
inland defense in the Philippines.2359  On Luzon, they assigned three battalions of infantry 
and engineers to Apparri; one infantry battalion in Lingayen Gulf; one infantry battalion 
in Dingalan and Baler Bay; one infantry battalion in Batangas; two infantry battalions on 
the coast of Lamon Bay; one infantry battalion in Olongapo; and two infantry battalions 
in Manila.2360 Another three infantry battalions of the 105th Division were held at Lamon 
Bay in reserve. The Imperial Headquarters began sending two newly organized mixed 
brigades in July but they were unable to complete arrival until October. The lower quality 
troops of the newly formed 55th IMB and the 33rd Infantry Regiment (minus one 
battalion) of the 16th Division were placed in central Luzon to support Baler and 
Lingayen Bay. The Imperial Headquarters unofficially organized the Fourteenth Army 
Area and the 35th Army headquarters. These forces were too thinly spread. 
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By now the U.S. Navy was strangling Japan at sea while bombs rained from the 
sky. One Japanese merchant captain recalled, “When I was in Manila for repairs in the 
summer of 1944 and learned of the heavy submarine losses of ships crossing the Bashi 
Straits from Formosa to Luzon, I and my associates began to fear the war was beginning 
to be lost.”2361  The Japanese forces in the Philippines requested a shipment of 100,000 
drums of fuel. By the end of September only 40,000 had arrived, and air raids promptly 
destroyed 37,000 of those. 2362  Too little arrived to carry out the army’s plans. The 
Japanese confiscated 3,000 motorcars in the Islands, half of them in the Manila area, 
further hampering the general economy.2363 A thousand of the vehicles went to the units 
constructing airfields.  The army’s ten infantry companies in Manila shared 300 cars, 
only half worked at any given time.2364 
The distribution of ill-equipped forces to address the invasion threat invited 
guerrilla action. In July, Matsui Kozan had to close the Mankayan Copper Mine because 
they could not transport the ore. In the mine’s general affairs office Yoshimichi Ozaki 
explained to officials the reasons: “impassable steep roads, decrepit vehicles and lack of 
replacement parts, uncooperative Filipino drivers, destruction of roads by torrential 
seasonal rain, and anti-Japanese guerrilla activities.” 2365  Setsuho Ikehata found that 
through the first half of 1944, Matsui Kozan desperately advertised for 200 truck 
mechanics and 200 truck drivers – “a state of affairs not at all unrelated to guerrilla 
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activities.”2366 Attacks by Vinzon’s Traveling Guerrillas on the Kalambayangan mine and 
the transportation carrying ore form the mine forced more closures.2367 
 To neutralize guerrillas, the Japanese prioritized the elimination of radios. Locals 
began noticing boats off the coasts and in rivers carrying strange arrays of antennas and 
wires. When these “Chinese clotheslines” appeared in Mompog Passage and in Ragay 
Gulf bracketing his radio station on the Bondoc Peninsula. Stahl took notice. “I suspected 
that these were crude radio-direction-finding rigs seeking a fix on our station,” he 
recalled, “My concern was great enough that we ceased radio operations for several days 
until they moved away, shifting our radio relay network to one of the other net 
stations.”2368  Volckmann turned to couriers to deliver his reports to Lapham who was in 
Baler with Ball.  
To subdue guerrillas in Mindanao, on 14 June the Greater Japan Islam 
Association survey team of Jingo Okamoto, Masato Owada, and Harukaze Furukawa 
arrived in Manila. They were too late; a Major Yamaji informed them that Fourteenth 
Army General Staff Defense Intelligence Section didn’t need them anymore.2369  The 
army already had a plan for dealing with the Moros. The survey team decided to go to 
Mindanao anyway. Before they found a plane to take them there, however, U.S. bombing 
of Davao forced Yamaji to order them to return to Japan. Colonel Inuzuka later indicated 
that the Fourteenth Army plans to introduce Muslim propagandists into Mindanao and 
build a mosque there failed for lack of suitable personnel.2370 
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Lieutenant Shigenobu Mochizuki of the Department of Information published a 
pamphlet Practical Outline for an Education and Enlightenment Movement in the 
Philippines: Guidelines and Concrete Proposals.2371 Mochizuki had graduated from the 
Tokyo Imperial University with a degree in Chinese philosophy, entered the army in 
1939, and went to Manila in January 1942 as part of the Propaganda Unit (now renamed 
the Department of Information).2372  He emphasized the use of school curriculums to 
eradicate Western ideals and align popular thought with loyalty to Japan. Mochizuki built 
the New Philippines Cultural Institute in Tagaytay forty-five miles southeast of Manila. 
Known by the Japanese as the Tagaytay Educational Corps (Tagaytay kyoiku tai), the 
Institute intended to reshape the minds of promising future Filipino leaders. In the first 
six-month Mochizuki instilled in the class of sixty handpicked Filipino POWs the 
Japanese spirit of self-sacrifice and the evils of American democracy’s individualism and 
materialism. “Indeed,” Lydia Yu-Jose observed, “the memories that remained in the 
minds of the graduates of this institute were patriotism and the discipline he 
enforced.”2373 Before either the first class graduated or the publishing of his pamphlet, 
guerrillas killed Mochizuki in an ambush in May 1944 in Cavite. Without him, the 
Institute closed. The graduates, it turned out, had only absorbed a sense of duty to one’s 
nation, and in their minds that nation was the Philippines.2374  
 
Luzon, D943/R-106 
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 Tensions rose as MacArthur approached the Philippines. On 7 July, President 
Laurel announced on radio: “No right-thinking Filipino should allow the re-conquest of 
the Philippines. We must bear in mind our commitments as an ally of Japan.”2375 Behind 
closed doors, however, he continued to tell Filipino and Japanese officials that he would 
rather quit as president then declare war on the U.S.2376 The Japanese began to seriously 
consider replacing Laurel with General Ricarte.  
Tensions also rose between guerrillas. Lapham continued to irritate Volckmann. 
“Early in the war,” he wrote, “disputes within and between guerrilla groups had been 
mainly over what our duties were and what our policies should be, much complicated by 
our rivalry for access to food and arms, all exacerbated by personal grudges. By 1944 we 
were quarreling mostly over jurisdiction: who should rule whom.”2377 Some guerrilla 
leaders suspected their rivals of trying to better position themselves as heroes before 
MacArthur returned. Blackburn countered: “As we knew it, Lapham never did very much 
of anything. He just ran a little raid here and there, and didn’t have many organized 
camps. They were just guerrillas by night and farmers by day.”2378 Although he was 
certain Volckmann spoke ill of him to SWPA and wanted him court-martialed, Lapham 
chose to ignore his neighbor. He wrote, “Most American operators, like Volckmann and 
me, barked a lot and exchanged many paper admonitions and warnings but we seldom 
really fought one another.”2379 
In the ECLGA, Ramsey authorized the manufacture of as many of the pipe bombs 
as possible with Walter Roeder’s new explosive devices. Through 15 July his guerrillas 
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placed the explosives on targets throughout Manila. After long hours of anticipation, after 
0100 hours that night explosions began to ring out across the city. The main Japanese fuel 
depot at Tanque burst into flames. Railroad tanker cars in the Manila yards exploded. Oil 
tanks in the Philippines Manufacture Company went up in flames. At dawn a 10,000-ton 
tanker in the harbor rippled with eruptions caused by a device dropped in a fifty-gallon 
oil drum loaded on board the previous day. A tanker burst into brilliant flames.2380 The 
blast caused a chain reaction with other vessels anchored next to the ship. Ramsey and his 
men watched it all from afar before retreating to their base to await reports from the field. 
“The Japanese, taken completely by surprise,” he learned, “had dashed about the city 
trying to determine what had happened. Roeder’s unpredictable fuses had been an 
inadvertent asset, imposing a randomness on the explosions that made it impossible for 
the Japanese to coordinate a response.”2381 The Japanese caught a handful of Ramsey’s 
agents placing explosives and they suffered dire consequences. Baba closed Manila, 
stepped up food confiscations, and began a wave of arrests and interrogations. The Huks 
quickly claimed credit for the bombings. Guerrillas in Manila struck again in mid-July, 
burning Piers 5 and 7 in the South Port, and on 25 July destroying a steamer in the Pasig 
River.2382 
Conflicts between Huk and non-Huk guerrillas had become more common. “A 
typical fight with the Huks developed once in 1944 up in the Sierra Madre,” Lapham 
wrote, “when they ambushed one of our patrols that was protecting Filipino cargadores 
carrying supplies sent to us from Australia.  A gun battle erupted and the Huks stole some 
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of the supplies.”2383 This was one example of what appeared to be a suspicious campaign. 
“Conflict with other guerrilla groups were frequent,” SPWA noted, “and by mid-1944 the 
Huks were actively fighting all their guerrilla neighbors. …Since early 1944 there has 
been a lessening of Hukbalajap attacks on Japanese installations, and it has been reported 
that the Japanese are arming the Hukbalajap, probably as a means of combating the 
guerillas.”2384 
Anderson tried to intervene in the three-way war between the Hunters, Marking’s 
Guerrillas, and the Huks. His loose association with the Hunters weakened when he gave 
them their own radio. When Japanese entered the fight near Infanta, Marking wanted to 
fight but obeyed Anderson’s order to lie low. “And so we pulled out,” recalled Panlilio, 
“finding a new camp up the Kaliwa, and the people whose houses had been burned all 
along the lower river said, under their breath, ‘Cowards! Big talkers!’”2385 With support 
from SWPA, Anderson forwarded to Marking supplies and three radio operators. “We 
looked at the three New Guinea boys,” said Panlilio, “so called because they had been 
trained for Signal Corps work in New Guinea. To us, they were heroes. What if they had 
not yet seen action? Why would they leave America, if not to give their lives for the 
Philippines? It was enough.” 2386 
Lapham had also just begun to receive SWPA weapons and supplies. “I began to 
form new reserve squadrons at a more rapid rate,” he remembered, “I even added a 
Chinese unit of seventy men, following a request from the secretary of a Chinese military 
organization in Manila. The new troops were sent west to Tarlac, usually the most 
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troubled of my provinces.”2387 Lapham’s organization reached its largest strength when 
Anderson agreed to give him Captain Dioscorro de Leon guerrillas in the southeastern 
Nueva Ecija sector. “This really changed nothing,” said Lapham, “since de Leon had 
been reporting to me as one of my own for many months; nonetheless the action was 
typical of Andy.”2388  
Sixty miles to the south the Japanese had gained a reputation in Bulacan province 
for particular brutality, molesting women and confiscated harvests. There Captain Alejo 
Santos lef the Bulakan Military Area (BMA) guerrillas. He had bolted from Bataan for 
his home in Bustos when King surrendered. Mayor Alfredo Cruz Eraña offered to support 
Santos if he would form a guerrilla unit to protect the people. Santos expanded the BMA 
to neighboring towns, picking up support from prominent citizens. He established a base 
in Victory Hills and by 1945 could claim eight regiments: M, Ponce, Republic, Mountain, 
Buenavista, Biyák-na-Bató, Kákarong, Valenzuela, and Batatè.2389 
 
Southern Luzon, D957/R-92 
In Bicol, Captain Faustino Flor was now cooperating with Lapus who had 
received P8,000 from Charles Smith. Their cooperation angered Colonel Zabat who 
claimed command of the 5th Military District. He accused Flor of being a Japanese spy 
and charged Lapus with trying to forcibly recruit one of his subordinate commanders, 
Molinas. Zabat retaliated on 21 July with a ninety-man attack against Lapus’ town of 
Monito, killing several of his men and mistreating the citizens. He sent other forces after 
Flor. About this time SWPA believed Flor commanded about fifty men between 
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Camarines Sur and Albay.  Although Zabat’s “methods of operation have aroused 
considerable animosity in other leaders of the district,” SWPA noted that he led Bicol’s 
most powerful group with 800 to 1,000 men in Albay.2390 
With his supply growing critically short on the Bondoc Peninsula of southern 
Luzon, Bob Stahl sought aid from General Vera and his guerrillas. Expecting the same 
rag-tag group of bandits he saw in May, Stahl was surprised by Vera’s new camp. “It was 
different,” he wrote, “There were no soldiers lolling about doing nothing, as had been the 
case in the previous camps I had seen. Everyone in sight seemed to be engaged in a chore 
of one sort or another. He had, as Mayor Medenilla had said, cleaned up his act.”2391 The 
camp was well organized.  They employed straddle trenches for latrines.  
“Yes, this was a different camp – and this was a different man than I had met a 
month or so ago. No longer was he a braggart, a boor, a horses’ ass,” Stahl noted, “He 
appeared to be interested in preparing to fight a war rather than in killing his family’s 
political enemies and robbing civilians. Quite a large order!”2392  Vera was typical of a 
number of Filipinos. Without training or preparation, he had set out with his people to 
avoid and resist the Japanese without realizing the enormity of the task. To professional 
American soldiers, he and his men appeared woefully inept. They were however tough, 
smart, and determined. Given time, they adapted.  
Vera further surprised Stahl by saying, “I have thought a lot about our first 
meeting. I was going to wipe out your little group and take your guns. You did not fool 
me with your message to General MacArthur and his answer to me.”2393 The Tayabas 
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chief explained that the ‘message’ saved Stahl for Vera could not dismiss it without 
confirming that the Americans took him lightly. He wanted the Americans’ respect. “You 
also ended my career as a bandit,” Vera continued, “for no one would take me seriously 
any longer. I had to change my army into a real guerrilla army. That was good. I want to 
get back at the Japanese for what they have done. After all, I am a Philippine Scout! I will 
fight them.”2394 By the time MacArthur came back to Leyte, Vera had a “well-trained, 
well-disciplined guerrilla army” of about 1,000 men despite having received almost no 
supplies from SWPA.2395  When the Americans asked Vera to destroy two Japanese 
radars near Boac Marinduque in support of impending landings, Stahl reported: “General 
Vera’s troops found both units and destroyed them – with no help and no thanks from the 
U.S. Army.” 2396 
SWPA took stock of the guerrillas. In Bicol on southern Luzon, Miranda had 
about 300 armed men in vicinity of Camp Tancing in Camarines Sur as the “53rd 
Regiment” in Lapus’ organization. Major T.B. Padua claimed 2,000 members but 
probably four companies of 350 men total with about 40 weapons in the San Miguel Bay 
organized as 53rd Regiment, 51st Division under Colonel Zabat. Other guerrillas seemed 
equally strong.  
 
Visayas, D957/92 
On 14 March the PRS had submitted a plan for replacing the lost Phillips team on 
Mindoro. By 21 June the SPWA staff had turned this plans into a mission to be led by the 
PRS executive officer, U.S. Navy Commander George F. Rowe. MacArthur’s G-2 
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recalled, “Rowe, a Navy pilot, had been a sugar broker and operator in the P.I. from 1930 
to 1941 and a partner in the firm Mitchel, Rowe & Co. He had flown extensively over the 
P.I. and had expert knowledge of the islands.”2397 The mission assigned to Rowe was to 
“develop communication nets forward into central Luzon and Manila, to cover Verde 
Island Passage, Apo East Pass, and Manila Bay area for naval movement, to obtain 
weather information, and to give air warning reports.”2398 
On the night of 9/10 July, the SS-168 Nautilus on her eleventh war patrol under 
skipper Lieutenant Commander George Sharp, Jr., delivered Rowe and his 22 men and 12 
tons of supplies at the mouth of the Amaay River in western Mindoro, before sailing on 
to deliver supplies to Kangleon on Leyte and Abcede on Negros. Rowe found support 
from local residents, and deliberately kept out of the ongoing dispute Ruffy and Jurado. 
Rowe’s men were “more thoroughly trained in the operation of technical equipment and 
were better equipped then any other party previously dispatched.”2399 They set up radio, 
air warning, weather observation and radar detection stations. With new high-powered 
cameras, photo development and copy equipment, they established facilities for 
photographing shipping lanes, installations, and captured enemy documents. Rowe was in 
communication with SWPA eight days after landing. 
Meanwhile on Masbate, Donato conferenced with his men and issued a 
declaration of separation from Peralta’s 6th MD and Tansiongco’s command. Many of 
Masbate’s Constabulary and reservists joined Donato’s command. against the Japanese 
garrison. 
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The Japanese withdrew all their forces except a small garrison from Bohol at the 
end of July. Ingeniero’s deputy, Captain Estaban Bernido, reassembled and reorganized 
the remaining Boforce guerrillas. Ingeniero returned in late August or early September 
and dispatched Boforce agents to Cebu, Negros and Leyte to request arms, ammunition 
and a radio transmitter. At the end of September, Ingniero reported to SWPA that his 
force was active 
In southern Luzon, Lapus requested SWPA immediately recognize him as 
commander of the 5th Military District. He claimed his 54th Regiment had 2,600 armed 
men with a division in reserve, but probably had closer to 1,500 poorly armed men. 
Lapus set his headquarters in Albay province, and conducted operations on the west coast 
of Sorsogon and Ticao Island.  Anderson’s agent Captain Barros found the Lapus troops 
“the ‘most military’ he had met in the Bicols.”2400 
 
Hawaii, D962/R-87 
The common faith among Filipinos that MacArthur would return was not shared 
in the halls of power in Washington. The United States faced a decision about the 
Philippines. The Chiefs of Staff believed that the best strategy was to bypass the Islands 
and head for Formosa to create a base for invading Japan. By all military considerations, 
they were correct. They realized, however, that MacArthur was intent on fulfilling his 
promise to return to the former American protectorate. Knowing this, General George C. 
Marshall warned MacArthur, “We must be careful not to allow our personal feelings and 
Philippine political considerations to override our great objective, which is the early 
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conclusion of the war with Japan.”2401  MacArthur insisted on a chance to make his 
argument to the President.  
On 21 July, President Roosevelt departed San Diego aboard the cruiser USS 
Baltimore bound for Hawaii. Five days later he docked in Honolulu. MacArthur had 
already arrived from his twenty-six-hour flight from Brisbane. The President immediately 
summoned the general for what turned out to be a photo opportunity for Roosevelt’s 
press entourage. MacArthur returned to his temporary quarters at Fort Shaffer and 
complained to his staff that the frail President had only wanted him in a picture to aid his 
reelection campaign.2402 
The next day, 27 July, the President and his commanders had dinner at the 
Holmes estate. Afterwards they discussed two possible approaches towards Japan. 
Nimitz, with staff and visual aids, spoke first and cogently argued for a direct approach to 
Formosa, skipping the Philippines all together. MacArthur then stood alone before a map, 
without a script or notes, and reviewed the American failure to defend the Philippines, his 
own embarrassment, and his promise to return. “Both approaches had,” wrote Tarling, 
“with the exception of northern Burma and part of the Philippines, attributed little 
importance to Southeast Asia, the original bone of contention. MacArthur had, however, 
been anxious, partly for political reasons, to regain, rather than bypass, the 
Philippines.”2403   
Nimitz won on points of geography, logistics, and other military considerations. 
MacArthur, however, warned that if the U.S. forces bypassed the Philippines: “We would 
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admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to the effect that we had abandoned the Filipinos 
and would not shed American blood to redeem them; we would undoubtedly incur the 
open hostility of that people; we would probably suffer such loss of prestige among all 
the peoples of the Far East that it would adversely affect the United States for many 
years. I feel also that a decision to eliminate the campaign for the relief of the Philippines, 
even under appreciable military considerations, would cause extremely adverse reactions 
among the citizens of the United States.”2404  
The President declared a recess and talked alone with MacArthur. “Seizing the 
initiative,” Alfred Castle wrote, “MacArthur used his political trump card. Reminding the 
president that this was a reelection year, he argued that abandoning 7,000 starving POWs 
and 17 million Filipino Christians would turn public opinion against him.”2405  
The high command reconvened the next morning at 1030 hours. At about noon 
the President waved his hand and said he had heard enough. He would adopt 
MacArthur’s plan to retake the Philippines and instructed Nimitz to support him. The fact 




U.S. Navy submarines continued their forays into Philippine waters. On 28 July, 
the submarine SS-197 Seawolf under Lieutenant Commander Albert M. Bontier began its 
fourteenth war patrol out of Darwin with orders to Tawi Tawi.2406  On 7 August the boat 
landed a six-man coast watcher team and nine tons of supplies at Tongehatan Point, Tawi 
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Tawi, before evacuating Captain Frank Young from his AIB coast watcher mission. Two 
days later Bontier landed six more men and five tons of supplies at Dumaran Island, 
Palawan. 
Master Sergeant Eutiquio B. Cabais led the Palawan team. With him were: 
Sergeants V.C. Goloyugo and J. Cuteran; Technicians Fourth Class T.E. Vergara and L. 
Marquina; and Technician Fifth Class Daganda. After making contact with local 
guerrillas, the PRS agents promoted themselves: Goloyugo to Lieutenant Colonel, 
Cuteran to Major, and the rest to Captain.2407 
 Cabais made his first contact with SWPA on 27 August. He moved his net 
control station from Dumaran Island to Batulan in north Palawan to obtain better 
coverage on enemy movements. Cabais added a weather station and sub-stations in 
Coron Bay, Bacuit Bay, and Cuyo Islands. Eventually, Peralta made contact with his 
team. Before transferring operations to Eighth U.S. Army on 28 February 1945, Cabais 
would recover, interrogate, and arrange evacuation for an escaped prisoner from Puerto 
Princessa, thirteen downed fliers, and three captured Japanese soldiers.2408 
 
Luzon, D969/R-80 
On 2 August, a flash news bulletin broadcast across the islands: “President 
Quezon of the Philippines died this morning August 1 at Saranac Lake, New York. 
Sergio Osmeña has succeeded to the presidency.” 2409  The effects of tuberculosis 
compounded by the stress of war had proved fatal to the president. Quezon was 
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considered by many to be a symbol of resistance, for some, he was the Philippines. How 
his death might affect loyalties remained to be seen. 
Mrs. Osmeña, still on Luzon, had moved her family away from Manila to Baguio. 
Now that her husband was president, she became worried that the Japanese would take 
her and her children hostage. She passed word to the USAFIP-NL that she wished to be 
evacuated into the mountains under guerrilla protection. For now, she would have to 
remain in place.  
On 25 July, the SS-186 Stingray under Lieutenant Commander Samuel C. 
Loomis, Jr., began its twelfth war patrol out of Majuro in the Marshall Islands.2410 On 27 
August, Stingray landed fifteen men and ten tons of supplies at Mayraira Point, on the 
northeastern tip of Luzon. On 7 September, the submarine returned to Darwin for a three 
days before heading out with orders to scout landing beaches at Majoe Island, Mindanao.  
On 15 September, Loomis delivered a four-man air warning team on the island. Four 
days later the boat returned to Darwin.  On 21 September Stingray would be out to sea 
again, delivering 35 tons of supplies to Baculin Bay, Mindanao, on 27 September and 
landing a three-man team on Suluan Island, Samar, three days later.  
In the Islands, the tempo of guerrilla activities picked up. Lapham wrote: “In the 
last half of 1944, while I was trying to arm new units, transmit intelligence to Australia 
with newly received radios, and distribute largess from submarines, I constantly received 
‘orders’ and ‘suggestions’ from Anderson, Volckmann, Merrill, and the agents of several 
different Filipino guerrilla leaders. Since I had no intention of submitting to any of them, 
on August 8 I radioed SWPA to request clarification of my status.”2411 He confided, “I 
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felt sure, for instance, that Volckmann would have been delighted to have me court-
martialed.”2412 
Communications were still tenuous. Anderson was in east central Luzon with in 
Ball Baler, Tayabas, relaying his communication to Fertig.  When Ball’s 3BZ radio died, 
his ATR4 proved too weak to relay. Stahl took up relay duty and Anderson in turn 
promised gasoline to Stahl, but it never arrived.  Ball sent Lieutenant Carlos Ancheta and 
Sergeant Pete Luz to Volckmann with a radio set to tie the USAFIP-NL into the Ball-
Smith-SWPA net. Volckmann wrote, “This was one of the most thrilling moments I 
experienced during my guerilla days in the Philippines. Radio contact with SWPA, lost 
since March 1943, was re-established! We again had hopes of receiving help from the 
outside world.”2413 When the batteries died after forty-eight hours, Sinay and Hernandez 
quickly rigged a connection to the camp generator. They then improvised a 75-watt set to 
replace the smaller radio brought by Ancheta.  
Volckmann contacted SWPA to ask for supplies and learned that an officer and 
fifteen men with 15 tons of supplies had recently landed at Bangui, Ilocos Norte, and 
were headed to his headquarters. Two weeks later USAFIP-NL scouts found the party led 
by Lieutenant Valera who had made a ‘blind landing’ prior to Volckmann having a radio. 
The sub’s skipper aborted the landing midway and departed when Japanese warships 
unexpectedly arrived on the scene.  
Arranging and receiving supplies from SWPA was a time-consuming process. In 
May, Lapham had met with Ball in Tayabas and received a radio. Between 17 and 28 
July, he had radioed back and forth with SWPA to coordinate his first delivery of 
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supplies by submarine. They debated possible landing spots and decided on Dibut Bay, 
five miles of steep hills and dense jungle from the Japanese garrison at Baler.2414 The 
PRS planned a mission for Parsons to resupply Lapham in July and approved the plan in 
early August. Lapham went to the rendezvous area seven weeks early to oversee the 
preparations of Lieutenant Aquino’s Squadron 103 as they built rafts for transferring 
supplies and rehearsed the signal plan for link up.2415   
On 12 August, the Narwahl under Lieutenant Commander Titus departed 
Fremantle on its thirteenth war patrol with forty-five passengers for Dibut Bay on the east 
coast of Luzon. 2416   On 29 August, the scheduled day of the rendezvous, Lapham 
guerrillas anxiously watched the bay. “All day we watched fruitlessly for our long-
awaited visitor,” he rcalled, “Then, early in the evening, the sub suddenly rose right out 
of the sea like a gigantic whale – between me and the shore! I was simultaneously thrilled 
and dumbfounded. The thing looked like a battleship.”2417 Chick Parsons and Private 
Courtney Whitney – the colonel’s son -- went ashore in a rubber raft.  While the 
submarine spent the next day off shore reconnoitering the bay, Parsons met with the 
guerrillas. At 1600 hours, skipper Titus spotted the guerrillas signal and returned to 
unload twenty-three passengers and ten tons of supplies “by the expedient handling and 
direction of Commander Parsons” who used guerrilla constructed bamboo rafts to ferry 
the gear.2418  
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They used ropes to guide the rafts to and from the sub while Lapham shared ham 
sandwiches and coffee with the captain in the boat’s mess. He remembered, “Days later I 
found that part of our cargo was a delicious new kind of army chow called K rations. I 
didn’t know that most GIs called their contents dog biscuits and other colorful, often 
vulgar, names. To me, after so many months of a guerrilla diet, even the Spam tasted like 
prime T-bone steak.” 2419  Lapham suddenly experienced a feeling common to other 
guerrillas resupplied by sub: “I still remember the thought struck me sharply: ‘What in 
the hell am I going to do with all this stuff?’”2420  Along with the supplies, SWPA sent 
Lieutenant Enrique Torres to assist Lapham in intelligence matters. Parsons returned 
ashore as Titus departed before midnight.   
At 1856 hours on 1 September, Narwhal arrived at the Magnac (reported as the 
Masanga) River farther south, recovered Parsons and Whitney, and unloaded another 
twenty men and ten tons of supplies. The sub also took aboard four evacuees: former tank 
sergeant Captain Rudolph O. Bolstad (LGAF), Captain Charles L. Naylor (LGAF), 
Private First Class Wilbur B. Jellison, and Lieutenant Wilbur J. Lage.2421 Another soldier, 
John M. Kerrey of the 228th Signal Operations Company, fell into the water and drowned.  
After a stop in Cateel Bay the next day to pick up one man and mail, Titus headed south, 
making Darwin on 10 September.  
On the Magnac River, Parsons delivered supplies to Anderson. West across Bicol, 
Major Richard Barros ran a station on Ragay Gulf with about sixty former Philippine 
Scouts working for Miranda. Anderson had promised to send him supplies from the next 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Section, available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/176290597/SS-167-Narwhal-Part1 accessed 29 July 
2016.  
2419 Ibid., 153. 
2420 Ibid. 
2421 Campbell.  
 
706 
submarine, and sent a courier instructing Barros to have Miranda send men north to 
Basiad Bay to receive arms and supplies. Twenty men led by Captain Leonardo Golpe 
and Lieutenant Eulogio Castañeda left Miranda’s area on 25 September and returned on 
13 October with 12 M-1 carbines, 3 submachine guns, 3 tommy guns, and assorted 
supplies a four metal boxes.2422  What Lapham had requested in May had arrived in 
guerrilla hands five months later. 
Anderson also sent Barros a radio, an unusual low-wattage set powered by a 
hand-cranked generator, for a coast watcher station to relay reports through Stahl.  Barros 
sent an operator to Stahl to coordinate codes and procedures. When several days later 
Stahl had not heard from Barros’ station, he decided to sail across the bay and find out 
what was wrong. “Naturally, I had an ulterior motive,” Stahl explained, “He had supplies 
– food, I should hope. Perhaps even cigarettes!”2423 
After a perilous sail across the bay, scaling a sheer cliff hundreds of yards high, 
and hiking a difficult jungle trail, Stahl and Eldred Sattem followed their guide Pablo 
Montalvo into Barros’ “Ohio Headquarters.” There they met American Ted Suttles, a 
former employee of the Camarines Norte mining company recently freed by guerrillas 
from the Japanese prison at Naga. Barros explained that his operators “might be good 
code clerks, but what’s the good of that if they can’t get the damned radio going?” 2424  
Radioman Stahl thought, “It wasn’t their fault. They hadn’t been schooled in proper 
operation of the type of equipment they were using. In fact, they had never even seen this 
type of equipment in their training, nor had I ever seen a radio like this before. This was 
not an unusual situation, for the Army sent a lot of equipment to us that might be 
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classified as junk – equipment long ago labeled unfit for combat use. Here was the 
perfect spot to dispose of these purchasing mistakes, for we were in no position to 
complain.”2425 From his experience with the bicycle powered “Dutch Set,” Stahl realized 
that both the transmitter and receiver would drift off frequency if the person cranking the 
generator did not maintain a steady pace. After a while they perfected the proper cranking 
rate to maintain contact with S3L.  
 Meanwhile on 29 August, Volckmann sent to SWPA a message with his new 
radio: “D-Day missions have been assigned within this command as follows: to destroy 
all enemy lines of communication; to harass, delay, and destroy all troop and supply 
movements; to destroy enemy supply dumps, truck parks, troop concentrations, and 
command posts: to prevent enemy from securing locally food supplies, construction 
materials, labor, means of transportation. Units of this command have been given detailed 
assignments and have assembled materials and trained men to accomplish above on 
orders from your HQ or lacking these on orders from this HQ. Request you inform the 
HQ of any changes desired. Volckmann.”2426 SWPA sent no reply to this message.  
Volckmann also relayed a request from Mrs. Osmeña’s for the USAFIP-NL to 
take her and her family into the mountains. He wanted President Osmeña to authorize 
such a move. The new President desired that his family stay in place. Volckmann 
informed the Philippine’s first lady that he would obey her husband’s orders, despite her 
vehement protests.  
From late August into September, guerrillas under John O’Day began a “reign of 
terror and atrocity” in Ilocos Norte in a desperate attempt to finally purge the area of a 
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“Japanese collaboration faction.”2427 Lapham recalled, “His main interest seemed to be 
pursuit of a vendetta with another group headed by CPT Fermin Bueno. The feud was 
resolved only when O’Day raided Bueno’s camp, captured Beuno and some of his men, 
and had them flogged.”2428 
By September, Volckmann had reorganized the USFIP-NL with three partially 
armed regiments of the 11th Division into a force totaling about 10,000 men. He was up 
and running with radio contact to SWPA and reporting all on traffic from 1st Military 
District in Northern Luzon. By now Volckmann carried on a robust program of 
intelligence gathering, sabotage, ambushes and training. Yet he remained frustrated by 
his inability to secure any supplies from directly from SWPA.  
Manila, D992/R-57 
By July, the direction of the war brought down Tojo’s cabinet. His replacement as 
Prime Minister, Kuniaki Koiso, was general of more than forty years service in the 
Imperial Japanese Army.  The Emperor also approved the appointment of retired admiral 
Mitsumasa Yonai as Minister of the Navy, who had been replaced as Prime Minister 
before the war for his perceived pro-American and pro-British views. The new Koiso-
Yonai cabinet entered office on 22 July with instructions from the Emperor “to carry on 
the war as effectively as possible and then at some point to prepare the groundwork for 
peace.”2429 Koiso believed the window for negotiation with the Americans had opened 
with the hard-fought battle of Guadalcanal and closed with Japan’s defeat at Saipan.  
Now he reasoned that their only hope for a negotiated settlement rested on the upcoming 
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battle for the Philippines: “If Japan won even one engagement in the battle, it could then 
prepare for a truce arrangement.”2430 They had to make the Americans pay such a high 
price for the Philippines that they would not want to continue the war any longer. 
The Japanese decided to make a fundamental change to their defensive plan for 
the Islands. “The Supreme Southern Army,” an officer later reported, “made clear its 
intention that the Philippines Operation would not be a defensive but a decisive 
operation.”2431 In other words, they were not out to further bleed the American forces 
marching toward Japan, but kill them. The Imperial Headquarters convened a planning 
conference. “Since an attack was imminent,” planners recalled, “the Army immediately 
decided to launch the attack before the enemy forces attempt a landing on any part of the 
Philippines.” 2432  The Supreme Southern Army labeled the offensive plan for the 
Philippine Campaign the Sho Ichigo (one opportunity). In mid-August, the Army began 
necessary preparations, but the time available proved too short.2433 
Shortages severely challenged the Japanese. By the end of August, less than one 
third of the weapons, ammunition, supplies and vehicles promised from Japan had arrived 
in the Philippines.2434  Troops rescued at sea (Kaibotsu Butai) and recuperating in Manila 
hospitals were pressed into the line after a short training period and with captured 
weapons – “but after August, even these weapons were no longer obtainable.”2435  
A malaria epidemic broke out in Manila. At Fort Santiago prison, a guard named 
Fukuomoto explained to Adalia Marquez that the epidemic was brought to the capital by 
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people who had come down from the mountains. “From this,” Adalai recalled, “I 
gathered that there were many guerrillas who had surrendered as a result of the 
pacification campaign conducted by the Japanese-run Department of Justice. The 
guerrillas had been promised immunity from arrest if they surrendered, according to 
Fukuomoto, and it was planned to integrate them in the Philippine Constabulary under 
the Japanese.”2436 Coincidentally, towards the end of August, Adalai and her children 
were released from Fort Santiago.  Others were less fortunate. 
U.S. Army Master Sergeant Richard Sakakida later testified that on about 25 
August, while he was a prisoner of war in Manila, he was called to witness the executions 
of between 18 and 40 people who had been tried on charges of being involved with 
guerrilla activities.2437 He distinctly recalled one of those summarily beheaded was an 
elderly woman named Mrs. Blanche W. Jurika – Parsons’ mother-in-law. Her remains 
were among the many interred in the Chinese Cemetery north of the capitol. Only after 
the war did Parsons learn of her fate. 
Outside the capital on 6 September 2,000 Huks and 250 Hua Zhi assaulted the 
Japanese base on Mount Arayat. The Hua Zhi created two new squadrons, the Cantonese 
(Second Squadron) and Fukien (Third Squadron) of about 100 men each. It also 
recognized the Manila Squadron under Li Biaofu that coordinated with the Philippine 
Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League. In October, the Hua Zhi would form a 
squadron in Tikman, Camarines Sur, with only twenty-six men with two pistols, in time 
to meet the American invasion and more secure arms and supplies. 
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Rumors from the jungle telegraph circulated Manila. U.S. airplanes reportedly 
bombed the Islands. Indeed, night air attacks – reportedly B-24s – began against Davao in 
August, with the heaviest raid on 8 September.2438 On 10 September naval telegrams to 
the Fourteenth Army in Manila reported U.S. forces landing near Davao, but the report 
proved false.  
 
Mindanao, D1,007/R-44 
In August, Fertig had complained: “The food situation is extremely critical. If we 
are not run out of here, we have enough fuel for 80 days. There is only food for 10 days. 
Our only chance of survival will be for the Nips not to press us too hard. Again our future 
is in God’s hands. We have done all we can.” 2439  To make matters worse, in early 
September the Japanese began moving troops around Mindanao. 2440  They now had 
25,000 troops in Surigao and 80,000 people in Davao, and they confiscated all the food 
they could find.  “Food is a terrific problem,” Fertig emphasized, “as this area is on the 
verge of starvation.” 2441 
The Japanese were consolidating their positions in Mindanao. Troops from 
Surigao journeyed through Agusan and Oriental Misamis to Cagayan before occupying a 
defensive area in South Bukidon. Another 5,000 Japanese soldiers, followed by women 
and children, marched from Naspit to Cagayan, despite harassment from Fertig’s 110th 
Infantry Regiment. The effort left only a 550-man garrison at Hinataun on eastern 
Mindanao, 700 in Surigao on the northern most tip of the island, and possibly 2,000 in 
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Agusan on the north coast. Then the Japanese completed a withdrawal across the Agusan 
River by mid-month. Troops in Davao withdrew leaving the city’s penal colony to the 
guerrillas.2442  Fertig noted, “Japs have left the whole river and are believed to be about 
ready to leave Butuan. Many troops withdrawn from Surigao. East clear from Lianga to 
Manag. Only 200 troops at Tandag. 32 ships caught on 9 Sept. in Lianga and Hinatuan 
Bays, and everyone sunk. We are getting troops there but should be plenty of Salvage. It 
is believed this convoy had just completed loading most of Lianga garrison when our task 
force caught them.”2443 The remaining Japanese forces at Camp Keithley would secretly 
depart one night in early October, link up with the battalion at Iligan, and moved to 
Davao. They would evacuate Damaslan and Iligon on 11 October and concentrate 35,000 
troops “between Digos, Pikit, and Velncia. Troops from Sambo arriving Davao by fast 
launch.” 2444   
Reviewing the war situation on 9 September, Fertig felt optimistic. “After nearly 
two weary years of battle,” he concluded, “the tide has turned. It should run to flood 
without serious opposition. I wanted to be home when the Aspens turn but impossible. 
Maybe by Christmas.”2445 U.S. carriers had just begun two days of bombing attacks on 
Davao, Surigao, Cagayan, Bukidon.  On 13 and 14 September, they hit Cebu, Leyte, 
Panay, and Negros. On 20 and 21 September, they hit Legaspi. Fertig wrote, “Box score 
thru 20 Sept. is 701 planes destroyed 176 ships sunk or damaged. Jap airforce practically 
driven from Mindanao, Davao, Sarangani Bay and Zambo hit almost daily.”2446 The day 
of redemption seemed at hand. After the war Japanese generals would admit, “When the 
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enemy task force raided the central and northern parts of the Philippines from 13 to 16 
September, our air corps and a part of the land units suffered severely.”2447  
On 14 September, Narwhal again departed Australia on its fourteenth war patrol 
with forty-one passengers. After a mission in the Netherlands Indies, the submarine 
rendezvoused with guerrillas off Balingasag, Mindanao, on 27 September.  Despite heavy 
rains the crew delivered three men and 20 tons of supplies and picked up guerrilla 
Captain Chandler Thomas who was to arrange the pickup of four stretcher-bound 
guerrillas down the coast.2448 Two days later Skipper Titus found Thomas’ requested 
landing site in Siari Bay a poor one due to currents, shoals and exposure to enemy eyes 
but he still sent out two rubber boats captained by reliable petty officers to retrieve the 
four wounded men. To Titus’s surprise, eighty-two evacuees came out to board the 
Narwhal. Eighty were former POWs the Japanese had sent north from the Davao prison 
camp when the submarine SS-263 Paddle torpedoed their transport Shinyo Maru and 
enabled their escape.2449 Indeed, only four of the men were litter cases.  
                                                        
2447 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 21. 
2448 Office of Naval Records and History, Ships’ Histories Section, Navy Department, “History of USS 
Narwhal (SS 167),” 14. Microfilm Reel Job No, H108, AR-229-76, Naval District Washington Microfilm 
Section, available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/176290597/SS-167-Narwhal-Part1 accessed 29 July 
2016.  
2449 Campbell identified the 82 men: Sailors S2C Charles V. Claybourn, TM2C Arthur D. Waters; Marines 
CPL Onnie E. Clem , Jr., PFC Verle D. Cutter; Army airmen CPL Ray E. Billick, PFC Hayes H. Bolitho, 
PFC Paul L. Browning, 2LT Eugene P. Dale, 1LT Harvey T. Denson, PFC Jack M. Donohoe, CPL William 
T. Frederick, Jr., PVT Walter “Chick” Gardner, Jr., 1LT John P. Gillespie, TSGT Donald F. Gillin, SGT 
Peter J. Golino, PVT Donald J. Granz, SGT James R. Greene, PFC Issac B. Hagins, PVT Francis Hoctor, 
PFC Roy J. Hughes, 2LT Ralph R. Johnson, SGT Robert J. Kirker, PVT Lyle G. Knudson, CPL Bill J. 
Lorton, PFC Victor L. Mapes, SSGT Cecil H. McClure, SGT Donald I. McPherson, PVT Cletis O. 
Overton, CPL Ralph H. Person, PFC Otis E. Radcliff, MSG George R. Robinett, 2LT Roy D. Russell, 1LT 
Bert “Ben” Schwarz, 2LT Murray M. Sneddon, CPT Charles A. Steinhauser; Army medical corps PFC 
Jesse Bier, CPL Calvin E. Latham, CPL Marcus N. Simkins; Army Signal Corps SGT Willard L. Haskell, 
Jr., 2LT Paul S. Snowden; Army infantry 1LT William P. Cain, 1LT Richard L. Cook, 1LT  James D. 
Donlon, Jr., PVT Willard E. Hall, PVT Glen E. Kuskie, PFC Joseph P. Lamkin, SGT James F. McComas, 
1LT Reverand John J. Morrett, 2LT John C. Playter, 2LT Harry J. Skinner, CPL John Stymelski, 2LT 
Edward S. Tresniewski, 2LT James K. Vann; Army ordnance PVT Walter N. Alexander, PVT John R. 
Bennett, PFC William E. Biddle, CPT Robert B. Blakeslee, PVT Lawrence P. Ingley, PFC Joseph H. Jones, 
PFC Omar A. Schoenborne; Army engineer PVT Marco A. Caputo, MAJ William C. Chenoweth, 1LT 
 
714 
  In his diary Fertig explained that the Japanese had loaded 750 American POWs 
on two small ships in Davao on 21 August before transferring them to the large ship.  On 
7 September, the U.S. submarine torpedoed the unmarked vessel but some POWs 
survived. “They were machine gunned by planes and from a launch launched by enemy,” 
he wrote, “83 including 26 officers finally reached shore. Fred Gallager, Harry Fisher, 
and Chenowyth were among the survivors.”2450 Guerrillas led these survivors to Siari for 
submarine extraction to SWPA.  
Leaving the area, Narwhal lost power on her rear planes and was stuck in diving 
posture to 170 feet before emergency procedures brought her to the surface just as a 
Japanese aircraft flew overhead. The boat survived the scare and made it to Mios 
Woendi, Dutch New Guinea on 5 October.  SWPA supply deliveries lifted the guerrilla’s 
spirits. The Narwhal had delivered 35 men and 35 tons of supplies near Kiamba and three 
men and 20 tons at Balingasag. 2451  
The results of photographic reconnaissance of “King Two,” Halsey’s carrier air 
raids of the Philippines in September, convinced the admiral that Japanese defenses in the 
central islands were weak.2452 The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur “to occupy 
Leyte, by-passing Mindanao, with Nimitz’s forces, having taken Palau, joining in the 
attack.”2453  Of course, when they had met in July at Pearl Harbor and the President 
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asked, “Douglas, where do we go from here?,”  MacArthur had replied, “Leyte, Mr. 
President, then Luzon!”2454 
 
Panay, D1,029/R-20 
On Panay, Peralta reorganized his robust force into six Combat Teams. The 1st 
Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Cirilo B. Garcia occupied northwest Panay with 
its headquarters in Libertad, Antique, and counted 132 officers and 2,166 enlisted men 
with 2,000 arms.  G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran became the commander of the 2nd 
Combat Team and Major Frederico Salacedo replaced him as District Intelligence 
Officer. The 2nd Combat Team held San Dionisio, Iloilo, with its headquarters at 
Amayong, and had 148 officers and 2,035 men.  Major P.B. Osman commanded 3rd 
Combat Team in west-central Iloilo Province with 73 officers and 1,340 men with 814 
arms. The 63rd Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Julian C. Chaves had a force of 
190 officers and 3,258 men with 1,400 arms in southern Iloilo Province headquartered at 
Mount Tigatay. Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Relunia ran the 64th Combat Team in east 
central Iloilo and Capiz Province and commanded 282 officers and 4,055 enlisted men. 
The 65th Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Braulio F. Villasis had a roster of 139 
officers, 2,075 men and 1,000 arms in southern Antique Province and Palawan with its 
headquarters at Lanaon, Antique. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel V.W. Grasparil led the 66th 
Combat Team in northern and western Capiz Province with 192 officers and 3,321 men 
and 800 arms. 
Peralta sought to flood targets ranging from Japanese installations to city street 
corners with agents recruited from within the puppet governments. By April, he had 
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intelligence contacts in Northern Luzon (Cagayan, Ilocos, Isabela, Nueva Ecija, N. 
Taybayas, Neuva Vizcya), Manila, Bataan, Corregidor, Cavite, and Southern Luzon 
(Laguna, S. Taybayas, Camarines Sur, Albay, Sorgoson, Camarines Norte).2455  “The 
object,” the PRS noted, “has been to introduce an element of competition between agents 
and to cross check information received.”2456 Often this competition spilled into friction 
with local free government officials. As SWPA observed, “Shifting support, failure to 
thoroughly examine the facts in disputes and the resultant hasty decisions, often cited by 
junior and inexperienced officers, have aggravated the local political situation on those 
islands.”2457   
Peralta reported spending P100,000 each month to maintain this intelligence 
network, P25,000 in Panay Emergency Currency and the rest in Japanese Military 
Currency. P10,000 of this went to Lapus, Merrit, Zabat and Miranda. He extended his 
influence into Luzon by sending out radios and agents to supplement his extensive 
network of couriers making weekly runs between Panay and Bohol, Samar-Leyte, 
southern Luzon, the intermediate islands and Masbate.  
By October Peralta reported having as 22,600 guerrillas, including Masbate, with 
8,000 arms of various types and about 160 rounds of ammo per weapon. Between mid-
1942 and October 1944 SWPA delivered 350 tons of supplies to Panay including 
“carbines, assorted machine guns, tommy guns, a few mortars, etc.”2458 Leadership below 
the top levels was weak, however, and failed to instill discipline. Agents reported: “There 
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are indications of rebellion against Peralta’s authority on Masbate.” 2459   Peralta’s 
subordinate commander Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurado had Masbate’s radio working 
by September and served as an able but contentious agent to Luzon and other islands. 
Guerrillas in east central Mindoro killed Jurado on 14 October. Still, with morale kept up 
by success in the field and support from SWPA, Peralta’s men kept the Japanese confined 
to garrisons at San Jose (Antique), Santa Barbara, Iloilo City and Capiz town, 
 
Manila, D1,005/R-46 
Japanese reinforcements began arriving: the 1st Division from September through 
November, the 68th Brigade and the Manila Defense Command from October through 
December, and the 10th, 23rd, and 19th Division (minus) in November and December.  The 
8th Division had begun arriving in early September and moved to Los Banos. The 2nd 
Tank Division reached Manila and Northern San Fernando then sent its main body to the 
area from Cabanatuan to San Miguel, and the rest to eastern Lingayen Bay. It had lost 
one infantry battalion, three tank companies, three artillery battalions and three engineer 
companies to the U.S. Navy during transit to the Philippines. 2460 The 61st IMB arrived in 
Luzon in late September and sent to the islands in the Babuyan Channel.  
The combination of guerrilla and U.S. Navy attacks virtually ended Japanese 
exploitation of Philippine resources. The Ishihara Sangyo Company reduced operations at 
the Larap mine to minimal production of ore for local pig iron foundries due to a lack of 
transport and omnipresent guerrillas. 2461  The entire mine would shut down on 18 
December. On 7 September, Leon Guinto, wartime mayor of Manila, had announced: 
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“No hostile acts against the Republic and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy will be 
tolerated. I weigh my words when I solemnly declare that the consequences of such 
hostile acts will be fatal!”2462 Yet that month the Japanese abandoned the shipping lines 
from Davao to Halmahera and Manila to Saigon. By November, they dropped the lines 
from Miri to Manila, from Singapore and Soerabaja to Balikpapan and from Manila to 
Ormoc and Davao.2463 The U.S. Navy’s success at sea made guerrilla attacks on mines 
irrelevant.  
In and around the capital Ramsey now claimed 45,000 members (7,000 armed) in 
the ECLGA. His expansion brought him into increased combat with the Hukbalahaps. 
With his radio and operator, he established reliable communication to SWPA through 
stations on Mindanao, Samar and Negros. The guerrilla 4th Ordnance Detachment under 
Pedro Villaluz operating in Zambales, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija also worked 
with Ramsey.  
Ramsey boasted of greater unity with local civilians but found it stressed his 
limited food supplies. This problem plagued all guerrillas. Rice production in the 
Philippines during the war had fallen by seventy-three percent.2464  In the latter half of 
1944, Japanese commanders waged a deliberate campaign to confiscate all available food 
stocks on Luzon to deny rations to the guerrillas and their allies. Meanwhile, as Abaya 
reported, “Many landlords amassed fortunes selling rice to our Jap guests at fantastic 
prices…the poor went hungry… Rice at two thousand pesos a cavan and still shooting 
up!”2465  Ramsey noted, “Through October and November we began eating monkey, 
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birds, and the indigenous kamoting kahoy, a pasty wild tuber. We were all losing weight, 
and by mid-November I was dangerously thin and debilitated.” 2466  
Meanwhile, having lost their carriers and naval aircraft, the Japanese assembled 
most of their remaining air force in the Philippines. They also concentrated naval vessels 
from Singapore and the Inland Sea into the Islands’ waters. They hoped desperate naval 
sorties under a land-based air umbrella would destroy any invading American fleet. 
Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group General Viscount Hisaichi 
Terauchi prioritized the defense of Luzon and brought in General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 
the conqueror of Malaya, from exile in Manchuria to command of the Fourteenth Area 
Army. The Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, however, overruled Terauchi and ordered 
preparations to fight a decisive battle on Leyte, not Luzon. 2467 
Yamashita had a reputation as a highly effective commander who “inspired strong 
loyalty and affection in his men” by sharing their sufferings.2468 Though deeply involved 
in the ‘February 26 Incident’ in 1936, his career survived. He now organized his 262,000-
man army into three main groups: the Shobu Group under his command in north Luzon; 
the 80,000-man Shimbu Group under Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama around 
Manila, and the 30,000-man Kembu Group under Major General Rikichi Tsukada near 
Bataan. The groups were to execute delaying actions against the invaders and withdraw 
into inland strongholds. At the right moment, Yamashita decided, he would declare 
Manila an open city.2469  
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 The Japanese kept up counterguerrilla operations.  On 11 October, Yamashita 
ordered the “subjugation” of “armed guerrillas.”2470 Ramsey learned that they captured 
and beheaded Charles Putnam. After seven months of torture, Pat Gaston was executed in 
Fort Santiago, accused of attempting to free prisoners.  
Ramsey had his own unexpected brush with death when he suffered appendicitis. 
His guerrillas used their rifles to bring him Dr. Teng Campa to conduct an operation. 
Campa secured a spinal anesthetic on the black market, but it proved to be a vial filled 
only with water and did  
nothing to curb the pain.2471 Ramsey sedated himself with copious draws of Tanduay 
rum. After five days of moving in and out of delirium and comas, he heard Campa tell 
him, “Your hospital is a joke. You need a surgeon.”2472 Campa volunteered to remain 
with Ramsey for the remainder of the war. 
Other native medical professionals came out to join the newly formed guerrilla 
bands.  Dr. Biason and his wife Daisy remained with Volckmann to run the medical 
station at the mine in Itogon and the facility at Uding.2473 Elsewhere Blas Miranda on 
Leyte managed to keep his prewar division and regimental surgeons and boasted of “one 
of the best hospitals ever built in the Visayas by any guerrilla organization.”2474  
 Not all medical professionals volunteered, however. Asked where he got his 
doctors and nurses Blackburn responded, “They came in like the others, but we also went 
out and kidnapped them because they were afraid to come and join the guerrillas. We 
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would go into town, pick up the doctor and his whole family, and move them into the 
jungle. After they were out there for a while, we usually dropped the word that they had 
joined the guerrillas, and so, they weren’t about to go anywhere else.”2475 By such a 
means Blackburn ‘found’ excellent physicians Jacob Pena and Juan Asuncion and 
surgeon Gonzalo Cabaliqunito.2476 
 Whatever the method of recruitment, guerrillas like Volckmann organized 
relatively robust medical support.2477 He even trained his Women’s Auxiliary Service 
(WAS) in first aid to supplement hospital personnel. In central Luzon, Marking formed a 
loose detachment of civilian physicians, Philippine Army medics, and a few nurses to 
form a hospital near the Pasig River.2478 
Medical supplies however remained hard to acquire. The Japanese controlled 
sources in Manila. Volckmann remembered, “Anyone who suddenly purchased a large 
quantity of medical supplies in Manila would soon find himself before the Kempeitai, the 
Japanese military police. Unless a watertight explanation could be given he would land in 
Fort Santiago prison never to be heard from again.”2479  A trusted merchant in Kiangnan 
put the USAFIP-NL in touch with a man named Lanag who ran the local dispensary and 
became a reliable source for medical supplies, at considerable personal risk.2480  Other 
guerrilla organizations tried to develop similar sources.  A female agent in Manila posing 
as a relief worker procured “from all possible sources, including hospitals, all the 
supplies she could lay her hands on. Messenger agents would contact her from time to 
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time and smuggle the supplies through the many Japanese inspection posts back to North 
Luzon.”2481 Women like Peggy Utinsky, Naomi Flores, and Maria Martinez routinely 
risked their lives to support guerrillas while working as nurses in Manila.2482 A good deal 
of guerrilla effort became invested in developing, maintaining and – when needed – 
evacuating these medical supply sources. 
The black market was an available but highly unreliable source of medical 
logistics, as Dr. Campa’s experience demonstrated. When all else failed guerrillas 
frequently ordered supplies taken from local civilians, usually with an “honest effort” to 
pay or provide receipts for later reimbursement “at a fair and just rate to be determined 
after the cessation of hostilities.”2483  Finally, when very desperate, the guerrillas targeted 
Japanese installations in raids specifically designed to capture medical provisions.2484 
Supplies by submarine, however, were increasing. In the first six month of its 
submarine operations, the AIB and PRS directed eight submarine missions to the 
Philippines; in the six-month preceding MacArthur’s return they conducted thirty 
successful landings. On 19 September, the SS-225 Cero under Lieutenant Commander 
Edward F. Dissette sailed from Darwin on its sixth war patrol with orders to patrol off 
Mindanao.2485 On 27 October Dissette forced the Japanese gunboat Kyeoi Maru No. 3 to 
run aground on Luzon. On 3 November Cero landed sixteen men under Vanderpool and 
17 tons of supplies on the coast of Luzon before heading off to Pearl Harbor. In addition, 
SWPA aircraft began to reach the Islands. 
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Volckmann thought he had finally arranged for a direct delivery of supplies from 
SWPA for 19 October. The submarine he expected to deliver supplies at Darigayos, north 
of San Fernando, La Union, failed to appear. SWPA sent supplies to other guerrillas on 
Luzon: on 23 October the SS168 Nautilus dropped off 12 men and twenty tons of 
supplies at the Massanga River, followed by another twenty tons of supplies at Dibut Bay 
the next day. Meanwhile Volkmann’s guerrillas built a 4,000-foot airstrip at Tuao where 
aircraft landed to coordinate and drop off supplies.2486 General Jarred V Crabb of 5th 
Bomber Command sent generators and equipment for the airfield. U.S. aircraft flying 
photographic missions over the island provided gridded photos to the guerrillas. 
Blackburn maintained a photo mosaic of his area to pass detailed locations of targets to 
SWPA.2487 “I also had the best orchestra in the area,” said Blackburn, “and the men liked 
the girls in this safe area.”2488 Many pilots would land and remain overnight. 
On 21 September, from the window of her school at Saint Rita College, young 
Isabela Yomul, watched formations of airplanes approach Manila. “Then the air-raid 
siren started to blare out loudly,” she recalled, “and I see small white puffs of smoke in 
the sky. The two bodied airplanes move so fast none of the white puffs is hitting them.” 
2489 The planes were twin-boomed P-38 Lightings of the U.S Army Air Corps and they 
introduced a very different American military to the Philippines. Robin Prising 
remembered watching from a rooftop in Santo Tomas prison: “Out of the massy surge of 
clouds, the American bombers came, tier upon tier of them, flying high, flying low, and 
earth shaking armada of aeroplanes, glistening silver-white in the sun as they rode the 
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air… As we began to count them, black bombs dropped from their bellies, smashing the 
harbor and airfields of Manila.” 2490  
The last American fighter that flew over the Islands, the P-40B Warhawk, could 
muster about 340 miles per hour and fly up to 31,000 feet, comparable to the Japanese 
Zero which could fly up to 346 miles per hour and up to 35,000 feet high.2491  The Zero 
was far more maneuverable which gave it a great edge in a dogfight. While the Japanese 
had made few improvements to the Zero, the new P-38L Lighting fighters appearing over 
Manila could fly 414 miles per hour and up to 40,000 feet.2492 The P-38s heralded the 
arrival of new American quantitative and qualitative advantages in bombers, aircraft 
carriers, naval gunnery, landing craft, submarines, artillery, and most other weapons and 
supply systems that shocked the Japanese and guerrillas alike. 
“Manila and Clark were heavily bombed by powerful carrier-based planes from 
21 September to 4 October,” the Japanese reported, “Our air bases and the ships which 
were in Manila Bay were heavily damaged.” 2493  Based on guerrillas’ battle damage 
assessments, SWPA would note the raids on September 21 and 22 were “especially 
gratifying” causing 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese casualties, hitting ninety percent of Japanese 
military installations, sinking some forty to sixty ships, mostly inter-island vessels, in 
Manila harbor.2494 Outside Manila, Marking related to his men how he was moved by the 
display of American airpower. One of his deputies replied, “Today is not the wonder of 
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it. The wonder, Marking, is how you pulled through last year. The wonder is how you 
kept on fighting.”2495 
Also on 21 September, the submarine SS-197 Seawolf put to sea under Lieutenant 
Commander Alfred Marion Bontier from Brisbane on its fifteenth war patrol to deliver 
personnel and supplies to the east coast of Samar.2496 A prewar sub, Seawolf won 13 
battle stars during the war. The boat reached Manus on 29 September and exchanged 
radar signals with Narwhal on 3 October before disappearing forever with all hands – 
possibly sunk by friendly fire. 
Two days after Seawolf departed Australia, the submarine SS-271 Ray under 
Lieutenant Commander William T. Kinsella departed Fremantle on its sixth war patrol 
for the South China Sea.2497 On 12 October, Kinsella sank the Japanese troop transport 
Toko Maru No. 7 near Cape Cavalite, Mindoro. He then torpedoed and sank the Japanese 
tanker Horai Maru No. 7 of the Mindoro west coast on 1 November. That same day the 
Ray landed three men and two tons of supplies at Mamburao, Mindoro.  The boat would 
be involved in the sinking of another transport ship, Kagu Maru, and a corvette Kaibokan 
7, before arriving at Pearl Harbor on 8 December.  
On 27 September, Laurel finally announced a declaration of war against United 
States and Great Britain with the unanimous consent of his cabinet and Council of State. 
He also let loose the Ganaps and the Makapili on the resistance. “In San Pedro, Laguna, 
the price for each guerrilla caught and executed was one sack of rice,” Abaya noted, “In 
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Santa Cruz, Makapilis demanded passes for meat and other foodstuffs. No salary was 
provided for these ‘patriotic’ soldiers. Hence an open incentive for looting.”2498 
The Makapili and other informers would find little reward for their collaboration. 
Adalia Marquez observed their positions. “No matter how faithfully they worked for the 
Japanese, when they outlived their usefulness they were done away with.”2499  She noted 
the case of a boy named Hilario who stole a briefcase that turned out to belong to a 
Japanese general who was on his way to brief General Yamashita. Captain Eda of the 
Japanese Military Police rounded up sixty-four people. “They were condemned not for 
participation, not for guilt by association, but by accident of location,” Adalia explained, 
“Even those informers who had helped the Japs get their men were still behind bars. It 
was common to hear, ‘What is the use? Be on the Japs side, they imprison you. Go 
against them, they do the same. Might as well be against them!’”2500 
New skipper Lieutenant Commander George H. Laird, Jr., steered SS-322 
Blackfin submarine out of under Pearl Harbor on its first war patrol on 30 September. 2501  
On 1 November Blackfin torpedoed and sank both the troop transport Unkai Maru No. 12 
and the auxiliary vessel Caroline Maru of the west coast of Mindoro.  On 18 November, 
Laird recovered documents and equipment from the guerrillas on the Camurong River in 
Mindoro. 
 
Northern Luzon, D1,018/R-31 
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In Baguio, a “hula hula dancer” at the Pines Hotel named Judy Geronimo went to 
see Eugenio Lopez and handed him a letter from local guerrillas. Lopez recognized 
Geronimo as a hostess who was “very close friends of the Japanese military police.”2502 
He declined the letter. After the war Geronimo testified that Lopez said the letter “would 
first have to be cleared by the Kempeitai.”2503 Two weeks later, the Kempei tai arrested 
Geronimo and sent her to be tortured and interrogated. She recalled: “I was taken to 
Bining, Mountain Province on 16 October, by three Japanese soldiers, where I was shot 
and buried. The Japanese then left, and some Igorots took me to the hills and took care of 
me.”2504  
In April 1945 Geronimo would lodge treason charges against Eugenio Lopez with 
the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps. Throughout the war, his brother Fernando had 
maintained his string of casinos in Iliolo City under Japanese protection and he published 
the pro-Japanese daily paper Panay Sho-Ho in Iliolo.  “Like most of the provincial 
political elite,” wrote Alfred McCoy, “who cultivated allies on both sides of the battle 
lines, the Lopez faction had maintained contact with pro-American guerrillas through 
USAFFE intelligence officers, among them Captain Patricio Miguel, a prewar Lopez 
supporter in the city police, and Captain Alfredo Gestoso, who helped Fernando escape 
from the city at the war’s end and later protected him from collaboration charges.”2505 
Despite the strong appearance of collaboration, elites like the Lopez brothers knew how 
to elude punishment.  
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General Tomoyuki Yamashita arrived on 6 October as the new Commander in 
Chief of the Fourteenth Army Area. The ‘Tiger of Malaya’ conquered supposedly 
impregnable Singapore in seventy days, the greatest disaster in the history of the British 
Army. “The Japanese subordinate military authorities in the Philippines had complained 
to Imperial General Headquarters against General Kuroda’s complacency and fondness 
for good living,” Agoncillo wrote, “Hence Yamashita’s appointment to the Philippine 
post.”2506 Yamashita had spent most of the war in semi-exile in Manchukuo and China 
but now was considered the right man to defend the Philippines. He had a lot to do 
without knowing just how little time he had to do it. 
On his arrival in Manila, Yamashita declared: “Those who stand against the 
Japanese Army must be regarded as their enemies. In the Philippines today, the war has 
come to the situation of kill or be killed. No matter who the person is, a Filipino or not, if 
we hesitate we ourselves will be killed.” 2507  In the previous weeks, newly arrived 
Fourteenth Army staff officers proposed a plan to assassinate President Laurel and asked 
Benigno Ramos and General Ricarte for their support. Other Japanese officers brought 
into the plot reacted with alarm and older hands on the army staff stopped it. 2508 
Ambassador Shozo Murata, President Laurel’s personal interpreter Masakatsu 
Hamamoto, and Colonel Utsunomiya maintained support for Laurel and fought the new 
hard liners and their attempts to destroy the Filipino elite.2509 
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The day after his arrival Yamashita assumed command and the next day convened 
a meeting of his division commanders “where he elucidated the important elements of the 
operational plan. He also emphasized the traditional battle spirit and affirmed that the 
land units must fight the battle on Luzon with the utmost effort.” 2510  Yamashita 
anticipated a decisive battle on Luzon, prioritizing the defense of the naval bases and 
airfields. To do so he would have to address the guerrilla threat. He confessed to his chief 
of general affairs, Utsunomiya, “I had no idea how bad the peace and order situation is in 
the Philippines.”2511 He blamed the staff and called Utsunomiya a ‘lazy official’ (dara-
kan), accused him and Chief of Staff Major General Takaji Wachi of spoiling the 
Philippine elites, and pointedly asked Ambassador Murata, “How could you have spent 
nearly three years here and let this happen?”2512 
To correct the situation Yamashita decided to take a risk and approved an idea 
advocated by Inzuzuka and Kageyama to arm Filipinos loyal to the Japanese. 
Collaborators like Ramos, Ricarte, and Pio Duran of the Makapili had of course long 
advocated such a measure. Since at least July they had been coordinating with the 
Kempeitai, Mainichi newspaper reporters in meetings at the New Philippines Cultural 
Institute recently moved to Manila.2513 The Fourteenth Area Army Headquarters formed 
an eighty-one-man Special Construction Unit (Tokubetsu Kosaku Tai) under Major 
Sato.2514 The unit was to organize, recruit and train a volunteer Filipino army to fight 
alongside the Japanese against guerrillas and any U.S. forces that might invade the 
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Islands. As a secondary mission, the volunteer forces were to support propaganda 
operations to sway the Filipino population to resist an American invasion.  
The Japanese also pressed the Laurel government for more manpower. The 
Philippine administration issued a report detailing reasons why Filipinos did not – and 
would not – answer calls from the Japanese military and businesses.2515 The primary 
reasons were: language barriers, poor wages, hard working conditions, forced relocations, 
separations from family, and the need to stay at home to fend off starvation. Many of 
these causes sprung from the action of the guerrillas. The Laurel report explained: “The 
anti-Japanese guerrilla efforts to prevent people from applying for work in Japanese 
projects, which this report does not mention, must have contributed to the difficulties in 
procuring labor encountered by military-commissioned mineral resource development 
projects.”2516 
The Japanese prepared to defend Luzon by rounding up anyone thought to be 
associated with the guerrillas. Adalia Marquez was one of those suspects. On 6 October 
one of her former guards, Kawata, secretly warned her to leave Manila quickly for she 
was about to be arrested again by order of Kempeitai Chief Colonel Nagahama and sent 
back to Fort Santiago. This time she would not return.2517  Adalia hurriedly gathered her 
children and headed to her extended family in Bucawe. 
 
Hollandia, D1,032/R-17 
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Parsons reported to the Sixth U.S. Army commander Lieutenant General Walter 
Krueger’s headquarters in Hollandia for a briefing.2518 Krueger informed Parsons that 
Sixth Army would invade Leyte on or about 20 October. Like almost everyone else, 
Parsons had assumed MacArthur would strike Mindanao first. SWPA instead decided to 
have Fertig harass the Japanese on Mindanao while Charlie Smith assisted diversionary 
landings on Samar.2519 Only in the last days of September had the Samar guerrillas, 
“acknowledging Smith’s integrity and ability,” met to nominate the American colonel for 
command of the Samar area.2520  On 4 October, SPWA endorsed the appointment. Smith 
reported having approximately 8,500 men (two-thirds with prewar training) but without 
trained officers. 
Krueger further informed Parsons that MacArthur and President Osmeña wanted 
to avoid collateral damage to the Philippine civilians. They wanted to evacuate villages 
near the invasion beaches but feared such a move might tip off the Japanese. They finally 
decided to have one trusted agent infiltrate the area prior to the attack and devise some 
way to move the locals without alerting the Japanese to the pending attack. That trusted 
agent had to be Chick Parsons.  
MacArthur would also need Kangleon’s help on Leyte and Samar. He promoted 
Kangleon to colonel on 1 October but the area’s guerrillas remained fractious. On Samar, 
Pedro Merritt’s group became the 93rd Division (322 officers and 1,408 men in four 
regiments), but he still refused to work under Kangleon. Reportedly, Merritt’s men 
violently intimidated and exploited the local people and government. Because of this 
Major Manuel Valley refused to join Merritt and added his 1,200 men on Samar to 
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Kangleon’s ranks. Colonel Juan Causing, the former commander USAFFE Leyte 
Provisional Regiment, also gave his guerrillas on Leyte to Kangleon, became his chief of 
staff, and went to Samar and in fact recruited Valley for Kangleon. Captain Luciano Abia 
joined constabulary troops to Valley. 
 Parsons knew he had to get to Kangleon’s headquarters which he believed to be 
somewhere near the Leyte capital of Tacloban. A submarine insertion, however, would 
take too long to arrange and execute and would likely draw too much attention. He would 
have to go in by air. With MacArthur’s authority, Parsons went to see Seventh Fleet 
commander Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid who reluctantly offered him a PBY 
Catalina Black Cat flying boat specially equipped for night operations. He then went to 
see the fleet commander of aircraft, Rear Admiral Frank D. Wagner, to schedule the 
aircraft and a special crew for a “destination to be designated by the above-named 
Parsons.”2521 Parsons returned to Hollandia for final coordination with MacArthur’s chief 
of staff, General Richard K. Sutherland, who informed him that Army intelligence had 
sent Lieutenant Colonel Frank Rawolle to accompany him on the mission. The Army was 
not going to rely on a naval officer to send the information they required.  
As his advance elements neared the Philippines, MacArthur ordered all guerrillas 
to concentrate on acquiring “reliable - specific information on enemy defensive position 
with later commitments as required to harassing actions to the extent of existing 
capabilities.”2522 SWPA’s staff got involved in using the guerrilla radio nets to prepare 
for the invasion. “As a result,” Ramsey recalled, “his demands on us for intelligence 
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became more insistent and pointed.”2523 Lapham recalled how MacArthur sent several 
messages with “specific instructions to survey the whole area we controlled, make every 
possible advance preparation for combat, and plan in detail an extensive program of 
sabotage to be put into effect when orders came from Australia.”2524 SWPA planners 
thought the guerrillas provided “a good picture of what they would meet after their 
landing.”2525  
Lapham wrote:  
“At various times we reported 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese troops 
accompanied by 200 Philippine Constabulary men and 2,000 drums of 
gasoline at various places on Luzon; 3,000 enemy troops at Urdaneta 
with four small tanks; 10,000 Japanese in the hills south of Paladapad; 
15,000 more along the National Highway; 4,000 more near a certain 
barrio; 500 in one place; 800 in another, and 15,000 in a third along 
Dingalan Bay; a division and half along the Zambalese coast, three 
more division in Pampanga, and 1,500 PC nearby, though perhaps half 
of these were really pro-American; 3,000 ground troops aboard 
fourteen transports off Port San Fernando, and 200 Nip engineers at 
Mahoag,; fifty Japanese guarding the supply depot at Damortis in the 
railway warehouse north of the station, plus 100 who guarded an 
ammunition dump at Batac barrio school, 400 infantrymen at Rosario, 
                                                        
2523 Ramsey, 285. 
2524 Lapham, 163. 
2525 See Reports of General MacArthur, 195. 
 
734 
900 troops and one mountain gun at Binalonan, 5,000 troops and some 
guns in a nearby convent, and 2,000 more in Inbac.”2526  
He added: “A recurring theme in dozens of such reports was that commodities were 
stored in schools, convents, churches, bamboo groves, or thickets of large trees where the 
Japanese seemed to think the goods would be concealed or the Allies would not expect 
them to be hidden.”2527 
SWPA also demanded information on the Huks. “We forwarded the names of 
eight or ten of their leaders and the towns in which they were currently staying,” recalled 
Lapham, “We emphasized that they were loyal to neither Japan nor America because they 
were true Communists who would try to seize power at the end of the war; that they 
probably had more troops in reserve; and that when they were not actively making 
trouble for us, they devoted much effort to plundering civilians.”2528 
SWPA over-saturated the Islands. In early October, Stahl learned of a new radio 
station on his area on the Bondoc Peninsula. “The Army and Navy were flooding the area 
with radio stations. Security needs kept us oldsters from knowing of the impending 
landing. The station at the Point was a part of a new network based on Negros Island and 
specifically a part of the Leyte landing operation. They weren’t anxious to tell me what 
they were doing although they admitted they knew of the existence of station S3L and 
had been told to relay through my station in an emergency.”2529 
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On 11 October, the Narwhal departed Mios Woendi in Dutch New Guinea under 
new skipper Commander William G. Holman on its fifteenth and final war patrol.2530 Six 
days later it delivered ten tons of supplies to Tongehatan, Tawi-Tawi. On 19 October, 
Narwhal delivered thirty-seven men and fifty tons of supplies to Calipapa, Negros, before 
heading home to Brisbane, Australia, on 2 November. Within three months the boat that 
had been a lifeline for the Philippine guerrillas would be ]decommissioned in the 
Philadelphia Naval Yard. 
 
Leyte, D1,040/R-9 
  After threading around Japanese spotting stations and radar sites in a moonless 
rain early on 12 October, Parsons’ flying boat sought out one of the three planned 
insertion points on Leyte. Low on fuel, they had to return to their base. He received a 
note from Whitney: “Kangleon on west coast. Does not believe he can get across for 
several days, due to heavy enemy interference. Recommend your trip be delayed as long 
as possible.”2531 Parsons decided to fly again that night. The first night’s pilot needed rest 
but opted to fly in the co-pilot seat for next attempt.  
 Flying just above the waves, they again ran the gauntlet between Homonhon and 
Dinagat Islands before landing on the water near Tacloban. Worried about Japanese 
planes at the city’s airfield and the enemy guns on the highlands above the beach, the 
flying boat kept its engines running while Parsons and Rawolle launched themselves and 
their rubber raft out a side window. In less than a minute they were paddling towards 
shore as the plane flew out of sight.  
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 As their raft tangled on a reef off the beach, the two Americans saw a light 
approaching from shore. Rawolle grabbed his carbine but the habitually unarmed Parsons 
called out to whoever was approaching and ordered them to fetch a boat. A tense and 
dangerous moment ended when two native fishermen arrived with a canoe to ferry the 
Americans inland. A retired Navy mess attendant from Cavite hosted Parsons and 
Rawolle and soon half the town was celebrating their arrival. After eating heartily, the 
two officers slept soundly. On the morning of 14 October two guerrillas appeared with a 
boat to take the Americans to one of Kangleon’s radio stations where they sent a message 
to SWPA: “Party arrived safely – Parsons.”2532 They sent the boat to get Kangleon who 
arrived that later that evening.  
Parsons informed Kangleon that MacArthur knew the Japanese were reinforcing 
their garrisons in the Philippines in anticipation of his return. They now had 24,000 men 
on Leyte, expecting him to attack there after he took Mindanao. Therefore, in a few days, 
American airpower would conduct terrible strikes against the enemy’s garrisons across 
the Islands, including those in Kangleon’s domain. MacArthur’s plans included heavy 
naval and air bombardment of Tacloban, normally home to 30,000 citizens. Fearing for 
the safety of the Filipinos, the General wanted leaders like Kangleon to have the people 
leave their homes and head for the hills before 16 October and stay hidden for one week. 
Without hesitation, Kangleon said it would be done. The guerrilla leader also agreed to 
Parsons’ request to have all radios on standby every hour on the hour. 2533 
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On 15 October, Kangleon reported to Parsons that the Japanese had abandoned 
Tacloban. He asked that the Americans spare Leyte’s capitol from bombing.2534  Parsons 
relayed the request but could not be certain SWPA approved or even received the 
message. Parsons knew the Japanese had imprisoned Kangleon’s children in Tacloban 
and suggested that they had time to send agents to liberate them. Kangleon refused to risk 
men and possibly tip off the Japanese to the impending invasion. The next day came 
word that the Japanese had left Panaon, leaving only civilians on this area still targeted 
for heavy bombing. Parsons again sent out a radio request to spare that location. The 
messages had been received but debated. “We had to decide whether the Japs were 
playing a game in withdrawing from Tacloban before the bombing started,” noted 
Whitney, “They might have returned after the barrage – and that would have been tragic 
for the American lads on the beach.” 2535  Given the guidance from MacArthur and 
Osmeña, however, SWPA redrew the bomb lines at Tacloban and Pananaon to limit 
collateral damage. 
On 15 October, the U.S. began heavy air raids on Luzon at Naga and Sipocot. 
“Two days later,” wrote Barrameda, “another massive morning air raid, this time in Pili, 
fueled the anger of the Japanese in the garrison there, and they massacred no less than 50 
men, women and children that afternoon in Barrio Agdangan in the town of Baao.” 2536 
The next day, SWPA ordered all the guerrillas in the Philippines to conduct 
attacks in support of the impending invasion. Lapham recalled, “We blasted bridges, cut 
communication lines, knocked holes in highways, ambushed truck convoys, attacked 
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enemy garrisons.”2537 Fertig’s guerrillas attacked fortifications in Misamis City with 400 
men armed with 200 Enfield rifles, submachine guns, automatic rifles, three 81mm 
mortars with 150 rounds.2538 On Bohol, Ingenerio reorganized Boforce into the 84th, 85th, 
and 86th Regiments with a total of about 8,000 poorly armed men. On Negros, SWPA 
officially promoted Abecede to Lieutenant Colonel.  
For several days the U.S. Navy swept for mines and surveyed beaches on Leyte. 
On 17 October teams from the 6th Rangers seized several small islands off Tacloban. 
They could not be certain what reception they would receive on the main island. During 
the previous year, the Japanese garrisons had stepped up frequent and intense patrols that 
arrested, tortured and interrogated more civilians. By January the pressure had led several 
of General Miranda’s guerrilla officers to accept amnesty, including Major Marcos 
Soliman. Since then, the Japanese reported 561 engagements against guerrillas, killing 
1,984 guerrillas, capturing 2,300 prisoners, accepting the surrender of 6 Americans and 
23,077 Filipinos and seizing 7 vehicles, 7 generators, 37 radios and communication 
items, 1,556 firearms, and 55,348 rounds of ammunition, while losing 7 officers and 208 
enlisted men killed, and 11 officers and 147 men wounded.2539 
On 19 October, SWPA issued a warning order of an impending landing by Sixth 
U.S. Army at Tacloban, Leyte. Fertig wrote in his diary: “Our time of trial and triumph is 
at hand.”2540   
The next day, the Battle of Leyte began. 
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20 October 1944 – 14 August 1945 
 
The guerrilla forces played a vital role in MacArthur’s return. They built and 
operated airfields, rescued down pilots, provided coastwatchers, passed intelligence 
and conducted pre-invasion demolitions. During the invasion, they coordinated with 
the population, scouted routes and enemy positions, interdicted enemy lines of 
communication and logistics, protected flanks and conducted deep operations, and 
acted as conventional forces at times. They also provided essential actions in liberating 
prisoners of war and saving them from execution. 
 
On 20 October at 0600 hours, a U.S. Navy armada opened fire on the beaches 
in that area. At 1000 hours landing craft brought X Corps from Lieutenant General 
Walter Krueger’s Sixth U.S. Army ashore. XXIV Corps landed fifteen miles farther 
south. They pushed forward against light resistance. At 1330 hours, in X Corps’ 
sector, MacArthur waded back onto Philippine soil. To a waiting microphone, he 
said, “People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty God, our 
forces stand again on Philippine soil.”2541 
To guerrillas throughout the Islands, MacArthur radioed: “The campaign of 
reoccupation had commenced. Although your area is not at present within the 
immediate zone of operations, it is desired that your forces be committed to limited 
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offensive action with the specific mission of harassing the movement of enemy 
reserves within your area and as far as possible contain him to his present positions. 
Intelligence coverage must be intensified in order that I be fully and promptly 
advised of all major changes in enemy dispositions or movement.”2542 
The impending link up of MacArthur’s command with the guerrillas posed a 
problem for SWPA.  On 30 September, G-3 Major General Stephen J. Chamberlain 
sent a memorandum to Chief of Staff Sutherland warning: “Our guerrilla forces have 
never burdened themselves with keeping or protecting Japanese captives and have 
not infrequently submitted them to severe methods of torture. As we return and 
recognize these forces more officially and directly as elements of our Command, 
such practices, if known to the enemy, may, not without justification, become the 
pattern for his treatment of our prisoners in his hands including survivors of Bataan 
and Corregidor.”2543 Chamberlain recommended sending a warning from MacArthur 
in the clear a to all units and commands (including the Japanese) stating that SWPA 
always treated prisoners according to the customs and laws of war and it expected 
all others to do the same. 
Sutherland responded the next day: 
“1. Guerrilla forces in the Philippines have operated in wholly 
irregular fashion and under conditions of the utmost difficulty. 
The penalty imposed by the enemy for their activities has been 
immediate death through inhuman torture. As has been the case 
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in practically all guerrilla movements, they have probably been 
forced to adopt the principle of ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for 
a tooth,’ not only for their own immediate protection through 
intimidation but also to secure the necessary cohesion among 
their own forces. Desperate men who fight outside the rules of 
land warfare cannot be expected to apply those rules 
unilaterally. I know of no case in history where it has been done. 
For these reasons I do not concur in the promulgation of the 
proposed directive. 
2. Upon reoccupation of various localities in the Philippines, the 
guerrilla forces will come under the direct and immediate 
control of the regular armed forces of the United States. They 
will be recognized and regularized and from that time forward 
will, of course, be required to abide by the established rules of 
land warfare.”2544 
MacArthur did not choose Leyte for the strength of its guerrillas. Although 
Kangleon’s 92d Division had three regiments with 209 officers and 2,981 enlisted 
men, it was a relatively recent formation that had received almost no support from 
SWPA.2545 He had only established his intelligence network in March and it “was not 
as active as most of the others in the Philippines,” with monthly totals of messages 
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received by SWPA of: 6 in March; 7 in April; 7 in May; 12 in June; 13 in July; 13 in 
August; 17 in September; and 26 in October.”2546 
In choosing Leyte, SWPA had decided to bypass, for now, the more obvious 
invasion target, Mindanao. “MacArthur radioed that we should do everything to 
prevent Nips moving toward Surigao,” Fertig wrote, “We also began limited 
offensive action against all Nip garrisons.”2547 All guerrillas took to the field.   
An attorney later assigned to General Yamashita’s defense counsel, A. Frank 
Reel, explained that from the perspective of the Japanese soldiers: 
“It is impossible to comprehend the speedy reconquest of the 
Philippines by the United States forces without an understanding 
of the part played behind the lines by the guerrillas. …Bridges 
were destroyed, wires were cut, military vehicles were wrecked. 
Japanese night patrols would fail to return to their bases – the 
soldiers would eventually be found dead, their heads and other 
important organs removed by bolo knives. Ambush, demolition, 
assassination, occasionally open combat, became the nocturnal 
activity of over a hundred thousand men who had secreted 
themselves in the hills and mountain slopes and who were 
supplied with food and information by other more loosely 
organized groups of men, women and even children in the villages 
below. 
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It is little wonder that Japanese soldiers felt that practically the 
entire population of provincial areas had sprung to arms against 
them, that the placid Filipino ‘civilians,’ who smiled at them by 
day, were treacherously murdering them by night.”2548 
To soldiers focused on a conventional fight, the guerrilla attacks appeared 
especially menacing. “Reports of atrocities flowed into Yamashita’s headquarters; 
guerrillas had hacked half-drowned sailors to pieces as they struggled shore on the 
southern coasts of Luzon after the Battle of Leyte Gulf while elsewhere guerrillas 
had murdered innocent Japanese civilian women and children.” 2549  Patrols 
discovered machine guns and grenades left by guerrillas on the perimeter of 
Yamashita’s headquarters in Fort McKinley and a bomb buried under the officers’ 
mess.2550 
Hundreds of Filipinos claiming to be guerrillas ready to assist the Americans 
swamped the Sixth Army landing sites. An Army history noted, “These individuals 
caused endless confusion, since it was practically impossible for the Americans to 
distinguish between the genuine guerrilla and his opportunistic counterfeit. After 
the first few days, however, the Army made contact with guerrilla headquarters and 
established liaison with the bona fide guerrillas.”2551 
As MacArthur’s forces arrived, they began absorbing, disbanding or 
reorganizing the guerrilla organizations they encountered. As a first step, SWPA 
assigned the guerrilla units to conventional force commanders. The 24th Division 
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and 1st Cavalry Division absorbed the guerrillas on Leyte. 2552  “General Krueger 
made the guerrillas a part of his armed forces, and they became a source of 
additional strength to the Sixth Army,” wrote Cannon, “These men frequently 
operated and patrolled in enemy-held territory and brought the Americans valuable 
information on Japanese movements and dispositions; the unit commanders of Sixth 
Army, however, tended to discount reports from such sources with regard to the 
size of Japanese forces. The guerrillas also guarded supply dumps and depots, 
bridges, and other installations in the rear areas.”2553 
Parsons brought Kangleon through the line of incoming troops and hailed a 
boat out to Kreuger’s flagship. Around them fell seemingly endless naval gunfire and 
air-dropped ordnance. MacArthur finally recognized Kangleon as the Leyte Area 
Commander and gave him written instructions: “I desire that you establish and 
maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest opportunity 
and thereafter you keep me informed of major developments involving enemy 
movement, dispositions and other activity within your area and observation.”2554 
Parsons and Kangleon established a communication center on the ship and provided 
guerrilla locations, codes and signals. 
Sixth Army decided that southern Leyte was so lightly defended as to justify 
extreme economy of force. They would leave the Japanese garrisons at Malitbog and 
Maasin to the guerrillas. Parsons had boasted, “The guerrillas could do it themselves 
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if they had a couple of gunboats to knock down the walls of the garrisons.”2555  He 
now got the chance to prove it.  
Before dawn on 21 October, Parsons flew to Sogod Bay north of Malitbog 
where he linked up at with local guerrilla leader Captain Juan Escaño who had about 
250 guerrillas at the ready. Offshore, the Navy supplied a pair of LCI gunboats 
(Landing Craft Infantry) specially armed with three forward mounted 40mm Bofors 
cannons along with several 20mm cannons farther aft.  Parsons’ target was a two-
story house on the beach in a thick-walled Japanese garrison compound reinforced 
with trenches. The night before Escaño’s men surrounded the compound. On 
Parsons’ order the gunboats began firing salvos near the water and then walked 
them towards the compound so as to avoid shelling the nearby town. When Parsons 
felt the position sufficiently bombarded, he ordered cease-fire and the guerrillas 
charged through the holes in the walls to finish off the garrison. Guerrillas in 
ambush killed all escaping Japanese. Inside the house the guerrillas found great 
quantities of food and supplies, and few bodies. The bulk of the Japanese force died 
trying to escape over the walls.  There were no survivors.  
Parsons’ second objective at Maasin was a Japanese garrison of about sixty 
men at a radio station in an adobe and stone schoolhouse surrounded by pillboxes 
and other defenses. A washerwoman provided the guerrillas with detailed sketches 
of enemy positions and said the Japanese expected reinforcement soon from 
Cebu.2556 Again the guerrillas took up positons and Parsons directed the naval 
gunfire. This time he used incendiary 20-mm rounds to set fire to the schoolhouse’s 
                                                        




wood roof. Before he lifted fire, the guerrillas attacked with bolos and slaughtered 
the garrison. Parsons notified 7th Fleet and Kangleon that guerrillas had secured 
southern Leyte.  
The operations on the southern Leyte typified the missions assigned to 
guerrillas during the liberation of the Philippines.  Sixth Army instructed its field 
commanders that “guerrillas not be given missions beyond their capabilities,” which 
normally limited them to reconnaissance, outposts, and guides.2557 Even so, in time 
many guerrilla units proved to have high combat capabilities. A study of 
Volckmann’s group noted, “The USAFIP-NL was the not only the largest and most 
effective guerilla organization in Luzon, it was also a combat division that 
successfully accomplished the tasks of a U.S. division in the Luzon campaign. The 
USAFIP-NL was a critical part of the Sixth Army campaign in northern Luzon in 
some of the most vicious and toughest fighting in the southwest Pacific theater.2558  
The Sixth Army would support Volckmann with the 308th Bomb Wing and Forward 
Air Controllers to provide air support.2559 
Ramsey’ ECLGA had more than 10,000 personnel “organized into military 
districts of Pangasian, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, and Bataan.”2560 They discovered 
and reported Yamashita’s movement of forces inland on Luzon to form a defensive 
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line away from the central plains.2561 Ramsey then led ECLGA forces to clear out 600 
Japanese soldiers from the fishpond region outside Manila and guided the U.S. 37th 
Infantry Division into the capital.2562 
On 23 October, the Nautilus delivered 12 men and 20 tons of supplies to 
Masanga River on Luzon. Two days later the boat put ashore another 20 tons at 
Dibut Bay. On 26 October, Nautilus delivered Americans Sergeant Rhys Wood and 
Sergeant Richard Ensor (who took the rank of Lieutenant) and Filipinos A. Luna and 
Sergeant Basud at ‘Hidden Bay’ (Tinagong Dagat – code for Salanga Point).2563 
Captain Golpe led them to Maragumdum, Dalupaon, Pasacao, (Radio City) where 
Barros operated a transmitter. Barrameda remarked, “The unit’s almost instant 
recognition [by SWPA] was more likely than not due to the fact that its CO was an 
American.”2564 
Between February 1943 and October 1944, SWPA had delivered nearly 500 
tons of supplies by submarine to Mindanao.2565 The 10th MD became a center for 
supply to other islands, especially Bohol, Leyte, and Luzon. Fertig’s men created 
airfields at Misamis, Labo, Dipolog, and Farm #2 in central Zamboanga. He recalled, 
“When these were completed, we began to receive supplies by C-47, C-46, and PBY 
planes.”2566 Willis remarked, “Some American planes had been dropping in to the 
airfield, thus we had some canned goods to work with. It was funny: the crews 
coming in wanted fresh stuff – onions, eggs, chickens, bananas, papayas, fish – while 
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we wanted canned goods, Spam, corned beef, sardines, dry biscuits and stuff from 
home.”2567  
On Leyte the 1st Cavalry Division secured Tacloban within 24 hours. On 23 
October, MacArthur hosted a ceremony in front of the municipal building to restore 
civil government to Leyte. The 5th Cavalry Regiment provided thirty “dirty and tired 
but efficient-looking soldiers” as an honor guard to escort President Osmeña.2568 A 
radio broadcasted the ceremony including speeches by MacArthur and Osmeña. 
Krueger decorated Colonel Kangleon with the Distinguished Service Cross and 
Osmeña appointed him governor of the island.2569  
As fighting increased in intensity inland, offshore desperate Japanese forces 
unveiled a new tactic, kamikazes, to attack U.S. ships in suicide missions. The 
desperate attacks reflected the ‘Shō-Gō 1’ plan for naval operations around the 
Philippines issued by Combined Fleet Chief, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. He began with 
the assumption that a successful American invasion in the Islands would cut 
supplies lines and render his fleet in southern waters useless. He was therefore 
willing to expend his forces in battle. 
Toyoda divided his remaining fleet into three task forces. Vice Admiral Takeo 
Kurita’s main “Center Force” (five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 
and fifteen destroyers) was to pass through the San Bernardino Strait and turn 
south to attack MacArthur’s landing area. Meanwhile a “Southern Force” would 
advance through the Surigao Strait in two groups: the first under Vice Admiral Shoji 
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Nishimura (two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and four destroyers) followed by and 
Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima  (two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and four 
destroyers). The successful advance of these forces would depend on avoiding 
American airpower. To ensure this, Toyoda organized a Northern Force. The plan 
envisioned using Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa with several aircraft carriers to act as 
a decoy and draw the American carrier forces away from Leyte.  
The U.S. Seventh Fleet under Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid provided 
MacArthur’s amphibious forces and close naval support. Its light carriers were 
equipped to support ground operations. Air cover for the operation came from the 
U.S. Third Fleet with its five fast carrier task groups under Admiral William F. 
Halsey, who reported to Nimitz. By 24 October, Halsey had sent two of his carrier 
groups back to the Ulithi naval base for resupply. 
As Kurita’s Center Force entered the San Bernardino Straight early on 24 
October, only planes from the carrier USS Intrepid were close enough to strike.  At 
1030 hours the Intrepid’s aircraft began what would be 259 sorties against Kurita’s 
task force. They hit three Japanese battleships and one heavy cruiser. The super 
battleship Musashi was eventually sunk. Kurita fell back and Halsey issued vague 
orders to his Third Fleet to be prepared to cover the strait with battles ships and 
two carrier groups. Upon learning of Halsey’s order, Kinkaid believed the covering 
force was in place and protecting his lightly armed Seventh Fleet as it supported the 
invasion.  
Shortly before dusk Halsey’s reconnaissance spotted the Northern Force 
decoy. Believing Kurita to be badly damaged in in retreat, Halsey decided to chase 
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the remaining Japanese carriers with everything he had. Just after dark Kurita 
reversed course with his still powerful battle group and headed for the unguarded 
San Bernardino Strait.  
Fertig reported watching a Japanese Task Force move through the Surigao 
Straits.2570 Around midnight, Nishimura’s Southern Force task force fought through 
more than three hours of attacks by American torpedo boats.  Thirty miles behind 
him, Shima followed. At 0300 Nishimura ran into volleys of torpedoes from 
American destroyers from the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Support Force. One Japanese 
battleship was damaged; the other was sunk along with a destroyer. An hour later a 
line of old American battleships, resurrected from the waters of Pearl Harbor, 
opened fire. Cruisers soon joined the battle. In the pitch-black night the Americans’ 
advantage in radar proved decisive. Nishimura’s fleet took a number of hits and 
began to scatter, running into Shima’s trailing force. The Battle of Surigao Strait 
would be the last gunfight between battleships in naval history. 
As the Southern Task Force began is fight, Kurita emerged from the San 
Bernardino Strait with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 
eleven destroyers. By dawn the Center Force ran into Kinkaid’s lightly defended 
escort carriers under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague. The American light carriers 
launched all planes and attempted to scatter behind a smoke screen and desperate 
attacks by the destroyers. As a guerrilla leader reported: “The whole Leyte 
expedition had been endangered.”2571   
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At roughly the same time Halsey launched a first wave of about 180 aircraft 
to attack the Northern Force.  Ozawa simultaneously launched 75 planes to attack 
Halsey. Almost all of the Japanese planes were shot down and did no damage. 
Throughout the day over 500 American sorties sank three carriers and a destroyer 
and crippled another carrier and a cruiser. Yet, Halsey’s success was marred by 
desperate pleas for help from Kinkaid.  
After some prodding from Nimitz, at 1115 hours Halsey ordered a task force 
south to protect Seventh Fleet. By the time they arrived, Kurita have broke off from 
the battle. Convinced that he had hit the center of Halsey’s fleet, and hit by swarms 
of American aircraft and seemingly every gun in the Seventh Fleet, Kurita had 
turned north before retreating through the San Bernardino Strait.  Before turning 
south, Halsey dispatched four cruisers and nine destroyers under Rear Admiral 
Dubose to finish off the Northern Force. They caught and sank the damaged light 
carrier and a destroyer. When an American submarine sank one of Ozawa’s cruisers 
late that night, the Battle for Leyte Gulf was over. The Japanese had lost “thirteen 
capital ships, three light cruisers, eight destroyers, and six submarines without 
achieving their objectives.”2572 
Exaggerated and mistaken reports led the Japanese high command to believe 
they had destroyed the U.S. Navy and cut off MacArthur on Leyte.2573 Ignoring 
Yamashita’s advice to save troops for a decisive battle on Luzon, the Imperial 
General Headquarters ordered the immediate reinforcement of Leyte “expecting 
                                                        




that they would formally accept MacArthur’s surrender.” 2574  They began 
transferring the 1st, 8th, 26th, 102nd, and 130th Divisions and the 68th Mixed 
Independent Brigade from the other Philippine Islands, Japan and China to Leyte. 
Just before the Battle of Leyte Gulf began, Mrs. Osmeña sent another urgent 
message to Volckmann pleading for her family’s evacuation from Baguio within 
seventy-two hours. USAFIP-NL had already drawn up a contingency plan, now they 
set it into motion. Early on 30 October, the seven members of the Osmeña family 
moved by car from their house to a point two-and-a-half miles out of Baguio. 
Volckmann’s agents got a friendly constabulary to falsely report the Osmeñas as 
having passed through a checkpoint on the road to Manila.  Members of the 66th 
Infantry escorted the family on foot up the mountain trails, carrying the First Lady 
and her pregnant daughter-in-law in chairs, and dumped their car over a cliff. “The 
entire plan worked out without a mishap,” Volckmann noted, “and Mrs. Osmeña and 
her four children were placed in a small camp near my headquarters.”2575 A month 
later the President had a grandchild born in the 121st Infantry’s field hospital. In 
January 1945, the whole clan reunited at MacArthur’s headquarters at Dagupan.  
By 2 November, the 24th Division had killed 3,000 Japanese troops in seven 
days of heavy fighting in Leyte Valley and entered Carigara on the north coast.2576 
Fertig wasn’t impressed: “My own opinion is that land fighting, at no time, has been 
a serious as communiques would make you believe.”2577 Sixth Army units secured 
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the airfield at Tacloban and scheduled drops of supplies to Luzon guerrillas. Kruger 
then began a two-corps pincer maneuver to clear the Ormoc Valley.  
The events on Leyte unsettled both the Japanese and the collaborators on 
Luzon. Laurel issued Force Labor Service Order (Executive Order No. 100) requiring 
work in support of the government with punishment of ten years in prison and 
P10,000 fine for noncompliance.2578  More importantly, he armed the Japanese-
allied volunteer Filipino Makapili. Laurel served as honorary adviser to the new 
unit, but Benigno Ramos served as its executive general.2579 Laurel worried that 
such a unit independent form the Philippine government was a possible threat. 
Suspicion of Ramos’s intentions added to his worries.    
On 3 November, the Meiji Emperor’s birthday, Manila lawyer and ardent 
nationalist Aurelio Alvero founded the New Leaders Association (NLA) to organize 
young Filipinos to guard utilities and communication facilities so as to free up 
Japanese troops to fight the Americans.2580  In the following months Alvero 
organized a larger armed force, the Bisig-Bakal-ng-Tagala, to maintain law and 
order in Manila. On 24 November, General Ricarte formed his own army, the 
Volunteer Army for Peace and Order of the Philippines (Kusangloob sa Kapayapaan 
at Kaayusan ng Pilipinas) better known as the Peace Army. With a mix of idealistic 
youth and old Ricarista veterans, the Peace Army totaled about 450 men under the 
command of Agapito Zialcita headquartered in Manila. Like Alvero, Ricarte desired a 
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force not under Ramos’s control. After Ricarte left Manila for Baguio, the growth of 
his force faltered, then it merged with the Bisig Army.  
Now that liberation was near, some guerrilla leaders quarreled anew over 
authority and postured for leadership roles. Volckmann sent runners to Al 
Hendrickson ordering him to provide a list of his troops. Hendrickson ignored the 
order.2581 Volckmann then threatened Ray Hunt with court-martial if he refused to 
acknowledge his commands. Both Hendrickson and Hunt were under Lapham. “My 
troubles with Volckmann were persistent and irritating,” wrote Lapham, “but they 
were only paper exchanges, never anything like as serious as my hostile relations 
with the Japanese or Huks.”2582 
A week later Fertig complained, “Burned up this afternoon as Sidney Rodgers 
of San Francisco reported that one Filipino Guerrilla leader from a neighboring 
island reported that his 1000 men had killed 5000 Japs since he organized his unit. 
This was done with bows and arrows since he has only 60 rifles. 8,000 Japs on 
island have been whittled down to 3,000, who spend their days hiding in caves. Such 
outright lies detract from the whole effort. This leader says his own bag is several 
hundred Japs. I don’t know who he is but I know he is a damn liar.”2583 
On 8 November, a typhoon struck the Islands and delivered several days of 
rain. Increased resistance, difficult terrain, weather and logistical problem slowed 
the advance. Within a day, bridges across Surigoa washed out. On 10 November, 
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radio station KAZ went off the air.2584 Fertig reported, “Fighting on Leyte continues 
slow and vicious.”2585 On 13 and 14 November, American Navy aircraft struck 
Manila. Yamashita formulated a new defensive plan for Luzon. He decided to fight 
delaying actions against the Americans at three key mountain passes: east of Manila, 
west of Clark, and near Baguio.2586 His soldiers prepared in utmost secrecy. After the 
war, a Japanese officer stated: “The guerrilla activities against our mobile 
transportation and the great deduction of military strength greatly influenced the 
Luzon campaign.”2587 
Volckmann arranged a new submarine rendezvous in northern Luzon for 
USAFIP-NL for 21 November. He planned primary (Darigayos Cove) and alternate 
(San Estaban) landing sites, arranged recognition signals and contact procedures via 
coded radio messages, and personally took charge of the primary rendezvous point. 
He assigned the secondary site to Barnett. His guerrillas established surveillance of 
both points ten days prior to the scheduled landing. Two days prior, they set up 
outposts to monitor all movement into and out of the landing zones. The night 
before, a combat battalion of 3,500 cargadores moved with the greatest possible 
secrecy into positions near each rendezvous point and organized into carrying 
parties. “The tension that existed is hard to describe,” Volckmann wrote, “Every 
officer, enlisted man, and civilian connected with the operation fully realized the 
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importance of accomplishing the mission successfully. We had been waiting three 
long years for this day – help the outside world!”2588 
Three days out SWPA had still not confirmed the recognition signals and 
procedures. Volckmann departed on a pony in the typhoon for the primary landing 
point, got washed over a cliff and stopped in his tracks by a swollen river. The next 
day at base camp a carabao buffalo got washed over the cliff and smashed the 
waterwheel knocking out power to his headquarters’ radio. Volckmann wrote, 
“What a helpless situation! I could not sleep that night for thinking about the 
possibility of missing contact with second submarine.”2589 
On the afternoon before the submarine arrival, the USAFIP-NL watched a 
large number of planes pounce on a group of ships a few miles out to sea. “Suddenly 
the air was filled with screaming planes diving on the ships, and a series of loud 
explosions followed,” Volckmann noted, “I could scarcely believe my eyes. I had a 
ringside seat to a U.S. air strike!”2590 Farther south planes struck the Japanese port at 
San Fernando. Unfortunately, the strikes brought Japanese patrols boats into 
Darigayos Cove putting the scheduled submarine landing at risk. When a Japanese 
boat anchored on the morning of the scheduled link up, Volckmann sent word to 
SWPA that the point was compromised and they should use the secondary spot. He 
could not be certain the message got through in time. Much to his relief, when he got 
back to his headquarters he learned Barnett had accomplished the rendezvous with 
the Gar and 22 tons of supplies were on the way along with sixteen men led by 
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Captain William Vaughn and Captain William Farrell. The equipment included 
radios, weapons, ammunition, demolition material, and medical supplies. The party 
included demolition experts Lieutenant Fred Behan and Lieutenant Donald Jamison, 
two enlisted weathermen, and ten Filipino radio operators and demolition men. 
They brought with them instructions for preparing for the pending American 
invasion.  The news of the submarine spread quickly and boosted moral across 
northern Luzon. Volckmann’s relief was indescribable.  
 The submarine SS-256 Hake under Lieutenant Commander Frank E. Haylor 
on its seventh war patrol roamed the South China Sea.2591 On 19 November, Hake 
torpedoed and damaged the Japanese light cruiser Isuzu fifty-five nautical miles 
west of Corregidor. On 5 December, Skipper Haylor delivered supplies to Libertad, 
Panay, and evacuated 29 recovered U.S. aviators and ten other refugees. The boat 
then delivered its passengers to Fremantle on 16 December. Meanwhile, the 
submarine SS-253 Gunnel under Lieutenant Commander G.E. O’Neil, Jr., on her 
seventh war patrol, torpedoed and sank two Japanese torpedo boats, the Sagi and 
the Hiyodori, and the merchant tanker Shunten Maru, in the South China Sea and the 
Sulu Sea. Suddenly orders diverted the boat to Flechas Point in Palawan to pick up 
eleven recovered U.S. aviators on 2 December. On 28 December, the boat ended its 
patrol at Pearl Harbor.2592 
Fertig felt no relief. On 22 November, he wrote: “It appears Sixth Army has 
decided to let me continue the fight here with few supplies. Personally, I don’t like 
the news because I intend to get home before too many have passed. I stayed while 
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the greatest need was here. Now that is past and I want to go home, and shall carry 
the fight to MacArthur.”2593 First, he faced an unexpected difficulty. The “Matas 
Militia” in Midsayap mutinied against his authority and established the independent 
command “Mindanao AUSFIP Philippine Army, Cobatato Sector.2594 
Fertig then learned that on 23 November a PBY flying boat arrived in his area 
at Casul Bay off Misamis Occidental with a Captain Thomas and two officers who 
met with junior officers and local people to devise quicker procedures for rescuing 
for downed pilots. SWPA had not told the 10th MD commander of such teams 
entering his territory. Fertig let it be known that he “did not approve of other units 
sending penetration parties into my area or have strangers gather info for they 
talked only with civilians and Junior officers. We are competent to conduct rescue 
and advise GHQ when evacuation should be made.”2595 If SWPA saw Fertig only as 
an irregular fighter operating in their area of command; he saw SWPA as an intruder 
in his zone. 
As MacArthur eyed a return to Luzon, he considered the collaborationist 
government. These were men left behind by Quezon with instructions to work with 
the Japanese while doing their best to protect the people. Which were guilty of 
treason and which were not was a matter of debate. On 28 November, MacArthur 
announced: “When our military forces have landed in Luzon, it shall be my firm 
purpose to run to earth every disloyal Filipino who has debased his country’s cause 
so as to impede the services of USAFFE officers or men who have continued to resist. 
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Such actions construe direct aid to the enemy in his war against the United States of 
America and the Philippine Commonwealth.”2596 Whether or not a collaborator 
‘impeded the services’ of USAFFE guerrillas, then, seemed to be the dividing line. 
Meanwhile numerous ‘fence sitters’ flocked to the Americans. The Japanese 
confirmed this drift with their actions. “They successively disarmed, then disbanded, 
the Constabulary – after which most of its members openly defected to the LGAF or 
other guerrilla organizations.”2597 
On 30 November, Major Romulo Manriquez men saw a plane crash in the 
Fifth District area near Nueva Vizcaya.2598 Getting to the spot, they discovered a 
Japanese transport carrying a number of high-ranking officers had crashed. Among 
the items recovered from the site, were papers from the new Japanese commander 
in the Philippines, General Tomiyuki Yamashita on his plans for the defense of the 
islands. The guerrillas quickly delivered the papers to MacArthur’s headquarters. 
On 6 December, Fertig entered into his diary new worries: “A new group of 
radio and radar sent to Panay and to establish contact with E71. They are sending 
their messages thru us. GHQ seems to feel that we are too big for our pants but when 
they want results they call on our net.” 2599  
Ambassador Murata had to threaten Laurel and his cabinet to get them to 
attend the ceremonial inauguration of the Makapili army on 8 December. 
Headquartered in Manila, the armed Makapili recruited heavily in Ganap regions 
such as Baliwag, Bulcana, Gapan, and Neuva Ecija. Local chapters ranged from 30 to 
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300 men and at its maximum strength the armed force numbered close to 5,000 
men. According to Motoe, “In Gapan, the Makapili chapter was visited by the 
members of the Hukbalahap, a Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla group, who 
offered to form a united front with them against the returning U.S. forces. However, 
the Makapili turned down the offer.”2600 The Makapili would fight American forces 
at several points, even conducting suicide attacks, but U.S. forces drove them into 
the hills to face starvation or trial for treason. 
Krueger entered Ormoc City on 10 December and crafted a new plan to 
tackle the Japanese: “the 77th Division was to break loose from its base and use 
Indian warfare or blockhouse tactics. At night each ‘fort’ was to establish an all-
round defense from any Japanese night attacks. In the daytime, an armed convoy 
was to go ‘from fort to fort.’ The Filipino guerrillas were to guard the bridges and 
furnish intelligence.”2601 In the final push, the 77th Division killed 1,506 Japanese 
soldiers while capturing only 7 prisoners, and lost 123 killed and wounded and 13 
missing.2602 Only the mountains west of the Ormoc Road remained in Japanese 
hands.  
On 13 December, Yamashita began shifting forces from Luzon to Leyte. The 
Japanese moved more than 34,000 troops to Leyte with over 10,000 tons of 
materiel, most of it through the port of Ormoc on the west coast.2603 They had to 
divert some units to suppress guerrillas in the Camotes Islands off the west coast of 
Leyte guarding the entrance to Ormoc Bay. The single infantry battalion (less two 
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companies) of the Camotes Detachment came from the 58th Independent Mixed 
Brigade with an added artillery battery and an engineer platoon.2604 
On 18 December, Fertig reported a Japanese radio broadcast listing their 
losses in the Philippines since 1 November as “78,041 Naval and 83,748 Army 
personnel or a total of 141,787” which he compared to MacArthur’s report of 
Japanese losses on Leyte as “39,136 counted dead, estimated 30,000 drowned in 
convoys and 21,000 believed killed but bodies taken away by the enemy.”2605 Eight 
days later Fertig reported: “The battle of Leyte is reduced to mopping up campaigns. 
The 77th landed at Pomopolan to close the last part in Nip hands. Figures indicate 
that Jap defeat was extremely serious. Since 20 Oct. AF shot down 1015 planes while 
carrier planes accounted for 1233 – total of 2348. Japs lost 164,000 tons of shipping 
plus 27 warships in attempts to re-enforce Leyte. Casualties were 113,421 Japs of 
whom 54,349 were counted dead. Our losses 2,623 killed, 8,240 wounded and 
missing.”2606 The Japanese would continue organized resistance on Leyte until 31 
December. After the war, the U.S. Army reported that Leyte cost the Americans 
15,584 casualties with 3,504 killed; the Japanese suffered an estimated 49,000 
killed.2607 
MacArthur turned to Luzon.  He placed the island’s guerrillas under Sixth 
Army.2608  To speed up reporting, SWPA authorized select guerrillas like Barros in 
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Anderson’s Luzon sub-stations, to transmit directly to the high command instead of 
clearing reports through net  
 
control.2609 On 12 December, Volckmann received a second submarine shipment. 
“Instead of arms and ammunition, and medical supplies that were so vital to 
Volckmann’s enterprise, they opened the crates to find nothing but propaganda 
items: cigarettes, rubber stamps, and candy bars bearing the words ‘I Shall 
Return.’”2610 Another submarine brought 25 tons of equipment and no propaganda 
items. Meanwhile, Volckmann scouted the best spot for an invasion force.  He chose 
Lingayen Gulf and sent a message: “There will be no repeat no opposition on the 
beaches.”2611 
In late December, the jungle telegraph carried rumors of a Japanese massacre 
of POWs in a prison camp near Puerto Princesa in Palawan. According to reports, on 
14 December the Japanese forced 150 prisoners into three air raid trenches, flooded 
the trenches with gasoline, and set the POWs on fire. They gunned down any who 
tried to flee the flames. Still, eleven managed to escape. 
On 15 December, U.S. and Filipino forces landed on Mindoro to create a base 
closer to Luzon. The 1,000 Japanese troops on the island offered little resistance. “By 
the end of the first day, Army engineers were hard at work preparing airfields for 
the invasion of Luzon. The first was completed in five days; a second was ready in 
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thirteen.”2612 The airfields allowed greater direct support for operations on Luzon. 
Four days after the Mindoro invasion, the Japanese command in Manila activated 
their Luzon Defense Plan. After three more days, the Laurel administration left 
Manila with the Japanese leadership for Baguio. 
 
Table 2: Japanese Casualties in the Philippines, 1945 
 
Two hundred Japanese soldiers marched into Bucawe where Adalia Marquez 
and her children were hiding.  The townspeople turned to two guerrillas, Glicerio 
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Samulde (Big Boy) and Domingo Paulino, who listened to San Francisco on their 
radio. “What does MacArthur say in a case like this when there is a Japanese 
company in town?” they asked, “Does he advise us to leave?”2613 “But alas,” Adalia 
wrote, “MacArthur overlooked such little details, although they were very important 
to the residents of a small town like Bucawe.”2614 After two hours, Adalia joined 
other local citizens and moved into the jungle near Batia where they established a 
camp. 
In Manila, the Japanese military cracked down on all suspected guerrilla 
sympathizers. The pressure split the PCAJVC. Hu Guizhi led part to join the Hua Zhi’s 
Bicol Squadron, the remainder in Manila joined the Hua Zhi’s Manila Squadron. 
SWPA tried to bring order to the Luzon guerrillas prior to MacArthur’s 
return. Captain George Miller brought representatives of the Hunters and Marking’s 
Guerrillas together in Boso-Boso, Antipolo (the Hunter’s 44th Division headquarters) 
to resolve their feud. Proposals to exchange overlapping units fell apart over 
arguments on the quality of the units to be gained or loss by each group. Then on 26 
December, Lieutenant Colonel Tereso D. Pía, commander of the Hunter’s 44th 
Division, led a delegation to Marking’s camp to renew discussions. They agreed to 
reactivate the joint Rizal-Eastern Laguna Command (RELCO) with Miller as an 
advisor. “It was this new body,” Agoncillo wrote, “that directed the two guerilla 
groups in their demolition and sabotage work which paved the way for the 
liberation of Manila in early 1945.”2615 
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Towards the end of December, Blackburn realized his guerrilla no longer 
needed to restrict themselves to raids and ambushes: they could go toe-to-toe with 
the enemy.2616 He led a guerrilla attack that drove the Japanese out of the west side 
of the Cagayan River near Tuso by early 1945. “As a matter of fact,” he later said, 
“the Japanese commander himself, told me when he surrendered to me, that they 
had lost 3,000 troops trying to cross that river at the town of Enrile, but never made 
it.”2617  “As confidence grew,” Blackburn recalled, “we could take a platoon and go 
against a company.”2618 
By now most of the Japanese appeared “ragged, haggard, weary, and 
weak.”2619 Trainloads of soldiers moved into the northern mountains, often taking 
many civilians with them. “A particularly sharp eyed lookout,” Lapham wrote, 
“reported that no less a dignitary than General Yamashita himself, surrounded by a 
convoy of tanks and motor-cycles, had passed through Talavera in Nueva Ecija 
province at 1:00 PM, January 3, 1945, headed north.”2620 
By January the Mindanao guerrillas operated about seventy radios covering 
roads, enemy positions, and shipping channels. They held airfields at Dipolog, Labo, 
Lala and Baroba frequently used by ‘distressed airplanes’ and supply deliveries. 
Fertig wrote: “Our New Year’s had a touch of sadness. Our trials has brought us 
close together ad this is the last New Year together. For us 1945 is the year of 
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victory.”2621 He had Childress evacuated from Davao to Leyte, and gave Laurenta 
command of the 107th Division. Fertig was starting to say goodbye. 
Two weeks into a patrol the submarine Stingray, now under Lieutenant 
Commander Howard F. Stoner, delivered 35 tons of supplies to Tongehatan Point, 
Tawi-Tawi.2622 Over the next ten days Stoner landed two parties on Nipanipa 
Peninsula, Celebes, and others on Kagean Island and on Pare Pare Bay, Celebes 
before returning to Fremantle, Australia, on 23 February and departing for America. 
On New Year’s Day, SWPA issued orders to all guerrillas on Luzon: 
“Beginning at dark on Fourth January proceed to destroy targets assigned by the 
Headquarters under plan of sabotage communicated to you by message of Two Nine 
November…”2623  Lapham activated all seventy of his squadrons. He noted, “In the 
five weeks between November 29, 1944, and January 4, 1945, when we received 
notification from SWPA that American landings in Luzon were imminent, my men 
were involved in only six authorized engagements or battles forced upon us. Three 
of these were against the Huks: once they ambushed us, and twice they attacked us 
openly. Our forces suffered about 65 casualties in these encounters, the enemy 
perhaps 90.”2624 Now that SWPA approved direct attacks on the enemy, Lapham 
wrote, “Before that first night was over, practically every one of our squadron 
managed to get into at least one or two fights with the Japanese.”2625 
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On 5 January, as U.S. airpower struck Formosa, Fertig received assurances 
from Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, MacArthur’s Eighth Army 
Commander. He reported, “Eichelberger promised action on serial targets for us and 
I advised that Surigao and Agusan are primary targets.”2626 On 8 January Fertig 
confessed to his diary: “Unless we get help or at least heavy air support we will lose 
the Augusan Coast. I have done all I could to get the Eighth Army to help me but 
wholly unsuccessful. Of course we are small fry and the big drive for landing on 
Luzon is in order.”2627 
The next day an armada of seventy U.S. Navy warships entered the Lingayen 
Gulf and at 0700 hours opened a one-hour naval gunfire barrage. Kamikazes sank 
several of the ships. At 0800 hours, landing craft began delivering 175,000 men of 
Krueger’s Sixth Army ashore.  For two weeks, the American forces met little 
resistance as they advanced towards Manila. Yamashita, lacking air power, artillery, 
or tanks, withdrew his 260,000 men inland to more defensible terrain. Supporting 
the conventional forces, the guerrillas conducted diversionary attacks, harassed 
lines of communication, blocked Japanese movements, scouted and provided 
intelligence.  MacArthur directed Krueger to seize Clark Air Field and the port at 
Manila as soon as possible.  
Word rapidly spread of MacArthur’s return. In Batia where Adalia Marquez 
hid with her children, the news interrupted a music class she was teaching. “In wild 
excitement,” Adalai recalled, “we threw the lesson book away and I immediately 
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played The Star Spangled Banner. People in the fields left their work and came into 
the hut to sing the tune they knew so well.”2628 
Americans made a second landing closer to Manila on 15 January. The 
Japanese withdrew their 1st Division from Leyte to Cebu to defend north of Bogoto. 
The division found “most of the inhabitants in the neighborhood of the area where 
the Division was to be quartered seemed to have moved out guided by the 
guerrillas.”2629 Soldier Kiyofumi Kojima recalled, “The enemy, of course, went 
anywhere they wanted to go, mountainous or not, and we didn’t have the strength 
to fight hand-to-hand. The fight for the airfields had practically wiped out our army 
troops and the few naval officers we had. The stragglers who escaped reassembled 
into a platoon.”2630  
On Luzon, Yamashita led the 152,000 soldiers of the Shobu Group in northern 
Luzon. Yokoyama had 80,000 troops of his Shimbu Group from east of Manila to the 
Bicol Peninsula. Tsukada organized his 30,000 men of the Kembu Group around 
Clark Air Field, the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor.2631  Krueger advanced the XIV 
Corps on 18 January. After five days, at Clark Field, the Sixth Army encountered the 
first determined resistance from the Kembu Group. Krueger would not secure the 
airfield until the end of January. On 2 February XIV Corps continued south toward 
Manila. 
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Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki held the southern Islands with 
the Thirty-fifth Army’s 100,000 men, but only about 30,000 were combat trained 
and equipped.2632 A survivor of the Palawan Massacre, Private First Class Eugene 
Nielsen, reported to U.S. Army intelligence officers on 7 January and relayed the 
story of what he had witnessed. Then on 26 January, Lapham arrived at Sixth Army 
headquarters to press for a liberation of the prison camp at Cabanatuan, warning 
that the Japanese were going to massacre that camp’s 500 POWs. Colonel Horton 
White, Krueger’s G-2, tasked the 6th Ranger Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Mucci to liberate the camp. Only four days later, with help from Alamo Scouts 
and Lapham’s guerrillas, they freed 522 POWs, including 492 Americans. Captain 
Juan Pajota led over 250 guerrillas in ambushing Japanese troops attempting to 
reinforce the camp during the operation.  
Sixth Army placed an Army artillery battalion and aircraft in support of 
Volckmann’s guerrillas in the area of Bessang Pass-Cervantes.2633 Close cooperation 
between the conventional and guerrilla forces required suppling the irregulars with 
modern radios at all levels of command. As Manuel Segura, leading guerrillas on 
Cebu, wrote, “communication was vital” during conventional attacks alongside the 
returning forces.2634 This was especially true with close air support. Volckmann 
wrote, “We had learned early while working behind the lines to trust nothing that 
flew, regardless of insignia, unless we were in radio contact with the planes.”2635 
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Volckmann’s guerrillas conducted several effective large conventional attacks on 
dug-in Japanese positions, but only after the 24th Marine Air Group provided a radio 
van to help direct air and artillery support.2636 By the time the last pockets of 
Japanese resistance collapsed, many of the guerrilla units across the Philippines 
were essentially fighting as conventional forces. 
In a number of ways guerrillas played vital roles in northern Luzon. Colonel 
Robert Connolly’s Task Force of the 21st Rangers from the Sixth Army worked with 
Blackburn’s guerrillas to capture Aparri.2637 Blackburn took Quicho’s battalion and 
occupied Aparri before a planned airborne drop. He later recalled, “The Americans 
never did provide much assistance. They had that task force there.”2638 When the 
rains came MacArthur’s fliers found they could not use their hastily constructed 
airstrips around Lingayen Gulf. Volckmann informed them that he had cleared 
inland airfields at Poro established Base M on Poro point. “So, we became 
conventional as hell when they landed,” Blackburn said.2639 
In return, the guerrillas avidly appreciated the American forces’ medical 
support. The Sixth Army’s 7th Field Hospital at Dagupan “received a number of 
Filipino guerrilla patients.”2640 The Army also provided medical teams to guerrilla 
units but an official Army medical history noted: “Large numbers of severely 
wounded casualties tested the guerrilla medics to the full. Surgical instruments 
were still few and laboratory facilities poor.”2641 Still, by March, Volckmann and 
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Blackburn had a medical battalion operating with 98 officers and 808 enlisted 
men.2642 
 Fertig jealously stewed on Mindanao.  He wrote, “Peralta reports he has only 
3500 Nips on Panay. He will be lucky fortunate again and will earn credit as the first 
guerrilla chief to clear his island. The Gods have smiled on him.”2643 He felt worn 
down, and hiking through rain and mud wore him down further. Recent trips to 
Krueger’s command with their clean clothes, fresh sheets, and hot coffee must have 
been bittersweet. “Col. Chaffee of Col. Whitney’s section arrived on the plane,” he 
wrote at the end of January, “He was most agreeable but extremely uninformed 
about Mindanao. He did not know what areas were garrisoned and which were 
clear. …He is against giving Peralta anything, says we have used arms and supplies 
given us and we will be given still more. As soon as Luzon is under control we will 
be next.”2644 
  “Since the operation had begun in late January,” one Army history noted, “its 
units had been fortunate enough to find bridges and fordable crossings almost 
everywhere they went.”2645 It was not fortune; it was guerrillas familiar with area 
acting as guides for MacArthur’s columns. They knew the best roads, avoided 
obstacles, and even built bridges and roads.2646 During the 24th Division’s fight on 
Kilay Ridge in late October, when officers found their maps inaccurate and visibility 
limited, they “relied on the service of Filipino guides” for their rest of the 
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campaign.2647 The Americans discovered distances indicated on their maps off by as 
much as fifty percent.2648 They had to rely on local sources of information and found 
that, “In general, the guerrilla reports were more accurate than those of 
civilians.”2649 
Guerrillas also demonstrated shortcomings, however. They seemed to 
routinely inflate estimates of enemy strengths. In November, guerrillas reported up 
to 5,000 enemy troops in Carigara when the numbers were far fewer.2650 Their 
reports indicated the Japanese held the Bataan Peninsula with 13,000 men when 
Yamashita left only 4,000 there. MacArthur committed 35,000 men to the peninsula. 
When the 38th Division went to capture the San Marcelino airstrip, they found 
Captain Ramon Magsaysay’s guerrillas had secured the field three days earlier.2651 
The fighting on Bataan became especially fierce. B. David Mann was part of 
the Sixth Army fighting the 10th Division and witnessed massed conventional 
firepower applied against the defending troops. Mann recalled, ““The horror of 
battle began to tell on the hardiest of the Japanese troops. Near constant 
bombardments made the soldiers nervous and emotionally disturbed. The necessity 
of holing up in caves to avoid being killed by explosions made them feel like animals 
with no chance to escape.”2652 One of those defenders, the 39th Infantry Regiment’s 
Sergeant Nagai remembered, “We all became neurotic, not only because of the 
                                                        
2647 Cannon, 228. 
2648 Ibid., 348. 
2649 Ibid., 250. 
2650 Ibid.,179. 
2651 Ibid. 
2652 Mann, 1171. 
 
773 
overwhelming power of the sounds, but also because of the psychological pressure 
on us.”2653 
On 3 February, a PBY flew Fertig flew to Leyte for the first time since 1921 
where he met with Willoughby. “He broke the news,” Fertig wrote, “that I should be 
under 8th Army in the near future and arranged that I should have lunch with Gen. 
Byers, or Colonel Thayer his Chief of Staff.” After the meeting, Fertig boasted, “It 
seems my name has been well publicized with the GHQ.”2654 The next day he went to 
Tacloban and met General Stivers and his staff. “I was given the key to the city. He 
took me over to the G-1 Section who is directly concerned with clearing the record 
of my men. I found that certain changes should be made in order to clear their 
records properly.”2655  
The citizens in Manila had a false sense of security. “There were rumors that 
President Roosevelt had warned the Japanese that if they touched Manila he would 
have Tokyo’s Imperial Palace bombed for twenty-four hours, without let-up,“ Adalia 
Marquez recalled, “The people had to say Roosevelt to make it more impressive than 
saying MacArthur. We had seen General MacArthur in the Islands, but this 
Roosevelt, he was at the White House, he was President of the United States!”2656 
Guerrillas tried to warn Manila’s residents. Isabel Yumol’s old family friend 
Dolfo and other guerrillas told them: “Today the U.S. Forces entered Manila and are 
making their fastest drive toward Malacañang Palace, the University of Santo 
Tomas, and the Bilibid Prison. They are guided and led by guerrillas who know the 
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quickest and safest way. They will soon be at Santo Tomas. So, I’m asking all of you 
to lock and barricade your front doors and close your front windows. Do not go out, 
or even look out, whatever it is you might hear. The safest place is the middle of 
your houses.”2657  
On 3 February, recalled Adalia Marquez, “I saw two planes fly very low over 
our camp. Three followed, then four, five, and soon there was an umbrella of 
American planes flying majestically through the sky towards Manila.”2658 Under the 
cover aircraft, the 1st Cavalry Division reached the outskirts of the capital.  At 1835 
hours that evening, the division entered Manila. Met by two Filipino guerrillas. 
“Skeptical at first, the Americans subjected the senior of the two, Captain Manuel 
Colayco, to intensive interrogation, until their doubts were allayed.”2659 Colayco 
guided the 1st Cavalry soldiers past mined areas to the gates of Santo Tomas where 
he was killed in by a grenade thrown by a Japanese sniper. The soldiers rescued 
over 4,000 captives from the prison. 
Yamashita decided to leave Manila and ordered the Shimbu Group to move 
inland, destroying all bridges behind him. However, the naval commander in Manila, 
Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabachi, decided to fight house-to-house in the capital with his 
16,000-man Manila Naval Defense Force.2660 Augmented with three army battalions, 
Iwabuchi would fight to the death in Manila with 21,000 soldiers.2661 
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MacArthur launched a combined airborne and seaborne assault on 
Corregidor on 16 February. After ten days of intense fighting, the forces secured the 
Rock, largely ending the stand of the Kembu Group.  
On 19 February, U.S. forces invaded Iwo Jima. The retreating Japanese troops 
on Luzon became fatally desperate and angry. From 12 to 25 February rumors said 
the Japanese trucked old men to a church in Calamba and strangled them with rope, 
massacred more than 2,000 Filipinos, around Manila, and killed 1,000 people in the 
village of Lipa.2662 
In mid-February, Krueger focused his troops on the 30,000-man Shimbu Group in the 
mountainous area east and south of Manila. The remaining 20,000 of Yokoyama’s men still held Bicol. A 
diversion of Sixth Army units to the Visayas weakened his hand. Krueger received faulty intelligence that 
the Wawa Dam was crucial to Manilas water supply when in fact it had not been used since 1938. He also 
believed his units thee faced fewer than 20,000 Japanese troops instead of the 30,000 actual defenders.2663 
When XIV Corps attacked to seize the dam on 20 February, they encountered tough fighting.  
The Japanese troops were in an increasingly desperate situation. Matsu Shinji 
had been drafted in 1939 and discharged in 1944 only to be called back to service 
for the Philippine duty. Serving in the mountains outside Manila, he observed: “The 
few Japanese soldiers who survived should have helped each other out. Instead 
there were those who killed themselves in suicidal explosions, those who killed 
their fellow men for food. Military police would take away soldiers trying to escape, 
accuse them of holding antiwar sentiments, and confiscate their food.”2664  
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Fighting in Manila went on for two months. “The Japanese attitude,” one 
chronicler wrote, “put quite simply was: ‘If you are not with us, you are against us.’ 
They thus declared that all Filipinos, including women and children, found inside 
the battle area were to be considered guerrillas and exterminated.”2665   “The battle 
quickly came down to a series of bitter street-to-street and house-to-house 
struggles,” Dale Andradé noted, “In an attempt to protect the city and its civilians, 
MacArthur placed stringent restrictions on U.S. artillery and air support. But 
massive devastation to the urban area could not be avoided.”2666 Fertig reported, 
“The main body of Japs are in the walled city and have taken many civilians with 
them. These have butchered [sic] ruthlessly.”2667 Iwabuchi’s troops “plundered, 
raped, and murdered” civilians inside the walls of the Itramuros district until it was 
finally overrun.2668  
On 26 February, MacArthur declared Corregidor recaptured. The next day he 
oversaw the re-establishment of the Philippine government while General 
Eichelberger’s Eighth Army invaded Palawan. On 3 March, MacArthur announced 
the liberation of Manila. The battle for city caused the deaths of almost 100,000 
Filipinos and thousands of American soldiers, even MacArthur could not bring 
himself to organize a victory parade.”2669 
On Palawan, the Japanese ceded Puerto Princessa and withdrew into the hills. The Americans 
discovered proof of the Palawan Massacre. Intense fighting broke out on the third day of the advance and 
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lasted five days. Mopping up lasted until late April.  In the end, the Americans lost 12 killed and 56 
wounded; the Japanese lost about 900 killed.2670   
Meanwhile, the 41st Division seized Zamboanga in Mindanao. On 1 March 
Eichelberger invited Fertig to move into his guesthouse at Eighth Army 
headquarters on Leyte. “The opportunity was past my greatest expectations,” Fertig 
remarked, “Both General Eichelberger and his staff lived up to my high hopes.”2671 
The Japanese held Mindanao with the 30th Infantry Division spread along the north 
coast and the 30th infantry Division in the south centered on Davao.   The makeshift 
54th Independent Mixed Brigade – created in June and arrived in Mindanao in late 
August – met the 41st Division in Zamboanga and fell back to the north. Tactical air 
support from the guerrillas’ makeshift airstrip at Dipolog, played a critical role in 
the operations. “Two reinforced companies from the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, 
were immediately airlifted in to bolster the guerrillas and ensure control of the 
airstrip. Soon thereafter, Marine Corsairs from Col. Clayton C. Jerome's Marine 
Aircraft Group, Zamboanga, were using the airstrip to cover naval bombardment 
and landing preparations off Zamboanga City.” 2672 Heavy fighting lasted for over a 
month, with the U.S. Army losing 220 killed, and the Japanese 6,400 dead.2673  
On 9 March, the United States began incendiary bombing raids against Japan. 
With the war reaching its climax, some leader worried about securing their place in 
history. Guerrillas were no exception. Fertig wrote: “Paul Cranston, feature writer 
for the North American Newspaper Alliance, was trying to get a release on my story. 
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If the good God is with me, I should be able to make some money out of the complete 
story. Tied down as I am, I don’t know whether the world will wait on me or not.” 
2674 
On 12 March, in northern Luzon, Yokoyama launched a series of counterattacks with the Shimbu 
Group east of Manila that proved ineffectual. Krueger advanced his XI Corps and forced the Japanese to 
retreat. As Andradé wrote, “On 17 May the 43d Division, aided by guerrilla forces and air strikes that 
delivered the heaviest concentration of napalm ever used in the Southwest Pacific, captured the Ipo Dam 
intact and restored Manila's water supply.”2675 
The war shattered the Philippine capital. Fertig wrote, “Manila has ceased to 
exist. Someone said that they are simply pushing the rubble into the bay to make 
ramps [on] which cargo could be unloaded.”2676 Lapham recalled: “…with no toilets 
either in the barrios or on the mountain roads in northern Luzon, human waste was 
scattered everywhere, both outdoors and in what was left of buildings. Anywhere 
one looked there was decomposing human bodies covered with flies an emanating a 
paralyzing stink. In barrios the manure contributed by pigs and geese compounded 
the fetid mess. Nobody washed his hands or changed his clothes for weeks at a time, 
lice were everywhere, and diseases multiplied predictably.”2677 Cholera and other 
diseases taxed U.S. Army medical support. 
Catching her first sight of Americans as they moved from Espana to Isabelo 
de los Reyes, Isabel Yumol noted their rifles slung across their bodies without 
bayonets. She remembered, “I look at the Americans and see tall, slender men, with 
white skin like those of our nuns from Spain and the non-Filipino Jesuits… A soldier, 
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not in a khaki uniform and without a gun, comes up to us and hands Tommy a little 
American Flag and three lollipops; he also gives me a flag and two bars of ‘Baby 
Ruth.’ And so Tommy and I start waving the flag and our V and saying ‘Victory 
Joe.’”2678 
Eichelberger sent General Rap Brush's 40th Division into Panay several miles 
west of Iloilo on 18 March. An Army history noted, “There they were greeted by Col. 
Macario L. Peralta's Filipino guerrillas drawn up in parade formation, and General 
Eichelberger recalled in his memoirs how the guerrillas stood ‘stiff in starched khaki 
and resplendent with ornaments.’ The strong guerrilla force of 23,000 had secured 
most of the island' except the area immediately around Iloilo where 2,750 Japanese 
were ensconced.”2679 
Eichelberger’s Americal Division under Major General William Arnold landed 
on Cebu on 26 March against little resistance. Arnold occupied a largely destroyed 
Cebu City the next day. Outside the city the Japanese put up a stiff fight. Arnold 
threatened their flank and forced a their retreat. “After clearing the remainder of the 
Japanese line, Arnold's men began pursuit on 20 April. Together with Cushing's 
guerrillas, they killed any Japanese who turned to fight.”2680  Some 8,500 Japanese 
moved into the hills and held out until the end of the war. The Americal Division lost 
410 men killed, 1,700 wounded, and suffered 8,000 non-battle casualties; the 
Japanese lost 5,500 dead. 2681 
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George Fukui, who had been raised in American until he was seventeen, 
served in the Japanese army as an interpreter on Cebu. “We found out that before 
the War’s end, when the Japanese forces were under attack by American troops, an 
order had been issued by the Japanese military that resident Japanese children 
under the age of thirteen would be an encumbrance and should be killed. It was 
thought that this order had been implemented.”2682 
On 29 March, government leaders Laurel, Aquino and Osias left the 
Philippines with Japanese Ambassador Murata, first to Taiwan then to Japan. That 
same day, Eichelberger’s Eighth Army invaded Negros. The Japanese ceded the 
coast. When the Americans reached the interior on 9 April, eight weeks of intense 
combat began. MacArthur lost 370 dead and 1,025 wounded, and killed more than 
4,000 Japanese in battle, another 3,300 Japanese died from starvation and disease, 
while 6,000 would surrender at the end of the war.2683 
The Japanese 75th Infantry Brigade’s 354th Independent Infantry Battalion 
held its position on Negros for fifty-two days at what would become known as Dolan 
Hill. Air attacks, artillery bombardments and infantry attacks whittled at their 
numbers. Supplies ran out.  Kokubo Sakurai recalled, “Maggots hatched in our 
bandages, writhing on our flesh and exuding a foul stench. Food supplies were cut 
off. Having eaten up all the stalks of grasses and plants, and all the insects and 
reptiles, we became malnutrition cases. One’s entire body swells, one’s strength 
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gives out, and it becomes impossible to control one’s bodily functions. Hunger 
gnawed at people’s spirit. There were those who ate human flesh.”2684 
Many Filipinos also faced starvation. Within their areas of operation, the 
guerrillas had controlled prices of food and restricted the black market. Those 
controls now vanished. “When the Americans came back,” Blackburn recalled, “they 
had a civil affairs unit attached to the U.S. divisions in the area. Within twenty-four 
hours after they moved in, a chicken that had been selling for 50 centavos, was 
selling for eight pesos, i.e., four dollars, the prices of everything just 
skyrocketed.” 2685  The returning U.S. and Philippine authorities outlawed the 
emergency currency printed by the guerrillas.2686 Philippine Civil Affairs Units 
(PCAUs) began to distribute food from U.S. Army stocks to the population. They 
managed to increase the Filipino’s daily consumption of rice to about one pound per 
day augmented by bread and corn.2687 It would take five years to restore Philippine 
rice production to prewar levels and not until the 1970s would they begin to 
approach western yields. 
Adalia Marquez visited the Manila markets filled with Army issued goods at 
exorbitant prices. She could barely afford some bread and a GI can of cheese, but on 
her way home an MP apparently under misguided orders inspected her bags and 
confiscated her purchases. “The act of the MP left us inarticulate,” she recalled, “I 
myself felt that if I had commented on what had happened there might be a Gestapo 
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who would tell on me.”2688 Marquez added, “I realized later that the American 
Military Police was only obeying orders and that the American Army was really 
trying to break the black market. But as I lay awake on my mat on the floor that 
night I was embittered – heart-sore. I knew that my [children] were still hungry. 
Army rules don’t mean much to a mother battling for her brood.”2689 Filipinos like 
her began to desire greater control over their situation. 
Fertig and the other guerrilla leaders presented several ideas for using their 
men as basis for immediately constructing a new Philippine Army (PA).  “My 
personal opinion is that nothing is being done to organize the PA, and that the delay 
will be serious,” warned Fertig, “Already the rumor is spreading that the Pro-Japs 
are taking command of the army. Should that gain sufficient 
following, you can expect civil war, with the split widening but following the original 
lines of that who were collaborationists and those who were not. My head aches 
each time I think of these islands trying to exist as sovereign nation. They are as 
incapable of self-government as the youngest Central American Republic.”2690 
Eventually, a number of guerrilla units transitioned to become units of the new 
Philippine Army.2691 
In April, Fertig learned that I Corps planned to form four regiments from his 
organization with “the rest of the guerrillas to be thrown to the wolves.”2692  He 
suggested five regiments, one for each division: “Bowler to command the 106th, 
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which would be the first to be processed and attached to the 24th Div. 108th to be 
next and 107-3rd. 105 Div. was all to pass to 41st Div. for tactical command but I 
would maintain Admin. Control. My ideas were adopted practically as given and 
Bowler instructed to make arrangements to get to Tuibpuan to take command of 
106th.”2693  Fertig found that the Philippine Civil Affairs Units working with 
MacArthur’s forces planned to place their officers in the command positions of the 
new regiments. Fertig had the impression the PCAU thought “the guerrillas were 
just a bunch of punks.”2694  
On 12 April, the day President Franklin Roosevelt died, Chick Parsons 
assumed his new duties in Manila. “He did promise to keep us in mind,” remarked 
Fertig, “and we are going to need friends. I can see that for we are about to be lost in 
the shuffle.”2695 Three days later Fertig explained, “It is only a question of time until 
we enter another period of adjustment for in some ways our guerrilla life was a free 
and easy life with many responsibilities but with compensating privileges. Now 
comes men, who may be ignorant, to take over our work. Their snap judgements 
may effect our reputation for the whole effort. So again I say: ‘It is in God’s hands 
and he has brought me far in safety.’”2696 
Eichelberger sent a battalion of the 164th Infantry to west Bohol near 
Tagbalaran. “Assisted by the local guerrilla force, the battalion pushed inland, 
located the defenders, and by the end of the month had cleared the island of active 
                                                        
2693 Ibid,19 April 1945. 
2694 Ibid.,18 April 1945. 
2695 Ibid., 12 April 1945. 
2696 Ibid., 15 April 1945. 
 
784 
Japanese resistance at a cost of seven men killed.” 2697 By 21 April, MacArthur 
deemed the Visayas secured, and concentrated on Mindanao. 
Lieutenant General Gyosaku Morozumi commanded 43,000 troops on 
Mindanao with a division in prepared defenses in the south around Davao, another 
division holding Malaybalay and Cagayan in the central and northern coast, and the 
independent mixed brigade still facing the U.S. 41st Division on the Zamboanga 
Peninsula. The Japanese combined strong defensive position with the island’s 
difficult geography. Yet, they also suffered severe shortages in artillery, ammunition, 
communications, and transportation and, as Stephen Lofgren observed: “Further 
complicating life for the Japanese was a vibrant guerrilla force led by Col. Wendell 
W. Fertig… Colonel Fertig's 24,000-man force controlled most of the island, keeping 
the Japanese confined to their garrison towns and to the major roads. The guerrillas 
were prepared to participate actively in future actions.”2698 The Japanese leaders on 
Mindanao had allowed themselves to believe that the earlier operations in 
Zamboanga by the U.S. 41st Division “constituted the extent of American plans for 
Mindanao.”2699 
Eichelberger divided Major General Franklin Sibert’s X Corps into two assault 
forces for Mindanao. Navy Task Force 78.2 would deliver the first, with the 24th 
Division, near Malabang on 17 April to secure an advance airfield. On 22 April, the 
second, with the 31st Division, would land farther south near Parang, to secure 
Highway 1 to Davao.  Before the landings, however, Fertig reported that, with 
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support from Colonel Clayton Jerome's Marine aviators from Dipolog, his guerrillas 
had driven off a Japanese battalion and secured Malabang and its airfield.2700 
Eichelberger’s forces changed plans to exploit Fertig’s accomplishment.  
The Japanese did not oppose the 17 April landing and the 24th Division drove 
on Highway 1 to secure the Mindanao River as a line of supply. The 31st Division 
landed on 22 April as the Marine Air Group 24 arrived at Malabang. The 24th 
Division’s rapid sprint of over 115 miles caught Morozumi’s force in Davao off guard 
and oriented towards the sea. It was overwhelmed on 27 April. On 3 May, the 24th 
Division entered Davao City. The Japanese would, however, fight fiercely around 
Davao over the next two months. 
On Luzon, I Corps continued to push northeast from Manila towards Bambang against heavy 
resistance from Yamashita’s Shobu Group. The corps found its units could advance north along the 
Lingayen Gulf landing more easily. Krueger sent the 33rd and 37th Divisions inland and, in Andradé’s 
words, “with the aid of air strikes and guerrilla harassment, wore down the defenders until they were on the 
verge of starvation” and captured Baguio on 27 April.2701 Meanwhile in the south the Americans encircled 
the remaining Simbu Group in Bicol near Lake Taal and then cut to the east coast. While the 11th Airborne 
Division isolated the peninsula, the 1st Cavalry Division “with substantial support from guerrilla units,” 
turned north to seize Infanta by 25 May.2702 
For the Japanese, life in the mountains of Luzon became a horror. Soldier 
Nishihara Takamaro recalled, “Passing through the jungle, I reached a hill. As far as I 
could see there were dead bodies, clothed only in dirty, worn loincloths… Spending 
every day among dead bodies makes one doubt whether on can know where the 
dividing line between life and death is. One’s thoughts become hazy and 
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disoriented.”2703 Without food or medicine, the men died even without combat. 
Takamaro said, “a fellow soldier whose name I didn’t know came crawling over to 
me. Taking off his clothes he bared his pointed rear end. It had become bluish-green. 
‘Buddy, if I die, go ahead and eat this part,’ he said, touching his scrawny rear end 
with his bony finger.”2704 
On the last day of April, Fertig accompanied Eichelberger in a B-17 bomber 
on an aerial tour of Mindanao. He took the opportunity to make a request: “Use of 
guerrilla troops by attachment to U.S. units is not utilizing our capabilities 
efficiently. I have requested that units revert to me for tactical command.”2705  
Eichelberger was noncommittal.  
On 3 May, the 31st Division reached Kibawe on the northern end of the Japanese line of 
communication with Davao City. That trail was a priority target for Eighth Army. “Inspection of the trail, 
however,” noted Lofgren, “soon reinforced Colonel Fertig's opinion that the trail's importance and 
capabilities had been vastly overrated.”2706 Eichelberger opted to limit operations there to a reconnaissance-
in-force and sent the division north on 11 May. The reconnaissance covered the line in eighteen days. “Yet 
even with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, it took the 167th Infantry until 30 June to move five miles 
beyond the Pulangi River and seize the Japanese trail-force headquarters at Pinamola.”2707 Skirmishing 
along the trail cost the American regiment 80 men killed and 180 wounded, while counting for almost 400 
Japanese dead. 
The 24th Division renewed its attack on 17 May in coordination with Fertig's 
guerrillas. Intense Japanese fires slowed the advance but artillery and Marine close 
air support favored the Americans. “Beginning on 29 May, the 19th Infantry and 
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Filipino guerrillas caved in the Japanese eastern flank, seizing the town of Mandong 
on 15 June and the eastern bank of the Davao River, which flows from north to south 
into Davao City.”2708 Fertig commented in his diary, “It seems that so many break 
their heads against the stone walls of chance and destiny, who could live much more 
easily and certainly more amiably if they did not try to build their own world to 
their own little desires. Perhaps the Jungle has taught me something.”2709 The 
Japanese 100th Division position collapsed and they retreated. The 24th Division lost 
350 men killed and 1,615 wounded; the Japanese had lost about 4,500 killed.2710 
Fertig continued to press for the inclusion of his men in a new national 
military. On 17 May, he wrote, “I learned much about the proposed Philippine Army 
but it does not appear that much can or will be done until Osmeña returns from the 
States with definite authority.” 2711  (Osmeña, of course, had returned with 
MacArthur). Twelve days later Fertig talked with Charles Smith and noted, “He feels 
that the present Commonwealth Govt cannot stand, that they are definitely 
interested in running American capital out of the Philippines, that Independence is 
an accomplished fact; that this is no place for the American after it is all over.” 2712 
On 2 June, Fertig met with Pendatun in Dansalan. He learned that Pendatun 
had orders to go to Cotabato to help reorganize Mindanao’s civil government. Fertig 
left the meeting in the belief that Pendatun would suggest he be named Chief of Staff 
of the new Philippine Army.2713 “I don’t know,” wrote Fertig, “Someone must take 
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hold of things if order is to be brought out of chaos. The only place that I would 
serve with the PA is in command. In any other position, I should find myself 
outmaneuvered by a cabal, with whick [sic] I could not compete.”2714 
Fertig was deceived. There would be no place for him or the other American 
guerrilla leaders in the post war Philippine Army or government. The Filipinos 
appreciated their contribution, but were determined to form their own government. 
The resistance movement had transformed them from a weak confederation of 
separate communities into a people sharing a national vision and a desire to govern 
themselves.  
Even if there had been a place for the guerrilla leaders, they were not 
physically able to occupy it. They had suffered physical and psychological damage 
that would take years to repair. After nearly three years of guerrilla life, Ramsey 
recalled, “I was down to less than a hundred pounds, and so weak that I could no 
longer support the weight of my .45 around my waist. Instead I began to carry a 
little snub-nosed .38 in a belt slung over my shoulder, and even that became a 
burden.”2715 Blackburn endured malaria for “nearly the whole damn war. I was 
always getting it.”2716  Similarly spent, Volckmann would move on to an assignment 
in Washington but “spent more time at Walter Reed Army Hospital than he did at 
the Personnel Division offices.”2717 
 Ramsey’s experience serves as a poignant example of the impact of disease 
and malnutrition upon the guerrillas. He weighed ninety-three pounds and doctors 
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determined he suffered from malaria, amoebic dysentery, anemia, and acute 
malnutrition and “general nervous collapse,” and quickly reassigned him to a desk 
job at Sixth Army headquarters for a chance to get well.2718  In May, he collapsed 
getting out of his cot one morning and had to be hospitalized. One day after 
returning to work he was doing paperwork when he noticed the words on a paper 
blur and his hand shaking. He recalled, “The spirit dissolved within me. It was 
coming, and there was nothing I could do about it except to withdraw into that 
pinpoint back in my brain from which I watched in safety while my nervous system 
fell to pieces again.”2719 He later explained, “I looked at the poor thing my body had 
become, and at the shambles of my spirit, and I understood that this was a war that 
was beginning, not ending. It was a war to recover myself, to redefine my being out 
the experiences I had had, to make sense of the very senselessness of the war itself. I 
was in chaos, collapse, splintered from myself. Yet I had not surrendered.”2720   
Ironically, many who worked with the Japanese avoided punishment. On 5 
June, Fertig met with Judge Saguin in Oroquieta: “He told me that when he arrived in 
Leyte, at the call of the President, it soon became evident that the people who had 
spent the war in the U.S. were very lenient in their treatment of collaborators. Soon 
it appeared to him that they were considering those who remained behind to live 
with the Japs, as the real heroes of the occupation.”2721 The puppet governor of 
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Leyte, Bernardo Torres of Leyte, faced a trial for treason but “the decision was so 
near a deadlock that they declared it ‘no trial.’”2722 
Meanwhile many of the wrong people faced punishment. On the streets of 
Manila, Adalia Marquez saw a man she recognized as a guerrilla detained by MPs 
while a man helping the MPs she knew was a collaborator. The unfortunate 
detainee, Sunga, explained he had been framed by one of his wartime enemies. “The 
only bitterness in my heart,” he said, “is that these Americans are misinformed 
about many of us. Naturally there are many personal grudges to satisfy, and these 
people don’t know anything except what they are told by stool pigeons. It is possible 
we will be set free when the Americans are satisfied with our defense, but the harm 
of imprisonment is already done.”2723 Adalia went to an American Counter-
Intelligence Corps officer, Lieutenant William Hartnett, to help sort out 
collaboration cases.  
Hartnett was a good man and tried to do the right things. Yet he surprised 
Adalia and revealed cultural differences when he innocuously explained why he 
liked the Philippines: “Why, the girls here paint their lips, their finger nails and even 
their toe nails, just as in the States. After those jungle days when we saw nothing but 
thick-lipped, wiry-haired, fuzzy wuzzies, your women here look like queens!”2724 
Adalia recalled, “I did not know whether or not to be flattered, although we 
apparently had the benefit of the comparison.”2725  
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The war was winding down. On 22 June, the day after fighting on Okinawa 
ended, Fertig attended a gala dinner with Admirals Halsey, Combs, Carney and 
Struebel and Generals Irving, Bruce, Byers, and Eichelberger. He heard praise for the 
Philippine guerrillas: “Admiral Halsey remarked that the shipping report on the 
movement of the Jap fleet in June 1944 helped to catch them off guard.”2726  Since 
the end of March, the Allies controlled all the areas of Luzon that had any strategic 
or economic significance. On 30 June, as the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth Army, 
Eichelberger told MacArthur all Japanese organized resistance had ended.  
Mopping up continued in the jungles until the end of the war. The Japanese 
had lost almost all of their 230,000 military personnel on Luzon, and about 70,000 
on Leyte, while the American reported 10,380 killed, 36,550 wounded, and over 
93,400 noncombat casualties, including 260 dead, mostly from disease.2727 On 
Mindanao the Japanese lost more than 10,000 killed in combat, about 8,000 more 
non-battle deaths, and some 22,000 who surrendered while U.S. forces lost 820 
killed and 2,880 wounded.2728 General Yamashita and about 50,500 of his men 
surrendered only after the close of hostilities on 15 August. Akira Fujiwara 
estimated that 400,000 of the 498,000 Japanese deaths in the Philippines resulted 
from starvation.2729 Reviewing the inadequate Japanese logistical systems, Edward 
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Drea commented, “the army’s incompetence killed more Japanese soldier’s than did 
the allies.”2730 
Airpower, artillery and superior logistics were major factors in the American 
victory. Some estimates hold that for every pound of supplies the Japanese delivered 
to each of their soldiers, the Americans supplied two tons to theirs.2731 “Another 
reason for success,” noted Stephen Lofgren, “was the great assistance that organized 
Filipino guerrilla forces provided. In today's parlance, the guerrillas constituted a 
valuable ‘force multiplier’ for Eichelberger's units. Before MacArthur’s return, 
guerrillas harassed Japanese units and provided valuable intelligence about 
Japanese dispositions and the relative suitability of landing beaches. After each 
landing, the guerrillas eagerly fought alongside the Americans and pursued the 
Japanese throughout the island interiors.”2732 
In a camp holding Japanese POWs on 15 August, Private First Class 
Shimodaira Tadao recalled, “At around eight o’clock Japan’s surrender was formally 
announced. Inside our tent we all faced north and bowed in silence. I couldn’t stop 
my flowing tears… This was fate, it was destiny.”2733 
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The narrative of the Philippine struggle from 1942 through 1944 is a synthesis of 
three distinctive conflicts fought by the Filipinos, Japanese, and Americans. Each side 
fought for different objectives in different ways in the face of different challenges yet 
their actions and reactions were interdependent. They each responded to and caused 
military, economic, political, cultural, and environmental changes. It is in the aggregate 
of these changes and responses that we discover the nature of their war and resistance. 
For the Filipinos, the war was one phase of both a longer fight against foreign 
occupation and influence and an inner struggle for social justice and identity. When the 
Japanese invaded, Filipinos spontaneously rose up in numerous isolated groups to initiate 
an asymmetrical fight against their occupiers. Many chose to invite American expatriates 
and refugee soldiers to lead or assist their efforts with their military expertise and 
possible arms, supplies and recognition from MacArthur. They found that the Americans 
could also provided neutral leadership behind which politically and socially divided 
Filipinos could unite. Still some guerrilla leaders like Macario Peralta chose not to recruit 
Americans so as to maintain a Filipino identity for postwar independence. The choice to 
incorporate Americans pr not signaled a new and emergent Philippine agency. 
The Filipinos’ initial spontaneous enthusiasm for resistance waned as the months 
and years passed and sapped their faith in MacArthur’s promised return. Indeed, most 
Filipinos either simply endured the occupation or even collaborated with the Japanese.2734 
The Japanese administration however proved remarkably incapable of exploiting this 
                                                        
2734 Some Filipinos, like others in Japan’s southern conquests, looked “to the Japanese as ‘brothers’ who 
would help free them from the white colonials.” Dower, 230. 
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situation. For every act of cooperation purchased with offers of amnesty or independence, 
the policies of occupation provoked greater resistance. Driving out the Americans 
crippled the Islands’ economic foundations and led to widespread joblessness, inflation 
and black markets that undermined legal authority. Japanese efforts to exploit Philippine 
resources brought popular resentment and provided targets for guerrilla attacks. Their 
decision to retain in power members of the existing Philippine government exposed 
Japanese policies to obstructionism. Practices of cultural subjugation ranging from slaps 
to rapes further infuriated Filipinos and turned them to the guerrillas’ side.  
To the Japanese, the occupation of the Philippines was a test of the ideas 
embodied in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Once they had conquered the 
Islands, their war was elsewhere. They had decided even before the invasion to treat acts 
of resistance as matters of law and order to be handled by the Philippine government. The 
Japanese rotated first line combat units out of the Islands as quickly as possible to higher 
priority areas of operations and used second tier conscripts for garrison duties. Unless 
they enjoyed overwhelming numbers, the garrison troops evidenced reluctance to chase 
guerrillas into the jungles or to operate at night. Their reliance on rigid tactics enabled 
increasingly able guerrillas to develop effective countermeasures. As a result, local 
Japanese commanders often accepted de facto truces that ceded control of rural areas to 
guerrillas and left much of the urban counterinsurgent efforts to the Kempeitai military 
police whose harsh methods increased hostility towards the Japanese across wide kinship 
networks.  
Nothing proved more counterproductive to the Japanese occupation than the 
unanticipated impact on food supplies caused by their policies. Before the war, the 
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Philippines had depended on imported diary, flour and vegetables from the United States 
and meat from Australia.2735  The invasion severed those imports without replacement. 
Japanese efforts to exploit Philippine rice production, combined with the demands to feed 
the occupying army and the failed effort to grow Formosan hortai rice, brought famine in 
many areas. The price of rice in Manila rose two thousand percent between 1941 and 
1945.2736 As Lizzie Collingham noted, “The wealthy went out into the countryside to 
barter jewelry, clothes and furniture for rice; the poor were so desperate that they ate 
foul-smelling rice recovered from the polluted bottom of Manila Bay.”2737   Starving 
people flocked to guerrilla groups like the Hukbalahaps who managed to maintain ample 
supplies of rice in their areas.   
The existence of the guerrillas discouraged the Filipinos in government from 
meaningful collaboration. Japanese General Akira Muto had served in China, Singapore, 
Sumatra and the Netherland East Indies before arriving for duty in the Philippines in 
October 1944. He found “that in all other colonial areas occupied by the Japanese during 
the war the conquerors found the native populations to be acquiescent, if not co-
operative. Only in the Philippines did they encounter fanatical resistance, despite the 
Japanese device of setting up an ‘independent’ government in the islands, which 
government had formally declared war on the United States.” 2738   Although 80,000 
Southeast Asians from India, Malaya and other countries served in pro-Japanese military 
forces, President Jose Laurel persuaded the Japanese that forcing Filipinos to serve in an 
                                                        
2735 Malcolm, 12, 27 and 243. 
2736 Collingham, 243. 
2737 Ibid. 
2738 Reel, 106 
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army against the United States would lead to a civil war.2739   The militancy of the 
Filipino guerrillas across the Islands provided convincing weight to his argument.  
For a long time the American high command was largely ignorant of these events. 
After Corregidor’s fall, the MacArthur spent months completely cut off from the 
Philippines and blind to the resistance movement that developed without him. The 
USAFFE soldiers remaining free in the Islands acted independently of MacArthur’s 
command. Horan, Thorp and other early leaders that had fought behind Japanese lines in 
support of USAFFE’s operations became free agents with Wainwright’s surrender. 
Within the year this first wave of American guerrilla leaders collapsed against the forces 
of fatigue, illness and effective Japanese counterguerrilla operations. Volckmann, Fertig, 
Ramsey, Lapham and the other latter American guerrilla leaders who spent that first year 
ill or otherwise out of the conflict found themselves with time to think about their 
situation and the choices they faced. Motivated by Filipino sacrifices, these men joined 
the resistance more for the cause than for MacArthur.  
Only gradually were some guerrilla leaders able to make contact by radio with 
MacArthur’s headquarters. He then began a deliberate program to verify, support and 
exploit the guerrilla movement. Through adroit grants of recognition, deliveries of 
supplies by submarine, and the promise of his return, MacArthur began attracting 
guerrillas to cooperate with his command. He demurred however when guerrillas asked 
for help to fight the Japanese and instead ordered them to restrict their activities to 
intelligence gathering operations out of fear that guerrilla attacks would only bring harsh 
retaliation upon Filipino civilians. For guerrillas who felt that popular support 
                                                        
2739 See the Indian National Army and the Burma Independence Army Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, 
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 294. 
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necessitated demonstrations of military action against the Japanese, such orders could not 
be wholly obeyed. This difference in purpose added to a reluctance in MacArthur’s 
headquarters to fully embrace guerrillas who were known to execute prisoners, 
assassinate suspected collaborators, confiscate civilian properties, and other practices 
contrary to the laws of war. To compensate, MacArthur built a shadow organization of 
operatives that worked parallel to the existing guerrilla groups. 
In part because of MacArthur’s orders, the Philippine guerrillas had less than 
decisive impact on the Japanese army as reckoned by traditional military measures. The 
Japanese military suffered a reported 498,600 casualties in the Philippines during the 
war.2740  Their conquest of the Islands (December 1941-May 1942) produced 11,225 of 
these casualties while another 419,912 were reported during the Allied invasion (October 
1944-September 1945, with eighty percent of the casualties from starvation or 
disease).2741   These numbers leave 67,463 casualties suffered by the Japanese in the 
Philippines during the period of occupation. Even assuming an extremely high eighty 
percent non-battle casualty rate, these numbers leave roughly 13,500 Japanese casualties 
resulting from combat against the guerrillas. 2742   History indicates that even 
                                                        
2740 The Australia-Japan Research Project cites the Senshi Sōsho (the official military gistory of Imperial 
Japan). Source: Australia-Japan Research Project at 
http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/AJRP2.nsf/530e35f7e2ae7707ca2571e3001a112d/e7daa03b9084ad56ca257209
000a85f7?OpenDocument accessed 3 February 2018. 
2741 The total casualties for the invasion and return come second hand from the Senshi Sōsho through 
Wikipedia. Total losses during the invasion were: 4,130 killed; 6,808 wounded, 287 missing. Total 
Regional Casualties during the Allied return: Army. 377,500; Navy 121,100; Total 498,600.  
2742 Finding a battle/non-battle casualty rate for the Japanese army is problematic. Required statistics do not 
exist.  In most of their battles in the Pacific even their sick and wounded fought to the death. In China they 
were known to kill their sick and wounded before leaving them. During WW2, the American Army 
suffered 234,874 battle deaths and 83,400 non-battle deaths (3:1). A better comparison for the Japanese 
fighting the Philippine guerrillas, during the Spanish-American War the U.S. Army suffered 369 combat 
deaths to 2,061 non-combat (about 1:5). Nese F. DeBruyne, American War and Military Operations 
Casualties: Lists and Statistics (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 26 April 2017), Table 
1. “Principal Wars or Conflicts in Which the United States Participated U.S. Military Personnel Serving 
and Casualties (1775-1991), ”1-2. 
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counterinsurgency operations that did not result in combat would still have caused a large 
number of casualties.  Combat against the Philippine guerrillas may therefore have cost 
the Japanese from between one understrength division (13,500 men or 23 infantry 
battalions) to four-and-a-half full divisions (67,500 men or nearly 113 battalions).  
A loss of even 67,500 soldiers would still not have had a critical impact on the 
overall Japanese war effort. The Japanese army began the war with 51 divisions: 27 
committed to China; 400,000 soldiers in 24 divisions available for offenses in the 
Pacific.2743  A loss of 67,500 men would have constituted a significant seventeen percent 
of this early force, but during the war the Japanese army grew to five million men and 
145 divisions (though of increasingly lower quality). The Japanese managed to garrison 
the Philippines with between 22 and 24 infantry battalions, the equivalent of one first line 
division. 2744  Throughout the war therefore, counterinsurgency garrison forces and 
casualties in the Philippines cost the Japanese military somewhere between two to five 
and a half divisions, about one to four percent of their army’s final strength.  
Beyond these numbers, however, the guerrillas impaired the Japanese war effort 
in significant ways. They denied economic exploitation of the Islands by sabotaging 
mines, assassinating managers, chasing away workers, disrupting transportation, and 
helping the U.S. Navy sink ships. Their efforts contributed to a significantly lower 
transfer of goods and payments from the Philippines to Japan than from other Southeast 
Asian territories.2745  Iron ore imports from the Philippines to Japan, for example, fell to 
                                                        
2743 Phillip Jowett, The Japanese Army 1931-1945 (1) (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 7. 
2744 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 45-56. 
2745 Between 1942 and 1945, Thailand’s payments and goods sent to Japan averaged 6% of GDP at wartime 
rates currency exchange rates and a little over 9% at 1937 rates. Payments by Indochina rose from 9.1% of 
GDP in 1932 to 25.4% in 1945. Indonesia rates fell from a high of 11.2% in 1943 as U.S Navy interdiction 
of sea lanes took effect. Gregg Huff and Shinobu Majima, Financing Japan’s World War II Occupation of 
Southeast Asia, 6-9. http://eh.net/eha/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Huffetal.pdf 
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just ten percent of prewar levels.2746  The guerrillas helped compel the Japanese to change 
their priorities from economic exploitation of the Islands to using them as a means for 
safeguarding shipping routes, but even there guerrilla-supported coast watchers helped 
sink nearly 800 Japanese vessels in Philippine waters.2747   
Perhaps the guerrillas’ most important achievement was the part they played in 
MacArthur’s winning argument for returning to the Philippines. At the strategy 
conference in Hawaii in July 1944, the American military consensus was to bypass the 
Islands and advance on Formosa. MacArthur countered that the United States could 
expect no support from Formosa’s population while “we could expect every possible 
assistance from the Filipinos against the hated Japanese occupation forces. In some areas, 
indeed, powerful Filipino guerrilla groups had already made substantial progress towards 
outing the conqueror.”2748 The knowledge that Filipinos were fighting and dying while 
waiting for America’s promised return significantly influenced President Roosevelt’s 
decision on strategy in the Pacific.  
The Japanese welcomed a decisive battle in the Philippines in hopes of achieving 
some measure of victory that would persuade the Americans to negotiate an end to the 
war. The guerrillas played a key role in denying this hope. They conducted critical pre-
invasion reconnaissance, sabotaged Japanese lines of communications and supplies, 
screened the flanks of invading forces, conducted vital public affairs coordination, and 
even fought as conventional forces at times. Moreover, their service as guides for 
MacArthur’s columns repeatedly led to faster and more secure Allied movements. 
                                                        
2746 Dower, 230. 
2747 Tom Bennet, World War II Wrecks, Philippines (Milford Haven, Wales: Happy Fish Publications, 
2010), 1-2. 
2748 Potter, Nimitz, 318. 
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With the support of the guerrillas, MacArthur delivered a crushing blow to the 
Japanese army. A total of 1,140,429 Japanese military personnel died in combat between 
1937 and 1945; 485,000 against U.S. forces.2749  Reportedly 255,795 of these died (out of 
381,550 total casualties) during MacArthur’s campaign to retake the Islands – 47 percent 
of all Japanese military personnel killed by U.S. forces and nearly 20 percent of all 
Japanese combat deaths during the war.2750  Another 115,755 surrendered – more than 
twice the total number of Japanese soldiers who surrendered everywhere else during the 
entire war. The defense of the Islands also cost Japan nearly all of its remaining combat 
aircraft and naval vessels. Because of the guerrillas, Japan got a decisive battle in the 
Philippines but not with the outcome they desired. 
The guerrilla campaign in the Philippines during World War II also presents 
significant challenges to current theories of irregular warfare and counterinsurgencies. 
This field today is framed by Maoist doctrine that defines guerrilla warfare in terms of 
revolutionary political means and ends. As Mao explained: “Guerrilla operations during 
the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount 
feature” but “there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, 
because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision.”2751  He outlined three 
phases of revolutionary warfare: a base phase to educate and organize the people; a 
guerrilla phase to harass the enemy and buy time to build regular forces; and a final 
conventional phase in which newly built regular forces defeat the existing institutions of 
power.  The three phases could operate in different areas simultaneously. Cold War 
                                                        
2749 Dower, 218. 
2750  Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (The United States Army in World War II: The War in 
the Pacific) (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1933), 694,  
2751 Mao, 56. 
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theorists studying Maoist ‘wars of national liberation’ fit their observations of guerrilla 
warfare into this model. 
Mao’s model for revolutionary war fails to explain the guerrilla war in the 
Philippines during World War II. In general, they did not fight for social change but for 
military objectives. As one Philippine guerrilla leader explained: “Our job isn’t to start a 
revolution, it’s to prepare for MacArthur’s invasion. We’re military men, not 
politicians.”2752  Even the political prewar social revolutionaries joined in a United Front 
that became the Hukbalahap guerrilla movement could not follow Mao’s formula.2753  
Under the direction of veterans from the Communist army forces in China, the Huks 
began organizing forces suited to a transition for conventional decisive operations.2754  
However, when MacArthur announced, “I shall return!” he undercut any such 
development. There would be neither the time nor the rationale for developing 
revolutionary conventional forces capable of overthrowing either the Japanese or the 
Philippine government. MacArthur would restore to power prewar elites. As Colleen 
Woods noted, for “the Huks and their supporters” this meant “the return of a deeply 
unequal colonial society and a government that would disproportionately serve the 
interests of the wealthiest or most politically connected class of Filipinos.”2755  
The Philippine guerrilla resistance is better explained by the theories published a 
hundred years before Mao by Carl von Clausewitz. As an officer in the Prussian army 
defeated by Napoleon and influenced by the example of Spain from 1807 to 1814, 
Clausewitz meditated on the possibilities of a popular armed resistance against an 
                                                        
2752 Ramsey and Rivele, 132-133. 
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2754 Davis, 38. 
2755 Woods, 6. 
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invader. In Chapter 26 of Book Six of On War, “The People in Arms,” Clausewitz 
concluded that, except in extraordinary circumstances, such resistance alone was unlikely 
to defeat a conventional enemy army. “To be realistic,” he wrote, “one must therefore 
think of a general insurrection within the framework of a war conducted by the regular 
army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan.”2756  In the Philippines, that regular 
army was the American army and the all-encompassing plan was MacArthur’s.  
Clausewitz argued that a people in arms served as “a natural auxiliary” to an army “in 
areas just outside the [active] theater of war – where the invader will not appear in 
strength – in order to deny him these areas altogether” and to wear down the enemy until 
such time as when the army can deliver the decisive counterstroke.2757  This was the 
purpose for which MacArthur sought to gain control of the organic Philippine guerrilla 
movement. Clausewitz thus not only provides insight into the conduct of the Philippine 
guerrillas, he reminds us that Maoist revolutionary doctrine is but a subset of a larger 
field of guerrilla warfare theory. 
MacArthur’s operations also produced significant political impact on the 
Philippines. The rise and consolidation of power by local guerillas, slowly linked together 
by his command, provided the framework that turned the previous collection of islands 
and peoples into a new Philippine nation. When MacArthur left the Philippines in 1942, 
turmoil reigned across the Islands. As a U.S. Army history noted: “Gradually, however, 
strong men emerged who formed the guerrilla bands into semi-military organizations. 
The leader of each band, who was generally an ex-member of the armed forces, gave 
himself a ‘bamboo commission,’ usually considerably higher than the one he had hitherto 
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possessed.” 2758  Through contact, recognition and supplies, MacArthur shaped the 
competition for power among the local guerrillas.  He chose reliable old order Filipinos 
like Ruperto K. Kangleon over more politically radical competitors like Blas E. Miranda 
on Leyte.2759  Through tenuous connections with Thorp, Volckmann, Ramsey and others, 
he helped isolate the Huks on Luzon. By supporting Fertig, he effectively prevented 
separate Moro interests from seizing power on Mindanao. By these efforts and many 
others, MacArthur reinforced selected guerrillas who then established local governments 
united his influence. 
The war provided a decisive phase in the long-running internal Philippine 
political contest. Emerging guerrilla leaders took the opportunity to eliminate competitors 
for power. Lapham wrote: “Some writers have complained, after the fact, that we 
guerrillas were inhumanly hard on barrio and town officials who were caught in 
excruciating dilemmas. I cannot deny this; I can only remind them guerrilla warfare is not 
a sporting contest among gentlemen who observe Marquis of Queensberry rules. It is a 
mean, dirty, brutal struggle to the death, devoid of any principle or sentiment save to 
survive and win.”2760  As reported in Bicol, the guerrillas battles “over matters of area 
command almost exceeds any fighting against the Japanese.” 2761   This environment 
enabled ambitious politicians to eliminate rivals and build new power bases. Ramon 
Durano, for example, influenced Fenton to execute a number of his political adversaries 
on Cebu and emerged as a dominant post-war figure. Others, like Fermin Caram on 
Panay, tried to use the Japanese to take down their rivals. In this war the guerrilla war 
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settled many existing contests for power and generally left those allied to MacArthur and 
the new government in the strongest positions. 
This period of war and resistance shaped Philippine politics for decades 
afterwards. MacArthur had skillfully prevented any single resistance leader from 
assuming power across the Philippines and thereby set the stage for a return of the prewar 
elites to power. He brought Quezon’s exiled former vice president and Nacionalista 
stalwart Sergio Osmeña, Jr., back as president of the new Philippines. In 1946, 
MacArthur’s agent in the occupation government, Manuel A. Roxas of the Liberal Party, 
became president. After a grant of amnesty to nearly all collaborators, occupation 
administration president Jose Laurel won election to the senate. In 1953 former guerrilla 
Ramon Magsaysay won the presidency and returned the Nacionalista party to power. 
Fellow Nacionalista Carlos P. Garcia, a BOFOR guerrilla veteran, followed him in office. 
Liberal Diosdado Macapagal, a former collaborationist aide to Laurel, won the 
presidency on 1961. Four years later Ferdinand Marcos won the presidency and would 
retain power largely on his mythic reputation as a guerrilla leader. He was finally 
replaced in 1986 in a revolt led by Corazon Aquino, collaborator Benigno Ramos’ 
daughter-in law.  
Guerrilla veterans and their kin will likely continue to influence future 
generations of Philippine politics, even if the number of Filipinos who had been guerrillas 
remains a point of contention.2762  After the war roughly 1.3 million Filipinos claimed to 
have served in over 1,000 guerrilla units, but the U.S. Army authorities would recognize 
                                                        
2762 In 1941, the Philippine Islands were home to 16,356,000 people. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Reports of the Sixteenth Census, 2,“Table 
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only 260,715 guerrilla veterans in 277 units.2763  (By one estimate, 33,000 guerrillas died 
during the war.2764) The claims of guerrilla veteran status by 7.8 percent of the total 
population may have seemed extreme, yet the Army’s recognition of only 1.6 percent of 
population as guerrilla veterans seems low when one considers that about 11 percent of 
Americans served in the U.S. military during the war – and their country had not been 
invaded.2765  While some Filipinos no doubt submitted false claims in hopes of getting 
veterans’ benefits, the vast majority had likely supported the guerrillas in some manner 
and many were doubt ignored for reasons of routine bureaucratic inefficiency.  
The price of resistance was extremely high. Estimates of up to 900,000 civilians 
and 57,000 Filipino soldiers had been killed.2766  U.S. Army records counted 131,028 
Americans and Filipinos “murdered, starved and tortured to death in the Philippines.”2767  
The war had left the survivors, especially in the Manila, greatly dependent on both their 
government and the Americans. Manila suffered battle damage only equaled by Warsaw 
and only Berlin and Stalingrad lost more than Manila’s 100,000 citizens killed in 
battle.2768  “Large parts of the city had been deliberately and methodically demolished,” 
                                                        
2763 Larry S. Schmidt, American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement on Mindanao During the 
Japanese Occupation, Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff 
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World War II Museum, “Research Starters: World Wide Deaths in World War II,” 
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A.V.H. Hartendorp observed, “and what the Japanese demolition had begun, American 
artillery had had to carry on.”2769 More than 200,000 city residents were left homeless.  
Suffering spanned the Islands. During the war, real per capita Filipino income fell 
by half.  GDP per capita fell by 60 percent (compared to Thailand’s drop of 15 percent, 
Indochina by 35 percent).2770 Years of shortages and famine had devastated large areas. 
As Collingham noted, “By 1944 it was not uncommon to see the corpses of those who 
had starved lying in the streets.”2771  It would take five years for the GDP to reach prewar 
levels and even longer for vital industries like sugar production to recover.  
Women especially suffered during the occupation. They endured threats and acts 
of sexual exploitation. Hundreds of thousands of women had to provide for families in 
the absence of men who served in the army or with the guerrillas, were imprisoned, or 
suffered debilitating injury or death. They were also subject to the imposition of cultural 
system that sought to diminish their place in a traditionally matriarchal society. The 
Filipinas fought back against their occupiers in a number of ways. Thousands served vital 
roles within the resistance as spies, couriers, administrative and support agents, or 
fighters. Their actions comprise a major part of this history and secured their place in 
society and politics. 
Many Filipinos would never recover from the hunger, homelessness and other 
hardships caused by the war and now sought meaning in their great, shared sacrifice.  As 
Tomas Confesor argued, Filipinos had earned the right to together decide “what system 
of government should stand here and what ways of life, systems of social organizations 
                                                        
2769 Hartendorp, 604. 
2770 “Between 1938 and 1946, income in the Philippines shrank by more than half. The combined income 




and code of morals should govern our existence.”2772  The war had changed the basis for 
such decisions. What had been a population identified by kinship networks, tribes and 
localities had become a network of local power brokers united in their newfound identity 
as Filipinos. 
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